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In the early twentieth century, the modernists problematized ornament in their 
refashioning of architecture for the industrial age. Today, architects are formulating 
different responses to image and its (re)production in the information age. In both 
discourses of ornament and image, surfaces are often the perpetrators: visual 
boundaries that facilitate false appearances, imprisoning humanity in a shadowy 
cave of illusion. Such views follow a familiar metaphysical model characterized by 
the opposition between inside and outside and the opaque boundary that acts as a 
barrier. This model determines the traditional (Platonic) philosophical approach 
that follows a distinct hierarchical order and a perpendicular movement of thought 
that seeks to penetrate appearances in order to arrive at the essence of things.  
This thesis deploys Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy to advance a different 
understanding of surface, image and appearance in architecture. Using the Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum as a catalyst, the thesis argues that many of the concepts with 
which commentators and critics analyse contemporary architecture follow models 
of thought that consider surfaces and their effects as secondary categories. Given the 
significance of visual (re)production and communication for contemporary society, 
the thesis proposes a different model based on surface as that which simultaneously 
produces, connects and separates image and reality. This non-hierarchical approach 
is inspired by surficial philosophy, which relates to Earth, to geology and topology, 
conjuring up a diversity of concepts from the thickness of the crust to the smooth 
fluidity of the seas. The result is an unfamiliar, polemical model of thought that 
does not define surface as a limit or barrier, rather a medium, a pliable space of 
smooth mixture. In this model, difference is not in the opposition between the two 
sides of a boundary line, rather it occurs upon and within the surficial landscape 
that consumes categories, promoting nomadic movements of thought that offer 
greater flexibility towards creativity and new possibilities.  
In surficial thought, images and appearances are not artificial copies of an 
originary reality, rather they possess a unique reality of their own. This approach 
allows architectural imagery to be theorised as a positive surfacing of architecture 





The motivation for this research can be traced back to thoughts, questions and ideas 
developed during six years of immersion in architectural design and theory at the 
University of Edinburgh, and also to the first hand experience of, and an embedded 
fascination with the intricately ornamented traditional architecture of Iran. One 
particular theme of interest was the poetic interpretation of art in Iranian culture, 
which manifests itself in architecture through the elaborate surfacing of sacred 
monuments with complex patterns and colourful motifs. This exhaustive 
ornamentation in traditional architecture became a source of intrigue for the author, 
particularly when in theories of modern architecture ornamentation was deplored 
as excessive, superficial or even associated with crime.  
In many cultures and civilisations, the most significant architectural 
monuments are often distinguishable by their labour-intensive design and 
construction processes, necessitated by a greater attention to detail and a desire for 
the beautification of architecture. In the case of Iranian architecture, sacred 
buildings are particularly noticeable, not just because of their monumental scale, but 
also because of the exhaustive decoration that seems to embellish every surface of 
the building. In such architecture, surface ornamentation is responsible for 
conveying the building’s significance, but more importantly, it often communicates 
a significant message, becoming both a reflection of the society’s belief system and 
also a reinforcement of it through architectural surfaces.   
In the case of Safavid2 mosques for example, the complex geometrical 
patterns that adorn the building are in fact representations of paradise or the 
Garden of Eden.3 However, since no art can accurately represent the divine garden, 
such ornamental depictions become clear abstractions, expressing their difference 
clearly. Thus, the preference for geometric depiction instead of figurative 
representation becomes an indication of submission and acceptance:
                                                      
2 The Safavid Dynasty ruled Iran from 1501-1722 forming the greatest Iranian empire since 
the Islamic Conquest of Persia. They established Shia Islam as the main religion for their 
empire marking a significant turning point both for Iran and Islamic history in general. 
3 See Nader Ardalan and Laleh Bakhtiar, The Sense of Unity: The Sufi Tradition in Persian 




submission to the might of God4 and acceptance of divine superiority. It is therefore 
possible to argue that the makers of such architecture saw their art as inherently 
different from what it alluded to, namely divine creation. For this reason, such art 
was not judged according to how closely it resembled what it represented, rather it 
was valued according to its own immanent system.  
Much of the complex patterns of Islamic ornamentation are generated by 
the various arrangements of the circle as a symbol of the universe. The centre of the 
circle symbolises the divine creator, around which his creations rotate.5 This 
geometric abstraction of the universe shifts the emphasis from accuracy of 
representation to the creation of a symbolic system capable of generating infinite 
ornamental patterns, which are all connected in that they express the same concept.  
For the author, such concepts hinted towards a different approach to 
appearance in architecture, one in which surface ornamentation was not a 
representation of reality, nor a secondary operation in architectural design. Instead 
ornamental surface effects constructed a different reality, a virtual reality that 
became a significant aspect of architectural creativity and delight. Such 
preoccupation with ornamentation might well represent artistic primitivity or 
innocence, but it evades the trappings of superficiality and questions of authenticity 
by an appreciation of all art as man-made creativity, which is originally different to 
divine creation.   
Another theme that developed from thinking about traditional art and 
decoration in Iran, was the theme of horizontality. The nomadic carpets of central 
Asia are colourful expanses of woven textile, often with intricate symmetrical 
patterns that do not have a right side up nor can they be the wrong way round. If 
motifs of animals are used, they are abstracted, twisted and rotated to arrive at a 
geometrical symmetry that abolishes vertical hierarchy or directionality. For 
example, if one compares the carpet to the portrait painting, it is evident that the 
latter is to be hung vertically on the wall, because it has an “up” side and a “down” 
                                                      
4 The Arabic term “islam” means "submission" and itself comes from the term “aslama,” 
which means "to surrender, resign oneself." A person who follows Islam is called a Muslim, 
and this means "one who surrenders to God." See Online Etymology Dictionary 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=Islam accessed January 2009.  
5 See Ardalan, and Bakhtiar, The Sense of Unity: The Sufi Tradition in Persian Architecture, pp. 
23-26 and pp. 40-43. See also Keith Critchlow, Islamic Patterns: An Analytical and Cosmological 
Approach, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976, pp. 7-9 
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side.6 However, nomadic carpets can be laid down anywhere and viewed from any 
direction retaining their appropriate orientation from any angle.7  
Such art emphasises surface not form, horizontality rather than vertical 
hierarchy, and an acceptance of art’s originary difference from the reality or ideality 
that it depicts. In other words, art is not considered as an inferior imitation of reality 
(reproduction), but rather a creative and symbolic re-production that produces a 
unique reality of its own. For the author, the traditional carpet simulates a lush 
ground plane (inspired by oases and gardens) upon which people live and 
worship.8 When such woven textiles become enclosure (as in the case of the 
nomadic tent), or they are reinterpreted as ornamentation applied to the surfaces of 
buildings, the non-hierarchical simulative operation continues to affect in different 
mediums. Consequently, it is possible to argue that the wall becomes an extension 
of the ground: not a perpendicular barrier that opposes the ground, but a folded 
surface that is already connected to the surficial plane.  
Thus, the author’s interest in ornament and nomadic art implicated surface 
expression in different media. Yet, modernist architectural theory associated 
ornament with degeneration and backwardness, while surface is often corrupted by 
the term superficial. Therefore, to say that a building is ornamental can often be 
something of an insult, implying that the design is lacking sufficient importance or 
conceptual complexity. Moreover, the ornamental layer is often defined by thinness 
or temporariness, and lacking the permanence of structural materials. As a result, 
ornament is often considered as a superfluous and superficial layer that generates 
false appearances. It was such attitudes toward surface expression that motivated 
the author to investigate the possibility of a different approach to ornament and 
surface appearances in architecture.   
                                                      
6 One could argue that the carpet has a front side and a back side determined by knotting, 
but it must be noted that compared to a portrait painting, the front and back distinction in 
carpets is much more subtle. It must also be noted that in recent years the Iranian modern 
carpet industry is increasingly using non-symmetrical images (rather than patterns) for their 
designs.   
7 I would like to thank Dr. Seyed Gholamreza Islami for his contributions to the 
development of these ideas.  
8 It is interesting to note that relative to Christianity or Judaism, Islamic worship involves a 
closer relationship to the ground: the terrestrial plane that connects people together. Prayers, 
often involve prostration where hands, knees and the forehead come into contact with the 
ground plane. This is considered an abolishment of hierarchy, (coming down to the same 
level as everyone else) and also a reinforcement of the sense of community. Thus, the 
ground surface becomes a physical connection between prostrating worshippers across the 


























Figure I: Textile ground: horizontality through geometrical symmetry. 






















Figure II: Textile wall following textile ground: surface ornamentation in 
traditional Iranian architecture. Source: the author. 
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NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND SPECTACULAR IMAGERY 
While in the pre-industrial age the creation of art and architecture was a relatively 
laborious task that was limited to one location, today the advent of new 
technologies has allowed faster production and reproductions of art in different 
media. Moreover, contemporary technology has allowed images to detach from the 
surfaces that carried them, enabling them to be transferred across digital networks. 
However, for many these moving images have lost their connection with reality, 
becoming illusory appearances conjured up by activated surfaces.  
The rapid development of the computer, digital media and new 
technologies of mass reproduction has been an important issue for this thesis. 
During his architectural training, the author became aware of a subtle scepticism 
amongst practicing architects and academics, directed towards new digital 
technologies. This scepticism can be attributed to many factors amongst which 
impatience with the developmental stages of new tools is perhaps an important one. 
For many, the hand drawn line is still preferable to the computer one, perhaps 
because it is considered to be in direct contact with the body and therefore emotions 
of the artist.9 The computer image is considered a mediated effect, lacking the 
authenticity of hand drawing. In other words, if both pencil and the computer are 
tools, the former is often considered more natural and the other more artificial.10  
Perhaps, the cynicism towards digital technologies can be attributed to the 
fact that in many digital “renderings” the image attempts to simulate the final 
design. This requires advanced training and familiarity with the complexity of 
software (and sometimes hardware), that is not always easy to master. Thus, the 
resultant imagery often fails in both fronts: it cannot reproduce reality accurately, 
while simultaneously failing to generate an evocative abstraction of the proposal. 
Even when digital images are produced effectively, they are often considered as 
visual spectacles that distract the viewer from the spatial qualities of the 
architectural proposal.11 Therefore computer visualizations suffer from the 
                                                      
9 See J. Albrecht, “Mechanization Takes Command in Architecture” in Domus, vol. 708, no. 9, 
1989, pp. 24-28.  
10 See Evan H. Shu “Touch versus Tech: Hand-drawn or Computer-rendered Techniques” in 
Architectural Record, vol. 188, no. 12, 2000, pp. 170-3. 
11 See Neil Leach, The Anaesthetics of Architecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 
1999, pp. 80-81  
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hierarchical relationship between image and reality since in their attempt to 
simulate they either become inferior copies or spectacular masks that are at best 
distracting, or in the worst-case scenario destructive to the reality of things. 
However, despite these issues, the computer and other digital technologies have 
continued their evolution facilitating new possibilities for the designer, even though 
for some mastering this new tool remains challenging.  
New modelling software programs allow designers to build a virtual 
model of their design, walk through it, adjust elements of it in real-time and 
generate architectural drawings at a click of a button. Moreover, the involvement of 
computers in the construction industry has allowed architects to realise their most 
primitive desires into buildings faster, easier and more economically. Some argue 
that this greater freedom leads to superficial and self-indulgent architecture that is 
not sensitive to its context.12 However, it is equally possible to argue that new 
technologies are merely aiding the expression of the same primitive desires that led 
to ornamentation in traditional architecture. In other words, the desire for surface 
expression and embellishment remains the same, what changes is the tools with 
which such desires are actualised.   
Today, many of the technologies that allow for the production and 
reproduction of art are dependent on surfaces: they either generate virtual surfaces 
(computer modelling, virtual reality environments), or they dis-colour surfaces 
(photography, printed magazines, advertising), or they project through activated 
surfaces (TVs, Screens, and so on). However, he proliferation of such new 
technologies in contemporary society has been accompanied by a heightened 
scepticism of surfaces, images and appearances, which is reflected in canonical texts 
of cultural theory. These opposing forces inspired the author to investigate the 
possibility of an alternative approach towards such visual phenomena and the 
technologies that enhance their operation.  
ON SURFACE, SURFICIAL AND SURFACING 
For most people, sight is their initial mode of interaction and surfaces the first place 
of contact with architecture. Surface is a boundary and a place of difference, change 
                                                      




and transition. In architectural discourse, ornament usually refers to surface effects 
applied on the outside of buildings and is perceived to improve the image of 
architecture, embellishing it or making it beautiful. Often ornament is applied after 
a building is constructed, and as an embellishment it has been associated with the 
feminine, the seduction of make-up, or the rise and fall of fashion.13  
Ornament implies surface since it is applied to the visible layers of an 
object. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “surface” as “the outermost part of a 
material body; the uppermost layer; esp. in art or manufacture, an exterior of a 
particular form or ‘finish’.”14 While surface implicates exteriority, its derivative, the 
“superficial” has much more negative undertones: “usually denoting that part or 
aspect of anything which presents itself to a slight or casual mental view, or which 
is perceived without examination; outward appearance”15  
“Superficial” implies shallowness and insubstantiality, both physically and 
intellectually. This might be a reference to the geometric definition of surface: “A 
magnitude or continuous extent having only two dimensions (length and breadth, 
without thickness).”16 As an adjective, superficial betrays surface by associating it 
with thinness and masking. In most cases, “superficiality” is an undesirable 
characteristic: no one wants to be accused of being concerned with only the obvious 
characteristics of something, lacking thoroughness or attention to detail, or 
possessing a personality that fails to understand, feel or sympathize.  
There is however, another adjective associated with surface, which is much 
more neutral. In the Oxford English Dictionary “Surficial” is defined as that which 
is “of or pertaining to the surface of the earth.”17 This thesis proposes surficial as an 
alternative to the superficial in order to encourage a different approach to surface 
and its effects. Surficial implies geology, materiality and stability. It implies 
thickness, and is connected with the ground upon which life occurs. As an adjective, 
surficial allows for a more stable understanding of surface, one which is not 
compromised by the depth that the term superficial lacks. Moreover, if superficial 
implies temporariness, the term surficial evokes the longevity and permanence of 
                                                      
13 See Bradley Quinn, The Fashion of Architecture, Berg, Oxford, 2003, pp. 2-4.  See also Mark 
Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.; London, 2001. 
14 Oxford English Dictionary www.oed.com accessed Dec. 2008.  
15 Oxford English Dictionary. 
16 Oxford English Dictionary. 
17 Oxford English Dictionary. 
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geological features. These concepts are elaborated later in the thesis in an attempt to 
formulate a different understanding of surfaces, images and appearances and their 
role in architectural design.  
In general, surface as a noun suffers from thinness and insubstantiality and 
is accused of masking what lies behind it. Expressions like “it was not as it appeared 
on the surface” or “to scratch the surface of something” imply that true reality lies 
behind surfaces, which must be ruptured and penetrated. Surface as a verb on the 
other hand, has more positive connotations. To surface something is to bring it to 
full view, implying a movement from hidden potential to visible actualisation. It is 
also “to give a (particular kind of) surface, esp. a smooth or even surface; to smooth 
or polish the surface of”18 something. Surface as a verb also implies purification or 
discovery: “To mine near the surface; to wash the surface deposit or ‘dirt’ for gold 
or other valuable mineral.”19  
Thus, as a noun, surface implies different notions of masking, but as a verb 
it suggests exposure. To surface something is to bring it to public notice, or to 
produce or expose a controversial issue or secret information. “Surfacing” is 
becoming “fully conscious or alert,”20 after a period of oblivion or seclusion. This 
implies coming into public view from a state of obscurity. Surfacing also implies a 
fluid relationship with depth. Submarines surface from a deep dive, but the water 
that constitutes the surface and depth of the sea is in continuous flux, rising and 
falling in a continuous process of transformation. 
“Surface effect” conjures up multiple meanings. Notions of “illusion” and 
“impression” are implied with “effect,”21 all of which refer to a problematic 
relationship between effects and reality. Surface effects are generally visible and 
constitute the appearance of objects. As a noun, “appearance” refers to the way 
something looks, the impression something or someone gives. As a verb however, 
                                                      
18 Oxford English Dictionary. 
19 Oxford English Dictionary. 
20 Oxford English Dictionary. 
21 “A visual or acoustic device used to convey atmosphere or the illusion of reality in the 
production of plays, films, or broadcasts” or “The impression produced on a beholder, 
hearer, or reader (formerly esp. by a work of art or literature); the impression produced by a 
picture, building, costume, etc., viewed as a whole; the look that a collection of features has. 
for effect: for the sake of creating a telling impression on the minds of spectators or hearers.” 
See OED.  
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appearance implies performance or participation in a public event. To appear is an 
act of becoming visible or noticeable, or a process of coming into existence or use.22 
“Appearance” conjures up notions of “image,” which in architecture can be 
the way buildings look from the outside or the inside. This conception of image can 
be related to a building’s architectural style, its role in culture and politics and its 
symbolic value. It is how a building fits into the extended visual culture. Another 
definition of image is the photograph or digital representation of a building 
reproduced on paper or disseminated through mass media. This notion of image 
has a more direct connection with material surfaces that display it: either the 
surfaces of paper or the surfaces of television or computer screens. A third 
conception of image is related to a mental impression, or an “image of thought” that 
forms in the mind. This conception of image is dependent on the individual their 
personal experience of architecture. In traditional models of thought, all three 
interpretations of image have a difficult relationship to reality: they are either a 
partial aspect of reality, an inferior copy of reality or mere illusory appearance.   
The dictionary defines image as “an artificial imitation or representation of 
the external form of any object” or “an optical appearance or counterpart of an 
object, such as is produced by rays of light either reflected as from a mirror, 
refracted as through a lens, or falling on a surface after passing through a small 
aperture.”23 The etymology of the word connects it to the Old French word Imagene, 
meaning "artificial representation" and to the Latin word imaginem, meaning "copy, 
statue, picture, idea, appearance," from the stem of imitari "to copy, imitate."24 
Image, is therefore seen as an imitation, a copy and mere appearance as difference 
from the real, authentic object.25  
So far, the list of terms began with “ornament,” and through “surface” and 
“superficial,” arrived at the “image” and “appearance,” which are considered as 
“copies” or “imitations” of an originary “reality.” Imitation is closely related to 
“simulation,” and for the same reason the “simulacrum” is a close relative of the 
                                                      
22 See OED.  
23 Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com accessed Dec. 2008. 
24 See Online Etymology Dictionary, www.etymonline.com accessed Dec. 2008. 
25 The etymology of image can be traced back to 11th and 12th c. imagene = Provencal: image, 
emage, Italian: im(m)agine, Spanish: imagen, Latin: imago, imagin-em imitation, copy, likeness, 
statue, picture, phantom; conception, thought, idea; similitude, semblance, appearance, 
shadow; apparently containing the same root as im-itari: to imitate.” See OED etymology 
www.oed.com accessed Jan. 2009.  
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image. Etymologically, simulacrum can be traced back to Latin and French origins 
meaning "likeness, image, form, representation."26 In the dictionary, simulacrum is 
considered as superficial appearance without authentic substance: “Something 
having merely the form or appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its 
substance or proper qualities.”27 
The proliferation of new technologies of visual communication and 
reproduction has given a new emphasis to the aforementioned terms, whilst 
creating numerous challenges and opportunities for architectural design. In the past 
few decades, digital media have created vast image-scapes and simulated virtual 
environments that parallel architectural spaces or natural landscapes. In this 
technological context, architecture finds itself caught up between the virtuality of 
images (and information) and the physical materials with which buildings are 
constructed. Faced with the effects of the “digital era” architectural praxis has no 
choice but to participate with the economy of images, appearances and visual 
communication. However, architectural theory continues to grapple with the effects 
of traditional views that consider such phenomena as secondary, inauthentic or 
superficial representations of an originary reality.  
This dissertation proposes that the expansion of the artificial domain (i.e. 
man-made products, images and information), demands a reconsideration of 
traditional conceptions of artificiality, superficiality and authenticity. Though, in an 
age of rapid visual exchange, images and surface appearances are critical in the 
success or failure of a project, traditional models of thought continue to treat such 
phenomena as marginal categories deprived of authenticity. For this reason, the 
thesis attempts to utilise aspects of continental philosophy to develop a different 
approach to surface, image and appearance in architectural theory and praxis.  
 
                                                      
26 This was dissimilated from simulaclom, from simulare "to make like". The word was 
borrowed earlier as semulacre (c.1375), via Old French simulacre. See Online Etymology 
Dictionary, www.etymonline.com accessed Dec. 2008. 








“The age of photography corresponds precisely to the irruption of the private into the public, 
or rather, to the creation of a new social value, which is the publicity of the private....”28  
Roland Barthes  
 
 
“Sometimes the best way to hide something is in full sight.”29 
 
  Beatriz Colomina 
 
 
“A wall has always been the best place to publish your work.”30 
 
    Banksy 
 
 
“For the canny detective, surfaces harbour clues of depths that render seemingly senseless 
appearances surprisingly intelligible.”31 
 
   Mark C. Taylor 
                                                      
28 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, Hill and Wang, New York, 1982, p. 98 
29 Beatriz Colomina, Privacy and Publicity, Modern Architecture as Mass Media, MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass.: London, 1994 p. 11 
30 Banksy, Banksy: Wall and Piece, Century, 2006, p. 8 




1.1 CONTEXT, CASE, CONCEPTS 
1.1.1 Context: Advanced Technology and Hyper-communication  
The current condition is characterised by advanced technology, interactivity and 
increasing speeds of communication, where media networks and intensified visual 
production, exert a powerful influence on every aspect of human culture. The 
resultant dynamism is evident not only in technology but also in science, economy, 
politics and cultural identity.  
The speed and breadth of communication has had numerous consequences 
with which we continue to grapple. Some of the more positive effects have been the 
promotion of exploration, “tolerance and inclusion.”32 The accessibility of 
information has led to a better understanding of distant cultures and other modes of 
thought, which in turn has encouraged nomadic movements across national, 
cultural and ideological borders. The current technological condition has 
encouraged a taste for heterogeneity, and it has also promoted a new understanding 
of minority rights, of “otherness” as a desirable category.33 Faced with rapid cultural 
and technological transformations, architecture is also changing, by exploring 
themes of communication, borderline conditions and the potential of digital 
technologies for a new architecture that is both sensitive and responsive to the 
increasing complexity of postmodern living.  
Arguably, contemporary architecture is in its postmodern phase, 
characterized by diverse interpretations of the postmodern agenda. According to 
Jencks, the postmodern movement in architecture can be traced back to the early 
1960s and the writings of Jane Jacobs and Robert Venturi. As opposed to the 
modern planning theories that emphasised purity and functional separation, Jacobs’ 
notion of the city was one of complex emergent organisation.34 In parallel, Venturi 
promoted a more holistic approach to architecture to combat the over-simplification 
and the functionalist ideals of Modernism.35 Like many architects in the sixties, 
                                                      
32 Charles Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? Wiley-Academy, 
London, 2007, p. 117 
33 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 117 
34 See Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Random House, New York. 1961 
35 See Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction, The Museum of Modern Art Papers on 
Architecture, 1966  
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Venturi had become frustrated by the elitism and formal simplicity of the modernist 
manifesto. Sensing the increasing complexity of modern living, he and his 
colleagues called for a different architecture inspired by the “popular” the 
“ordinary,” and the signs and advertising surfaces of advanced capitalism.36  
Thus, as a reaction to the modernists manifesto of “form follows function”37 
and the deprecatory association of ornament with crime,38 Venturi et al proposed 
the “decorated shed” concept which was an attempt to liberate surface expression 
from functional responsibilities and simultaneously free structure from the burden 
of communication and expression. This, they argued, would be a better alternative 
to “duck” architecture in which form follows and often represents function.39  
The decorated shed concept signalled a theoretical shift from the 
modernists’ notions of cladding and style to the postmodernist notions of screen 
and communication. This was an attempt to allow architecture to participate freely 
within the visual influx of signs, billboards and screens of mass media that were 
quickly replacing the machinic structures of the Industrial Revolution as symbols of 
capitalism. It was hoped that by returning to complex visual communication, and 
by acknowledging the importance of popular culture, the desire for clarity in the 
modernist manifesto would transform into a desire for “complexity and 
contradiction.”  
The postmodern manifesto allowed architects to engage popular culture 
whilst maintaining a relationship with their professional ethos. This was the effect 
of “double coding”40 facilitated partly by the decorated shed concept and partly by 
notions of irony as a complex form of communication. Consequently, much of 
postmodern architecture maintains a certain schizophrenic quality: at once 
                                                      
36 See Robert Venturi, Dennis Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour Learning from Las Vegas: The 
Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.: London, 1977 
37 The origins of this phrase can be traced to Louis Sullivan who wrote, “form ever follows 
function.” See Louis Sullivan, “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered” published 
Lippincott's Magazine, vol. 57, March 1896, pp. 403-9. The electronic version can be accessed 
at http://academics.triton.edu/faculty/fheitzman/tallofficebuilding.html accessed 20th 
March 2008. 
38 See Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular 
Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, XYZ Books, Los Angeles, 2002, pp. 29-36. 
39 Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of 
Architectural Form, p. 87 
40 Charles Jencks writes: “Today I would still partly define Post-Modernism as I did in 1978 
as double coding: the combination of Modern techniques with something else (usually traditional 
building) in order for architecture to communicate with the public and a concerned minority, usually 
other architects.” Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 51 
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acknowledging the intricacies of architectural theory and simultaneously trying to 
appeal to the demands of popular culture as presented through mass media.  
Though the decorated shed concept allowed greater freedom of surface 
expression, it nevertheless exaggerated the disconnection between “ornament” and 
“structure” as problematized by the modernist metaphors of clothing and cladding. 
If the modernists deplored the excessive ornamentation of previous architectural 
styles and promoted the removal of ornament, some postmodernists adopted 
stylistic historicism in which decorative historical references were applied to 
structures that rarely ventured beyond the shed concept. Such reference to past 
styles was pastiche and superficial, demonstrating a reductive simplicity of 
communication or a regurgitation of old motifs. Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia 
(1978) and Michael Graves’ Portland Public Service Building (1982) are examples of 
this postmodern dilemma.  
Others embraced theoretical criticality through double-coding and irony, 
where architectural communication attempted to acknowledge opposing points of 
view. In many cases this second approach resulted in the construction of 
monuments to a critical commentary on architecture’s established ways, which was 
often only understood by a few architects, theoreticians or historians who were 
familiar with the (double) coded language. This approach threatened a return to the 
elitism of modernism and/or a reduction of architectural experience in favour of 
intellectual or textual delight. James Stirling’s addition to the Neue Staatsgalerie in 
Stuttgart, (1983) or Peter Eisenman’s “House VI”, (1975) are examples of this second 
approach.  
A third group of architects responded to Venturi’s embracing of popular 
culture, by designing “iconic” or “imagistic” buildings that communicated to a 
larger audience.41 Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum (1997), Rem 
Koolhaas’s CCTV building in Beijing (2008) or Arata Isozaki’s Disney Headquarters 
in Florida (1991) are different examples of this third approach. Much of this 
architecture was made possible by giant corporations hiring global architects to 
construct iconic buildings, both to represent their cause, but also to draw attention 
to it. Inevitably, much criticism of such architecture picks up on the inflated 
monumentality and the tendency for such architecture to approach the condition of  
                                                      
41 For the three approaches to postmodernism, see Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-
modernism Going? pp. 57-60  

















Figure 1.2: Peter Eisenman: House VI, Cornwall, CN, USA, 1975.  














Figure 1.3: Frank O. Gehry: The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, Spain, 
1997. Source: the author. 
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an “icon,” described as a visual one-liner that reduces architecture to a mere image: 
a flat representation of something else. Such criticisms also highlight the 
contradiction within postmodernism in that despite its appeal to the masses and the 
promotion of diversity and freedom, it remains within the logic of capitalism where 
only a select few can truly appreciate its ideals.42  
Having such concepts in mind and with reference to the rapid 
technological re-production of visual data, this dissertation uses Frank Gehry’s 
Bilbao Guggenheim Museum as a point of departure in order to explore the 
possibility of a different approach to image-making or the creation of visual effects 
in architectural design. Of the different architectural examples, Gehry’s museum 
seems appropriate, not only because it is an iconic building that has managed to 
exploit the mass media to create the “Bilbao Effect,” but also because it raises 
important questions about the role of surface and its effects in contemporary 
architectural design and theory.  
1.1.2 Case: The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum 
Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim is a museum of contemporary art situated 
alongside the Nervión River in Bilbao, Spain. Since its opening to the public in 1997 
the museum has attracted much international attention evidenced by the 
publication of numerous books, newspaper and magazine articles, or the creation of 
online webpages devoted to the building. Moreover, the building has catalysed 
further development for the city of Bilbao not only by attracting many tourists but 
also by catalysing further architectural projects by some of the most renowned 
architects in the world, including Norman Foster,43 Arata Isozaki,44 Zaha Hadid,45 
and Santiago Calatrava.46  
Gehry’s museum has become a cultural and socio-political icon generating 
much needed publicity for Bilbao and the Basque region while bringing success and 
fame for the architect too.47 The museum has been accredited with “putting Bilbao 
                                                      
42 See Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 61 
43 Bilbao Metro by Norman Foster, 1990-1995.  
44 Isozaki Atea, or Isozaki Towers, 1999.   
45 See Zaha Hadid’s Zorrozaurre master plan for a 60-hectare peninsula in the Nervión river 
in the former port area of Bilbao, Spain, 2004.  
46 See Santiago Calatrava’s Zubizuri (White Bridge) which is a foot-bridge across the Nervión 
river in Bilbao.   
47 The building can be seen in the opening sequence of the 1999 James Bond film The World is 
Not Enough.  
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on the map” and despite its formal complexity, it was built on time and on budget. 
Moreover, the BGM marks an important turning point in Gehry’s career, 
representing a refinement of his personal style to a distinct architectural brand, 
which allowed him to achieve celebrity status, becoming what is called a 
“starchitect.”48 Many have celebrated the building and its subsequent 
reformulations (the Experience Music Project in Seattle, 2000, or the Disney Concert 
Hall in Los Angeles, 2003), as sculptural works of a genius symbolizing freedom 
and democracy. The building has also been popular with fellow architects: Philip 
Johnson declared it as “the greatest building of our time”49 while Sverre Fehn called 
it "fantastic."50  
Gehry's museum can be summarised as a series of folded surfaces based 
around the broken ship concept inspired by Bilbao’s former ship-building industry. 
The building’s flowing forms offer a welcome relief from the rectilinear forms of the 
post-industrial city, generating a shimmering visual expression of fluidity and 
movement that can also be associated with the waves of the river or the Atlantic 
coast beyond. Yet, the BGM is not just a pretty sight. At the time of its conception, 
the museum represented a successful hybridisation of traditional and modern 
technologies and processes of design and construction. In order to transfer the 
complex curves from architectural models to a building, Gehry and his team had to 
learn from the aerospace industry. Since in the early 1990s most architectural 
modelling software were purely for visualisation purposes, Gehry’s team had to use 
CATIA51 in order to map out and formulate the museum’s surfaces precisely. It was 
the combination of digital modelling software and new construction technologies 
                                                      
48 Since the Bilbao Gehry has appeared in Apple's black and white "Think Different" pictorial 
advertising campaign (2006) that associates offbeat but revered figures with Apple's design 
philosophy. He even once appeared as himself in the animated series The Simpsons (“The 
Seven-Beer Snitch” aired in 2005) where he parodies himself by suggesting that his ideas are 
derived by looking at a crumpled paper. He also voiced himself on the TV show Arthur, 
where he helped Arthur and his friends design a new treehouse (see “Castle in the Sky” first 
aired in Dec. 2004). Gehry has also starred in a documentary film about himself in 
collaboration with film director Sydney Pollack (a friend of Gehry’s) entitled Sketches of Frank 
Gehry (distributed by Sony Pictures Classics, 2005). In this documentary some of Gehry’s 
more prominent work is discussed with input from his friends and critics. 
49 Denny Lee “Bilbao, Ten Years Later” The New York Times, published on 23 Sept. 2007 at 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/ accessed on 20/10/2008. 
50 Anna Maria Guasch, “Global Museums versus Local Artists: Paradoxes of Identity 
between Local and Global Understanding” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, University 
of Nevada Press, 2005, p. 195 
51 CATIA - Computer Aided Three Dimensional Interactive Application - was developed by 
the French company Dassault Systemes. 
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that allowed Gehry and his team to construct the complex geometries of the 
building with efficiency and economy.  
Thus, the BGM is not only a highly successful visual spectacle, but also an 
early exploration of alternative processes of design and construction. Moreover, 
Gehry’s sculptural design challenges many of the established hierarchies that 
dominate architectural theory. Whilst it can be argued that the BGM provided 
Gehry with a stylistic formula that he has been mostly unable to escape from, this 
thesis attempts to demonstrate that the design and construction of the BGM has 
important implications for notions of superficiality, authenticity and architectural 
creativity in the current technological condition. Moreover, Gehry’s museum raises 
important questions about transdisciplinary participation, the significance of surface 
in the design process, and the importance of image making for the contemporary 
context that is increasingly dominated by technological communication. By 
exploring some of the issues this thesis attempts to understand why Gehry’s Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum has been so popular and simultaneously so problematic for 
some critics and commentators.   
1.1.3 Concepts: Developing Surface Thought 
For some theorists like Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe the BGM’s flowing curves, shimmering 
surfaces and spectacular imagery is more modernist than postmodern since it 
indicates a concern with the ornamental and the visually beautiful, rather than the 
postmodern preoccupation with ironic, double-coded communication.52 Others like 
Hal Foster argue that in the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, Gehry collapses the 
dichotomy between the “duck” and “decorated shed”53 and remains “tectonically 
obscure.”54 It is neither structure that follows the program nor one that symbolises 
                                                      
52 Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe writes: “Not only is it pretty, but it’s modernist, rather than 
postmodern, in the sense in which those terms are used in the discourses surrounding the 
visual arts, while tat the same time it is of course quite unmodernist in every crucial respect 
except for its preoccupation with visual effect self-assertive liveliness – which incidentally 
illustrates the bankruptcy of the way those terms are used. I see Gehry’s work as caught 
inevitably but unfortunately in arguments to which it has a more subtle relationship than is 
perhaps normally described, but that are in any case not resolvable.”  See Jeremy Gilbert-
Rolfe, “Frank Gehry is not Andy Warhol: A Choice between Life and Death” in Learning from 
the Bilbao Guggenheim, University of Nevada Press, 2005, p. 223.  
53 Hal Foster writes: “As Gehry has privileged neither structure nor ornament, he seemed to 
transcend this opposition, but it is more accurate to say that he collapsed it, and often 
combined the formal duck with the decorated shed.” Hal Foster, Design and Crime: And Other 
Diatribes, Verso, 2003, p. 33 
54 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 37 
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the program, thus becoming a “decorated duck”55 which embodies the “most 
problematic aspects of both modern and postmodern architectures: the wilful 
monumentality of the first and the faux populism of the second.”56 
In fact Foster remains the most consistent critic of Gehry’s architecture, 
associating his success and popularity with “spectacle-effects”57 and the seduction 
of an imagistic architecture that is “self-indulgent” and “arbitrary.”58 He argues that 
Gehry’s architecture “evokes an individuality that seems more exclusive than 
democratic”59 and rather than instigating civic engagement, the BGM and Gehry’s 
other cultural centres “appear as sites of spectacular spectatorship, of touristic 
awe.”60 Foster argues that such projects (the BGM being the most prominent) 
represent an elitist, self-indulgent and individualist artist who designs “out of the 
‘cultural logic’ of advanced capitalism, in terms of its language of risk-taking and 
spectacle-effects.”61 For Foster the BGM is not only a spectacular image that 
symbolises the accumulation of capital, but it also represents “’an image 
accumulated to the point where it becomes capital.’”62  
That the BGM is successful at generating capital for the city is 
unquestionable and it is fair to assume that the building’s spectacular 
monumentality is an important factor. Yet, one wonders whether Foster’s essay 
carries an originary negativity towards surface appearances and a cutting criticality, 
which is in fact a reaction against the mass popularity of Gehry’s work. Thus, in an 
effort to show that Gehry is not the “Greatest Living Artist”63 he punctures the 
shimmering surfaces and ruptures the skin, suggesting that the BGM has somehow 
managed to deceive us. This thesis attempts to argue that while Foster’s criticism 
assumes a perpendicular movement of thought that penetrates surfaces, images and 
appearances, a different movement of thought is possible, which floats across the 
expanse of visual expression and is more supportive of creative exploration. This 
parallel or non-perpendicular movement of thought is formulated using surface as a 
                                                      
55 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 33 
56 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, pp. 33-4 
57 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 41 
58 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 40 
59 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 41 
60 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 41 
61 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 41  
62 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 41  
63 This statement marks the very point from which Foster begins his critique of Gehry’s 
work.  
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philosophical concept, which in the case of Gehry and the Bilbao Museum, becomes 
the primary architectural element.  
Foster compares the BGM with Frank Lloyd Wrights Guggenheim 
Museum (a whitish building that can be called modernist) arguing that the former 
lacks “formal logic” or the “programmatic conceit” of the latter. Moreover, by 
comparing Gehry’s work with sculpture (the Statue of Liberty) he argues that the 
BGM is in fact a “separate skin hung over a hidden armature” where the skin is 
allowed to “dominate” the structure.64 The result, he believes, is disorientating 
spaces and an evident lack of sensitivity towards the context.  
Foster’s essay implies some important questions: is Gehry’s work the result 
of a preoccupation with visual spectacle and superficial effects, with all the 
shallowness that these words can conjure up? Is the BGM tectonically obscure 
because the “skin” has been allowed to dominate the structure? Is the “Bilbao 
Effect” nothing more than the seduction of the superficial, the spectacular and the 
imagistic at the expense of formal logic, programmatic rigor and sensitivity to 
context? If so, how can Gehry get away with so much?  
The thesis proposes that the answer lies upon the very surfaces with which 
Gehry designs, visualizes, constructs and re-produces his buildings. It finds it 
questionable whether the BGM should be divided into the structure/skin, 
function/form opposition so characteristic of modernist manifestoes. Perhaps the 
BGM’s appeal lies in its invitation of the viewer to remain at the surface level, an 
ambition which considering the current technological context seems more profound 
than superficial. Thus, rather than designing for the penetration of surfaces and 
images in order to arrive at a hidden structure or reality, the building invites the 
viewer to float within and upon the surface, which forms the architectural place 
within which communication of ideas, expression of sense and transformation of 
established categories occurs.  
Arguably this is a different approach to surface, which does not define it in 
opposition to a hidden depth. Moreover, the movement of thought that is 
encouraged is not one of vertical ascent towards the height of Ideas65 nor is it a 
 
                                                      
64 See Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 37 
65 Both Platonic Ideas and lofty ideals.  






















Figure 1.5: Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, Spain, 1997.  
Source: the author. 
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descent towards the depths of meaning. Instead it is a non-hierarchical floatation, 
which suggests a more horizontal exploration of alternative sensations and unlikely 
realisations. Such a mode of communication seems to be primitive and postmodern, 
expressive and obscure.  
The following chapters attempt to suggest a particular approach to 
architecture, through Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Musem as a suitable case 
study, and with reference to modernist concepts (clothing, cladding, clarity), the 
postmodernist equivalents (duck, decorated shed, complexity) and more general 
notions of aura, image, spectacle and simulation. It is argued that Gehry’s BGM 
evokes and includes many of these concepts in a pliable whole, while maintaining 
an auratic complexity and a seductive expressivity. The proposed argument is that 
Gehry’s museum communicates through a primitive, yet simultaneously unfamiliar 
mode of expression which includes intuition, illusion and simulation in the 
construction of what Jencks calls an “enigmatic signifier.”66 In such communication 
clarity is not the central goal, because the origin and the original do not form the 
focal point. Instead the emphasis lies on the process, those of expression, 
interpretation, and perhaps hallucination. In this form of communication, one 
enjoys the journey through the thickness of implicit propositions that create a 
phenomenal expression of sense, rather than literal (or ironic) communication of 
meaning or fact. This is argued to be primitive and in many ways at odds with the 
culture of critical commentary, yet simultaneously it is highly relevant and in tune 
with the postmodern logic of plurality as it manages to incorporate complexity and 
diversity within a series of seemingly simple gestures.  
In a deprecatory tone, Foster declares that the primary site of Gehry’s 
architecture is in media reproduction.67 This thesis argues that such sentiments 
highlight a familiar theoretical position that defines the image as the inauthentic 
copy, the spectacle as seductive illusion and ornament as superficial excess. Given 
the proliferation of mass media and the impact of such new technology on 
contemporary thought, this thesis proposes that other approaches are possible that 
deal more sensitively with the reality of virtualities and the significance of effects. It 
suggests that a redefinition of parameters is required beginning with the surface, 
                                                      
66 Charles Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-Modernism Going? John Wiley, London, 
2007, p. 62 
67 See Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 38 
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both as a philosophical concept and the physical site upon which such phenomena 
take effect.  
The research investigates traditional metaphors of design and established 
attitudes towards image, authenticity and reality, which seem to problematize and 
be problematized by emergent examples of creativity in the current postmodern 
condition. The aim is to explore some possible theories for the following related 
questions: What do we mean by the terms “surface” or “skin” in architecture? Do 
surface effects deceive the viewer, devalue architecture or diminish the “aura” of 
buildings? Is surface architecture necessarily superficial? Does the spectacle signal a 
degradation of reality? Are images or simulations shadowy copies of an original 
reality? What is the significance of mass media and new technologies for 
contemporary architecture?  
It is argued that the negativity and shallowness associated with 
superficiality is closely related to the separation of “appearances” from the “real,” 
where the former is seen to be a deficient representation of the latter. In this familiar 
point of view, surfaces are the culprits: the thin outer elements that facilitate false 
appearances and mask the viewer from the true reality of things. This traditional 
approach is evident in the modernists’ formulation of ornament as a nonessential 
layer that hides the primary elements of architecture and signals superficiality and 
excess. In the contemporary condition, similar attitudes continue through scepticism 
towards imagery, virtual reality and the spectacle of architecture technologically 
reproduced across the surface-scape of mass media.68  
In the following chapters, this thesis will consider different philosophical 
models involving image and the simulacrum in order to arrive at a different 
approach to appearances in architecture. Whilst traditional philosophical models 
define images as misleading copies of an original reality, and while some 
contemporary theorists declare images as simulacra (without any reference to 
reality), this thesis argues that an alternative approach is possible which considers 
images as immanently different from their supposed models. From this point of 
view, images construct a unique reality that demands valuation according to its 
own rules. This in turn suggests that the images of architecture do not represent a 
depreciation of architectural experience or a superficial representation of original 
                                                      
68 See Neil Leach, The Anaesthetics of Architecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 
1999. 
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ideas. Instead, images expand architecture’s field of influence and represent the 
surfacing of its potential beyond the locality of a specific time and place. Thus, in 
the current technological condition of mass imagery, a different approach to 
architecture is possible, one in which the “surfaces of architecture” transforms to 
“surfacing architecture” through different mediums.  
The thesis argues that most metaphors used for describing ornament in the 
modernist discourse are based on the conceptual separation of the “outer layer,” 
which is often considered secondary or superfluous. However, other metaphors are 
possible that imply a more integral relationship between surface appearances and 
the architectural object. The thesis proposes a different approach in which surfaces 
do not mask, instead they extend architecture’s operational territory by engaging 
with the technological surface-scape of mass media. From this point of view there is 
nothing to hide since everything occurs upon the surface - the very site of 
architectural operation. 
1.2 DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTERS 
Taking Foster’s criticism of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum as a point of 
departure, the thesis attempts to expand some of the key concepts with which 
commentators and critics analyse contemporary architecture. If the BGM is 
considered “tectonically obscure” or a “decorated duck” in reference to Venturi’s 
writings, it seems important to devote some time to the modernist doctrines that 
inspired such theories in the first place. This leads to a discussion of ornament and 
the issues of out-siding and superficiality in theories of ornament. The thesis proposes 
that in their theorisation of ornament, the modernists established a pervasive binary 
hierarchical system, which devalues surfaces and their effects as secondary or 
superfluous. This binary hierarchy was not only in tune with notions of efficiency, 
economy and mass production central to the cultural logic of capitalism in early 
twentieth century, but it was also harmonious with traditional models of thought 
that have persisted in Western philosophy. Thus the modernist condemnation of 
ornament is argued to be closely related to an established understanding of surface, 
image and appearance in traditional epistemology and philosophy.  
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In order to expand this proposition, the seven chapters of the thesis are 
divided into three parts. Part One, which consists of two chapters, traces the effects 
of traditional transcendental hierarchy69 in influential theories of ornament and image. 
It is argued that such concepts are devalued since reality is considered to be beyond 
or behind surface appearances. Part Two of the thesis (also consisting of two 
chapters) proposes a different philosophical approach based on Gilles Deleuze’s 
writings. In this part of the thesis, a theoretical approach to architecture is 
constructed based on surface as a model of thought, which is used to represent non-
hierarchical valuation, smooth mixing of categories and the expansion of the in-
between as a territory of exploration. Part Three of the thesis is a review of the 
proposition, which concludes the discussion.  
The following chapter of the thesis (i.e. chapter two) is titled “The 
Superficiality of Surface and the Inauthenticity of Its Effects.” The chapter begins 
by analysing Adolf Loos’s association of ornament with crime and his association of 
the ornamental layer with clothing. Key works by Mark Wigley and Beatriz 
Colomina are utilised to argue that the modernists’ metaphor of clothing the structure 
followed and clarified a well established binary hierarchy, not only between the 
sexes, but also between the covering layer and the hidden structure. By considering 
“tattooing” as a primitive act, the pioneers of modernist theory offered “the suit,” 
“the dress” or “the make up,” as modern metaphors. However, it is argued that 
such conception of ornament considers surfaces and their effects as masking the 
“body” of architecture, suggesting a conceptual detachability that inevitably leads 
to a devaluation of surface design in architecture. The chapter proceeds to argue 
that Venturi’s “decorated shed” concept continues this binary separation between 
visual expression and structural function. This segregation of ornament from the 
function of architecture is argued to be an inheritance from modernist theories. 
However, certain projects (like the BGM) collapse the hierarchy between form and 
function by infusing visual delight into every aspect of architectural design, from 
conception to construction.  
                                                      
69 In this thesis “transcendental hierarchy” refers to a hierarchical model of thought based on 
transcendence, which is Latin for climbing or going beyond something.  The term also refers 
to the belief that primary concepts (origin, essence or reality) are beyond secondary concepts 
(copy, image and appearance). Transcendental hierarchy is traced back to Plato’s philosophy 
which is characterized by a desire to transcend the “visible realm” to arrive at the 
“intelligible realm.” See section 3.1 of the thesis.  
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Chapter two also elaborates the concept of transparency, which was an 
important element of modernist thought. By deploying Colin Rowe and Robert 
Slutzsky’s essay70 the chapter explains how transparency does not necessitate the 
disappearance (or the puncturing) of surfaces, nor does it always signify tectonic or 
conceptual clarity. “Phenomenal transparency” for example, operates upon the logic 
of implication or the state of being clearly ambiguous. In this understanding of 
transparency, depth is a surface effect, expressed and implied through evocative 
arrangements of opaque surfaces.  
Chapter two is also concerned with the transformation of attitudes towards 
originality, authenticity and technology in an age of digital mass reproduction. 
Rather than what Benjamin declares the “withering of aura” the thesis suggests that 
aura evolves through the operation of images and their reproductions. Gehry’s 
museum for example, anticipates the reproduction of its image in the mass media, 
which work on both fronts: on the one hand they express the concepts, intentions or 
aspirations of the design to a wider audience, on the other hand, they attract and 
inspire more viewers to visit the “authentic” construction in situ. While the images 
of such architecture are arguably an extension of its architectural corpus, they 
simultaneously reinforce the appeal of what is generally referred to as the “original” 
building, from which such “reproductions” are deduced. Thus, Gehry utilises 
contemporary technologies of reproduction and communication in order to provide 
wider visual access to his architecture, while simultaneously reinforcing the “aura” 
of the physical building and its context. The large number of visitors to the 
Guggenheim Museum is a good illustration of this effect.  
Chapter two discusses different concepts, which are all related to the 
themes of superficiality and authenticity in the postmodern context. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide a context for chapter three, which follows related themes in 
philosophy, arguing that much of the established hierarchies in architectural 
thought stem from a transcendental hierarchy that can be traced back to Plato’s 
philosophy.  
Chapter three is titled From “Shadows” to “Simulacra:” The Degradation 
of Image and the Real.  This chapter is based on the proposition that the scepticism 
                                                      
70 Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, "Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal," in The 
Mathematics of Ideal Villa and Other Essays, The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.; London, 1976, 
pp. 159-185.  
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directed towards ornament, image and surface effects in architecture, is the result of 
the separation of “appearances” from the “real” where the former is considered a 
bad representations (or copy) of the latter. Moreover, surfaces are often considered 
as opaque outer elements that separate the viewer from reality by masking or 
generating false appearances.  
In this chapter, the thesis traces the root of such thinking to Plato’s 
philosophy, particularly the “metaphor of the sun,”71 “analogy of the divided 
line”72 and the “allegory of the cave.”73 It is argued that these metaphors and 
allegories theorise traditional attitudes towards surfaces as opaque visual barriers, 
and their effects as distorted representations of a hidden reality. Moreover, such 
metaphors imply that man-made effects are not to be trusted because they are 
artificial imitations that distract the viewer from their natural origins. Yet, the 
proliferation of man-made phenomena continues with greater speeds, assuming a 
large portion of everyday interaction. If suspicion towards man-made effects 
continues, the result can be a depreciation of creativity and a devaluation of human 
development. In order to arrive at an alternative approach, numerous philosophers 
have attempted to revise the traditional Platonic attitude towards origin and copy, 
authentic and artificial. 
Chapter three traces the “closure”74 of Platonism through the writings of 
Jacques Derrida. This leads to a discussion of the signifier and the concept of 
“trace.” This chapter also discusses Jean Baudrillard’s theories, which following 
Guy Debord’s writings75 depict a world in which images have managed to destroy 
reality altogether, creating “the hyperreal.”76 The thesis suggests that if Derrida’s 
theories indicate the “closure” or “deconstruction” of Platonism, Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality is what is left after the destruction of Platonism – a superficial world 
that induces “melancholic fascination.”77 It is argued that such conceptions of the 
current media saturated condition are pessimistic and nihilistic, as they do not 
acknowledge the unique value of human creativity and visual expression.  
                                                      
71 See Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press, London, (507b-509c) 
72 Plato (509d-513e) 
73 Plato (514a-520a) 
74 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, John Hopkins University Press, London, 1976, p. 14 
75 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Ken Knabb, Rebel Press, London, 2006. 
76 See Jean Baudrillard, 1994, Simulacra and Simulation, University of Michigan Press, p. 1 
77 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, p. 160 
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This thesis proposes that Gilles Deluze’s philosophy can be utilised to 
formulate another approach that transforms traditional attitudes by shifting the 
emphasis from authenticity to creativity. In this approach the production of images 
is no longer the reproduction of an original reality, but instead the production of a 
different reality. In other words, images are considered to create their own reality, 
and since they are already different from their supposed model, they are valued 
according to their own immanent logic and affective potential. Relating such a view 
to architecture would mean that the design, projection or construction of image is a 
legitimate extension of architectural design, not a deceitful act, nor a mere “side 
effect” of the physical building. From this point of view, producing an architectural 
image (icon or brand) is in fact extending architecture’s operational territory beyond 
the specificities of the site through an engagement with the interconnected surface-
scape of mass media.  
Following this proposition, chapter four explores the various definitions of 
“surface” in order to investigate the possibility of an alternative conception that 
escapes the shallowness and superficiality of traditional definitions. Chapter four is 
titled What is Surface? and utilises Avrum Stroll’s work to explores the term in 
everyday language. Stroll’s findings demonstrate that there are different 
conceptions of “surface,” which can be divided into two general groups: abstract 
and physical conceptions.78 Using Stroll’s conceptions as a reference, this thesis 
argues that it is possible to define surface with an essential thickness or an integral 
depth. Moreover, both the ordinary person’s point of view and the scientific 
conception includes foreign layers such as paint and patina as the surfaces of the 
object. This means that for most viewers what architects refer to as “cladding” or 
“skin” can easily be the surfaces of architecture. This usage of the term suggests a 
much more continuous relationship between surface effects and the architectural 
object. Thus, what some architects and commentators define as the “ornamental 
layer” “cladding,” or “skin,” (with an implied detachability and superficiality which 
arises from an enforced binary hierarchical relationship to “structure” or material 
“flesh” of buildings), can be defined as the “surfaces” of architecture, without which 
architecture would not be recognisable.  
                                                      
78 See Avrum Stroll, Surfaces, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988, pp. 39-60 
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Semper argued that the origins of architecture are in the hanging carpet 
that represented individual creativity, cultural identity and festive spirit. Structure 
served to support this “textile wall.”79 This thesis appropriates Semper’s theory to 
argue that buildings like Gehry’s BGM are built upon the same primitive formula, 
but more importantly, they suggest that architecture is in fact the creation of 
expressive, space-making surfaces, rather than the cladding or fashioning of space-
making structures.  
Stroll’s work demonstrates that there is no one definition for surface, 
indicating the flexibility and pliability of the term in everyday usage.  Rather than 
seeing this as a case for “piecemeal realism,” this dissertation argues that in the 
context of creative production, this pliability is an opportunity for further 
theorisation and exploration of architectural surfaces. Having this in mind, and 
following the closure of Platonic thought discussed in chapter three, the thesis 
arrives at chapter five entitled An Alternative Approach to Surface, Image and 
Appearance. This chapter introduces Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy as a more 
appropriate alternative to the transcendental hierarchy80 of Platonic thought. This 
chapter is based on the proposition that Deleuze uses topological and geological 
conceptions of surface in order to formulate a surficial philosophy that collapses 
hierarchy without abolishing difference.  
Deleuze and Guattari develop numerous philosophical concepts in an 
attempt to formulate a complex philosophy that shifts the emphasis from comparison 
to origin based on criteria of similitude, to exploration of processes of becoming based on an 
appreciation of originary difference. This is argued to have important ramifications for 
refining attitudes towards images and appearance (in architecture). Moreover, 
surficial philosophy formulates an understanding of reality that includes 
imagination, illusion and effect. This thesis suggests that a surficial approach to 
architecture promotes a non-hierarchical and a non-perpendicular voyage of 
thought that is more in tune with surfaces, images and appearances. This is 
contrasted to the perpendicular, transcendent or penetrative movement of thought 
that is attributed to traditional approaches. The thesis argues that a surficial 
approach necessitates a “haptic eye” that offers a more affirmative and exploratory 
                                                      
79 Gottfried Semper “The Four Elements of Architecture” in The Four Elements of Architecture 
and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 74-130, p. 104 
80 Hierarchy based on transcendence as the belief that the (superficial) visible realm must be 
surpassed to arrive at (essential) origin or the intelligible realm.   
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attitude towards architectural design, criticism and education. This is because in 
surficial thought categories do not exist in rigid striation, but instead they are in 
constant transformation within a smooth mixture that constitutes complex reality.  
With this in mind, this chapter introduces a number of philosophical 
concepts in order to express the smooth conceptual milieu of surficial thought. The 
purpose of this chapter is not an exhaustive exposition of the ramifications of each 
concept for architecture, instead to map out an unfamiliar theoretical approach that 
relies on such concepts to destabilise traditional models of thought and construct 
new alternatives.  
Chapter six is titled Surficial Architecture: The Case of the Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum. In this chapter the thesis returns to architecture, specifically 
Gehry’s museum from which many of the themes of the research began. This 
chapter deploys surficial thought to gain a new perspective on this particular 
architectural case that has not only been successful in responding to its brief, but it 
has also become an iconic monument to the significance of surface, images and 
appearances in contemporary architecture.  This chapter attributes the popularity of 
Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum to a primitivism that is in fact highly 
postmodern, while it associates its unpopularity for some critics (like Hal Foster), to 
conceptual slipperiness, enigmatic ambiguity and the perpetual exteriority of such 
surface architecture.  
This chapter questions whether the formal logic of Gehry’s architecture lies 
in the tectonic relationship between “skin” and “armature,” or instead its logic 
arises from a definition of architecture as continuous skin, or folded surface, which 
suggests a different relationship with the internal, external and the virtual 
environment that it creates. Gehry’s design process can offer important clues. For 
example, it is significant that after sketching some preliminary thoughts on paper, 
Gehry continued to model the building with paper, a thin and pliable material that 
inspired the surfaces of the finished museum. Computer technology also has an 
important part to play, both in translating the models into final construction and 
also by modelling them in virtual reality, allowing more comprehensive interior 
views and the possibility of applying numerous modifications in real time.  
This chapter follows the proposition that what transforms in Gehry’s 
design process is the skin, or the thick surface, from its beginnings as paper to its 
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virtualisation in the computer and its construction in titanium. This process is based 
on the logic of surfaces and significance of their effects. Moreover, by trusting paper 
and its transformation through different media, Gehry creates a consistent 
architectural process. It is therefore not surprising that Thomas Krens declares that 
Gehry has “a greater faith in the process than any other architect,”81 a design 
process that Antonino Saggio calls “Skin in.”82  
If the BGM’s design logic problematizes the relationship between skin and 
structure, it is because despite tradition, it doesn’t define skin according to the order 
of construction, i.e. the logic of structure. In this sense, Gehry’s work invokes 
Semper’s theories, who saw the pliable textile wall as the primary site of 
architectural creativity. Like surface, the term “skin” is often used in opposition to 
bones or flesh and always with the human body in mind. Not only are there many 
skins that are alien,83 with different priorities in relation to the body, but also skin 
has a more fundamental relationship to the body than a mere sack that interiorizes 
the organs. After all, what is a body without a skin? Can a skin-less body still be 
defined as one? Similarly, what is architecture without surfaces or visual effects?  
This thesis argues that it is possible to think of Gehry’s BGM as continuous, 
folded skin, in which every element operates as an exteriority, which through folds 
and unfolds creates interiority. In other words, the BGM is likened to a Möbius 
strip, continuously connecting, producing and transforming different architectural 
categories. In Gehry’s museum steel girders follow the same logic of folding as the 
titanium surfaces, as there is nothing to hide because everything is “hides and 
skin.”84 
Foster blames the computer for facilitating a direct translation of the 
architect’s designs without resistance, resulting in individual self-indulgence or 
                                                      
81 Thomas Krens quoted in Bruce Lindsey, Digital Gehry: Material Resistance / Digital 
Construction, Birkhäuser, Basel, 2001, p. 42 
82 See Antonino Saggio “Flying Carpets,” preface for Digital Gehry: Material Resistance / 
Digital Construction, pp. 5-9, p.8 
83 The diversity of skins in the animal kingdom is remarkable. Familiar examples of what can 
be called “alien” skins are the skin of chameleons or even squid that change colour both for 
camouflage and for communication.  
84 Mark C. Taylor’s quote is deliberately modified to omit implications of loss or nostalgia: 
“As Le Corbusier suggests, once surface is liberated, it quickly becomes all-consuming. If 
nothing separates inside from outside, skeleton and skin converge; there is no longer 
anything to hide because nothing remains but hides and skins.... When surface consumes 
depth, everything is turned inside out.” Taylor, Mark C., Hiding, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago; London, 1997, p. 188 
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tectonic obscurity.85 However, in chapter five, the thesis argues that surficial 
thought allows for an affirmative critical point of view that encourages exploratory 
experimentation by emphasising the immanent potential in new techniques and 
creative endeavours.86 Whether Gehry’s museum is a result of a continuously 
transforming design process or the inflated ego of a starchitect, it is nevertheless 
important to note that the success and popularity of the BGM supports the theory 
that architecture is an art of surfacing.    
Chapter seven is titled Conclusions: Exploring Surface as Medium. This 
chapter summarises the arguments and marks the end of this study.  
1.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Contemplation on architecture can bring certain philosophical issues into relief, 
while simultaneously philosophical concepts can have important ramifications for 
architectural design. With this in mind, the thesis follows a line of enquiry based on 
the analysis and synthesis of different concepts that are extracted from 
philosophical texts or constructed through reflection on a particular architectural 
project.  
The intention of this research is not to conduct a historical survey of texts. 
Instead, the thesis attempts to highlight an interrelated web of concepts that indicate 
a particular model of thought which is determined to go beyond surface 
appearances. Faced with the expansive complexity of the subject matter, the thesis 
ploughs established theories in order to germinate a new theoretical proposition 
that provokes them. Therefore, the research approach necessitates a shift of 
emphasis from clarification to problematization and it often adopts a rationale that 
seems unfamiliar or at odds with convention. 
The study begins with the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum and uses it to 
highlight a series of concepts in architectural theory. In the next step, the roots of 
such concepts are traced back to classical thought followed by an elaboration of 
                                                      
85 Foster, Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes, p. 40 
86 Today, new technologies allow for new design processes, while new materials and 
construction technologies inspire unforeseen ways of creating architecture. Contemporary 
design processes embrace chance while algorithmic processes allow the computer to inject 
controlled randomness into the design process. It is therefore possible to argue that such 
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches can in fact suggest that the ego of the 
architect or his intention is becoming less dominant. 
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recent philosophical approaches that attempt to overcome such traditional models 
of thought. Utilizing these approaches, the thesis generates a particular theoretical 
attitude to architecture, which is then related to the particular architectural case 
from which the journey began.  
The architectural case and its criticism bracket the concepts that are 
explicated throughout the research. Therefore, the thesis is not based on a case study 
in the traditional sense, which would involve a detailed empirical analysis of the 
building, but rather an “exemplifying case”87 that acts as a catalyst for conceptual 
exploration and a binding agent that unites the various philosophical concepts. In 
this sense, the particular architectural project allows the different elements of the 
research to relate to each other.   
The research picks up on themes of interest from the author’s previous 
projects including a dissertation entitled “The Symbolic Surface: A Study of 
Cosmological Representation in the Islamic Architecture of Iran” (2001)88 and a thesis 
project entitled “Morphed Topologies: Osthafen Film Studio, Berlin” (2003).89 The former 
was an investigation of the symbolic significance of ornament in traditional 
architecture of Iran; the latter was a proposed film studio for Berlin, which explored 
the transformation of the moving image into architectural form.90    
Combining elements from these previous research projects, the thesis 
adopts a strategy that places more emphasis on proposition than definition. This is 
                                                      
87 According to Alan Brynam “Much case study takes place on what might be called the 
exemplifying case. Cases are often chosen not because they are extreme or unusual in some 
way but because they will provide a suitable context for certain research questions to be 
answered.” Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004, p. 51.  
88 Submitted for MA (Hons) in Architectural Design.  
89 Submitted for Masters of Architecture at the University of Edinburgh.  
90 This was a project based in Osthafen, Berlin, which proposed a film studio to supplement 
Berlin’s already established Babelsburg film studio. In this thesis project (which was a 
collaborative endeavour with Kamil Ariff Malek Shah) the author explored the themes of 
surface, skin and image in order to design an appropriate conceptual expression for the film 
studio. The end result was a series of architectural volumes with topological skins distorted 
by images taken from a video of Berlin, captured on the U-Bahn. Individual images of this 
film were selected and projected onto spatial “blocks” that were painted with photographic 
emulsion. Because of the projective process, the images were often distorted once they 
affected the surfaces of the blocks. However, this was seen as a welcome distortion and 
accepted as part of the transformation of the city to an architectural surface via the 
photographic image. Once the architectural blocks were “tattooed” with images of the city, 
the next step was to let the images “melt” the rigid surfaces. This was done manually and 
with a degree of interpretation. The final result was a series of architectural propositions 
based on a photo-cinematic design process. 
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argued to be more in tune with architectural design and creativity. The thesis 
contributes to existing knowledge by constructing a conceptual bricolage that draws 
on components from various sources. The contribution of the author is detectable in 
the selection of the constituting elements, the analysis and exegesis of the theoretical 
texts, and the composition of the disparate elements to develop an alternative 
theoretical attitude towards architecture (in general) and the architectural case (in 
particular).  
The structure of the thesis is illustrated by the diagram below, which 
implies a flattening of the linear hierarchy of the text in order to indicate the 
interconnectedness of the different chapters and the themes discussed therein.  
 
Figure 1.6: Structure of thesis diagram. Source: the author. 
The thesis has been divided into three phases of operation. Part one can be broadly 
described as the analysis phase in which conceptual “problems” are defined with 
specific reference to existing theories in architecture and philosophy. Part two is the 
synthesis phase, which formulates the proposition using concepts borrowed from 
philosophy and architectural theory. Part three summarizes the propositions and 
introduces new concepts for further research opportunities.  
The seven chapters are distributed asymmetrically in relation to the 
aforementioned parts. Chapter one operates in conjunction with the preface, both 
acting as a gateway into the research. Chapters 1, 4 and 7 regulate the movement of 
the hypothesis by introducing new concepts and concluding the discussion 
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inherited from previous sections. Chapters 2 and 6 elaborate on theories and 
concepts that can be directly related to architecture and its techno-cultural context. 
Chapters 3 and 5 are concerned with concepts and theories that relate to philosophy, 
and which are used by the thesis to formulate a different approach to architectural 
theory and praxis. Chapter seven and the epilogue conclude the thesis and relate it 
to other themes reserved for later research.  
The diagram above is not intended to be an accurate representation of the 
structure of the idea, but rather an abstract illustration of how the research findings 
are presented through a series of chapters that can relate to each other in non-
sequential ways. As the thesis progresses and the themes of research are elaborated, 
the number of interactions increases. For instance, chapter one can only relate to 
three other (two, three and four) while chapters two and three can relate to four 
other chapters. As the thesis progresses into the proposition phase, the number of 
relationships reaches its maximum with chapter four making contact with six other 
chapters.91 Though chapter four is not an extended piece, it nonetheless introduces 
surface as a material entity and a philosophical concept with variable definitions. 
After realising that a single accurate definition cannot be reached, the thesis uses the 
remaining chapters to explore the possibility of using geological and topological 
conceptions of surface to formulate an alternative theoretical approach to 
architectural design and criticism. As the thesis progresses towards its final chapters 
the various concepts are brought together in order to draw legible conclusions. 
Thus, the thesis begins with themes and questions arising from architecture which 
are then explored in architectural theory and philosophy before coming full circle to 
architecture, from which the journey started.  
                                                      
91 The adjacency of the squares is an indication of greater interaction, only if the chapters 
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For all the apparent futurism of the CATIA designs, these structures are akin to the Statue 
of Liberty, with a separate skin hung over a hidden armature, and with exterior surfaces that 
rarely match up with interior spaces. (This comparison might not be fair to the Statue of 
Liberty, for it involves an innovative interplay between structure and skin, whereas Gehry 
allows his skin to dominate his structure). Again, Gehry is frequently associated with Serra, 
but Serra exposes the construction of his sculptures for all to see, and Gehry is often 





I have always thought that this building, in a shape resembling Gaudi’s modernism and, 
going even further back in time, the Baroque tradition of Borromini, was merely a screen 
building, a decoration inscribed on splendid scenography; the Abandoibarra neighbourhood 
of Bilbao, next to a river, a (steel) bridge, and a valley and almost inventing a new genre of 
architectural sculpture or urban architecture: a ‘landscape of image.’ And all this was 
thought up closely in line with a spectacle-based society and cultural tourism.93 
 
Anna Maria Guasch  
 
                                                      
92 Hal Foster, “Master Builder”, Design and Crime and Other Diatribes, Verso, 2003, pp. 37-8 
93 Anna Maria Guasch, “Global Museums versus Local Artists: Paradoxes of Identity 
Between Local and Global Understanding” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, University 
of Nevada Press, 2005, p. 195 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER TWO 
Taking Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum as a point of departure, this chapter 
investigates some of the conceptual terminologies with which commentators and 
critics analyse contemporary architecture. If the BGM is accused of allowing the 
“skin” to dominate the “structure,” or it is considered a “decorated duck” in 
reference to Venturi’s metaphors, it is important to elaborate the theories that 
inspire such terminologies in the first place. Given the scope and diversity of the 
topic, a detailed history of the different manifestations of these concepts would be 
extraneous to the present project. This chapter is therefore not intended to be an 
exhaustive historical survey. Instead, it presents a constellation of themes, concepts 
and theories that would be relevant for understanding the established logic that 
undervalues surfaces, images and effects and favour of structure, reality or 
transparency. Thus, the chronological nature of this chapter is more an 
organisational device than an indication of method.  
The intention in collecting and laying out a range of concepts is twofold. 
First by analysing their mode of operation, this thesis will define a critical position, 
which will be developed in later chapters. The second purpose of this chapter is to 
begin a conceptual groundwork for a philosophical exploration, which will be used 
to theorise an alternative approach to the aforementioned architectural concepts and 
the case study.  
The chapter is structured into three sections. The first section of this chapter 
demonstrates the theoretical separation of ornament from structure and the 
modernist understanding of transparency. This section follows the themes of 
covering and uncovering that are implicated by the metaphor of clothing. The 
second section of this chapter shifts the discussion to notions of image and its 
technological reproduction, focusing on influential theories of image. This section 




2.1 MASKING SURFACES: “CLOTHED” STRUCTURE AND THE 
“DECORATED SHED” 
The appearance of a building is highly important not only for the architect, but also 
for the client, the end-user, the general public, and sometimes for establishing 
cultural identity or national pride. Seeing a building (whether in situ or as an image) 
marks the first moment of interaction, interpretation and judgement and as a result 
every architect invests considerable effort to respond to certain standards of beauty 
and style. Precisely because making a good first impression is important, most 
radical shifts in architectural theory (modernism, postmodernism, and even 
deconstruction) involve a refashioning of visual effects or architectural style.  
The appearance of a building is often discussed in opposition to the way it 
is constructed, which is often associated with “the reality of things.” Notions of 
“skin,” “cladding,” “ornament,” or “image,” are often contrasted to that which lies 
beneath or beyond: either the structure that allows appearances to exist or the 
originary model, of which appearances are mere copies. Furthermore, there is the 
general opposition between form and function, popularised by the modernist motto: 
form (ever) follows function. If the one opposition is based on reinforcing the 
hierarchy of construction, the other is preoccupied with determining the functional 
value of images and visual effects. 
In architectural discourses, talk of appearances manifests itself in different 
debates. One of the most influential of these is the discussion of ornament and the 
metaphors of design that are related to it. Following this discourse leads to notions 
of cladding, dressing or clothing that were theorised by early modernists in their 
quest for a refashioning of ornament and style in architecture. On the one hand, 
such theories were responsible for popularising the image of architecture as a naked 
(structural) body that must be clothed. This resulted in the separation of visual 
expression (form) from the function of architecture, where surface effects were 
valued by the logic of structure or the order of construction. On the other hand such 
theories inspired the postmodern concepts of “duck” and “decorated shed” which 
continued the binary opposition evident in the modernist manifestos. 
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2.1.1 The Textile Wall and the Metaphor of Clothing  
If Foster’s essay in Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes (2005) warns against 
spectacle-effects and the reduction of architecture into image and capital, over a 
hundred years ago Adolf Loos’s essay “Ornament and Crime” (1908) warned 
against the degeneration of architecture through excessive ornamentation.  Both 
essays rely on conceptions of ornament and spectacle that imply an act of covering: 
the modernist formulation of ornament as a layer of clothing or cladding,94 
dismisses interior surfaces, accusing ornament of covering something more 
authentic, while the conception of spectacle as an autonomous image implies an 
appearance that masks the viewer from authentic reality.95 
 In the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb “clothing” is defined as “the 
action of covering or providing with clothes; dressing.”96 The important element in 
this definition is covering which implies opacity and concealment. In normal use, 
clothing is a layer, which is not only detached from the body, but it is also of a 
different material and of a different nature. Clothing can easily be taken off and 
replaced with another layer. It is a temporary commodity associated with style, 
fashion, gender and social status.  
The term “cladding” has a similar nature. According to the OED, cladding 
is “a coating or covering applied to the surface of an object, a building, etc.; the 
application of such a covering.” Like clothing, cladding implies detachability and 
covering. It is a layer that is applied afterwards and can be removed in order to 
expose the underlying, originary body. Both clothing and cladding are terms that 
denote the upper and outer layer, which is foreign and separate from the primary 
architectural elements. This thesis argues that such words shift the emphasis from 
surface expression to notions of masking, hiding or covering, which depreciates the 
significance of surfaces and their effects by associating them with obscurity and 
deceit. Moreover, the metaphor of clothing instigates a binary hierarchical system in 
which surfaces and surface effects become secondary to primary elements, like 
structure or natural materials.   
                                                      
94 See www.oed.com accessed November 2008.  
95 This conception of the spectacle will be discussed at length later in this chapter.  
96 See www.oed.com accessed November 2008. 
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Although the conception of architecture as clothing can be traced back to 
Vitruvius or even earlier,97 the point of departure for this discussion is Loos’s “Law 
of Dressing” (Gesetz der Bekleidung] which in turn is a direct reference to Gottfried 
Semper’s “Principle of Dressing” [Prinzip der Bekelidung] formulated in the mid-
nineteenth century. Loos’s theorisation of ornament represented a shift of emphasis 
from Semper’s theories and became influential for the “modernist movement” in 
architecture. However, before elaborating Loos’s approach, it is important to devote 
some time to Semper’s theories, which were an important influence for his 
successors.    
Semper (1803-1879) was an architect and a theoretician who formulated his 
ideas in nineteenth century Europe when developments in archaeology, 
ethnography and philology had revealed new facts about the art of the ancients. He 
was interested in the origins of architecture, which he thought was shared between 
different cultures and styles. Being poised between the traditional architecture of 
“poets” and the industrial architecture of the “polytechnicians,”98 Semper sought to 
understand the essence of architecture in order to reconcile the differing viewpoints 
and practices with each other. 
As an antithesis to Laugier’s illustration of the “Primitive Hut,” Semper 
associated the origins of architecture with the production of decorative textiles, 
rather than structural elements like walls or pillars.99 According to Semper, 
architecture did not originate in the construction of a wooden shelter that is later 
supplemented by ornamental layers, “rather, it was with all the simplicity of its 
basic forms highly decorated and glittering from the start, since its childhood.”100 
                                                      
97 See Bradley Quinn, The Fashion of Architecture, Berg Publishers, 2003, p. 2. See also Marcus 
Vitruvius Pollio, The Ten Books on Architecture, trans. Morris H. Morgan, Kessinger 
Publishing, 2005, 5, p. 284  
98 In Rykwert’s words young artists in the nineteenth century were gradually moving away 
from their guilds and assembling in academies, but more importantly, in schools, the artists 
“shifted their attention from creating objects intended to edify, move or excite the spectator, 
and concentrated on an authentic expression of individual vision, in which the artist’s 
relation to the spectator through the object became increasingly less important…”Thus, 
architects separated into the two groups of the “poets” and the “Polytechnicians” who 
developed different understandings of beauty and decoration. Joseph Rykwert, “Ornament 
is no Crime” in The Necessity of Artifice, Academy Eds., London, 1982, pp. 92-101, p. 93 
99 See Marc-Antoine Laugier’s Essay On Architecture 1755, trans by Wolfgang and Anne 
Herrmann, Hennessey & Ingalls, Los Angeles, 1977  
100 Gottfried Semper, “Preliminary Remarks on Polychrome Architecture and Sculpture in 
Antiquity,” in Harry Francis Mallgrave and Wolfgang Herrmann, The Four Elements of 
Architecture and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 45-73, p. 52 
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Moreover, Semper argued that in early buildings, the colourful textile was the 
primary architectural element and the supporting structure had a secondary 
function in space-making: 
Hanging carpets remained the true walls, the visible boundaries of space. 
The often solid walls behind them were necessary for reasons that had 
nothing to do with the creation of space; they were needed for security, for 
supporting a load, for their permanence, and so on. Wherever the need for 
these secondary functions did not arise, the carpets remained the original 
means of separating space. Even where building solid walls became 
necessary, the latter were only the inner, invisible structure hidden behind 
the true and legitimate representatives of the wall, the colourful woven 
carpets.101 
Central to Semper’s arguments were the ethnographic data, which he used to 
demonstrate that the production of textile wall mats came before the development of 
clothing. This realisation liberated weaving from its traditional definition as a 
simple technique to cover the body, while simultaneously freeing the textile wall 
from subservience to the body, the binary hierarchy between genders and the 
dilemma of style, which all became pronounced in the metaphor of clothing.  
By associating the beginning of architecture with textiles, Semper implied a 
close connection between architecture and clothing (or dressing).102 However, in his 
theories, architecture does not follow the logic of clothing, rather it is clothing that 
follows the logic of architecture. Semper argued that before the invention of clothing, 
the woven textile designated spatial boundaries, established the idea of family and 
the very first notion of social community. Moreover, as primitive dwellings took 
shape, the motifs and patterns on the textile surfaces began to communicate social, 
cultural and ideological identity.103 Therefore, for Semper the production of the 
colourful woven surface marks the first instance of architectural production: “…the 
beginning of building coincides with the beginning of textiles.”104  
                                                      
101 Gottfried Semper “The Four Elements of Architecture” in The Four Elements of Architecture 
and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 74-130, p. 104 
102 Semper drew on the similarities of the German word for wall (Wand) and dress (Gewand) 
to arrive at his “Principle of Dressing” as the “true essence” of architecture. In a footnote he 
writes: “The German word Wand [wall], paries, acknowledges its origin. The terms Wand and 
Gewand [dress] derive from a single root. They indicate the woven material that formed the 
wall.” See Semper, “The Four Elements of Architecture” in The Four Elements of Architecture 
and Other Writings, p. 104 
103 See Gottfried Semper, “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in 
The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, pp. 181-263, p. 254 
104 Gottfried Semper, “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The 
Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, p. 254  
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Semper’s primitive textile wall is different from a clothed wall because it is 
a unitary concept. In this conception, the textile wall is a double-sided architectural 
surface that is responsible for the demarcation of space and the visual expression of 
personal and cultural motifs. A clothed wall however, segregates the outer layer 
that either covers the body of architecture or creates a visual construct that is foreign 
to the primary architectural elements. Although Semper used terms like dressing or 
mask, he nonetheless emphasised creative surface expression and symbolic 
communication. For him the dissimulation of how appearances are constructed was 
a sign of “high artistic development:” 
I think that the dressing and the mask are as old as human civilization, and 
the joy in both is identical with the joy in those things that drove men to be 
sculptors, painters, architects, poets, musicians, dramatists, in short, artists. 
Every artistic creation, every artistic pleasure presupposes a certain 
carnival spirit, or to express myself in a modern way – the haze of carnival 
candles is the true atmosphere of art. …The untainted feeling led primitive 
man to the denial of reality in all early artistic endeavours; the great, true 
masters of art in every field returned to it – only these men in times of high 
artistic development also masked the material of the mask. 105  
For Semper, the development of the wall as we know it today, was a response to the 
need for a warmer, more solid and durable support behind the textile surface.  This 
had the effect of making the textile a dressing layer, which later transformed to 
“surrogate dressings,” such as stucco, wood and metal plaques, terra cotta facings, 
or granite panelling. However, for Semper such dressings are not secondary layers, 
but instead other manifestations of the original textile wall which was responsible 
for the demarcation of space and the expression of artistic creativity. The structure 
that supports such surfaces is “foreign to the original idea of spatial enclosure.”106 
In other words, from Semper’s point of view, the originary architectural act 
occurs upon surfaces and through surface effects. The denial of reality by 
dissimulating the material of the mask is not ignorance or disregard for materiality 
                                                      
105 Semper “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four 
Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, p. 257 
106 In relation to modern construction materials, Semper writes: “The same is true for walls 
constructed out of unburnt bricks, stone, or any other building materials, all of which in 
their nature and use have absolutely no relation to the spatial concept. They were used for 
protection and defence, to secure permanence in the enclosure, or to serve as foundations 
and supports for the spatial enclosure above, for carrying stocks and other loads, in short, 
for reasons foreign to the original idea of spatial enclosure.” Semper, “Style in the Technical 
and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four Elements of Architecture and Other 
Writings, pp.254-5 
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or construction.107 On the contrary it is a “mastery” of materials, a detailed 
knowledge of construction through which materiality could be effaced. 
Consequently, architecture is the manipulation of surfaces, images and symbolic 
motifs, not just for the demarcation of space, but also for visualization, simulation 
and communication. Mark Wigley writes:  
[For Semper] Architecture begins with ornament...Strictly speaking, it is 
only the decoration that is structural. There is no building without 
decoration. It is decoration that builds... Space, house, and social structure 
arrive with ornament. The interior is not defined by a continuous enclosure 
of walls but by the folds, twists, and turns in an often discontinuous 
ornamental surface.108 
Semper posited a radical theory that Greek polychromy found its historical genesis 
in the primal act of carpet making: the art of the “wall fitter.”109 Thus, what the Neo-
classicists called the “high” art of ancient Greek monuments in their pristine 
whiteness, were not only originally polychrome, but they were also inspired by 
what his contemporaries would call “low” decorative arts, such as those of weaving 
and carpet making. For Semper Greek art and architecture was the result of gradual 
process of learning and absorption from other ancient civilisations.110 In a direct 
statement against theories that declared the independence of Hellenic art, he wrote:  
                                                      
107 Semper clarifies this by emphasising the necessary mastery of materials: “Masking does 
not help, however, when behind the mask the thing is false or the mask is no good. In order 
that the material, the indispensable (in the usual sense of the expression) be completely 
denied in the artistic creation, its complete mastery is the imperative precondition. Only by 
complete technical perfection, by judicious and proper treatment of the material according to 
its properties, and by taking these properties into consideration while creating form can the 
material be forgotten, can the artistic creation be completely freed from it, and can even a 
simple landscape painting be raised to a high work of art.” Semper, “Style in the Technical 
and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four Elements of Architecture and Other 
Writings, pp. 257-8 
108 Mark Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 2001, p. 11 
109 Thus, for Semper, the perfection of the wall as an element (idea or motive) of architecture, 
took place in ancient Assyria and Persia, cultures that were famed for their colourful 
tapestries. Semper, “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The 
Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, p. 258. 
110 “The most significant result of these latest conquests in art history is the collapse of an 
outdated scholarly theory that has been impeding the understanding of the antique world to 
no end, according to which Hellenic art was considered a native growth of the soil of Greece 
– although it was simply the magnificent bloom, the culminating goal, the end result of an 
ancient formative principle whose roots, so to speak, were widespread and deeply planted 
in the soil of all lands that had been the seats of the social system in antiquity.” Semper, 
“Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four Elements of 
Architecture and Other Writings, p. 247. 
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Yet critics call them barbaric and do not concede that the Greeks could 
have covered such delicately shaped profiles with paint. On the contrary, 
the monuments have become monochrome through barbarism. All periods 
of high artistic accomplishment agree in the disputed principle of 
polychromy. The Greeks, the Moors, the Normans, the Byzantines and pre-
Goths, even the Gothic masters themselves practiced it. How harsh and 
unfair it is to reproach such times as barbaric because their views of art 
deviate from our own! It is really not possible that we could be in error? 
Would it not be fair to think of the possibility, at least, that what appears to 
us bizarre, glaring, gaudy, and glittering would no longer be so if we 
looked at it with less stupid eyes?111 
Semper elevated surface expression above structural necessity and associated the 
essence of monumental architecture with the stage apparatus “covered with 
decorations ... adorned with festoons and garlands, fluttering banners and 
trophies.”112 This he argued is the “motive of the permanent monument which is 
intended to recount for coming generations the festive act and the event 
celebrated.”113 This was a theory in which ornament and surface expression was 
seen as defining architecture and forming an important aspect of human interaction, 
rather than a secondary act of frivolous superficiality.  
Moreover, by associating weaving with architecture before the invention of 
clothing, Semper’s theory of the textile wall avoided the hierarchies of gender and 
the detachability of clothing. The textile wall allocated the essence of architecture to 
the visible surface, rather than a hidden depth. Thus, Mark Wigley writes “[In 
Semper’s theory] Everything is in the surface.... Occupying a space does not involve 
passing through some kind of opening in the surface, like a door, to find an interior. 
To occupy is to wrap yourself in the sensuous surface.”114  
Semper’s theories became a source of inspiration for the architects that 
followed him. However, his textile wall was quickly replaced with clothed structure. 
If the woven wall was a double-sided surface, the clothed wall became one-sided, 
viewed mainly from the outside. This meant that ornament transformed from 
surface expression to a foreign layer that covered the primary elements of 
architecture. Thus, instead of thickening the visual surface to accommodate the 
                                                      
111 Semper, “Preliminary Remarks on Polychrome Architecture” in The Four Elements of 
Architecture and Other Writings, p. 59. 
112 Semper, “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four 
Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, pp. 255-6. 
113 Semper, “Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics” in The Four 
Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, p. 256 
114 Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, p. 25 
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necessity for solidity and warmth, ornamental surfaces were thinned-out as they 
were declared superficial layers that were detachable from the body of architecture.  
Gradually, Semper’s celebratory approach towards colour, ornament and 
surface expression changed into the modernists’ quest for the standardization of 
fashion, the modernisation of clothing, and the clarification of gender hierarchy. 
Amongst those who were responsible for this shift, were Adolf Loos, and Le 
Corbusier whose writings on ornament, clothing and style became highly influential 
for the modernist movement.  
2.1.1.1 A Modern Suit for Architecture 
Both Loos and Le Corbusier were influenced by Semper’s “Principle of Dressing” 
and his theory of the textile origins of architecture.115 Loos admits that “[t]he 
covering is the oldest architectural detail”116 or “cladding is older even than 
structure.”117 However, he advocates a break from the past through the removal of 
excessive ornament from architecture. In the process Loos devalues surface 
ornamentation by regarding it as a primitive act and a sign of degradation. In 
“Ornament and Crime” (1908), he writes: 
One can measure the culture of a country by the degree to which its 
lavatory walls are daubed. With children it is a natural phenomenon: their 
first artistic expression is to scrawl on the walls erotic symbols. But what is 
natural to the Papuan and the child is a symptom of degeneration in the 
modern man. I have made the following observation and have announced 
it to the world: the evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of 
ornament from objects of daily use.118 
Unlike Semper who associates ornamentation with the origins of architecture, Loos 
associates ornament with the primitive, defined as an uncultured and a backward 
state. Words like “daubed” or “lavatory walls” indicate Loos’s conception of 
                                                      
115 Loos’s “Law of Dressing” is a direct reference to Semper’s “Principle of Dressing.” See 
Loos’s “Das Prinzip der Bekleidung,” Neue Freie Presse, September 4, 1898, translated as “The 
Principle of Cladding” by Jane O. Newman and John H. Smith in Adolf Loos, Spoken into the 
Void: Collected Essays 1897-1900, pp. 66-69, p. 67. Bekleidung is being translated here as 
“dressing” following Mallgrave and Herrmann’s translation rather than Newman and 
Smith’s translation as “cladding.” (For the notes on this issue, see Gottfried Semper, The Four 
Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, translated by Harry Francis Mallgrave and 
Wolfgang Herrmann, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 293 See also Adolf 
Loos, Spoken into the Void, p. 139. 
116 Loos, “The Principle of Cladding” in Spoken into the Void Collected Essays 1897-1900, p. 66 
117 Loos, “The Principle of Cladding” in Spoken into the Void Collected Essays 1897-1900, p. 67 
118 Ludwig Müenz and Gustav Küenstler. Adolf Loos: Pioneer of Modern Architecture, Thames 
and Hudson, London, 1966, pp. 226-7 
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ornament as a repulsive, superficial layer that is applied well after the construction 
of the wall. If for Semper ornament represented the textile origins of architecture 
and the primary role of the wall as a symbolic, communicative and space-defining 
surface, for Loos, ornamentation was a sign of degeneration associated with a 
criminal’s tattoo or the immaturity of a child:    
When man is born, his instincts are those of a new-born dog. His childhood 
runs through all the changes corresponding to the history of mankind. At 
the age of two he looks like a Papuan, at four like one of an ancient 
Germanic tribe, at six like Socrates, at eight like Voltaire…The child is 
amoral. To us the Papuan is also amoral....The Papuan tattoos his skin, his 
boat, his rudder, his oars; in short, everything he can get his hands on. He 
is no criminal. The modern man who tattoos himself is a criminal or a 
degenerate….The urge to decorate one’s face and everything in reach is the 
origin of the graphic arts….But what is natural for a Papuan and a child, is 
degenerate fro modern man.119  
What occurs in Loos’s theories (which influences modernist manifestos) is a 
formulation of an attitude towards ornament as excessive or superfluous. However, 
Loos was not in favour of the complete removal of this covering layer. Instead, he 
advocated a particular style that was efficient, modern, civilized, and dignified. In 
order to illustrate his concepts, Loos compared ornamentation with clothing, 
specifically men’s clothing, which he argued was more advanced than women’s:  
The clothing of the woman is distinguished externally from that of the man 
by the preference for ornamental and colourful effects and by the long skirt 
that covers the legs completely. These two factors demonstrate to us that 
the woman has fallen behind sharply in her development in recent 
centuries.120 
If in Semper’s theory architecture was a woven unity, in Loos’s theory architecture 
becomes a clothed entity, the outer layer of which suffers from conceptual out-
siding, binary opposition and hierarchy. Loos’s position on clothing clarifies his attitude 
towards ornament in architecture. However, unlike Semper’s textile wall, the 
metaphor of clothing implies a difference between the feminine and the masculine. 
The prejudices set up by Loos are clear: the long skirt of women’s clothing hinders 
function and the colourful ornamentations are mere “effects,” both indicating 
                                                      
119 Adolf Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular 
Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, edited by Bernie Miller and Melony Ward, XYZ Books, 
Los Angeles, 2002, p. 29 
120 Adolf Loos, "Ladies' Fashion," Neue Freie Presse, Aug. 21, 1898, in Adolf Loos: Spoken 
into the Void, Collected Essays. 1897-1900, MIT Press Cambridge, Mass. 1982, p. 102. 
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primitivity and degeneration. Men’s clothing on the other hand is superior because 
it is modest and muted, not absent:  
Primitive men had to differentiate themselves by various colours, modern 
man needs his clothes as a mask. His individuality is so strong that it can 
no longer be expressed in terms of items of clothing. The lack of ornament 
is a sign of intellectual power.121 
Loos saw “good” clothing as a neutral, masking layer that must not be a disguise. 
He prohibited confusion by banning simulation. Dressing must not simulate the 
materials they cover, they should only “reveal clearly their own meaning as 
dressing for the wall surface,” identifying their separation from structure. Thus, 
“wood may be painted any colour except one – the colour of wood.”122 The key 
themes are honesty to materials, transparence of communication and a desire for 
authenticity, which prohibits simulation. The transparence of communication 
however, is not literal transparency or nakedness, it is rather truthfulness and 
clarity of expression. Loos believed that by dressing correctly and preserving his 
integrity, the modern man must adhere to the cultural essence of civilized society. 
His theories demonstrate an attempt to develop an architectural style that conforms 
to the aesthetic tastes of the dominant majority. This majority however is not a 
quantitative majority of numbers, but a qualitative majority determined by power 
or cultural superiority.  
Many architects of early twentieth century were inspired by Loos’s 
theories. The white walls of the International Style123 were not only a move towards 
notions of purity and clarity, but also an indication of the desire for a style of 
architecture that would have lasting appeal. Mark Wigley has demonstrated that 
despite common belief, the white walls of modernism that replaced the ornamental 
styles of nineteenth century were not naked, nor were they any different in their 
                                                      
121 Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular Culture 
in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, p. 36 
122 Loos, “The Principle of Cladding” in Spoken into the Void Collected Essays 1897-1900, p. 67.  
123 The term “International style” usually refers to the architectural style of the formative 
decades of Modernism. The origins of the term can be traced back to Henry-Russell 
Hitchcock and Philip Johnson’s book written to record the International Exhibition of 
Modern Architecture held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City in 1932 (which 
identified the common characteristics of modernist architecture). See also Henry-Russell 
Hitchcock and Philip Johnson, The International Style, W.W. Norton, Pennsylvania, USA, 
1966.  
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ornamental operation.124 According to Wigley, these thin layers of white paint, were 
in fact clothing architecture. Thus, “The modern building is only modern because it 
is like a modern outfit.”125   
The simplicity of the modernist outfit was not only a refashioning of an 
architectural style, but also a response to practical necessities. The greater need for 
mass housing after the world wars necessitated rapid construction in which 
ornamentation was regarded as costly and slow. If buildings were to be mass-
produced on an industrial scale, they would need to have simpler surface effects. 
Thus, the lack of ornament indicated efficiency and economy:  
The producer of ornament must work for twenty hours to obtain the same 
income of a modern labourer who works for eight hours… The lack of 
ornament results in reduced working hours and an increased wage.126  
The modernists promoted a new style for architecture represented by the “white 
suit” that was easily mass-produced and brought uniformity, the comfort of 
belonging and a sense of modernisation for the masses. Therefore, the advent of the 
modernist style and a combination of theoretical, technological and socio-political 
factors popularised the metaphor of clothing and established it as an enduring 
concept within architectural discourse.  
2.1.1.2 The Seductive Dress 
The metaphor of clothing implied notions of covering, but it simultaneously 
inspired its opposite: the concept of revealing. Both are necessary elements of the 
clothing metaphor. If most modern clothing hides certain aspects of the body, it is 
nonetheless designed in such a way that it reveals the presence of the body behind. 
It is for this reason that clothing is ordered and governed by the logic and the 
proportions of the human body.  
                                                      
124 Mark Wigley writes: “Although everyone seems to be everywhere concerned with the 
beauty and purity of the naked body of industrialized structures, modern architecture is not 
naked. From the beginning, it is painted white. ... What cannot be seen is the obvious. No 
matter how thin the coat of paint is, it is a still a coat. It is not simply inserted into the space 
vacated by clothing. It is itself a very particular form of clothing. And by sustaining a logic 
of clothing, modern architecture participates in many of the economies from which it so 
loudly announces its detachment.” Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of 
Modern Architecture, p. xviii 
125 Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, p. 156 
126 Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular Culture 
in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, p. 33 
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Amongst those who promoted revealing in the metaphor of clothing was 
Le Corbusier. According to Beatriz Colomina, Le Corbusier’s architecture was 
characterized by a desire for uncovering, exposure and the dominance of the gaze.127 
Unlike Loos for whom, men’s fashion was a model of modernity, for Le Corbusier, 
female clothing became applaudable because it exposed the charms of the body: 
Woman has preceded us. She has carried out the reform of her dress. She 
found herself at a dead end: to follow fashion and, then, give up the 
advantages of modern techniques, of modern life. … So, woman cut her 
hair and her skirts and her sleeves. She goes out bareheaded, bear-armed, 
with her legs free. And she can dress in five minutes. And she is beautiful; 
she seduces us with the charm of her graces of which the designers have 
admitted taking advantage. The courage, the liveliness, the spirit of 
invention with which woman has revolutionized her dress are a miracle of 
modern times. Thank you!128 
For Le Corbusier, women’s clothing is modern not only because it allows the body 
to move freely, but also because there is less of it. Women can go out “bareheaded, 
bear-armed" and their fashion is laudable because it reveals the “charms” of the 
body. Much like Loos, Le Corbusier does not promote total nudity; the transparency 
he applauds is limited and carefully orchestrated. In other words, Le Corbusier does 
not theorise the complete removal of the clothing layer. What he proposes is a 
progression towards the thinning out of this layer, which marks the beginning of 
seduction. Wigley writes:  
While Semper locates architecture in the supplementary layer, whitewash 
supposedly purifies architecture by eliminating the “superfluous” in 
favour of the “essential.” Le Corbusier’s infamous Vers une Architecture 
(Towards an architecture) of 1923 had already argued that the culture it 
promotes is one of “rejection, pruning, cleansing; the clear and naked 
emergence of the Essential.”129 For civilization to progress from the sensual 
to the visual, the sensuality of clothes has to be removed to reveal the 
formal outline, the visual proportion, of the functional body. ... But the 
body cannot be completely naked as that would be to return to the very 
realm of the sensual that has been abandoned. There is a need for some 
kind of screen that remodels the body as formal proportion rather than 
sensual animal, a veil with neither the sensuality of decoration nor the 
sensuality of the body. The whitewash is inserted between two threats in 
order to translate body into form.” 130  
                                                      
127 See Colomina, Privacy and Publicity, Modern Architecture as Mass Media, pp. 306-334 
128 Le Corbusier, Precisions on the Present State of Architecture and City Planning, The MIT 
Press, Camb. Mass.; London, pp. 106-107 
129 Le Corbusier, Vers une Architecture Translated by Frederick Etchells as Towards a New 
Architecture, John Rodker, London, 1931, p. 138 
130 Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, pp. 15-16 
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Loos saw seduction as a primitive and inferior act that produces unnatural effects.131 
The repression of such seduction by dressing architecture in a masculine suit was 
for Loos, the task of the modern architect.132 Le Corbusier maintained the same 
clothing metaphor, but he expressed it differently. Instead of covering the erotic 
body using a formal suit, Le Corbusier exposed the seductive body through a 
swimsuit. Both architects theorised surface ornament as a secondary layer in relation 
to the primary architectural body and both followed the traditional hierarchy 
between the genders: Loos advocated men’s clothing as superior, and aimed to 
create a masculine outfit for architecture, while Le Corbusier exposed the feminized 
architectural body to the penetrative gaze of men.133  
Le Corbusier’s “Law of Ripolin,” suggested a stripping of outdated 
ornamentation to expose the smooth modern object.134 But architecture was not left 
naked since the white paint remained as a thin “veil.”135 The coat of white paint was 
in fact a tool of control: at once banishing colour as a visible symbol of the feminine, 
and simultaneously orchestrating the exposure of the “charms” of the feminized 
architectural body. Thus, much like a white swimsuit, the thin layer of paint shifted 
the attention from surface expression to the architectural body that revealed itself 
through the thinned-out clothing.136  
                                                      
131 Loos writes: “Woman covered herself, she became a riddle to man, in order to implant in 
his heart the desire for the riddle’s solution….It is an unnatural love. If it were natural, the 
woman would be able to approach the man naked. But the naked woman is unattractive to 
the man. She may be able to arouse a man’s love, but not to keep it.” Adolf Loos, "Ladies' 
Fashion," Neue Freie Presse, Aug. 21, 1898, in Adolf Loos: Spoken into the Void, Collected 
Essays. 1897-1900, MIT Press Cambridge, Mass. 1982, pp. 98-103, p. 99 
132 Loos considered surface ornamentation as a sign of eroticism and degeneration:“The first 
ornament that came into being, the cross, had an erotic origin. The first work of art, the first 
artistic action of the first artist daubing on the wall, was in order to rid himself of his natural 
excesses. A horizontal line: the reclining woman. A vertical line: the man who penetrates 
her. The man who created it felt the same urge as Beethoven, he experienced the same joy 
that Beethoven felt when he created the Ninth Symphony. But the man of our time who 
daubs the walls with erotic symbols to satisfy an inner urge is a criminal or a degenerate. It 
is obvious that his urge overcomes man: such symptoms of degeneration most forcefully 
express themselves in public conveniences.” Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime 
and Ornament, The Arts and Popular Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, p. 29 
133 See Colomina, Privacy and Publicity, Modern Architecture as Mass Media 
134 Le Corbusier writes: “Imagine the results of the Law of Ripolin. Every citizen is required 
to replace his hangings, his damasks, his wall-papers, his stencils, with a plain coat of white 
ripolin.” Le Corbusier, The Decorative Art of Today, p. 188 quoted in Wigley, White Walls, 
Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, p. 15 
135 Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, p. 16 
136 “Flowers, sun, joy. Who is going to wear these beautiful bathing costumes created by our 
big stores? And how soon.” Illustration from Le Corbusier, La Ville Radieuse, 1935 included 
in Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern Architecture, p. 279. 
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Figure 2.1: The textile and the textile wall. Nomadic tent, central Asia.  












Figure 2.2: Clothing and clothed structure. Feminine and masculine suits. 
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The modernists decried ornamentation by associating it with uncivilized 
culture, femininity and degeneration.137 Whether promoting dignified covering or 
seductive exposure, modernists like Loos or Le Corbusier problematized the 
architectural surface through the metaphor of clothing and the binary hierarchies 
associated with it. Both approaches expressed a masculine drive for dominance: one 
wanting to control appearances, the other exploiting the power of the penetrative 
gaze.138  In either scenarios surface ornament is defined as a clothing layer, foreign 
to the architectural body, yet bound and regulated by it.  
Inspired by Semper’s “Principle of Dressing,” modernist theories revolved 
around the metaphor of clothing. However, if for Semper clothing followed 
architecture, for the modernists clothing inspired architecture. The promotion of 
white walls was not an abandonment of the ornamental clothing layer, rather its 
transformation into a standard tight fitting suit that exposed the contours of the 
architectural body. This meant that surface expression was reduced and controlled 
in favour of the structure that held it up. In Semper’s theory, architecture occurred 
upon the surfaces of the textile, the structure having a supportive role.  In early 
modernist theories however, textiles turned into clothing, and structure became a 
body (with gender and proportion), which began to dictate the clothing layer. Thus, 
when textiles walls changed to clothed structures, the architectural surface was 
trapped in a binary hierarchical system in which oppositional forces compete for 
dominance, often coming second to other architectural elements.  
2.1.2 Seeing Through Surfaces: “Literal and Phenomenal Transparency”  
While the metaphor of clothing in modernist theory led to visual restraint and a 
thinning of surface ornament as the superficial layer that covered the body of 
                                                      
137 Le Corbusier wrote: “Decoration is of a sensorial and elementary order, as is colour, and 
is suited to simple races, peasants and savages.... The peasant loves ornament and decorates 
his walls. The civilized man wears a well-cut suit and is the owner of easel pictures and 
books.” Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, p. 143 
138 For Le Corbusier the penetrative gaze is to be liberated, but only for men. The argument 
revolves around notion of comforts, yet the agenda is one of domination: “And What about 
us, men? A dismal state of affairs! In our dress clothes, we look like generals of the Grand 
Armee and we wear starched collars! We are uncomfortable....The English suit we wear had 
nevertheless succeeded in something important. It had neutralized us. It is useful to show a 
neutral appearance in the city. The dominant sign is no longer ostrich feathers in the hat, it is 
in the gaze. That’s enough.” Le Corbusier, Precisions on the Present State of Architecture and 
City Planning, p. 107 
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 architecture, the ideal of transparency inspired the penetration of such layers in 
order to reveal materiality, structural logic, architectural space or artistic intent.  
According to Anthony Vidler, Modernity has been haunted by “a myth of 
transparency...represented, if not constructed...by a universal transparency of 
building materials, spatial penetration, and the ubiquitous flow of air, light, and 
physical movement.”139 If the white suit concept originated in a desire to theorise a 
pure style for architecture, (i.e. a fresh, new covering), the increasing use of glass in the 
International Style demonstrated a desire for a pure architecture without covering, 
which represented political openness, democracy, clarity and honesty.  
However, the claim to transparency of the modernist movement came 
under careful scrutiny, demonstrating that transparency cannot be reduced to the 
simple use of glass in architecture, or that obscurity is not always signified by the 
presence of opaque surfaces. It was Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, whose 
insightful essay “Transparency: Literal, Phenomenal” (first published in 1963) 
highlighted an alternative conception of transparency in architecture. Rowe and 
Slutzky proposed “phenomenal transparency” as “a simultaneous perception of 
different spatial locations,” and “that which is clearly ambiguous”140 They compared 
phenomenal transparency to the visual effects produced by Kandinsky’s “Dream 
Motion” where the overlapping of the geometric figures represented in two-
dimensions make the relative spatial locations of these figures difficult to fathom.   
Rowe and Slutzky demonstrated their conception of phenomenal 
transparency in architecture through a comparison of Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus 
building (as an example of literal transparency) with Le Corbusier’s villa at Garches 
(as an example of phenomenal transparency).  The Bauhaus, they argued, relies on 
an over-dramatization of glass, with the assumption that literal transparency 
produces the same visual effect as Cubists paintings. However, since the Bauhaus 
building uses transparency literally, “the observer is…denied the possibility of 
experiencing the conflict between a space which is explicit and another which is 
implied.”141 Thus, the Bauhaus approach lacks “potential ambiguity” in that the 
                                                      
139 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass.: London, 1992, p. 217 
140 Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, “Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal” in Colin Rowe, 
The Mathematics of Ideal Villa and Other Essays, The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.: London, 
1976, pp. 159-185, p. 161 
141 Rowe and Slutzky, “Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal” in The Mathematics of Ideal 
Villa and Other Essays, p. 171 
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viewer is “denied the possibility of penetrating a stratified space which is defined 
either by real planes or their imaginary projections.”142  
The villa at Garches however, is presented as a case of phenomenal 
transparency displaying a contradiction between the façade and internal spatial 
configuration. In this case glass is used more as a taut surface carefully framed and 
framing other elements in the façade, rather than simply used for literal 
transparency. Rowe and Slutzky argue that the façade of the villa allows for 
multiple interpretations, or clearly ambiguous readings. 
Rowe and Slutzky’s essay highlights the seduction and the visual richness 
of phenomenal transparency in architecture, which is in fact an effect produced by 
the careful arrangement of surfaces. Literal transparency is solely based on the 
natural characteristics of the material glass, in which one can see beyond its 
surfaces. Phenomenal transparency however, is based on organizational complexity 
where opaque and transparent surfaces are arranged in such a way that they imply 
different interpretations. This latter approach to transparency includes an immanent 
ambiguity that offers the potential for multiple readings: 
...there is a continuous dialectic between fact and implication. The reality of 
deep space is constantly opposed to the inference of shallow space; and by 
means of the resultant tension, reading after reading is enforced.143 
Phenomenal transparency demonstrates the visual richness of organizing surfaces 
in a manner that offers a multitude of interpretations. This shifts the emphasis from 
the penetration of surfaces for visual and conceptual clarity, to surface design, or 
surface expression to arrive at visual complexity and interpretive diversity. 
Moreover, such conceptions demonstrate that transparency does not necessitate the 
thinning-out, disappearance or puncturing of surfaces, nor an association with 
tectonic exposure or conceptual clarity.144 In other words, it is possible to be 
transparent, without being clear and it is possible to be communicative without 
being literal. Phenomenal transparency highlights the richness of implication and 
                                                      
142 Rowe and Slutzky, “Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal” in The Mathematics of Ideal 
Villa and Other Essays, p. 171 
143 Rowe and Slutzky, “Transparency: Literal and Phenomenal” in The Mathematics of Ideal 
Villa and Other Essays, p.170 
144 See Hal Foster’s criticism of Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum: “Gehry is 
frequently associated with Serra, but Serra exposes the construction of his sculptures for all 
to see, and Gehry is often tectonically obscure.” Foster, Design and Crime and Other Diatribes, 
p. 37 
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Figure 2.3: Literal and Phenomenal Transparency: Bauhaus Building (Walter 
Gropius) and Villa Garche (Le Corbusier). Rowe and Slutzky argue that most 
images of the Bauhaus are taken at an angle in order to demonstrate its three 
dimensionality. The same literal strategy is adopted for transparency, in that 
depth is exposed through large panes of glass. Images of Le Corbusier’s villa 
however, are often taken from the front view, because it is through the 
arrangement of the surfaces of the façade that notions of depth are expressed. 
The glass windows are treated as the surfaces of the façade that imply depth, 
not holes that expose the deep interior. 
Source: http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/fnart/fa267/gropius.html  
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the significance of surface expression. It also demonstrates that allusions to depth 
can be compressed to the surfaces, a process that can be called surfacing depth. 
Further still, phenomenal transparency offers the possibility of seeing architectural 
openings (windows, doors, screens, and so on) as the continuation of the 
architectural surfaces, rather than visual holes in the wall.  
The modernist ideal of transparency follows a binary hierarchical system 
that attempts to go beyond superficial effects in order to arrive at a comforting 
clarity. Rowe and Slutzky’s essay however, demonstrates an alternative approach 
that relishes the ambiguity of surfaces and the interpretation of their effects. Perhaps 
the modernists ideals operate in absolute binary oppositions (masking v 
transparent) while the concept of phenomenal transparency approaches surfaces 
through “fuzzy logic.”145 This suggests the possibility of other modes of 
communication that cannot be reduced to literal transparency or opacity. This 
alternative approach to transparency suggests that concepts such as clear ambiguity, 
translucency, or phenomenal transparency offer a greater potential for diverse 
interpretations. Moreover, it is possible to imply notions of depth through the 
arrangement of opaque surfaces, or surface effects. This not only encourages a shift 
of emphasis from the simple use of materials to their expressive organization, but it 
also indicates a different movement of thought. In this alternative approach, the 
mind does not penetrate surfaces to arrive at a hidden depth, instead it floats across 
them, reading their effects to access simulated depths. Consequently, the pleasure of 
interpretation does not arise from clearly seeing the layers of construction, but 
rather from exploring the expansive complexity of surface expression.  
Glass used literally to represent transparency is denied its surfaces and is 
often associated with the absence of masking. Such a strategy is considered to open 
up the body of architecture to inspection, symbolising a clarity of operation that 
continues to be regarded as the epitome of social morality. However, glass is not 
                                                      
145 Fuzzy logic introduced in 1965 by Lotfali Asker Zadeh at the University of California, 
Berkeley, is a system of logic that attempts to define degrees of logic as being distinct to 
probabilities. Asker Zadeh writes: “The term fuzzy logic is used ... to describe an imprecise 
logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with 
linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, 
etc. ... As a consequence, the truth tables and the rules of inference in fuzzy logic are (i) 
inexact and (ii) dependent on the meaning associated with the primary truth-value true as 
well as the modifiers very, quite, more or less, etc.” See Lotfali Asker Zadeh, “Fuzzy Logic and 
Approximate Reasoning” in Synthese, 1975; vol. 30, numbers 3-4, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 
407–428, p. 407 
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completely transparent: it always has an opacity that renders it translucent. Glass has 
surfaces that can be dyed, painted, etched or sand blasted. In fact, in most cases 
glass is used in architecture because its surfaces are highly visible. It is the minute 
reflectivity, the slight tint, the glowing edges, or the waviness of the surface that 
separates glass from a mere hole in the wall and allows it to be considered as a 
visual symbol of modernity.  
2.1.3 Postmodernity and the “Decorated Shed” Concept 
“Postmodernism” began appearing in a variety of artistic fields in the 1960s and 
1970s. In architecture, postmodernism involves a renunciation of the modernist 
preoccupation with stylistic purity, transparency, rationalism or aesthetic elitism.146 
Robert Venturi’s theories were particularly influential in a move away from the 
ideals of the International Style towards the diversity of styles that was later 
associated with the postmodern movement in architecture.  
In 1966, Venturi established a series of principles that challenged the ideals 
of modernism and promoted "the difficult unity of inclusion" over the "easy unity of 
exclusion."147 The aim was the reappropriation of different styles (both past and 
present) that were forbidden by High Modernism. Venturi proposed “the seemingly 
chaotic juxtaposition” which would express “an intriguing kind of vitality and 
validity,” that would produce “an unexpected approach to unity as well.”148 This 
was a call for a more complex approach to architecture, one that did not reveal its 
logic so easily: “In the validly complex building or cityscape, the eye does not want 
to be too easily or too quickly satisfied in its search for unity within a whole.”149 
Venturi celebrated continuity and diversity as a reaction to the modernist 
uniformity: 
Inflection is a means of distinguishing diverse parts while implying 
continuity. It involves the art of the fragment… If inflection can occur at 
many scales – from detail of a building to a whole building – it can contain 
varying degrees of intensity as well. Moderate degrees of inflection have a 
kind of implied continuity that affirms the whole. Extreme inflection 
literally becomes continuity. Today we emphasize our opportunities to 
                                                      
146 Postmodernists like Robert Venturi Philip Johnson, Christopher Jencks, Kenneth 
Frampton, or Michael Graves renounced the abstract formalism of the International Style 
and celebrated visual complexity, stylistic eclecticism and historicism. 
147 Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture. (2nd ed). Architectural Press, 
London, 1977, p. 16 
148 Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, p. 104 
149 Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, p. 104 
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express the literal continuities of structure and materials – such as the 
welded joint, skin structures, and reinforced concrete. Except for the flush 
joint of early Modern architecture, implied continuity is rare. The shadow 
joint of Mies’ vocabulary tends to exaggerate separation.150   
Venturi problematized the rigid hierarchies of modernism. What he aspired to was 
a complexity that would free architecture from the dogmas of modernist theory. 
This would not be a complete dissolution of boundaries and a state of meaningless 
chaos, rather a questioning of these boundaries that would make them the very 
place of architectural production.  
Though Complexity and Contradiction (1966) laid out the theoretical 
aspiration for a move away from the uniformity of the International Style, it was 
Learning from Las Vegas (1972) that provided a blue-print and a working metaphor 
for the postmodern turn in architecture. In it, Venturi and his colleagues celebrated 
the most recognizable forms of American commercial architecture, ranging from the 
Las Vegas Strip to billboards, neon lights, and parking lots. Moreover, they 
categorised architecture into two types: the “decorated shed,” “where systems of 
space and structure are directly at the service of program, and ornament is applied 
independently,” and the “building-becoming-sculpture” or “the duck”, where  “the 
architectural system of space, structure, and program are submerged and distorted 
by an overall symbolic form.”151 Whilst acknowledging that most architecture is a 
mix of the two, Venturi and his colleagues promoted the “decorated shed” concept 
as a replacement for the “duck” architecture of modernism, arguing that the 
modernist agenda either reduces the building to “dry expressionism, empty and 
boring – and in the end irresponsible” or, ironically, by rejecting “explicit 
symbolism and frivolous appliqué ornament,” it distorts “the whole building into 
one big ornament. In substituting ‘articulation’ for decoration, it ... become[s] a 
duck.”152   
Venturi implied that separating the ornamental layer from functional 
structure is in fact a more honest way of dealing with ornament.153 Thus, the 
decorated shed model allowed a clear division of responsibility: surface ornament 
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provided embellishment, symbolism and visual communication, whilst structure 
dealt with gravity and functional necessities without hindering stylistic play at the 
surface level. Venturi rejected the modernist abandonment of ornament in search 
for purist architecture represented by white walls or transparency. As a result, the 
decorated shed concept represented an attempt to explore the positive aspects of the 
metaphor of clothing, i.e. the diversity and complexity of styles and the playful 
variations that it implicated.  
It is possible to argue that the decorated shed concept was the heightened 
celebration of the metaphor of clothing in architecture, which was closer to the 
Semperian textile than the gender driven clothing of Loos or Le Corbusier. This is 
because the decorated shed concept freed surface ornament from the laws of 
structure and allowed the symbolic surface to operate independently. In other 
words, unlike the white suits of modernity, Venturi’s concept was not bound by the 
rules (proportions or gender) of the architectural “body” and therefore allowed 
architectural surfaces to participate freely with the images, signs and screens of the 
electronic era.154  
Yet, Venturi’s model maintained and in fact exaggerated the modernist 
association of ornament with shallow superficiality. After all the decorated shed 
metaphor was an attempt to be more honest about the difference between surface 
play and structural function. Therefore, Venturi’s concept can be interpreted as a 
clarification of roles and a disciplining of ornament to its appropriate place in 
architecture. Thus, ornament was accepted as superficial signage but nothing more. 
One can see the traces of the modernist disdain for ornamentation in Venturi’s 
“postmodern” theory:  
When Modern architects righteously abandoned ornament on buildings, 
they unconsciously designed buildings that were ornament. In promoting 
Space and Articulation over symbolism and ornament, they distorted the 
whole building into a duck. They substituted for the innocent and 
inexpensive practice of applied decoration on a conventional shed the 
rather cynical and expensive distortion of program and structure to 
promote a duck; minimegastructures are mostly ducks. It is now time to re-
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evaluate the once-horrifying statement of John Ruskin that architecture is 
the decoration of construction, but we should append the warning of 
Pugin: It is all right to decorate construction but never construct 
decoration.155  
Venturi’s theory maintains a distinct anxiety about embellishment and 
ornamentation. If ornament is to return to architecture, it must be contained and 
segregated from the function of architecture. The decorated shed concept suggests a 
clear distinction between the ornamental layer and the underlying structure. 
Though the concept is an attempt to free surface communication, it nevertheless 
falls victim to the hierarchical order that it inherits from modernist theory and the 
metaphor of clothing. Semper saw the essence of architecture in the ornamental 
textile that was then supported by structure, however, Venturi’s decorated shed 
metaphor defines the ornamental layer as secondary cladding applied to primary 
structure. Thus, Venturi promoted surface communication and expression, but such 
activities remained secondary to the primary act of construction.  
Because of this conceptual hierarchy, early postmodern architecture 
inspired by Venturi’s decorated shed limited embellishment to a superficial veneer 
of stylistic historicism (“pastiche”) while structural design rarely ventured beyond 
the shed concept. Michael Graves Portland Public Service Building, Piazza d'Italia 
by Charles Willard Moore, or the Horton Plaza by Jon Jerde are clear examples of 
the negative effects of the decorated shed concept.  
This thesis proposes that although Venturi’s decorated shed concept 
succeeded in subverting the dominant dogmas of modernism, it could not escape 
the binary hierarchical system set up by them. This conceptual dependence is 
similar to Venturi’s counter-quote “less is a bore” which reverses Mies van der 
Rohe’s “less is more,” but mimics its operation. Consequently, much of early 
postmodern architecture was a reactionary gesture to the heroic stance of the 
International Style, and merely “mirrored” the principles of its predecessor. In the 
same way, the decorated shed metaphor continues the valuation of surface 
ornamentation according to the order of construction, even though it rejects the 
modernists’ purification of ornament. Therefore, much early postmodern 
architecture wore a historicist suit, or a colourful costume designed merely to subvert 
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the dominant white suits of modernism, not challenge the hierarchy between 
ornament and structure that determines the former as secondary to the latter.  
Nevertheless, the aspirations of Venturi and other postmodernists in 
dismantling the rigid laws laid down by the International Style were of great benefit 
to architecture. The decorated shed concept allowed greater freedom of surface 
expression, while the colourful signage of the Las Vegas Strip was appropriated to 
promote more sensitivity to the needs of ordinary people, the logic of popular 
culture, and the potential of rapidly evolving electronic technologies. Such theories 
argued that it is possible to create an architecture that includes complexity in a 
unified whole, while remaining sensitive to the needs of the ordinary user.156 Such 
architecture would be more flexible and adaptable to its cultural milieu as it would 
not be controlled by rigid or predefined ideals.        
2.2 QUESTIONS OF AUTHENTICITY IN AN AGE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL IMAGERY: “AURA,” “SPECTACLE,” AND THE 
“SIMULACRUM”  
The whitewash of modernism was the ornamental surface disciplined to a layer of 
white paint, the thinness of which was simultaneously an indication of its 
conceptual subservience to the architectural body beneath, and an effect of the 
seductive tension between complimentary processes of covering and revealing in 
the metaphor of clothing. Thus, in modernist theory, the surfaces of architecture 
were valued in relation to the structure beneath, which represented the primary 
elements of architecture.  
The decorated shed metaphor freed ornament from the rigid laws of 
structure, however ornamentation remained a secondary operation relegated to the 
superficies of buildings. Thus, it was “all right” to decorate construction 
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“but never construct decoration.”157 The primary task of architecture remained the 
construction of structure: the originary architectural body, which was later 
supplemented with ornament. The decorated shed arrangement was proposed as a 
more transparent expression of this hierarchical order.  
Thus, the modernist and postmodernist theories that formulate ornament 
in architecture follow a persistent binary hierarchy that depreciates surface 
appearances by association with the superficial, the superfluous or the secondary. 
This thesis argues that this association is also a symptom of the separation of 
appearances from reality where the former is either a deficient representation of the 
latter, or a masking layer that (partially or completely) hides the originary elements.  
The first section of this chapter has been concerned with the relationship 
between ornament and structure. The second part of this chapter however focuses 
on the notion of image following the proposition that the anxiety towards ornament 
in architecture parallels an embedded mistrust of images in wider culture. With this 
in mind, the remainder of this chapter explores three related concepts: aura, 
spectacle and the simulacrum that have developed in parallel with technological 
progress in twentieth century. These concepts are mentioned not only because they 
are influential for the theorisation of attitudes towards images and their 
technological reproduction in the twentieth century, but also because they are 
relevant to the architectural case used in this study, i.e. Frank Gehry’s Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum.  
2.2.1 The Reproduction of Image: Aura and Authenticity 
Since the advent of “mass media”158 writers and critics have been analysing the 
effects of new technologies on notions of authenticity, creativity and social change. 
One of the most influential essays on this theme is Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of 
Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), in which he argues new 
technologies have caused the “withering of the aura” of works of art by making 
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them accessible to the masses.159 Benjamin defines “aura” as the false sense of awe 
and reverence that one might feel in front of an original work of art, which would 
have more to do with the “cult value” of the work than its true artistic merit. This 
cult value can be added cultural value, a sense of privilege or importance generated 
by limited accessibility, or even association with religious belief.160  
Benjamin argues that new technologies of reproduction emancipate the 
work of art from “its parasitical dependence on ritual.”161 This leads to a shift of 
emphasis from cult value, generated by reverence for authenticity to “exhibition 
value”162 which leads to a reversal of function: “Instead of being based on ritual, [the 
work of art] begins to be based on another practice - politics.”163 For Benjamin, 
technological advancement has created a unique possibility to replace the false 
importance of a work of art with a valuable instrumentality that could be used to 
change people’s lives for the better:  
To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a 
perception whose “sense of the universal equality of things” has increased 
to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of 
reproduction.164  
Thus, the mass reproduction of art has the beneficial effect of “reactivating” the 
object reproduced, leading to a new and fresh approach to cultural production: 
One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches 
the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many 
reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. 
And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his 
own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two 
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processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse 
of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind.165  
For Benjamin, film, newspapers, photography and other technologies of mass 
reproduction, are fundamental to a departure from traditional models of thought 
that focus on the auratic, the authentic or the original, which is wrapped in a shell of 
uniqueness: possessing “the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it 
may be.”166 The removal of such distancing shells and the increased accessibility of 
the reproduced image, word or scene, allows the masses to be more involved in 
culture and politics.  
For Benjamin auratic art possesses a shell that separates it from the masses. 
New technologies however, penetrate this shell, making art accessible. If traditional 
art operates by maintaining a natural distance from reality, technological art 
“penetrates deeply into its web.” Benjamin explains this using the following 
analogy, which is quoted at length: 
How does the cameraman compare with the painter? To answer this we 
take recourse to an analogy with a surgical operation. The surgeon 
represents the polar opposite of the magician. The magician heals a sick 
person by the laying on of hands; the surgeon cuts into the patient’s body. 
The magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and 
himself; though he reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he 
greatly increases it by virtue of his authority. The surgeon does exactly the 
reverse; he greatly diminishes the distance between himself and the patient 
by penetrating into the patient's body, and increases it but little by the 
caution with which his hand moves among the organs. In short, in contrast 
to the magician - who is still hidden in the medical practitioner - the 
surgeon at the decisive moment abstains from facing the patient man to 
man; rather, it is through the operation that he penetrates into 
him. …Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The 
painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the 
cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.167  
In the case of the painter, the relationship between art and reality is mediated 
through the surfaces of the canvas and the painter’s creation offers a picture of 
reality that is evidently tainted by his equipment and judgment. Therefore, one 
might call his art clearly ambiguous or phenomenally transparent. The cameraman 
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however, operates differently to the painter. His image of reality is an assemblage of 
multiple fragments that resemble reality more accurately, but which are “put 
together under a new law.”168  
Benjamin argues that this representation of reality is “more significant than 
that of the painter, since it offers, precisely because of the thoroughgoing 
permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality, which is free 
of all equipment.”169 However, it is questionable whether film or photography 
depicts reality “free of all equipment.” The cameraman’s image of reality is in fact 
tainted by the shape of the lens, the camera’s point of view, or the particular 
framing of the subject. Therefore, the cameraman’s operation is in fact “literal 
transparency” or more precisely minimal translucency, in that much like the lens 
through which he captures his subjects, his intervention is difficult to detect, but 
nonetheless present. In other words, aura is not absent, just more difficult to detect. 
The painter’s operation on the other hand, is maximal translucent, in that it is clearly 
tainted with his interventions.  
Benjamin explains that the contemporary condition is characterized by “the 
desire of contemporary masses to bring things closer, spatially and humanly,” and 
their “bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its 
reproduction.”170 He attributes both of these developments to the increasing 
participation of the masses in contemporary life and the gradual disappearance of 
aura. In this context, artistic productions based on new technologies of mass 
reproduction maintain a different relationship to authenticity, one that is not based 
on traditional platonic definitions:   
To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of 
art designed for reproducibility. From a photographic negative, for 
example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ 
print makes no sense.171 
Though Benjamin celebrated the effects of new technologies in providing 
participation and accessibility, he conceded that under capitalism, technology was 
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not often used in a positive way and the potential of mass media to include the 
masses in politics might in fact never be fully utilized. The film industry he argued, 
was in fact “trying hard to spur the interest of the masses through illusion 
promoting spectacles and dubious speculations.”172  
Such concern is later theorised by Guy Debord, for whom mass media 
disseminate false images that overpower authentic reality. The evolution of this 
distrust for images and their reproduction culminates in the theories of Jean 
Baudrillard for whom images become simulations, which destroy authentic reality. 
Thus, if in early twentieth century technology offers the possibility of progress 
through accessibility and the withering of false importance, a few decades later, the 
rapid development of technology catalyses nostalgic theories that consider the 
dissemination of images as the masking or even the destruction of reality. This 
thesis argues that such attitudes towards imagery and mass media follow a 
traditional Platonic model of thought that is based on the hierarchical separation of 
appearance from reality.  
2.2.2 The Dominance of Image: The Spectacle and the Speculative 
If in 1936 Benjamin celebrated the withering of aura, by 1967 Guy Debord and 
others began to highlight the misappropriation of mass media under capitalism. 
Debord saw the modern society as one in which lived life is quickly becoming a 
represented life by “an immense accumulation of spectacles.”173 The current world, 
he argued, is characterized by the separation of image from reality, where the 
spectacle has become dominant over real life, and the production of the spectacle 
has become the ultimate goal of society.  
Debord defines the spectacle as an “autonomous image” and the “concrete 
inversion of life.”174 The spectacle is an “abuse of the world of vision” and “a 
product of the techniques of mass dissemination of images.”175 The spectacle 
substitutes meaning and reality, where the false appears to be how the true should 
be: “In a world which really is topsy-turvy, the true is a moment of the false.”176 
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Therefore, “the spectacle is affirmation of appearance and affirmation of all human 
life, namely social life, as mere appearance.”177  
Debord argues that in modern society, the spectacle becomes a barrier 
between human beings and the real world and the sense of vision takes precedence 
over the other senses. The sense of vision as “the most abstract and the most 
mystifiable sense” causes the “generalized abstraction of present-day society.”178 In 
the resulting condition dominated by imagery, appearances present themselves as 
“enormously positive, indisputable and inaccessible”179 and the spectacle dictates 
that whatever appears is good and whatever that is good must appear. Debord 
suggests that such powerful imagery develops an attitude of “passive acceptance”180 
in spectators who are faced with a “monopoly of appearances.”181 In other words, 
the spectacle does not create a dialogue, but in fact a monologue where the observer 
has no choice but to accept.  
For Debord, the spectacle degrades “concrete life” into a “speculative 
universe.”182 This is a world in which reality is masked by appearances, where the 
spectacle removes power from the people by making them passive spectators, 
seduced and dominated by spectacular appearances. Separation becomes a key 
concept: separation of image from reality, or individual from society. This 
separation is seen to be accelerated by new technologies (TV, cinema, photography, 
virtual reality and other optical media) that split society into individual spectators 
and flatten reality into superficiality.183  
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Evidently, Debord’s conception of the spectacle is based on a traditional 
hierarchy that inspires transcendence: images are fraudulent copies of authentic 
reality and must be surpassed to arrive at what lies hidden behind or beyond. 
Therefore, images and appearances are not only secondary categories, but they are 
also screens that cause separation, imprisonment and illusion: “The spectator’s 
consciousness, imprisoned in a flattened universe, bound by the screen of the 
spectacle behind which his life as been deported.”184 Although Debord blames the 
spectacle on “all the weaknesses of the Western philosophical project which 
undertook to comprehend activity in terms of the categories of seeing,”185 this thesis 
argues that his approach in fact follows and continues the Plato’s philosophical 
models whose metaphors and analogies186 established the very ocular nature of the 
Western philosophical project. It is therefore not surprising that Debord depicts 
humanity as imprisoned in the flattened universe of spectacular imagery while 
Plato considers humanity as imprisoned in the shadowy cave of false 
appearances.187 
Like Plato, Debord associates appearances with fraud while those who 
consume them are banished to the “margins of existence”: 
The spectacle obliterates the boundaries between self and world by 
crushing the self besieged by the presence-absence of the world and it 
obliterates the boundaries between true and false by driving all lived truth 
below the real presence of fraud ensured by the organization of appearance. 
…The acceptance and consumption of commodities are at the heart of this 
pseudo-response to a communication without response. … In the terms 
applied by Gabel to a completely different pathological level, “the 
abnormal need for representation here compensates for a tortuous feeling 
of being on the margin of existence.” 188 
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For Debord, in a society of spectacle technology becomes a tool of domination, 
which operates by inducing isolation.189 This is what Benjamin warned against: the 
misuse of technology in the hand of capitalism. The spectacle is therefore “capital to 
such a degree of accumulation that it becomes an image,”190 but this image separates 
humanity from reality, causing passivity, misery and isolation.  
2.2.3 The Autonomy of Image: Simulation and “Hyperreality” 
Debord’s concern for the negative effects of mass media continues in Jean 
Baudrillard’s theories who translates the society of the spectacle into a society of the 
simulacrum. In Simulacra and Simulation (1985) Baudrillard states that in modern 
society there has developed a condition of appearances without reference to any 
origin or reality and not merely a separation from the real.  He calls this condition a 
state of hyperreality where truth and meaning is taken out of the equation and 
where images operate differently: 
Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or 
the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, 
or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal.191 
The hyperreal is the effect of the fourth phase of the image as the “simulacrum.” 
The first phase of image is when it is “the reflection of a profound reality”. This is 
called good appearance where “representation is of the sacramental order.” 192 The 
second phase is an image that masks or denatures reality. For Baudrillard, it is “an 
evil appearance”, where it is “of the order of malfeasance.”193 Debord’s conception 
of the spectacle falls into this second category. The third phase of the image is 
characterized by the masking of the absence of a profound reality, in which case the 
image becomes “of the order of sorcery.”194 This is where image exploits the desire 
for the existence of reality, but masks the absence of it. In this phase, image remains 
dependent on reality; albeit on the absence of reality. Finally in the fourth phase, 
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192 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
193 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
194 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
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image is no longer “of the order of appearance, but of simulation.”195 In this case, 
image simulates the existence of reality and is considered autonomous or independent 
of true reality.196  
Baudrillard sees images as “murderers of the real,”197 as perfect simulations 
with no reference to reality. For him simulation is opposed to representation since it 
is the “the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversion and death 
sentence of every reference.”198 In other words, simulation occurs when the sign 
destroys its relation to the signified (to the real), and exists independently. The 
consequence of simulacra for society is argued to be a sense of nostalgia.199 Faced 
with a “plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality” one has to take refuge in 
the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared. For Baudrillard the 
dissemination of simulacra causes the real to become hallucination and the 
hyperrealism of simulation to dominate.200 The only way to escape this world of 
hallucinatory simulations is through negativity or criticism.201 For Baudrillard, 
ideology cannot escape the simulacrum either, since ideology only corresponds to a 
“corruption of reality through signs”202 and its attempts to restore the objective 
process, to restore the truth, is nothing but a failure since there is no truth to be 
found behind the simulacrum.  
Baudrillard’s conception creates a model of the universe not as a circle but 
as a “pure inflexion or circular inflexion” without any “focal point” or “centre of 
periphery.”203 What remains is the flatland of superficial imagery that consumes 
                                                      
195 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
196 According to Baudrillard, simulation can be explained by an example of someone who, 
instead of faking that he is ill, by merely staying in bed, manages to simulate an illness by 
producing in himself some of the symptoms. Thus with simulation, it is the very principle of 
reality which is problematized and not merely the presence or absence of it. 
197 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 5 
198 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
199 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
200 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 23 
201 “Power floats like money, like language, like theory. Criticism and negativity alone still 
secrete a phantom of the reality of power....One must not resist this process by trying to 
confront the system and destroy it, because this system that is dying from being 
dispossessed of its death expects nothing but that from us: that we give the system back its 
death, that we revive it through the negative.” Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 24 
202 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 27 
203 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 29 
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reality. Appearances take over essence whilst subjects and focal points disappear 
giving way to simulacrum.204  
Baudrillard goes beyond Debord’s theories by arguing that even mass 
media does not operate from a source of power and politics. Instead the media 
should be thought of as a “genetic code” residing on the surface and mutating the 
real into the hyperreal.205 Thus, the simulacrum marks “the end of perspectival and 
panoptic space” where true power is only a hypothesis, thus the “very abolition of the 
spectacular.”206  
Baudrillard’s simulacrum as a concept is different from Debord’s spectacle 
because in simulation, there is no dialectic or the separation of the image from the 
real. Everything collapses onto the surface through an “implosion” of meaning and 
depth. Thus, in a catastrophic turn, surface replaces the radiating mode of causality 
suggested by the Platonic tradition207 and even the differential mode of 
determination as suggested by Leibniz’s Monadology.208  
Although Baudrillard seems to offer a novel conception of image, surface 
and appearance in the contemporary condition, his theories contain a nihilistic and 
nostalgic undertone, which longs for the authentic reality that has become absent.209 
For creative production, such nihilistic attitudes cause hypocrisy, deceit or even 
inhibition in the exploration of new technologies. Nonetheless, there is much to 
agree with in Baudrillard’s theory, without having to adopt a pessimistic attitude 
towards images and the technologies of their (re)production. 
                                                      
204 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 29 
205 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 30 
206 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 30 
207 See section 3.1 of this thesis.  
208 See chapter 5 of the thesis. See also Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Monadology, trans. 
Robert Latta, Forgotten Books, 1968. 
209 Baudrillard admits: “I am a nihilist.” Later he writes: “If it is nihilistic to be obsessed by 
the mode of disappearance, and no longer by the mode of production, then I am a nihilist.” 
See Simulacra and Simulation, p. 160 and p. 162. 
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2.3 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has been concerned with the association of ornament with 
superficiality and image with inauthenticity. Both discourses of ornament and 
image are argued to reveal important clues about established attitudes towards 
surfaces and appearances in architecture. Theories of ornament are significant not 
only because they relate to surface effects, but also because the “modernist” and the 
“postmodernist” turn in architecture were theorised through a reformulation of 
ornament and decoration in architecture.  
One of the most evident features of the modernist agenda was a radical 
break from the ornamental excesses of past styles, either by promoting “white 
walls” or by the widespread use of glass to achieve visual and conceptual 
transparency. This new approach was an exploration of new materials and 
construction techniques, but also a response to the capitalistic machine and the logic 
of industrial production, which demanded simplicity, uniformity, and 
standardisation for rapid and economical manufacturability.    
The question of appearance (and visual communication) was also 
responsible for the genesis of the postmodern turn in architecture. Faced with new 
technologies, architects began to replace metaphors inspired by clothing with others 
based on signs, billboards and the electronic screens, which had began to replace the 
industrial machines of early twentieth century as symbols of modernity. Venturi’s 
“decorated shed” concept was one such model that allowed the building facade to 
engage with visual communication, freed from the restraints of structure. Much like 
their predecessors, the postmodernists followed the logic of late-capitalism, in that 
they allowed for the easy customization of the industrial shed.  
Inspired by Semper’s “textile wall” and the “principle of dressing,” early 
modernists used the metaphor of clothing to describe the role of ornament in 
architectural design. However, the metaphor implied that the ornamental layer was 
foreign to the rest of the building. Thus, as soon as surface ornament was likened to 
clothing, it became artificial and detachable from the primary elements of architecture. 
The metaphor of clothing established a familiar philosophical model that defined 
surface appearances as inauthentic artificialities that mask the observer from the 
natural reality beneath. Such conceptions of ornament followed the separation of 
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“image” from “reality,” whereby the former is considered as masking, hiding or 
denying access to the latter. Consequently, it is argued that both notions of 
ornament and image suffer from the effects of a hierarchical ordering that 
depreciates them as secondary, artificial, superficial or even deceitful. 
As concepts such as “ornament,” “appearance” and “image” became 
fraudulent representations of reality the desire for transcending such illusionary 
effects began to dominate architectural creativity. This tendency for transcendence 
within the modernist theoretical discourse shifted the emphasis from surface 
creativity to notions of “transparency,” “clarity” and “authenticity” and the 
exposition of the relationship between surface and the reality that it masks. It is 
argued that this approach to architecture followed the traditional Platonic model 
(with its rigid hierarchy and its desire for transcendence), which preferred 
“structure,” “materiality” or “function” as primary categories, while it devalued 
“surface,” “ornament,” or “form” as secondary or subservient categories. Thus, one 
group became original and necessary, the other copy and superfluous.  
By transforming Semper’s textile wall into a clothed wall, and by shifting 
the emphasis from surface expression to an appropriate clothing of structure, 
modernist theories defined the wall as a dichotomous entity, which became 
subjugated by binary power struggles. If Semper saw the essence of monumental 
architecture in surface expression (the colourful textile or its reincarnations in 
ornament) the modernists made surface expression subservient to the logic of 
structure. Therefore, ornament became associated with the “superficial,” and 
surface associated with the “ornamental,” both terms indicating shallowness, 
decadence, deceit or insubstantiality.  
Though ornament was generally deplored in modernist theory,210 the 
appeal of beautified appearances remained strong in architectural praxis. This 
necessitated a different solution which would not be associated with the styles of 
the past. Consequently, the white paint or the glimmering surfaces of glass (and 
metal)211 were substituted for ornamentation, not only representing purity, honesty 
                                                      
210 Particularly in the writings of Adolf Loos, Le Corbusier and other pioneers of Modernism 
in architecture. See Wigley, White Walls, Designer Dresses: The Fashioning of Modern 
Architecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 2001. 
211 Much of today’s architecture avoids applied ornamentation in the traditional sense of 
daubing walls or creating colourful patterns or sculptural motifs on the surfaces of 
buildings. However, alternative materials and construction technologies have facilitated a 
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and transparency, but also representing natural materiality as opposed to man-
made effects.  
In order to develop a better approach to ornament, the postmodernists 
followed the decorated shed model that allowed greater freedom of surface 
expression. The decorated shed concept was more in tune with Semper’s theories as 
it gave more significance to surface effects. Venturi’s theories allowed complexity 
through irony and double coding, whilst freeing up the architectural surface to 
engage with visual communication and new technologies that had become an 
influential aspect of people’s lives.  
Benjamin’s aura, Debord’s theory of the spectacle and Baudrillard’s 
conception of the simulacrum demonstrate the transformation of attitudes towards 
image and its technological reproduction in mass media. If Benjamin highlighted 
the significance of technology in demystifying art, he also declared the irrelevance 
of authenticity in an age of reproduction. Thus with the “withering of aura” came 
the dissemination of images which according to Debord began to dominate real life. 
However, it is possible to argue that while technologies of mass reproduction 
worked against traditional notions of reality and authenticity, they also reinforced 
them in the process. In the case of Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum for 
example, media reproduction works on two fronts. On the one hand the reproduced 
images of the building express the aspirations of the design to a wider public 
audience. On the other hand, such imagery attracts more viewers to visit the 
physical building in situ. Thus, the images of such architecture can be considered as 
a continuation of its surface effects, which reinforce the appeal of what is generally 
referred to as the “original” building from which such “reproductions” are 
deduced. The large number of visitors to the BGM clearly illustrates this concept.  
Yet, images are often considered as inferior copies rather than an extension 
of reality. Debord’s “society of spectacle” and Baudrillard’s “hyperreality” are 
descriptions of a world in which such images and appearances have dominated or 
destroyed reality. As mentioned previously, such negativity towards the image is 
                                                                                                                                                        
new approach to embellishment. For example in the case of Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim 
Museum, (and many of his later projects) the metallic surfaces (titanium, stainless steel, 
copper panels) are used for their glittering and reflective effect, which gives them an 
ornamental quality. This and the flowing forms generated by such surfaces create a 
spectacular architecture, which simultaneously causes widespread fascination and an 
equally prevalent unease with the authenticity and significance of such visual delight.  
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the result of the binary hierarchy between appearances and the real. In such 
established modes of thought, surfaces are the culprits: the thin outer elements that 
through their opacity mask and separate the viewer from the rest of the object, (i.e. 
the reality of the object). Moreover, surfaces facilitate the printing, projection or 
screening of images that are either bad representations or are illusory simulations 
with no reference to reality whatsoever. Therefore, surfaces are considered to evoke 
the shallowness of the superficial or the inauthenticity of the artificial. 
This thesis proposes that such distrust of surfaces, images and appearances 
can be traced back to Plato’s philosophy, particularly the “metaphor of the sun,”212 
“analogy of the divided line”213 and the “allegory of the cave.”214 Within these 
metaphors and allegories lay the seeds of established attitudes towards surfaces as 
visual barriers and effects as shadowy representations of a hidden reality. Such 
metaphors also imply that man-made effects are not to be trusted because they 
distract from the natural reality. Yet, the proliferation of man-made phenomena 
continues with greater speeds, where in the current technological world, more time 
is devoted to interaction with (and through) artificialities (and virtualities). In such a 
context, continued suspicion towards man-made effects can inhibit creative 
progress or cause nihilism or nostalgia. In order to arrive at an alternative approach, 
a reconsideration of traditional philosophical models is necessary beginning with 
notions of origin and copy. 
                                                      
212 See Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield, (507b-509c) 
213 Plato, Republic, (509d-513e) 




FROM “SHADOWS” TO “SIMULACRA:” THE 







Such would be the successive phases of the image: it is the reflection of a profound reality; it 
masks and denatures a profound reality; it masks the absence of a profound reality; it has no 
relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.215  
Jean Baudrillard 
 
And you should appreciate that there are four states of mind, one for each of the four 
sections. There’s knowledge for the highest section and thought for the second one; and you’d 
better assign confidence to the third one and conjecture to the final one. You can make an 
orderly progression out of them, and you should regard them as possessing as much clarity 
as their objects possess truth.216 
Plato 
There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. The focus or the source of the myth are 




When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a 
plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality – a plethora of truth, of secondary 
objectivity, and authenticity.218  
Jean Baudrillard 
 
                                                      
215 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
216 Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford University Press, London, (511d -511e)  
217 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” 
Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pp. 278-294, 
p. 286 
218 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER THREE 
The following chapter elaborates the proposition that the scepticism towards 
ornament, image and appearance in architecture, is an effect of a particular system 
of thought that was established by Plato (and his followers) and which in Richard 
Coyne’s words: “has currency in popular culture today... though it arrives here 
through various transformations.”219 This traditional model of thought considers 
surfaces as visual barriers and images as shadowy representations of a hidden 
reality. Moreover, a reflection on Plato’s metaphors and analogies suggests a 
distrusting, cynical attitude towards man-made effects (including art) since they are 
considered artificial copies of natural phenomena that are themselves imitation of 
universal “Ideas” (or ideals).  
Following Plato’s dialogues, there has been much philosophical debate on 
the nature of reality and the role of art in philosophy and epistemology. This 
inevitable process began with Plato’s student and successor, Aristotle, who 
according to Coyne “challenged the authority of Plato’s teaching” with a “concrete, 
‘empiricist’ philosophy of matter and form” that is often considered in opposition to 
the “Platonic idealism.”220 Jonathan Hale elaborates the philosophical opposition 
between Plato and Aristotle and the role of the artist in each system of thought:  
Where Plato tried to show the emergence of the particular from the 
universal, Aristotle reversed this movement with his normative ideals. 
Similarly, in Plato, the artist seems trapped by the universals and restricted 
to the imitation of the forms found in nature. In Aristotle, however, the 
individual has some freedom to discover, like the scientist, new ideals in 
the world. The opposition set up here between the two views of the artist 
became part of a dichotomy between two systems of thought. From Plato’s 
idealism and the dominance of the intellect came the Rationalist tradition 
of Descartes, Hegel and others. On the hand, from Aristotle came an 
emphasis on the senses and the empirical philosophies of Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume.221 
A third philosophical figure who was as an “early contributor to this field” is the 
Roman philosopher Plotinus, who “managed to resolve some of the contradictions 
                                                      
219 Richard Coyne, Technoromanticism: Digital Narrative, Holism, and the Romance of the Real, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London, 1999, p. 51 
220 Coyne, Technoromanticism: Digital Narrative, Holism, and the Romance of the Real, pp. 50-1 
221 Jonathan Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester; New York, 2000, pp. 52-3 
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between the two philosophies set out above”222 by constructing “a hierarchical 
system to explain the relationship between different levels of being.”223 Thus, 
Plotinus began “an influential aesthetic theory as a component of his neo-
Platonism.”224 
Hale provides an overview of aesthetics in philosophy through the works 
Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and 
Deleuze, which covers many of the major philosophical movements: Platonism, 
Neo-Platonism, Romanticism, Phenomenology, Structuralism and Post-
structuralism. The intention of this chapter is not pursue the intricacies of each 
philosophical school of thought, as that would be extraneous to the scope of this 
study. Instead, the thesis attempts to elaborate the Platonic roots of this aesthetic 
tradition and explore the problematization of this Platonic tradition through the 
works of recent philosophers such as Derrida and Deleuze who have provided a 
rich body of concepts for architects and designers in recent years. The particular 
philosophers chosen for this study are pertinent to the architectural case (The BGM) 
and a series of conceptual hypotheses related to surface, image and appearances 
that were inherited from previous research projects.  
Thus, the following chapter begins by an exposition of the role of surfaces 
and their effects in Plato’s transcendental model of thought. It then proceeds to the 
“closure”225 of Platonism through Jacques Derrida’s theories, which leads to a 
                                                      
222 Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester; 
New York, 2000, p. 53 
223 Hale writes: “Beginning with Plato’s divine creator as the ultimate source of truth and 
beauty, Plotinus set up a hierarchical system to explain the relationship between different 
levels of being. These levels are described as emanations from the “One” – the “Absolute” 
source of the order of the world. From the One comes the divine mind, which Plotinus called 
Nous, and from this comes the Soul, both of the world and of individuals. The Soul, as for 
Plato, controls or pilots the body, which is part of the final emanation into the physical 
world of objects. All levels partake of the divine order of the One, and it is this order that the 
Soul comes to recognise in its contemplation of beauty. Individual beauty is therefore a 
symbol of an underlying cosmic harmony, which the Soul can perceive because of its 
relationship with the One. This high from of beauty is what the individual soul aspires to, 
and the artist therefore has this goal in mind. In nature this beauty is only imperfectly 
represented whereas the artist can discover it more directly from within. It is here that 
Plotinus parts company with Plato’s thinking, as the artist is given a privileged role in his 
system.” Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester; New York, 2000, p. 53 
224 Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester; 
New York, 2000, p. 53 
225 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore; London, 1976, p. 14 
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discussion of the signifier and the concept of “trace.” If Derrida’s theories operate 
by placing origins “under erasure,” (i.e. deconstruction) Baudrillard’s “hyperreal” is 
what is left after the destruction of the origin: a state of illusion and melancholic 
fascination. The thesis argues that such processes based on erasure and 
disappearance evoke the absence of a reality that is lost or impossible to define, 
which in turn catalyses pessimism and cynicism towards creativity in the 
contemporary context of mass imagery and media reproduction.  
This thesis argues that if in Plato’s analogies surfaces are opaque and 
shadowy boundaries, in Derrida’s deconstruction they become mythic signifiers, 
while in Baudrillard’s theory of the hyperreal surfaces are associated with two-
dimensionality and superficiality and the simulacra that destroy depth, meaning and 
reality. These different conceptions of surface in philosophical models of thought 
open up the discussion in chapter four, which uses Avrum Stroll’s work to 
investigate the definition of surface from the “common-sense point of view”226 and 
the possibility of a single conception that encompasses the various manifestations of 
the term in everyday language. The findings of this investigation are then related to 
chapter five, which elaborates the intricacies of a non-hierarchical model of thought 
based on a specific conception of surface. The thesis argues that this alternative 
approach is surficial not superficial and it is characterized by immanence rather than 
transcendence, which implies a shift of emphasis from the authenticity of origin to 
the creative potential of lines of flight.  
                                                      
226 Avrum Stroll, Surfaces, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988, pp. 11-12 
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3.1 THE BRILLIANT ORIGIN  
In his most notable work, The Republic, Plato constructs his philosophy through 
Socrates’ dialogues and different metaphors and analogies, of which three are of 
particular importance: the “analogy of the divided line” that breaks up the world 
into the realms of the physical and the abstract; “the metaphor of the sun,” that 
attempts to explain notions of the “Good” as the generator of the visible world; and 
the “allegory of the cave,” which is presented as symbolising the human condition. 
These three images of thought will be expanded in order to extract the Platonic 
approach towards surfaces, images and appearances. 
Hale describes the Platonic model of thought as one in which “nature 
provides an ‘image’ of the underlying forms whereas art, as an image of nature, is 
even further removed from truth.”227 For this reason, art is “merely the means to an 
intellectual end, which the philosopher must dispense with in the process of the 
search for truth.”228 This approach to art is an effect of Plato’s ontology characterized 
by a binary hierarchy that Coyne describes as the “division of the world into (a) the 
realm of shadows, the sensible world, the material, which mortals inhabit, ... against 
(b) the world beyond appearances...the realm of the ideas, universals and forms, the 
Intelligible world, ... the real, which deals with perfection.”229   
It is in the analogy of the divided line that Plato divides the world into the 
realm of the “visible” and the realm of the “intelligible” and compares them in 
terms of clarity and unclarity.230 According to Robin Waterfield, the analogy 
suggests a model that resembles figure 3.1. However, Plato demands “respect and 
admiration for”231 sections of the line that are considered originary and superior. 
Thus, even though the analogy begins with a line, as one reads through Plato’s text, 
it becomes apparent that the different sections of the line are not equal. (See figure 
3.2) 
Plato associates the visible realm (A and B together) with “belief,” whilst 
the higher intelligible realm (C and D together) is associated with “knowledge.”
                                                      
227 Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, p. 51 
228 Hale, Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory, p. 51 
229 Coyne, Technoromanticism: Digital Narrative, Holism, and the Romance of the Real, p. 50 
230 Plato, Republic, (509d-510a) trans. by Robin Waterfield, 1993, p. 237 
231 Plato, Republic, (511a), p. 239 
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Within these two partitions, section A is described as visible “likenesses” associated 
with “conjecture” - for example “shadows, reflections (on the surface of water or on 
anything else which is inherently compact, smooth, and bright), and so on.”232 
Section B is described as the physical objects identified with “confidence” whose 
likeness is found in section A – for example “all the flora and fauna there are in the 
world, and every kind of artefact too.”233  
 
                                                           |                                                   |                 
                A                  B                 C                D 
Figure 3.1: Plato’s analogy of the divided line. Source: the author after Robin 
Waterfield’s diagram in Republic, 1993.  
 
 
                                                
                                                                   
                                                   
                                                       
               A (conjecture)                  B (confidence)           C (thought)     D (knowledge) 
Figure 3.2: Plato’s analogy of the divided line with the hierarchy between each 
section of the line. Source: the author.  
Therefore, B consists of originals while A consists of copies. Section C is the realm of 
ideas that are deduced from section B.  Plato associates C with “thought”. Finally 
section D is also the realm of ideas, but ones that are constructed using those in C 
without any reference to the physical world of the “visible realm.” Therefore, while 
the “types” within section C are deduced using elements of B, the types in D are 
                                                      
232 Plato, Republic, (510a), p. 237 
233 Plato, Republic, (510a), p. 237  
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superior since they are generated by a philosophical “dialectic” about the elements 
of C: 
And you should appreciate that there are four states of mind, one for each 
of the four sections. There’s knowledge for the highest section and thought 
for the second one; and you’d better assign confidence to the third one and 
conjecture to the final one. You can make an orderly progression out of 
them, and you should regard them as possessing as much clarity as their 
objects possess truth.234 
Evidently, the metaphor of the divided line is not horizontal, but vertically 
progressive, identified by an ascent towards originality and clarity. The hierarchical 
difference between the categories is clear: the abstract intelligible world (CD) is 
defined as superior to the physical and visible world that are inferior likenesses 
(AB), while physical objects (B) are superior to their images, shadows or reflections 
(A). This sequence of hierarchical relationships becomes clearer in the allegory of 
the cave, which follows the analogy of the divided line discussed above.  
3.1.1 From Shadows of Surface to the Light of the Source  
Plato’s “allegory of the cave” is introduced in book seven (514a – 520a) and is the 
continuation of the “metaphor of the sun” and “analogy of the divided line.” The 
metaphor of the sun considers the eye as a sensory organ fundamentally different to 
other organs in that it requires a medium. Light is that medium that allows one to 
see objects:  
Even if a person’s eyes are capable of sight, and he’s trying to use it, and 
what he’s trying to look at is coloured, the sight will see nothing and the 
colours will remain unseen, surely, unless there is also present an extra 
third thing which is made specifically for this purpose.’… ‘It’s what we call 
light,….235  
The sun represents goodness and is the source of light that makes seeing possible. 
For Plato, the role of goodness in the intelligible realm is comparable to the role of 
the sun in the visible world: 
The sun is the child of goodness…It is a counterpart to its father, goodness. 
As goodness stands in the intelligible realm to intelligence and the things 
we know, so in the visible realm the sun stands to sight and the things we 
see.236  
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235 Plato, Republic. (507d-507e) p. 234 
236 Plato, Republic (508b-508c), p. 235 
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The allegory of the cave continues the ocular theme through the story of a group of 
prisoners kept in a dark cave in such a way that they can only see shadows cast by 
objects moving in front of a firelight. The prisoners are deceived by these distorted 
shadows and they cannot see the reality of the cave or the world outside it:  
Imagine people living in a cavernous cell down under the ground; at the 
far end of the cave, a long way off, there’s an entrance open to the outside 
world. They’ve been there since childhood, with their legs and necks tied 
up in a way which keeps them in one place and allows them to look only 
straight ahead, but not to turn their heads. There’s firelight burning a long 
way further up the cave behind them, and up the slope between the fire 
and the prisoners there’s a road, beside which you should imagine a low 
wall has been built – like the partition which conjurors place between 
themselves and their audience and above which they show their tricks.’… 
‘Imagine also that there are people on the other side of this wall who are 
carrying all sorts of artefacts. These artefacts, human statuettes, and animal 
models carved in stone and wood and all kinds of materials stick out over 
the wall; and as you’d expect, some of the people talk as they carry these 
objects along, while others are silent.’237  
The allegory suggests that the prisoners confuse shadows with reality and associate 
the sounds of the people carrying the objects with the effects on the wall.  However, 
if one of these prisoners is freed and allowed to look around, he will realize the 
reality of things. The firelight would first hurt his eyes but he will soon begin to 
escape the illusory prison of his former existence. Furthermore, if the prisoner is 
dragged away from the cave and brought into the sunlit world of the outside, he 
will be in further pain and distress, but will eventually understand a greater truth, 
that of the existence of the sun as the generator of life on earth.238 
Plato confesses that his hierarchical categorisation based on transcendence 
is just a theory, but maintains that “goodness” is the origin of the brilliant light in 
the visible world and truth and knowledge in the intelligible world: 
The region which is accessible to sight should be equated with the prison 
cell, and the firelight there with the light of the sun. And if you think of the 
upward journey and the sight of things up on the surface of the earth as the 
                                                      
237 Plato, Republic (514a-515a), pp. 240-1 
238 “He wouldn’t be able to see things up on the surface of the earth, I suppose, until he’d got 
used to his situation. At first, it would be shadows that he could most easily make out, then 
he’d move on to the reflections of people and so on in water, and later he’d be able to see the 
actual things themselves. Next, he’d feast his eyes on the heavenly bodies and the heavens 
themselves, which would be easier at night: he’d look at the light of the stars and the moon, 
rather than at the sun and sunlight during the daytime.’…’And at last, I imagine, he’d be 
able to discern and feast his eyes on the sun – not the displaced image of the sun in water or 
elsewhere, but the sun on its own, in its proper place.’” Plato, Republic (515-516), p. 242 
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mind’s ascent to the intelligible realm, you won’t be wrong – at least, I 
don’t think you’d be wrong, and it’s my impression that you want to hear. 
Only God knows if it’s actually true, however. Anyway, it’s my opinion 
that the last thing to be seen – and it isn’t easy to see either – in the realm of 
knowledge is goodness; and the sight of the character of goodness lead one 
to deduce that it is responsible for everything that is right and fine, 
whatever the circumstances, and that in the visible realm it is the 
progenitor of light and of the source of light, and in the intelligible realm it 
is the source and provider of truth and knowledge.239  
Thus, in Plato’s metaphor, the cave represents the visible world, while the 
intelligible world is represented by the world outside the cave, lit up by the sun. The 
shadowy images in the cave are the result of objects blocking the firelight. The 
world outside represents the realm of Ideas (or Forms) that are types generated by 






Figure 3.3: Section through Plato’s cave, showing the vertical arrangement of 
the cave and the hierarchy of concepts. Source: the author. 
There are key elements of this metaphor that set up powerful connotations for the 
Platonic model of thought. Firstly, the cave is an interiority created by opaque 
surfaces that not only block light from the outside but also facilitate distorted 
shadows. Secondly, and as consequence of the first condition, the cave is a 
restrictive environment in which light is scarce. For this reason shadows are 
unwanted and sinister, being associated with the lack of “goodness,” “knowledge” 
or “truth.” In certain conditions where light is abundant, like a desert for example, 
shade is in fact appreciated as a place of relief and refuge from the glare and heat of 
                                                      
239 Plato, Republic, (517b – 517c), pp. 243-4 
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the sun. Nevertheless, in Plato’s metaphor, shadows are undesirable and the world 
is compared to a theatre of trickery based on masking and oppression. The prisoners 
are unable to appreciate their environment not only because they are bound, but 
also because their necks are tied so they can only look in one direction. They cannot 
even see the shadows of the people holding up the objects in front of the firelight, 
because a strategically placed wall hides them from view. Thus, in the Platonic 
model, surfaces always block light, sight and thought, limiting knowledge and 
freedom through masking, covering and hiding.  
The vertical dimension is another key factor in the operation of the 
metaphor. The fire is placed higher than the prisoners, which means that they 
cannot see their own shadows on the wall. Moreover, the prisoners are denied 
participation and cannot create their own shadows. In other words, the images in 
front of them do not acknowledge their existence and they cannot take part in the 
theatrical act. Plato does not discuss creativity nor does he elaborate on the 
characters holding up the objects. The main concern is the imprisonment of the 
“prisoners,” their escape from the interiority created by opaque surfaces and their 
ascent to the higher realm of truth and reality.    
Plato uses the cave as a metaphor for the human condition, but one in 
which surfaces are associated with masking and surface effects devalued as 
distorted copies of reality. In the cave (visible realm), the light source is a point (not 
a plane) objects are opaque (not transparent or translucent) and the shadows on the 
wall are inferior representations of objects. Outside the cave (intelligible realm), 
things are little better: the light source is brighter, higher and further away and 
there is more freedom of movement. Yet, the light source remains a singular point 
and therefore casts projective shadows and the natural world remains a likeness of 
the heavenly ideal beyond. Thus, in both worlds, images are distorted 
reproductions of originary reality and appearances fall short of the ideal Idea.   
Plato’s model can be compared to a hierarchical pyramid model, with 
goodness as the illuminating point at the top, types, ideas and objects of the natural 
world in the middle, and the diverse shadows, images and reflections occurring at 
the bottom, projected onto the surfaces of reality. Such a model is characterized by 
vertical hierarchy and by the distorted nature of surface effects. Thought is 
encouraged to travel upwards towards the original source (which symbolises truth, 
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knowledge and reality), away from shadowy surfaces and conjectural images that 








Figure 3.4: Plato’s allegory of cave as a cathode-ray-tube model, showing the 
hierarchical dependency of the three elements of (1) source, (2) model and (3) 
copy. Shadows need objects and objects need the source of light for their 
existence in realm of the visible. Moreover, surface effects are always projective 
and therefore distorted. Source: the author.  
3.1.2 The Source of Transcendental Hierarchy 
The centrality of the light source as the point of origin for the visible realm is 
significant in Plato’s metaphors and analogies.240 Combining the “allegory of the 
cave” with “the metaphor of the sun,” it is possible to argue that Plato’s ocular 
philosophy constructs a circular, or more accurately a spherical model of thought, in 
which the focal point is the illuminating and originary source, surrounded by the 
opaque surface upon which shadowy copies are projected. The volume between the 
centre and the periphery is natural reality while the images and appearances that 
                                                      
240 “The sun ... not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for 
their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. ... In like manner, 
then ... the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being 
known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good 
itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.” Plato, 
Republic, (509b), pp. 239-240  
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form on surfaces are peripheral and artificial categories that are associated with the 
“margins of existence.”  
 
Figure 3.5: The Platonic mode of thought as a spherical model. Source: the 
author.  
If light represents goodness, then in this model, surface marks the boundary 
between goodness and evil, or the unknown.  Moreover, the curvature of the 
peripheral surface creates appearances that are in fact warped reproductions of 
reality. Thus, if the original point illuminates, the curved surface masks, distorts and 
deviates. In this model, transcendence becomes necessary which involves moving 
away from surface effects towards the goodness of the illuminating origin, which is 
in fact surface-less.  
Translating this model for the contemporary condition would suggest that 
the mass media and its surface-driven technologies (paper, film, electronic screens) 
form the curved surface of the sphere, which is expanding rapidly. However, this 
technological boundary continues to produce warped reproductions of reality. Since 
the metaphorical surface and its effects are in infinite expansion, the best strategy is 
to leave the realm of fraudulent images and appearances for the central focal point 
that represents clarity and goodness.  
Though Plato’s metaphors and analogies seem familiar and 
comprehensive, they nonetheless leave out a myriad of complexities. For example, 
Plato’s ocular system of thought is based on a separation of the light source from 
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facilitator of sight, without any reference to the significance of surfaces and shadows 
in visual perception. If there were nothing but light, there would be nothing to see, 
which is why it can be argued that surfaces and their effects (shadows, reflections 
etc). are equally necessary for visibility.  
The allegory of the cave is reliant on a seemingly sensible conception of 
surfaces as visual barriers that can only receive light. Yet, we now know that in the 
depths of the sea, where sunlight fades away, bioluminescence allows creatures to 
generate their own light that is then emitted through the surfaces of their skin.241 
This light and such surfaces do not have a place within the Platonic model, as it 
does not mention transparency, translucency, glow or even colour. Plato’s 
monochrome allegory is a binary oppositional formulation in which one of the pair 
is perceived as original and the other as its subservient opposite. In this model of 
thought, shadows (images, appearances) are inferior reproductions of a real object, 
but more importantly they are the absence of light, and surfaces are responsible for 
it. Not only does this model imprison the complexity of the world into two 
categories, but it also sets up a powerful binary hierarchy, which continues to 
influence thought in the present day.  
In the Platonic cave, creativity, communication and expression do not enter 
the discussion. The people holding up the objects make shadows unintentionally, 
whilst the prisoners are unable to make shadows because the firelight is placed 
higher than them. Here, vertical hierarchy denies creativity, and shadow making 
becomes an oppressive political act. It is only by escaping this realm of artificiality 
that the prisoners can access the natural reality on earth and the transcendent reality 
of the heavens. The movement of thought that is promoted here is one that goes 
beyond surfaces, images and appearances in order to acquire knowledge, freedom 
and truth.  
The platonic model of thought is based on the sun as the source of light and 
life. The illuminating source acts as Form: the essence and the generating universal 
Idea. Shadows, images and reflections are mere appearances, which only mimic the 
                                                      
241 Bioluminescence is the production of light by a living organism caused by a chemical 
reaction within their body during which light is generated. The term originating from the 
Greek bios for "living" and the Latin lumen meaning "light". Examples of bioluminescence can 
be found in deep-sea creatures such as “Anglerfish”, “Flashlight fish” as well as other 
creatures such as “Fireflies” and “Glow worms”. See 
http://www.lifesci.ucsb.edu/~biolum/accessed June 2009. 
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real Forms. Thus, in the Platonic modle, when the observer views the world he 
attempts to understand the unity behind the multiplicity of appearances. This is 
because Form is an archetype, which is original and superior to its different 
manifestations.  
There is evidence for this theory. For example, we appreciate the colour 
blue in its different shades, but we call the sky blue and the sea as blue, even 
thought we are aware that the blue of the sky is different to the blue of the sea. The 
emphasis then is not on the differences that make each colour unique, rather the 
common ground that gives a unifying name to a particular section of the spectrum.  
Plato however, would argue that blueness is originary and the variations of colour 
are secondary imitations of the archetypal concept. Evidently, this model of thought 
is less interested in subtleties of difference and more concerned with the presence of 
a unifying idea.  
One would imagine that following Plato’s logic, one could arrive at the 
ultimate Form that is the generator of everything. The sun however is not it, since it 
is only a symbol, a child of that unity: “The sun is the child of goodness”242 and 
“Only God knows if it’s actually true….”243 In the absence of a singular unifying 
Form, Plato constructs a binary hierarchical system, in which one category comes 
before the other: heaven and earth; light and shadow; intelligible and visible. This 
bifurcation marks the very instance when the complexity of reality is reduced into a 
binary hierarchical system that disregards differences and the potential richness of 
multiplicity.  
Since Plato’s time, much has been added to our knowledge of the world. It 
has been demonstrated that like the height of the heavens, little is known about the 
depths of the oceans. Moreover, quantum physics has revealed the complexities of 
the subatomic realm. Unity, order and complexity exist in every level of the thick 
milieu to which we give the name Universe. Nevertheless the appeal of the high as 
associated with heavenly knowledge and the low as the realm of earthly conjecture 
continues to manifest itself in different forms.  
Perhaps this has something to do with humanity’s inability to rise above 
the surface of the earth to which it is biologically bound. Yet, it seems odd that even 
                                                      
242 Plato, Republic, (508b), p. 235 
243 Plato, Republic, (517b), p. 244 
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though almost every human activity occurs on this surface, it is often considered as 
inferior to the voluminous space of the heavens.244 The surface of the earth however 
is not two-dimensional or flat, nor is it a thin layer of existence. Indeed, it is through 
its deformational nature (the curvature and the rise and fall of topography) that the 
terrestrial surface defines a thick zone of operation that facilitates human existence.   
The Platonic model of thought promotes a vertical movement, an ascent 
towards the purity of Forms. Rather than seeing knowledge in the depths of 
meaning, the Platonic philosopher searches for knowledge in the heights of Ideas. 
However, both processes, (ascent to height and descent into depth) implicate a 
perpendicular movement of thought against the surface that is caught in the middle. 
This thesis pursues the possibility of a philosophy that does not dig deep or fly 
high, but rather includes such actions within an encompassing thickness. It also 
questions whether a philosophical approach is possible that does not divide 
complexity into twos and then elevate one half over the other. Finally, the thesis 
explores the characteristics of a model of thought that is not just concerned with 
origins and definitions, but also with expressions, interpretations and future 
possibilities. 
These questions shall be revisited in due course, especially with reference 
to architectural creativity, which forms an important theme of the thesis. But in 
order to arrive at an alternative philosophical approach, it is important to explore 
the recent “closure of Platonism” through the works of Jacques Derrida, whose 
theories have contributed to the development of an alternative model of thought 
that has been influential in contemporary architectural theory and praxis.  
3.2 ORIGIN UNDER ERASURE 
Since the time of its conception, Plato’s metaphysics has been subject to much 
careful scrutiny. However, the Platonic attitude towards surfaces and appearances 
has endured time, not only because of its potent simplicity but also because it has 
become an inseparable constituent of the Western philosophical tradition. In recent 
decades however, a certain philosophical shift has occurred which Jacques Derrida 
calls a “rupture” or an “event,” which refers to the “decentring” of metaphysics. 
                                                      
244 Space walks are still luxury rarities for the majority of human population.  
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Derrida’s own work marks a radical development of such a decentring, but one that 
follows a series of contributions by philosophers such as Aristotle, Plotinus, 
Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and so on.245  
Derrida’s work emerged at a time when the French intellectual scene was 
experiencing a clear divide between those who valued the genesis or origin of 
experience (phenomenologists) and others who believed that experience was a 
result of structure that is not experiential (structuralists). Derrida problematized the 
very notion of origin by adopting a strategy of questioning metaphysics without 
giving a (metaphysical) answer: 
…to ask oneself about the meaning of the notions of structure or genesis in 
general, before the dissociations introduced by reduction, is to interrogate 
that which precedes the transcendental reduction. Now the latter is but the 
free act of the question, which frees itself from the totality of what precedes 
it in order to be able to gain access to this totality, particularly to its 
historicity and its past. The question of the possibility of the transcendental 
reduction cannot expect an answer.246  
It was in 1966 that Derrida delivered a seminal lecture at Johns Hopkins University, 
entitled "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." In it he 
argued that the original structure and the structural origin are paradoxical concepts 
and are characterized by infinite substitutions, which is why “structure” and 
“genesis” are both polluted by traces of their opposite. In other words, decentring is 
already at work:  
Thus it has always been thought that the centre, which is by definition 
unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while 
governing the structure, escapes structurality. This is why classical thought 
concerning structure could say that the centre is, paradoxically, within the 
structure and outside it. The centre is at the centre of the totality, and yet, 
since the centre does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), 
the totality has its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre.247  
                                                      
245 Derrida sees his own work as a continuation of Nietzsche and “his critique of 
metaphysics, the critique of the concept of Being and truth, for which were substituted the 
concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth)”; Freud and his 
“critique of self-presence”, consciousness of the subject and finally “the Heideggerean 
destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of Being as presence.” 
Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pp. 278-294, p. 280  
246 Jacques Derrida, “’Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology” in Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pp. 154-168, p. 167 
247 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, p. 279 
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For Derrida the entire history of metaphysics could be characterized as “a series of 
substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the 
centre”248 where various metaphors and metonymies have merely assumed the role 
of the centre. Furthermore, “It could be shown that all the names related to 
fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable 
presence – edos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia, (essence, existence, substance, subject) 
aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”249 Thus, the 
notion of centre is not originary because it has been marked by a series of 
substitutions and also because historically, it has been exclusive since it has always 
been characterized by presence.  
For Derrida “The overabundance of the signifier, its supplementary character, 
is ... the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must be 
supplemented.”250 Thus, if origin is finite, lacking or not inclusive of all possibilities 
(presence and absence) then such origin is not a true origin but merely a placing of the 
concept. This indicates that origin is a conceptual construct, not a purely originary or 
central Idea. Derrida calls this the “absence” of a transcendental origin, which 
causes the decentring of metaphysics and the infinite play of signification:  
This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, 
the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became 
discourse – provided we can agree on this word – that is to say, a system in 
which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never 
absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the 
transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification 
infinitely.251  
Derrida questions the originality of that which assumes the centre of the 
metaphysical circle, without substituting it with another finite concept. Refusing to 
be contaminated by metaphysics, he does not propose a metaphysical model, since 
any model that uses traditional concepts would inevitably be contaminated by their 
metaphysical operation. The desire to subvert metaphysics without practicing 
metaphysics leads to what Derrida calls the “closure” of metaphysics, through a 
                                                      
248 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, p. 279 
249 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, p. 279 
250 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and 
Difference, p. 290 
251 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and 
Difference, p. 280 
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strategy of placing terms under erasure (sous rature). This leads to an ongoing 
process characterized by a strategy of re-reading philosophy to expose and exploit 
the infinite play of the signifier. 
 Derrida calls this strategy deconstruction, which is different from the 
Heideggerian “destruktion.”252 According to Derrida, a destructive discourse is 
impossible since there is no language or lexicon that is foreign to the history of 
metaphysics. For this reason, the destruction (destruktion) of metaphysical concepts 
would only be participation in producing further metaphysics.253 Derrida’s 
deconstruction does not destroy the concept of centre; rather centre as a 
metaphysical concept. Deconstruction therefore demonstrates the limitations of 
metaphysics by exposing the limitations of signification, which is argued to be 
responsible for creating the very centre of metaphysical models.  
For Derrida traditional metaphysics is not based on an absolute centre 
without lack but instead on a series of central concepts that merely assume the position 
of the central origin. It is for this reason that such origins must be placed under 
erasure, not only as a reminder of their finitude, but also to free the play of signifiers 
and to anticipate things yet to come. Thus, deconstruction highlights the absence of a 
true original centre, which then legitimates the continuous erasure or substitution of 
traditional origins.   
Derrida likens deconstruction to a “pharmakon,” a medicine-poison that 
threatens the philosophical tradition, but simultaneously helps it against 
annihilation. By placing the origin under erasure, deconstruction weakens 
traditional metaphysics, but also prolongs its life through instilling within it the 
seeds of its own destruction. Therefore deconstruction can operate like a vaccine or 
it can be a viral intrusion that destroys aspects if not all of established traditions:  
                                                      
252 Heidegger often placed the term and its erased version side by side (Being, and Being) 
implying that there is a notion of Being that exceeds our definitions of it. Derrida however, 
argues that our understanding of Being is always determined by our definitions and 
therefore Being must always be under erasure. For Heidegger’s destruction of the ontological 
tradition, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson, Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, pp. 41-49.  
253 “…all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. 
…There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake 
metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this 
history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest.” Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, pp. 280-281 
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This pharmakon, this “medicine”, this philtre, which acts as both remedy 
and poison, already introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all 
its ambivalence. This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of 
fascination can be – alternately or simultaneously – beneficent or 
maleficent…Operating through seduction, the pharmakon makes one stray 
from one’s general, natural, habitual paths and laws.254  
3.2.1 Play, Différance and Writing  
Derrida’s “closure” of metaphysics begins with a closer look at signification. For 
him, the game of signification is a game of signs, and signs have always been split 
into the signifier and the signified, “even if, as Sassure argues, they are 
distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf.”255 Derrida writes: 
“The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of 
mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning. To this epoch 
belongs the difference between signified and signifier, or at least the 
strange separation of their “parallelism,” and the exteriority, however 
extenuated, of the one to the other. This appurtenance is organized and 
hierarchized in a history.”256  
Central to Derrida’s closure of metaphysics is the argument that signifiers do not 
refer to a transcendental signified, but always to other signifiers. This highlights the 
play of language and the processes of deferral through which meaning is produced. 
Derrida theorises this through différance,257 which is not only a deliberate misspelling 
of difference,258 but also a play on the French word différer, which means both to 
“defer” and to “differ.”  
Différance contains a number of features that govern the production of 
meaning. The first feature that relates to deferral states that words and signs do not 
fully denote what they mean, but can only be defined through the supplementation of 
additional words, from which they differ. Thus, meaning is always deferred through 
an endless chain of signifiers that are different from each other. The second feature 
                                                      
254 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, Athlone, 
London, 1981, pp. 61-171, p. 70 
255 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, London, 1998, p. 11 
256 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 13 
257 Derrida first uses the term in his 1963 essay entitled “Cogito and the History of Madness”: 
"The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that which exceeds and the 
exceeded totality: the différance of the absolute excess." Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the 
History of Madness” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge & Kegan, London, 
1979, pp. 31-63, p. 62. 
258 The “a” in différance is evident in writing but not heard in speech. This follows Derrida’s 
quest to subvert the Platonic privileging of speech over writing as well as the distinction 
between the sensible and the intelligible.  
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(relating to difference) suggests the force that differentiates things from one another, 
generating the difference that underpins meaning itself. Différance suggests that 
there is no single interpretation of a text. Therefore, the re-reading of texts is not 
only possible, but also essential to writing and thought. In Roland Barthes’ words, 
"a text's unity lies not in its origins," or its author, "but in its destination," or its 
audience. 259 
Derrida insists that différance itself is "neither a word, nor a concept,”260 
which seems to suggest that it has a transcendental nature. This proposition finds 
support from Derrida’s preference to call the term “quasi-transcendental.”261 
Différance and deconstruction are concepts (or quasi-concepts) that attempt to 
explain the complex process of signification, which produces traditional notions of 
“meaning,” “essence,” or the “signified.” By putting such notions under erasure, 
deconstruction weakens metaphysical hierarchy by questioning the legitimacy of its 
central origins. For example, Derrida challenges Plato’s belief that writing is 
secondary to speech, which is secondary to an original Idea. Instead he argues that 
thinking is in fact already writing and the act of writing, as the externalisation of 
thought, is embedded in the production of meaning:  
The exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general, and 
...there is no linguistic sign before writing. Without that exteriority, the 
very idea of the sign falls into decay.262 
Through (quasi-)concepts such as “arch-writing,” “trace,” “supplement” and 
“différance” Derrida deconstructs the metaphysical tradition, in which meaning is 
thought to be either within the depths of something, or beyond it, emanating from a 
transcendental source. If in such traditions, surface, appearance, writing, or the 
manifestation of an Idea is considered as deformed, perverse or superficial, for 
Derrida such notions are already at work in the production of meaning, essence or 
the central origin.  
                                                      
259 See Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath, Noonday Press, New York, 
1977, pp. 142-148  
260 Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, University of 
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Derrida proposes a model of thought based on the exteriority of writing and 
the continuous erasure and substitution of origin. This is because a pure signified is 
impossible, since every signified is a product of a series of signifiers. This 
deconstructive approach overcomes transcendental hierarchy by putting the origin 
and the original under erasure. However, erasure is never total and deconstruction 
is not destruction, because a common ground is needed to make communication 
possible. When the totality and purity of the Platonic Idea is deconstructed, thought 
and writing become free and the emphasis shifts from the brilliant source to the 
signifying surfaces of the metaphoric sphere.263 Thus, the finite interiority of an 
enclosed volume is unfolded onto the expansive surfaces of text: 
The idea of the book is the idea of totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; 
this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted 
by the signified pre-exists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs and is 
independent of it in its ideality….The idea of the book which always refers 
to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the 
encyclopaedic protection of theology and of logocentricism against the 
disruption of writing, against its aphoristic energy, and, as I shall specify 
later, against difference in general. If I distinguish the text from the book, I 
shall say that the destruction of the book, as it is now under way in all 
domains, demands the surface of the text.264    
Derrida refers to language as a “field” which is “in effect that of play, that is to say, a 
field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite”.265 In this model of thought, 
meaning is no longer defined in relation to a transcendent above or below. Instead it 
occurs upon the surfaces of a field of play in which signifiers are the perpetual 
players. The infinite play of the signifiers and the exteriority of the field suggest that 
totalization is “sometimes defined as useless, and sometimes as impossible”266 since 
for Derrida, the nature of language excludes totalization. 
This field of signification is characterized by lack: “there is something 
missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions.”267 
However, if there is no rule to the game, then meaning becomes an artificial 
construct through which any signifier can pass through. In other words, substitution 
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cannot occur without restraint, because that would undermine the very notion of 
the signified, leading to a break down of communication. Therefore, an ordering 
centre must somehow remain to structure the field of language and the play of 
signifiers. What governs the Derridean field is the trace of origin or the site of its 
absence, which influences the passage and play of signifiers and structures the 
surfaces of textual production.  
Thus, Derrida’s game is in fact a careful one, since the consequences of the 
destruction of centre are unsatisfactory for meaning and linguistic production.  
Therefore, he proposes “sure play” which is limited to the substitution of existing 
and present pieces, but offers a strategic alternative to rigid dogma or pure play 
(absolute indetermination):  
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this 
structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, 
negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose 
other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous 
affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the 
affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without 
origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then 
determines the non-centre otherwise than as loss of the centre. And it plays 
without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the 
substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, 
affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal 
adventure of the trace.268  
Derrida abstains from creating new rules, because he limits his game to re-
appropriation and substitution. Therefore, the play that he proposes remains within 
the fabric of traditional concepts, which do in fact exert an ordering force on the 
resultant deconstructions. In other words, the centre somehow remains but becomes 
subject to a play that allows it to side step any real destructive discourse. The 
placing of origins under erasure is therefore a strategy of exposing the 
substitutability of the centre and simultaneously exploiting it to catalyze further 
philosophical production. But, this strategy must apply decentring in small dosages 
otherwise the weakening of centre would lead to its destruction. That would be 
when the centre is defined as an artificial concept, leading to indeterminate play and 
the implosion of meaning.  
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Though Derrida argues that deconstruction does not destroy the 
philosophical tradition, from a certain perspective, it is in fact quite successful at 
doing just that. This is not because deconstruction substitutes the origin with 
another – in most cases the opposite – but because it pollutes the concept, or more 
accurately exposes its pollution. By de-crediting the origin (essence, substance, or 
the centre) with its own finitude, deconstruction eliminates faith in the 
“metaphysics of presence,” by continuously highlighting the absence written within 
it. Thus, deconstruction never completely destroys the philosophical tradition, but it 
continuously undermines its operation through the tracking of “traces,” “aporias” 
and shortcomings.  
Derrida constructs many (quasi-)concepts, but he does not give a 
metaphysical totality. The resistance to define anything in terms of presence, the 
promotion of play and the presence of paradoxical quasi-concepts (developed from 
the erasure of metaphysical origins) exposes Derrida to accusations of rhetorical 
trickery, intentional obfuscation269 or even nihilism.270 However, Derrida argues that 
it is only through the deconstruction of old concepts that one can “designate the 
crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be 
glimpsed.”271 
Yet, it is not surprising that Derrida is accused of nihilism, since his project 
against the “metaphysics of presence” contains numerous references to “absence”, 
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“death”, “closure,” “mourning,” and other terminology that evoke the negative.  
This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of decentring, or the battle against the 
risk of “falling back within what is being deconstructed”272 which continuously 
threatens the very core of deconstructive philosophy.  
3.2.2 The Disappearance of Origin 
According to Derrida every discourse is “bricoleur” in the sense that it is a 
borrowing of concepts from the text of heritage, which is “more or less coherent or 
ruined.”273 Therefore:  
There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. The focus or the source of 
the myth are always shadows and virtualities which are elusive, 
unactualizable, and nonexistent in the first place.274  
In this sense, there is no true creativity in the traditional sense of the word, which 
would imply the production of something from nothing or the imitation of a 
metaphysical origin. Instead, creativity is the re-arrangement of pre-existing 
elements that are not metaphysical entities but rather concepts that are “more or less 
coherent or ruined.”  For Derrida, true originality (and original truth) is not to be 
found in philosophizing, rather in reading philosophy in a different way. This 
would not be the destruction of originality, but the transformation of its definition 
to one that limits it to the boundaries of pre-existing elements.  
Because Derrida’s conception of creation is dependent on a pre-existent 
past, it inevitably leads to the following question: if philosophical production is 
reading philosophy differently, then there must be an originary philosophy from 
which all the subsequent readings of philosophy started from? Derrida’s solution to 
this “chicken and egg” conundrum is that the true originary philosophy is in fact 
absent, and it was only the trace of this already absent origin that started the 
process.  
To consider every origin as a myth would be a refusal to believe, even 
momentarily. In everyday scenarios however, there is no such high standards for 
notions of origin, original or creativity. The “common-sense” approach relies on a 
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realisation that such perfectionism leads to an inescapable spiral towards an “absent 
origin” which cannot be found or defined. Because of this, it is more productive, if 
perhaps less accurate, to say that there are different kinds of originality: some that 
are dependent on the rearrangement of pre-existing elements (as in bricoleur 
constructs), and others that are accidental, incidental or even mad. In other words, 
rather than reducing creativity to “sure play” (i.e. the substitution of established 
elements), it is possible to explore a more risky approach based on random 
discovery or exploratory experimentation, with the hope of adding something 
altogether different to the existing elements.   
Moreover, using concepts that have been put under erasure, without faith 
in their originary presence is much like considering everything as secondary in 
relation to an originary concept (quasi-concept or otherwise) that is absent or has 
disappeared. If this is not nihilistic, then it is extreme perfectionism that can have 
catastrophic ramifications for imagination and creativity. Perhaps, the antidote to 
this mode of thought can be found within Derrida’s own logic in the form of a 
counter-myth that gives meaning to everything, but which is itself a myth. Derrida 
writes: 
In this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who supposedly would be 
the absolute origin of his own discourse and supposedly would construct it 
“out of nothing,” “out of whole cloth,” would be the creator of the verb, the 
verb itself. But if this is the case, if the difference between bricolage and 
originality is erased and if every discourse is considered bricolage, then the 
very meaning of bricolage would break down. Thus, the reflection of 
bricolage would be the myth of the engineer, which acts as its opposite 
which gives it its definition. Myth acts as counter-myth in order to give 
both myth and counter-myth meaning. And more importantly the process 
continues as other myths come to criticize the set up and establish new set 
ups.275 
But are all these myths and textual bricolage the same? How can we judge the 
qualities of these myths? In Derrida’s own words: “Does this mean the 
abandonment of meaning and the abandonment of critical thinking?”276 Derrida 
believes that we must not try to centre a discourse that is essentially acentric, and 
we must “renounce the episteme which absolutely requires, which is the absolute 
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requirement that we go back to the source, to the centre, to the founding basis, to 
the principle, and so on.”277  
But if the quest for the centre is the very search for meaning, then what are 
we left to do? Derrida declares that the question “cannot be answered.”278 It seems 
that if deconstruction is not an effective destruction of philosophy, it is an effective 
destruction of the empiricism that drives it forward. Yet the destruction of 
empiricism would also be the destruction of the attempt to arrive at a useful 
conclusion that helps with our being in the world. Deconstruction leaves us in an 
uncomfortable middle position between myths, counter-myths and deficient truths. 
What remains is a state of infinite questioning; the pondering of “conception, 
formation, gestation, and labour” of a question aimed at the non-definable and that 
which resists definition. In this context, argues Derrida, choice becomes trivial:  
I do not believe that today there is any question of choosing –in the first 
place because here we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of 
historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial; and in 
the second, because we must first try to conceive of the common ground, 
and the différance of this irreducible difference.279  
The deconstruction of metaphysics uses “play” and the “trace” where the former is 
“the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as 
the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence”280 and the latter 
is “is nothing, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question What is? And contingently 
makes it possible.”281 Thus, Derrida’s quest against the “metaphysics of presence” 
relies on disappearance as a concept that plays with presence and absence. This 
disappearance, which is evident in the trace, ensures a seductive presence-absence 
that allows complex quasi-concepts to act as centre or origin. Such quasi-origins 
assume a paradoxical existence that resists destruction and they operate like a 
double-coded pharmakon in that they prolong the survival of the philosophical 
tradition.  
 
                                                      
277 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 286 
278 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 288 
279 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, p. 293 
280 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 50 
281 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 75 
Chapter Three: From “Shadows” to “Simulacra:” The Degradation of Image and the Real –  
Origin under Erasure 
 
 118 
3.2.3 The Trace of Origin 
In “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida argues against the Platonic hierarchy that depicts 
writing as an “artificial exteriority,” a “clothing for thought,” or “a garment of 
perversion and debauchery.”282 Using the concept of “arch-writing” he attempts to 
complicate the traditional relationship between writing and speech:  
It is not a simple analogy: writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, has 
always been considered by Western tradition as the body and matter 
external to the spirit, to breath, to speech and to the logos.283 
According to Derrida, writing has traditionally implicated a loss of innocence and a 
deceit of the written, graphic image. As a result, it has often signified a forgetting of 
the origins of thought. Following a deconstruction of Plato’s texts, Derrida proposes 
that “the violence of writing does not befall an innocent language, [rather] there is an 
originary violence of writing because language is first, in a sense … writing.”284  So 
language is the surfacing of thought, and writing is the very moment of its 
occurrence. Because of this originary involvement of writing with thought, 
hierarchies between writing, speech and thought must be reconsidered: “We are 
thus not blind to the visible, but blinded by the visible, dazzled by writing.”285  
This approach to writing is not limited to language, rather it is like a “vast 
field” that forms the very fabric of thought, in which language delineates its own 
area:  
The immotivation of the trace ought now to be understood as an operation 
and not as a state, as an active movement, a demotivation, and not as a 
given structure. Science of the “arbitrariness of the sign,” science of the 
immotivation of the trace, science of writing before speech and in speech, 
grammatology would thus cover a vast field within which linguistics 
would, by abstraction, delineate its own area, with the limits that Saussure 
prescribes to its internal system and which must be carefully re-examined 
in each speech/writing system in the world and history.286  
Thus, writing is defined as a topography upon which thought occurs. “Arch-writing” 
is not writing in the traditional sense of the word, rather it is a new concept, that is 
associated with writing since in the traditional sense, writing is defined as that 
which threatens the dominance of speech:  
                                                      
282 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Dissemination, p. 35 
283 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Dissemination, p. 35 
284 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy”, Dissemination, p. 37 
285 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy”, Dissemination, p. 37 
286 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 51 
Chapter Three: From “Shadows” to “Simulacra:” The Degradation of Image and the Real –  
Origin under Erasure 
 
 119 
An arch-writing whose necessity and new concept I wish to indicate and 
outline here; and which I continue to call writing only because it essentially 
communicates with the vulgar concept of writing...If I persist in calling that 
difference writing, it is because, within the work of historical repression, 
writing was, by its situation, destined to signify the most formidable 
difference. It threatened the desire for the living speech from the closes 
proximity, it breached living speech from within and from the very 
beginning. And as we shall begin to see, difference cannot be thought with 
the trace.287  
Derrida argues that writing doesn’t signify the externalisation of thought, but 
thinking itself. This redefinition of the relationship between thought, speech and 
writing promotes thinking as a physical action (not a metaphysical concept) whose 
consequences leave traces upon surfaces that can outlast the presence of the thinker. 
The concept of writing therefore highlights the originary connectedness of intent 
and expression, prior to their division in the philosophical tradition. Derrida 
expresses this connectedness by placing thought and its “external” manifestation 
upon the same originary surface that unites them:  
This arch-writing would be at work not only in the form and substance of 
graphic expression but also in those of non-graphic expression. It would 
constitute not only the pattern uniting form to all substance, graphic or 
otherwise, but the movement of the sign-function linking a content to an 
expression, whether it be graphic or not.288  
However, arch-writing contains a spectral presence, which is caused by the erasure of 
origins. This trace of presence “… must leave a track in the text.”289 Yet, Derrida 
insists that one must not, and cannot hold on to this presence, because the trace is 
not originary: “we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins 
with the trace, there is above all no originary trace.”  
Yet, it is this trace that facilitates meaning in text as it provides the spectral 
presence of an origin, a signified or a meaning.290 Nevertheless Derrida is adamant 
that his philosophy is not based on presence:  
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The trace is not only the disappearance of origin – within the discourse that 
we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin 
did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by 
a non-origin….291  
Derrida’s theory is seductive because it continues to describe a quasi-metaphysical 
origin through its traces, which never explain it in its original totality. His 
descriptions veil and unveil the origin in an infinite loop that makes meaning 
appear-disappear amongst its own many traces. The seduction of such a strategy 
arises from the near-absence of origin, or more accurately it’s flickering, which is 
different from total absence or presence. Thus, Derrida suggests a seductive process 
of appearance-disappearance, characterized by the infinite speed of transition from 
one to the other, because “the value of the transcendental arch [archie] must make its 
necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of arche-trace must comply 
with both that necessity and that erasure.”292  
The Derridean philosophical agenda is characterized by a sure-play 
between metaphysical concepts, centred by the ghostly zone attributed to the origin. 
His strategy is reliant on the operation of trace which “does not exist”293 but which 
is “in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once 
again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general.”294 Thus, in Bennington’s 
words, Derrida’s method is a sort of “non-sense in the very simple sense of going 
against the very sense of sense.”295 It is a strategy that never fails to be intriguing 
because it continuously shifts between dualities, simultaneously implying the 
possibility and the impossibility of meaning. Origin in Derrida’s deconstruction is 
elusive, which is why it resists total criticism, and hence its own natural death. In 
this philosophical approach, concepts are always slippery, just out of reach.  
Whilst deconstruction is an effective strategy for neutralising hierarchy in 
oppositional terms, it nonetheless demands a continuous back and forth movement 
determined by the logic of “neither, nor,” “sure play” and “substitution.” This is the 
inevitable position if one is to avoid yet another metaphysics of presence. If Plato’s 
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philosophy advocated transcendence towards the realm of Ideas, Derrida’s 
philosophy displays traces of transcendence through negative theology.296 The 
conception of trace for example is a good example of Derrida’s negative 
transcendence:  
The concepts of present, past, and future, everything in the concepts of time 
and history which implies evidence of them – the metaphysical concept of 
time in general – cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace.297  
In negative theology one goes beyond affirmation to negation and eventually past 
both affirmation and negation to negative transcendence, where concepts become 
ineffable and incomparable, transcending all definitions. In Daniel W. Smith’s 
words:  
Derrida says, what is “proper” to God is to have no properties as such, or 
to “be” ”nothing”. The logical formula of transcendence is to say that 
something “is” neither x nor not-x, because it is beyond them both. Derrida, 
by his own admission, adopts this formula of transcendence in his analyses 
of différance.298 
It is for this reason that the notion of différance, follows a similar conception to that 
of trace or arch-writing, as something that: 
“is” neither this nor that, neither sensible nor intelligible, neither positive 
nor negative, neither superior nor inferior, neither active nor passive, 
neither present nor absent, not even neutral, not even subject to adialectic 
with a third moment, without any possible sublation (Aufhebung). Despite 
appearances, then, it [différance] is neither a concept nor even a name; it 
does lend itself to a series of names, but calls for another syntax, and 
exceeds even the order and the structure of predicative discourse. It “is” 
not and does not say what “is”. It is written completely otherwise.299  
A philosophy based on such impossible concepts becomes difficult to put to use in 
everyday situation and the refusal to provide a legible definition leads to 
accusations of deliberate obscurity and nihilism.300 In other words, deconstruction’s 
affinity with “negative theology” makes it difficult for everyday function. In most 
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scenarios there is tolerance, where concepts are accepted with their deficiencies and 
used in their incompleteness. The everyday person is ultimately not interested in 
the precise mathematics of language, or the absolute origins of meaning, rather 
workable approximations that allow for creative expression and communication. 
The agenda of deconstruction is defined as making insecure the 
foundations of traditional metaphysics by arguing that the depth of meaning is not 
originary to surfaces of representation. Instead there is always the surface-depth of 
writing (or arch-writing) which signifies the surfacing of thought. However, 
Derrida’s refusal to define concepts in terms of presence leads to the presence of a 
lack, which underlies much of his arguments. This lack, which is present at the 
spectral origins of his philosophy, is created by the “absence” of a “non-origin” that 
is impossible to define. It is precisely because deconstruction relies on erasure and 
disappearance that it finds itself in a precarious position between falling back to 
what it deconstructs and falling victim to accusations of nihilism or negativity. This 
uncomfortable middle-position, between deficient truths and illusory myths, can 
only be sustained through denial, the logic of “neither, nor,” or negative 
transcendence.  
As evidenced by concepts such as trace, spectre, pharmakon and 
mourning, absence is an important force in Derrida’s philosophy, which manifests 
itself through an anxious preoccupation with death, both as the demise of theories 
and as the end of lived life: 
… to philosophize is to learn to die. I believe in this truth without being 
able to resign myself to it. And less and less so. I have never learned to 
accept it, to accept death, that is. We are all survivors who have been 
granted a temporary reprieve….301  
In his “closure of Platonism,” Derrida expresses an “originary mourning” for 
metaphysics, which in turn taints deconstruction with a defensive anticipation of its 
own demise. However, the closure of metaphysics can also be formulated as an 
anticipation of regeneration, in hope of continuity and transformation. Derrida 
displays traces of such an attitude, but his choice of words betrays a philosophical 
approach that leans towards absence: 
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I have always been interested in this theme of survival, the meaning of 
which is not to be added on to living and dying. It is originary: life is living 
on, life is survival [la vie est survie]. To survive in the usual sense of the 
term means to continue to live, but also to live after death. When it comes to 
translating such a notion, Benjamin emphasizes the distinction between 
überleben, on the one hand, surviving death, like a book that survives the 
death of its author, or a child the death of his or her parents, and on the 
other hand, fortleben, living on, continuing to live. All concepts that have 
helped me in my work, and notably that of the trace or of the spectral, were 
related to this “surviving” as a structural and rigorously originary 
dimension. It is not derived from either living or dying. No more than what 
I call “originary mourning” that is, a mourning that does not wait for the so 
called “actual” death.302 
Derrida’s approach is based on erasure: whether the erasure of origins or the 
erasure of life. The centrality of this erasure taints all other concepts such birth, 
rebirth, regeneration, sleep or other transformations.  The resultant effect is a 
ghostly presence that seems at odds with lived life. Thus, Derrida admits: “I become 
appearing-disappearing, like that uneducable spectre who will have never learned 
how to live.”303  
Because of this approach to life, Derrida considers text as an important 
legacy that survives biological erasure.304 Consequently, the survival of the text must 
be guaranteed through the operation of theoretical pharmakons that protect it from 
total destruction. This thesis however, argues that the questioning of traditional 
philosophy need not result in mourning, disappearance, or absence, nor does it 
require a defensive strategy. Instead, by focusing on the supplementarity of the 
supplement rather than the originary lack of the origin, it is possible to appropriate 
Derrida’s theories for a more positive approach that supplements erasure with 
creative re-production.  
The evasiveness and complexity of Derrida’s philosophy make his 
intentions unclear.  This condition is illustrated by a caricature by Guy Billout,305 
which depicts Derrida as a fuzzy, blurred character, gazing at his own reflection 
that seems clear (perhaps implying that Derrida is not as philosophically clear as he 
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would have use believe). Others highlight the difficulty of his writings. Bennington 
for example writes:  
Derrida would be in the position of Moses, proposing an unintelligible 
liberation in so abstract and forced a rhetoric, a writing so artificial and full 
of ruses that one would say it was a foreign language (GL, 48a). This 
writing would be like the Jewish tabernacle, a construction of bands, empty 
inside, signifier without signified, containing nothing at the centre. (49a)306  
 
Figure 3.6: Guy Billout’s depiction of Derrida. Source: www.nytimes.com 
Though Derrida’s deconstruction allows for a flattening of hierarchy in 
metaphysics, for some critics, it does not escape transcendence, which manifests 
itself in the negative.307 Deconstruction operates on the basis that every origin 
proposed so far is a finite concept while the impossible non-origin remains an 
infinite quasi-concept that cannot be defined. On the one hand, this encourages for a 
re-interpretations of the metaphysical tradition, but on the other hand it creates a 
messianic process that expects the impossible, forever demonstrating how things 
fall short of the impossible. As Caputo writes:  
Deconstructing everything in the name of the undeconstructible is a lot like 
what religious people, especially Jews, would call the "critique of idols." 
Deconstruction, is not nihilism; it just has very high standards. 
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Deconstruction is satisfied with nothing because it is waiting for the 
Messiah, which Derrida translated into the philosophical figure of the "to 
come" (à venir), the very figure of the future (l’avenir), of hope and 
expectation.308 
The importation of deconstruction into architecture has had mixed results. On the 
positive front, a questioning of architectural traditions leads to a re-thinking of 
established patterns, which could open up a way for alternative strategies. On the 
negative side however, excessive deconstruction begins to oppose creativity by 
getting lost in the contradictions of signification, or it begins to turn architecture 
into an inferior reproduction of impossible ideas that are often inaccessible to the 
majority of people.309  
For many, deconstruction is the only strategy for an age in which faith in 
metaphysics is diminishing. Since there is no way of doing without metaphysics, 
one must decentre metaphysics from within. This is achieved by exploiting the play 
of concepts in the history of philosophy, subjecting them to slippage and sliding in 
order to read them differently. Thus, in the deconstructive approach, creativity is in 
bricolage and the substitution of pre-existing elements. 
This thesis argues that it is possible to devise another philosophical 
approach to metaphysics, one that does not put it under erasure. This philosophical 
approach that will be elaborated in chapter five, follows the proposition that the 
potential of metaphysics as a praxis has not yet been exhausted. In other words, 
there are many other (metaphysical) models of thought that are yet to be 
constructed. The thesis also suggests that deconstruction evokes erasure which 
inevitably creates a condition that inspires theorists like Jean Baudrillard to declare 
the absence of origin and the flattening of all reality into simulacra. Like Derrida, 
Baudrillard expresses a loss of faith in metaphysics, but his theories are more 
extreme as they replace “sure-play,”310 with “criticism,” “negativity”311 and 
“theoretical violence.”312 
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3.3 THE ABSENCE OF ORIGIN 
The disappearance of authentic reality and the dominance of false imagery has been 
a common critique of the effects of contemporary mass media. As noted previously, 
Debord and others have declared that the proliferation of images has not only 
propagated superficiality, but also separated people from lived reality. Jean 
Baudrillard however, takes this stance further, arguing that in modern society there 
has developed a condition of appearances without any reference to any origin or reality, 
and not merely a separation from the real.  He calls this condition a state of 
hyperreality where truth and meaning is taken out of the equation and image 
operates autonomously.313 This indicates “the radical negation of the sign as value, from 
the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every reference.”314 Therefore, for 
Baudrillard, mass imagery facilitated by new technologies has created a condition in 
which the sign destroys its relation to the signified and to the real. 
As was elaborated previously, Derrida theorised the absence of an absolute 
signified. He argued that every signified is in fact a signifier, which is arrived at 
through a process of deferral. With such concepts Derrida put the metaphysical 
concept of origin under erasure, insisting that the structural centre (which could be 
concepts such as origin, reality, meaning, Idea, etc). is in fact a linguistic construct 
and our experience of the world is always through such artificial signifiers (myths 
and counter-myths) that must be deconstructed. Baudrillard adopts Derrida’s 
model (which describes the relationship between signifier and signified) in order to 
explain the relationship between image and reality. However, he takes the erasure 
of origins to its limit by arguing that the current media saturated context signals the 
dissolution of dialectical thinking and the beginning of simulation in which images 
exist autonomously without any relationship with reality. Similar to Debord’s 
conception of the spectacle, Baudrillard suggests that in the contemporary 
condition, images only refer to each other, thus, constructing a superficial 
“hyperreality” in which meaning implodes:  
 …nothing separates one pole from another anymore, the beginning from 
the end; there is a kind of contraction of one over the other, a fantastic 
telescoping, a collapse of the two traditional poles into each other: implosion 
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– an absorption of the radiating mode of causality, of the differential mode 
of determination, with its positive and negative charge – an implosion of 
meaning. That is where simulation begins.315  
This hyperreality is a mutation of “the third phase of the image,” where the image 
“masks the absence of a profound reality.”316 Baudrillard warns that once the deceit 
of signifiers is discovered, there is first despair and a desire to eliminate false 
images. But in time, despair gives way to acceptance and melancholic fascination. 
Finally we are consumed by nostalgia for a time when discovery was true:  
When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. 
There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality – a plethora of 
truth, of secondary objectivity, and authenticity. Escalation of the true, of 
lived experience, resurrection of the figurative where the object and 
substance have disappeared.317 
With this view, Baudrillard sees images as “murderers of the real:”318 perfect 
signifiers that destroy reality. For Baudrillard, simulation is not representation because 
the signifier (image) destroys its relation to the signified (reality). Everything 
collapses onto the surface, which replaces the radiating mode of causality and the 
transcendental system of hierarchy established by the Platonic tradition. This 
surface, however, is sinister and artificial, possessing all the negativity and 
shallowness of the term superficial.  
Baudrillard warns that, in a world deprived of meaning what remains is 
the “fascination” of a “desert-like” indifference, which will eventually destroy us. He 
defines this fascination as a “nihilistic passion par excellence, ... the passion proper 
to the mode of disappearance.”319 Thus, in a disillusioned tone, Baudrillard gives in 
to nihilism: “If it is nihilistic to be obsessed by the mode of disappearance, and no 
longer by the mode of production, then I am a nihilist.”320  
For Baudrillard, the play of texts and images has already created a 
condition in which theories, images, and meaning all float by chance. Neither 
meaning can exist nor criticism, neither ideology nor nihilism. In this context, 
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authentic origin is subsumed by simulative imagery: 
I observe, I accept, I assume, I analyze the second revolution, that of the 
twentieth century, that of postmodernity, which is the immense process of 
the destruction of meaning, equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. 
He who strikes with meaning is killed by meaning.321 
Thus, Baudrillard becomes a neo-nihilist, concerned with the destruction of non-
ideology, for in a world of floating theories, destruction by nihilism becomes 
impossible. Faced with such a condition, Baudrillard advocates theoretical terrorism 
born out of a sense of helplessness and a desire to revive meaning: “Theoretical 
violence, not truth, is the only resource left to us.”322 
3.3.1 Image, Sign, Seduction 
Baudrillard’s conception of seduction explains how he considers images and 
appearances to have enticed humanity into the catastrophic state of hyperreality. 
For him, images and signs engage the viewer in a superficial game, which exploits 
the seduction of appearances rather than the deliverance of meaning. Seduction 
thus becomes a “passion for deviation” and not a unilateral deliverance of truth: 
These appearances are not in the least frivolous, but occasions for a game 
and its stakes, and a passion for deviation – the seduction of the signs 
themselves being more important than the emergence of any truth – which 
interpretation neglects and destroys in its search for hidden meanings. This 
is why interpretation is what, par excellence, is opposed to seduction, and 
why it is the least seductive of discourses. 323  
According to Baudrillard all meaningful discourse seeks to end appearances, which 
is an “impossible undertaking.”324 Therefore, the unconscious motive of such 
discourses is a fascination with, or perhaps more accurately, an expectation of 
negation, because the goal of all such discourse is an impossibility. Thus, discourse 
is tempted by its own failure and “by the bracketing of its objectives, of its truth 
effects which become absorbed within a surface that swallows meaning.”325 This 
absorption within the self and the lack of truth “in order to better fascinate” the 
other, becomes the “primitive seduction of language.” 326 
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Baudrillard considers images and appearances as “hypnotic 
mechanisms,”327 that do not hide truth but the fact that there is no originary truth in 
the first place. Thus, images are seductive, precisely because they divert attention 
from the real truth: that there is none. 
One need not want to dispel appearances (the seduction of images). But if 
one does, it is imperative that one not succeed lest the absence of the truth 
become manifest. Or the absence of God, or the Revolution.328  
Baudrillard sees images as exploiting our fascination with “death, our vulnerability, 
and with the void that haunts us.”329 Seduction is therefore the allure of death as 
life’s final destiny, a condition in which “absence ... seduces presence.”330 
Baudrillard explains that Narcissus was not seduced by his reflection on the surface 
of the water as an absolute other, nor was he seduced by his reflection as an 
idealised self. Instead, Narcissus was seduced by the depthless surface, or the 
“superficial abyss,”331 which drowned him and his image, the self and the other. In 
this model of thought, surface reduces the “distance between the real and its 
double” which inevitably leads to seductive catastrophe. The surface of the water is 
not one of transparency or reflection; it is rather a surface of deadly absorption.332  
According to Baudrillard, seduction “is to die as reality and reconstitute 
oneself as illusion”333 which is an indication of two things: on the one hand a 
curiosity for death much like the “fascination with the void, as in the physical 
vertigo of a chasm, or the metaphorical vertigo of a door that opens onto the 
void,”334 and on the other hand the appeal of beautified appearances: “Above all, 
seduction supposes not a signified desire, but the beauty of an artifice.”335 The desire 
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for death is defined as a “calculated weakness” or “an incalculable weakness.” 
Unlike a “challenge,” seduction does not draw the other into one’s area of strength. 
On the contrary, in seduction one draws the other into one’s area of weakness. But 
this is a calculated move because one’s area of weakness is the other’s too, i.e. 
fascination with deadly appearances:  
We seduce with our death, our vulnerability, and with the void that haunts 
us. The secret is to know how to play with death in the absence of a gaze or 
gesture, in the absence of knowledge or meaning. 336 
Baudrillard’s approach towards images, appearances and their seduction is clarified 
by his description of women’s make-up. The application of make-up, he argues, is 
an erasure of the self and a transformation into a pure appearance denuded of 
meaning. The surface of make-up absorbs all expression and becomes the woman. 
But this becoming is not a creative act of production – a re-production. It is rather a 
calculated act of reproduction (replication, duplication) that flattens the woman to 
the thin surface of the make-up. Seduction therefore becomes the “artificial” 
perfection of the sign: 
[Makeup] absorbs all expression within its own surface, without a trace of 
blood or meaning. … There is no God behind the images, and the very 
nothingness they conceal must remain a secret. The seduction, fascination 
and “aesthetic” attraction of all the great imaginary processes lies here: in 
the effacing of every instance, be it the face and every substance, be it 
desire – in the artificial perfection of the sign.337 
If modernists like Loos evoked gender in their discussion of ornament as the 
degenerate daubing of structure, Baudrillard uses gender to discuss image in 
postmodernity as the seductive eclipsing of power and reality. For Baudrillard, 
surface orchestrates a superficial game of appearances similar to a seductress for 
whom “the power of man’s desire is a myth that she uses in order to both evoke and 
destroy it.”338   
In Baudrillard’s hyperreality everything exists upon the seductive surface, 
which destroys reality by replacing it with illusory appearances. The only escape 
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from this world of seductive simulations is through negativity, criticism, theoretical 
violence and death, which would end the “melancholic fascination … [that] grips us in 
the world of disappearance.”339 Not even analysis can bring any depth, since “no 
matter how the analysis proceeds, it proceeds toward the freezing over of meaning, 
it assists in the precession of simulacra and of indifferent forms. The desert 
grows.”340  
In this fatalistic theory, the “originary mourning” of Derrida turns to a 
desire for death, which provides the only escape from the superficiality of simulacra 
and the melancholic fascination that accompanies them. Ideology cannot escape the 
simulacrum either, because it is defined as the “corruption of reality through 
signs.”341 Thus, the inevitable has already arrived: a simulated hyperreality, which 
destroys the original centre and allows the superficial artifice to subsume reality.  
There is much to agree with in Baudrillard’s theories if it were not for the 
persistent nihilistic lament that undermines his insight. One can sympathize with 
his concerns: the aim of such theoretical extremism is the exposition of the 
consequences of erasure as a strategy, in which the uninhibited play of signifier and 
the disappearances of the signified leads to a superficial game of appearances in 
which meaningful discourse may be lost. However, highlighting the excesses of 
seductive imagery is very different to declaring that there is no longer any meaning. 
Moreover, appearances are essential for any form of communication. Yet, 
Baudrillard’s argues that discourse is “secretly tempted by … failure, by the 
bracketing of its objectives, ...which become absorbed within a surface that swallows 
meaning.”342 This would be the “the primitive seduction of language.”343 The 
seduction of language may be an archaic phenomenon, but to reduce it to the 
destruction of meaning is taking things too far. Derrida was careful not to take such 
a position, even though perhaps he catalyzed it.   
In Baudrillard’s theory of the hyperreal, Benjamin’s withering of aura, 
Debord’s domination of the spectacle and Derrida’s erasure of origin are radicalised 
to the total destruction of the real. The simulacrum represents absolute opacity, total 
reflectivity, pure two-dimensionality and complete deferral. In this bold conception, 
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humanity is trapped within an artificial superficiality, which is all that there is. Like 
Plato’s cave, Baudrillard’s hyperreality depicts humanity as a prisoner of surfaces 
and their superficial effects.  
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The themes and concepts discussed in this chapter have followed the proposition 
that the subordination of ornament and image in theory are related to an established 
philosophical model of thought that can be traced back to Plato. It has been 
demonstrated that appearances suffer from a persistent transcendental hierarchy 
that not only separates them from reality but also categorises them as superficial 
imitations. This approach to images and appearances was traced back to Plato’s 
metaphors and analogies in which the origins of the visible world is placed in the 
higher intelligible realm of Ideas - just as the source of shadows on the metaphoric 
cave were traced back to the firelight or the sun.  In such transcendental 
conceptions, image (and ornament) is considered as superficial signifiers of an 
originary reality that is hidden beneath or beyond. 
In order to find an alternative approach to this metaphysical model, 
Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy was elaborated, not only because of its 
influence amongst contemporary architects, but also because it offers a way of 
subverting the dominant hierarchies of traditional thought. Deconstruction 
destabilises Platonic metaphysics by demonstrating that the central “origin,” or 
authentic “reality” are in fact signifiers in a chain of different signifiers that 
continuously defer meaning.  As a result, absolute origin is in fact absent and since 
every signifier is different, every discourse must be deconstructed to expose its 
“aporias.”  
Derrida argued that the deferral in language implies that origin must be 
put under erasure, since its originality has become questionable. Such a strategy for 
the overcoming of metaphysics through language is based on the absence of an 
absolute signified. This strategy has differing consequences. On the one hand, 
deconstruction allows further discoveries within the limits of the tradition, not by 
producing more metaphysical systems, but by unravelling the intricacies of what 
has been written before. This would be breaking up the established context in 
anticipation of emergence, which is achieved through re-reading of existing 




works.344 On the other hand, deconstruction leads to negative perfectionism: which 
is deconstructing everything in the name of the undeconstructable, waiting for a 
true signified that will never come.345 In other words, in the absence of the 
impossible non-origin, the erasure of the signified leads to the play of the signifier, 
where the “death of the author” and the deferral of meaning catalyze superficiality 
and obfuscation. This leads to Baudrillard’s theories of hyperreality in which the 
artificial sign destroys meaning and reality. 
Plato’s transcendental philosophy defined the origin in a different world, 
higher and brighter from the shadowy surfaces of the visible realm. While Derrida’s 
philosophy subverts this hierarchy, it nonetheless maintains an “elective affinity” 
with negative theology.346  In other words, although Derrida promotes play, his 
philosophy is nonetheless centred by a series of quasi-concepts that are absent, 
contradictory and impossible.347 This negative theology can be described as the 
substitution of the Platonic Sun with a Black Hole,348 which creates endless 
speculations about its exact definition or mode of operation. The Platonic sun orders 
the ocular system of concepts based on goodness and presence. The Derridean black 
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hole on the other hand, deconstructs all presence to a chaotic vortex that is 
nonetheless governed by the non-definable absence at its centre.   
This thesis argues that if Derrida’s erasure of origin “demands the surface 
of the text,”349 Baudrillard’s hyperreality flattens reality onto the superficial image in 
“an implosion of meaning.”350 This is not only a highly nostalgic theorisation of 
contemporary condition, but one that continues to search for Platonic Ideas. In 
Baudrillard’s conception of the simulacrum, the binary hierarchical divide between 
image and the real collapses onto the surface, but this is seen to be an undesirable 
event, in which reality is destroyed in the process.   
As a way of summary, it is possible to argue that if the Platonic model 
preferred the brilliant source to shadowy surface effects, the closure of Platonism 
through the erasure of origin demanded the play of surfaces (of the signifier, text 
and writing). However, the erasure of origin necessitated an absent origin that could 
not be defined. The impossibility of such an origin and the free play of signifiers 
inevitably catalyzed nihilistic theories that declared the destruction of origin and the 
artificial perfection of the sign (Baudrillard). Therefore, hyperreality is defined as a 
hallucinatory condition, facilitated by modern media technologies, in which the 
withering of aura (Benjamin) and the dominance of spectacle (Debord) mutates into 
the flattening of the real onto the superficial image. 
Such philosophical explorations inspire the question: what are the 
implications for architectural theory, and specifically, a study of Frank Gehry’s 
Bilbao Guggenheim Museum? Without going into details, (which shall be left for 
chapter six), it is important to highlight that when critics (like Hal Foster) question 
the dominance of skin over structure, they perform two simultaneous conceptual 
operations. Firstly, the architectural envelope is divided into ornamental skin and 
fundamental structure. This is then followed by a second conceptual turn in which 
the beautified surface is considered secondary in relation to functional structure, 
materiality, context or other concepts that are considered primary. This thesis 
argues that both of these conceptual operations are the effects of a transcendental 
hierarchical system of thought that continues to consider appearances as superficial 
reproductions of authentic reality. Thus, the primary task of architecture is either 
merely represented by architectural imagery (duck) or covered by imagery (decorated 
                                                      
349 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 18 
350 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 31 




shed). In both scenarios a clear distinction is made between designing for the 
appearance of the building, and designing for its originary function.  
Much criticism of Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Museum revolves on the argument 
that the building is designed for the spectacular image, which is destined for media 
reproduction. The images of architecture reproduced across mass media are 
considered artificial in comparison to the authentic physical building situated in its 
context. In such conceptions, the surfaces of Gehry’s architecture seduce, but this 
seduction is illusory fascination, evoking a Baudrillardian conception of seduction. 
Moreover, the images of Gehry’s architecture are spectacular, but the spectacle is an 
image that masks and hides reality – implying a Debordean conception of the 
spectacle. Consequently, Gehry’s architecture is either frivolous or inauthentic, 
because its appearances do not match its function, nor do they display a clear 
relationship to historical context, logical structure or structural logic. Such is the 
familiar approach towards appearances in which they are at best detached from 
originary reality, or in the worst-case scenario, they are hallucinatory images that 
have no relationship with reality whatsoever.  
The deconstruction or closure of such approaches would challenge the 
definitions of “surface,” “structure,” “skin”, “image” or “reality.” It would also 
attempt to question what we mean by the function of architecture. In this way, this 
thesis is deconstructive arguing that appearances are in fact an important element of 
architecture: an arch-imagery that precedes architecture. However, the thesis also 
attempts to take the discussion beyond existing elements, by extending the 
definitions of surface. As shall be demonstrated in later chapters, this would be a 
Deleuzean approach of creative concept making in which deterritorialization of 
thought is always accompanied by reterritorialization.  
With this in mind, the thesis attempts to consider Frank Gehry’s museum 
through a surficial philosophy based on immanence rather than transcendence 
(whether positive or negative transcendence). This implicates a different 
understanding of surface (one that is not in opposition to depth) and a different 
conception of architecture: not skinned-structure, duck or decorated shed, but 
surface architecture. By appropriating surficial philosophy, this thesis argues that 
image making is not a secondary or a superficial task since images are not inferior 
copies of reality or murderers of the real. Instead images produce more reality, as they 
possess an immanent dissimilarity from their supposed models. Consequently, it is 




possible to consider the spectacular nature of Gehry’s BGM as successful 
participation in a different reality: a simulated reality that continues to be produced, 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
Foster’s critique of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum implies some important 
questions: is Gehry’s work the result of a preoccupation with visual spectacle and 
superficial effects, with all the shallowness that these words can conjure up? Is the 
BGM tectonically obscure because the “skin” has been allowed to dominate the 
structure? Is the “Bilbao Effect” nothing more than the seduction of the superficial, 
the spectacular and the imagistic at the expense of formal logic, programmatic rigor 
and sensitivity to the site? If so, how can Gehry get away with so much?  
This dissertation argues that the answer lies upon the very surfaces with 
which Gehry designs, visualizes, constructs and reproduces his buildings. In other 
words, it is questionable whether Gehry’s BGM is intended to be divided into the 
structure/skin, function/form opposition so characteristic of modernist 
manifestoes. Perhaps the BGM’s appeal lies in its invitation of the viewer to remain 
at the surface level, an ambition which considering the technological state of current 
society seems more profound than superficial. This thesis proposes that rather than 
designing for the penetration of surfaces and images in order to arrive at a hidden 
reality, structure or logic, the BGM invites the viewer to float within and upon the 
surface, which forms the architectural place within which communication of ideas, 
expression of sense and transformation of established categories occurs.  
Arguably this is a different approach to surface, which does not define it in 
opposition to a hidden depth. Moreover, it seems that the movement of thought that 
is being encouraged is not one of vertical ascent towards the height of Ideas nor is it 
a descent towards the depths of meaning. Instead it is a non-hierarchical floatation, 
which suggests a more horizontal exploration of alternative sensations and unlikely 
realisations. Such a mode of communication is argued to be primitive and 











It holds that depending on the contextual situation, it will be sensible (and sometimes true, 
sometimes not) to say that one who looks at, gazes at, stares at, etc., an object may be said to 
be seeing the object, to be seeing the whole object, to be seeing all of the object, to be seeing 
each and every part of the object, to be seeing the object itself; and (taking a breath) to object, 
all of the surface of the object, only the surface of the object, and part of the surface of the 
object; and (taking another breath) sometimes to be seeing the surface, all of the surface, the 
whole surface, etc., of the object, and at the same time, to be seeing the object, all of the object, 
the whole object, and so on; and (taking another) sometimes to be seeing each of these items 
directly and sometimes not. Each of these characterizations fits some situation in which 
human percipients find themselves and does not fit others. What piecemeal realism then adds 
is the assertion that none of them fits every situation in which human percipients find 
themselves.351  
Avrum Stroll 
                                                      
351 Avrum Stroll, Surfaces, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988, p. 179 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FOUR 
This thesis proposes that it is possible to think of Gehry’s museum as an architecture 
of surface. This implies a conceptual strategy without transcendental hierarchy in 
which architecture occurs upon the surface, not between skin and structure, or 
image and reality. To elaborate this conception of architecture, the thesis first 
deploys a philosophy of surface and later adopts a surficial philosophy. 
A philosophy of surface investigates the nature of surfaces and their 
significance for interaction with the external world. In the current condition where 
images proliferate through mass media, surfaces have gained greater significance. 
This is not only because they facilitate the projection or the screening of images, but 
also because (communication) technologies are becoming ever thinner and 
smaller.352  
In geometry, surface is a flat, two-dimensional entity that lacks materiality 
or depth. However, Avrum Stroll’s “analytic deconstruction”353 of surface in 
everyday language demonstrates that different interpretations of the term are 
possible, each with its own unique qualities. Using Stroll’s work as a reference, the 
following chapter demonstrates that both the “ordinary” and the “scientific” 
definitions of surface have an essential thickness, and an embedded depth, indicating 
that it is possible and highly popular to define surface as a thick boundary 
condition, i.e. a milieu or a medium. 
This chapter also mentions four different theories of visual perception in 
order to determine the significance of surface in various epistemological models. 
This part progresses from theories that view surface as a barrier or mask that hide 
the rest of the object, to one that defines visual perception as an effect of “surface 
layout.” Stroll demonstrates that there are different theories of surface in 
epistemology and no one definition of surface can embody the variety of its usage.  
                                                      
352 An integrated circuit (also known as IC, microcircuit, microchip, silicon chip, or chip) is a 
miniature electronic circuit, which is manufactured on the surface of a semiconductor 
material such as silicone. An integrated circuit incorporate semiconductor devices such as 
the transistor and resistor. Integrated circuits are now in use in most electronic devices and 
have revolutionised contemporary technology. See 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/integrated_circuit.aspx, accessed April 2009.  
353 See A. P. Martinich “Analytic Phenomenological Deconstruction” in Certainty and Surface 
in Epistemology and Philosophical Method: Essays in Honour of Avrum Stroll (Problems in 
Contemporary Philosophy), ed. A. P. Martinich and Michael White, Edwin Mellen Press Ltd, 
London, 1991, pp. 165-84. 
 
This indicates the flexibility and pliability of the term in everyday use. 
However, rather than seeing this conclusion as a case for “piecemeal realism,” 
(which is Stroll’s preferred strategy) this thesis argues that in the context of creative 
production, the impossibility of defining surface in general, is an opportunity for 
further theorisation and exploration of (architectural) surfaces.  
Following from this conclusion, later chapters will demonstrate that a 
topological and topographical conception of surface can be used to arrive at a 
surficial philosophy that gives more emphasis to creativity and productivity by 
overcoming the hierarchy and transcendence in traditional thought. Such a 
philosophical approach characterized by “univocity” and “immanence,”354 is argued 
to be more sympathetic to creative production, offering a more flexible attitude 
toward new technology and alternative processes of design.   
4.1 DEFINITIONS OF SURFACE: “THEOREMS” FROM EVERYDAY 
LANGUAGE 
The work of English philosopher, Avrum Stroll offers an intriguing insight into the 
usage of the word “surface” in the English language. Stroll investigates the 
definition of surface through what he calls the “geometry of ordinary speech,”355 
which is used to arrive at a series of “theorems” based on a “common-sense point of 
view.”356 According to Stroll this informal geometry of speech is “deeper, more 
primitive, conceptually prior to, and indeed the basis for the refined and regimented 
mathematical and scientific treatments of geometric concepts,”357 of which one could 
mention the surface. Although the scientific language of geometry and the less 
formal language of ordinary speech can be quite different, it is hoped that by 
focusing on their similarities one can arrive at a better understanding of the term 
“surface.”358 
                                                      
354 For an explanation of these concepts see section 5.1 of the thesis. 
355 Avrum Stroll, Surfaces, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988, p. 11 
356 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 12 
357 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 12  
358 Stroll identifies the major difference between ordinary language and geometry as the 
former’s lack of axioms. While in geometry axioms and inference rules are used to derive 
theorems, very few of the sentences of English can be described as theorems. However, 
certain geometric axioms are shared between the two languages, for example “cube,” 
“triangle,” and “square” which are so familiar to ordinary speakers as frequently not to be 
thought of as technical words at all. 
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Stroll explains that “surface” resides in the “overlap” between everyday 
language and geometry. Other words include “line,” “point,” ”edge,” “side,” 
“angle,” “corner,” “apex,” and “face.” The term “overlap” is used because certain 
technical words are not found in ordinary speech and conversely certain words are 
not part of the geometrical lexicon. “Brim,” “brink,” and “verge” would be 
examples of the latter.359 “Surface-talk” refers to that part of everyday language that 
describes surfaces and signifies their presence. In other words, the “common sense 
point of view” stipulates that if one can apply surface-talk to an object, then it must 
have surfaces. The nature of surface-talk depends on two important factors: firstly 
the operations performed on the surfaces, and the secondly the properties that the 
surfaces have inherent in them. Moreover, in surface-talk, the sense of vision and 
touch are most important since other senses like hearing, smell and taste “are 
mentioned rarely, if at all, in everyday speech in surface-talk about such objects.”360  
4.1.1 Immateriality or Two-dimensionality of Abstract Conceptions 
Through a rigorous analysis of surface-talk, Stroll concludes that there can be four 
different conceptions of surface, all of which consider surfaces as a boundary 
condition. The first conception (inspired by the writings of Leonardo da Vinci) is 
when surface is considered as an interface, a common boundary without divisible 
bulk that does not belong to either of the contiguous entities that are in contact.361 In 
this scenario, surface is seen as an abstract entity that marks the theoretical 
distinction between two things, or a thing and nothingness. Surface is abstract but it 
is not like a “phenomenon.”362 Therefore, surface remains the same regardless of the 
operations performed on either entity in contact. This is because surface is a 
theoretical construct; it has no physical dimension.  
The second conception of surface as an abstraction (“DS model”) defines it 
as belonging to its corresponding entity. This definition is arrived at through 
“thinning out a physical surface until we are left with a kind of logical limit or 
                                                      
359 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 201 
360 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 24 
361 See Stroll, Surfaces, pp. 40-46 
362 By phenomenon, Stroll refers to images and shadows that do not have divisible bulk or 
physical properties. Described in this way, surface is like the “equator” in that it is an 
abstract boundary, which in this case, separates the northern and southern hemisphere of 
the earth. 
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conceptual limit to the object.”363 Under this abstract model, surface is infinitely thin 
and impossibly shallow. However, it is only associated with physical objects that have 
stable shapes and discernible boundaries.  
Thus, the DS model “has something deeply to do with the shape of the 
object, and with the fact that its shape is readily discernible in ordinary 
circumstances.”364 Air, clouds, human beings, and other large365 living creatures do 
not fall into this category because:  
the objects to which surfaces are ascribed must have a certain density or 
compactness, and reasonable determinate and stable boundaries; all of 
these features are connected with the shape of the object, a shape that ought 
to be determinate and stable enough so that we can easily recognize it 
under normal conditions of visibility.366  
The necessary stability of the shape of the object in the DS conception is the reason 
why one cannot talk of the surfaces of a river, while it can be said that a lake has a 
surface. A river is animate water, in continuous movement between the bedrock 
and the air above, and therefore it is not considered to have surfaces. Unlike the first 
abstract conception of surface, the DS model possesses the characteristics of the 
object to which it belongs. Nevertheless, in this conception, surface is devoid of any 
physical thickness and as a result, it remains two-dimensional.  
4.1.2 Minimal or Arbitrary Thicknesses of Physical Conceptions 
In contrast to the abstract definitions of surface discussed above, Stroll proposes two 
other conceptions that treat surfaces as physical entities with properties that include 
depth or divisible bulk. The first of the physical conceptions of surface is taken from 
an ordinary person’s point of view (“OS model”), which defines surface as part of 
the object deep enough to become marked and scratched. In this conception, surface 
is a boundary that has a thickness upon (and within) which various physical 
operations can be performed. More importantly, this definition of surface also 
includes such “covering materials as paints, lacquers, glosses or resins – and 
sometimes even … the patina that an object develops or acquires with time.”367 The 
OS conception is unique because it is characterized by the thickness, not the thinness 
                                                      
363 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 46 
364 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 49 
365 Since we are using the “geometry of ordinary speech” to deduce theorems, large here, 
means large enough to be visible by the naked eye. 
366 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 49  
367 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 53 
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of surface. However, the depth at which surface ceases and the rest of the object 
begins is often defined arbitrarily.  
Stroll suggests another physical conception of surface based on the work of 
Gabor A. Samorjai.368 Much like the OS view, this “scientific conception” represents 
surface as a physical entity with properties of various kinds that can be subject to 
different physical operations. In this conception, surface is defined by the 
“progressive thinning out”369 of a material, moving from the centre to the boundary, 
the only difference being that the thinning process is stopped as one approaches the 
last layer of atoms belonging to the object. This is because “one can’t find anything 
‘thinner’ than a last layer of atoms” and it is “the last layer that belongs to that 
object before one moves into a medium of a different sort.”370  
The scientific view (SS) seems similar to the DS model in that it defines 
surface by thinning out the object. However, in the SS conception, surface is a 
fundamentally different concept, because it maintains minimal thickness that can only 
be viewed using advanced technologies.371 In other words, if in the DS model, 
surface is a two-dimensional entity without any thickness, in the SS model surface 
becomes a three-dimensional phenomenon, even though its thickness is not visible 
to the naked eye.  
Moreover, in the SS model, technological magnification allows for surface 
to assume different qualities. For example, an electron microscope photograph of a 
“clean” deposit-free surface reveals that it is in fact heterogeneous, not 
homogeneous. An extreme magnification of the scientific surface (surface that is one 
atom thick) shows that it contains a number of topographical features such as 
“terraces, steps, kinks, all of which one might well find in a hillside orchard.”372 It is 
therefore through technological magnification that surface is transformed into a 
complex topography, or a surficial system, upon which different reactions, interactions, 
and operations occur.  
                                                      
368 Gabor A. Samorjai is a professor at the University of California, Berkely, and a leading 
researcher in the field of surface chemistry.  
369 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 54 
370 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 54 
371 “The thinning-out process that would eventually lead to one’s thinking of a surface as an 
abstraction seems irresistible; yet Somorjai does resist it. He states categorically that the 
surface is a physical entity, or, as he calls it, a ‘system,’ which includes such features as 
adatoms, kinks, and the rest.” Stroll, Surfaces, p. 57 
372 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 57 
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The scientific conception allows every entity a surface, which can be 
studied and analyzed. For example, clouds, trees, persons, and animals are 
considered to have surfaces that mark them off from other entities in their 
environments. The OS view would agree that such entities have boundaries, but 
would reject the idea that such boundaries are surfaces.  For example, the OS view 
would not consider skin to be a human’s surface, but for science, the last atoms of 
skin would be the surface of humans. Similar remarks can apply to certain 
phenomena such as clouds, fog, haze, and air. Therefore, a physicist can talk about 
the surface of the air and surface of water (air-water interface), but the ordinary 
speaker, would not agree: they do not say that the surface of the air is rough or 











Figure 4.1: The Four Conceptions of Surface. Source: the author. 
Despite these differences, both OS and SS definitions allow layers of paint or patina 
to be considered as the surface of the object, and they both give emphasis to the 
DS MODEL 
Abstract: conceptual outer limit 
Only objects with stable shape can have surface 
Surface is two-dimensional 
Surface is infinitely thin 
OS MODEL 
Physical: thick outer layer 
Only objects with stable shape can have surface 
Surface is more than two-dimensional 
Surface is arbitrarily thick 
SS MODEL 
Physical: last layer of atoms 
Almost everything can have a surface 
Surface is more than two-dimensional 
Surface is minimally thick 
LS MODEL 
Abstract: conceptual interface 
Anything can have surface 
Surface is two-dimensional 
Surface is a concept 
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operations that can be performed upon surfaces. This allows surface to be 
heterogeneous to the rest of the object without losing its conceptual continuity with 
the object, i.e. without being considered as a foreign layer. In such physical 
conceptions, surface is not only a thick milieu, but it is also a heterogeneous 
boundary condition in which the object and its appearance exist in a complex 
surficial system.  
4.1.3 Exceptions: Surface-less Phenomena or Surface Phenomena? 
It has been demonstrated that from the “common-sense point of view,” certain 
conceptions of surface are possible that do not define it in opposition to depth. 
These thick surfaces are conceptually continuous with the rest of the object, even if 
they are of different material make-up. However, the common-sense approach has 
its own limitations. For example, there are certain things to which surface-talk 
cannot be applied. Stroll groups such entities into two categories: certain 
phenomena (like shadows, rainbows, lightning), and certain objects (like clouds, 
dogs, plants, trees and persons).  
However, it is possible to argue that most of such phenomena are 
dependent on surfaces for their existence and therefore, they can be called surface 
phenomena. For example, shadows are created when light is not cast on certain areas 
of a surface. In other words, without surface there would be no shadows, just as 
without light there would be no shadows either. This line of reasoning can be 
extended to argue that images are also surface phenomena. Arguably, without 
reflective surfaces (of mirrors), sensitised surfaces (of photographic film or paper) or 
the activated surfaces (of digital screens) there would be no mirror images, 
photographic images, or any virtual imagery.  
For the case of animate objects (animals, human begins, etc). things are a 
little different. Stroll points out that from the common-sense point of view, it is 
possible to say that one touches someone’s “skin” or “hair” but one cannot be said 
to be touching their surface. Thus, skin can be said to have a surface but not the 
person and although surface-talk is sometimes applied to the “inanimate” parts of 
animate beings, it is hardly ever applied to the whole person or to the whole 
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animal.373 Therefore, from the common-sense point of view: “[t]he basic turf to 
which surface-talk applies is the world of the inanimate.”374  
However scientific analysis and new technologies have demonstrated that 
seemingly stable, inanimate surfaces are in continuous movement (earth’s surface), 
while seemingly homogeneous surfaces are in fact heterogeneous layers (oxidised 
atoms, impurities, steppes and terrains) that change in time (e.g. patina). Therefore, 
it is possible to argue that new technologies have facilitated an altogether different 
understanding of surface and an ability to see that surfaces are in fact always 
surfacing.   
4.2 SURFACE IN VISUAL PERCEPTION: THE POTENTIAL OF 
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS 
A common feature of epistemology has been characterized by questions about what 
it means to “see” something, and whether one can see the whole object, part of it or 
none of it at all. Naturally, notions of surface are an important factor in such 
epistemological pursuits. Stroll argues that in general, the epistemological tradition 
posits that “we don’t literally see all of an object from a given perspective and at a 
given moment, but at most a certain part of it” which in turn is taken to mean that 
“we see a certain part of its surface.” 375 In such statements, surface is used as a 
singular term that forms only a part of the object and almost always hides the other 
parts through its opacity. In other words, our perception of the world is always 
partial and mediated through a surface, which sits between the observer and the 
whole reality of the object.  
4.2.1 Surface as Barrier  
Stroll explains that attitudes towards surfaces in traditional epistemology are based 
on three contrasting theoretical assumptions that can be refuted through particular 
examples. As was mentioned above, the first assumption is that the object discussed 
has only one opaque surface and we only see part of it. This theory
                                                      
373 According to Stroll, “…from the fact that the skin has a surface, and is part of a human 
being, it does not follow that the human being has a surface. But this does follow with 
respect to the skin of an apple.” Stroll, Surfaces, p. 35 
374 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 27 
375 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 89 




can be exemplified by a steel marble which would be said to have one surface, only 
a certain part of which can be seen from any angle at any one time. In this 
conception, part of the surface masks the rest of the object. Theorists like Martin 
Lean376 and Roderick Chisholm,377 argue that even though the observer can only see 
part of the surface of the object at any given time, he is still said to be seeing the 
object. In such theories “ to see a physical object just is (trivially) to see part of its 
surface.”378 
The second assumption sees surface as different from the non-surface parts 
of the object. Here surface acts as a barrier in blocking the view towards the other 
parts of the object. According to G.E. Moore one can see part of the surface directly 
and the object itself indirectly.379 Moore refers to the part of the surface that is seen 
directly as “sense-datum.”380  
The third theory is a combination of the two above, which suggests that 
surface is only a part of the object; therefore seeing it or part of it means that we do 
not see all of the object. This suggests that if one sees the surface of an object, one 
does not see the object, but just its surface. This final theory raises the important 
issue of the “part-whole” relationship, which is different to the “part-part 
relationship”381 of the preceding cases. (See figure 4.2) 
These three assumptions define the traditional perception of surfaces: 
“namely, that they are intermediaries, standing, as it were, between the observer 
and certain parts, aspects, or features of the object, or even standing between the 
observer and the whole object itself.”382 But, there are exceptions for each of these 
contrasting assumptions. For example for the first theory, one can mention a dice 
that has six surfaces. From a common-sense point of view, one cannot talk about the 
surface of a dice and if the dice is made of glass, one can see through it and see all of 
                                                      
376 See Martin Lean, Sense Perception and Matter: A Critical Analysis of C. D. Broad’s Theory of 
Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1953, pp. 68-69 
377 See Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1957, pp. 153-156 
378 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 99 
379 See O. K. Bouwsma, “Moore’s Theory of Sense-Data” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. 
P. A. Schilpp, 3rd ed. La Salle, Illinois, 1968, pp. 201-222 
380 See Stroll, Surfaces, pp. 101-2 
381 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 95 
382 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 95 




it. Therefore, to state that seeing an object is seeing only part of its surface directly is 
a form of “naïve realism.”383 
The second and third conceptions of visual perception are a little more 
complicated. In Moore’s theories, seeing an object is seeing “part of the surface of 
the object … but never the whole object or the object itself.”384 For Clarke however, 
“in such circumstances we see the whole object, or the object itself, …[but not] the 
surface of the object or any part thereof.”385 Moore’s position is more 
straightforward, but Clarke’s theory needs further elaboration.  
 





Figure 4.2: Surface as a barrier to seeing: the three epistemological assumptions. 
Source: the author after Thompson Clarke’s diagrams reprinted in Stroll, 
Avrum, 1988, Surfaces, p. 109 
 
4.2.2 No Surface, Just Object 
In Clarke’s conception, seeing an object is not seeing its surfaces because, if this 
were so, the observer would only be seeing a part-object that would be masking the 
object. Therefore, when X has seen a tomato, he has seen the object without the 
                                                      
383 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 102 
384 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 104 
385 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 104  
Surface masks other parts of the object 
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Seeing part of surface is seeing the object  
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interference of surfaces, which are intermediaries that hide other parts of the object.386 
The question therefore is what we mean by “seeing” and whether one should go 
beyond a common-sense understanding of term to such a degree that it becomes 
alienated and foreign?  
To further explain his theory of vision, Clarke proposes the concept of 
“nibbled at” to demonstrate how the preconception of an object determines its 
visual perception. Clarke argues that depending on the “units” that make up an 
object, surface-talk about the object differs. For example, if a tomato is seen to be 
made up of two parts, (i.e. surface and the rest, or simply divided into two parts) 
then when one part has been “nibbled at” it would be right to say that half of the 
tomato has been nibbled at. However, if the tomato is seen as a unit entity, then one 
can say that the tomato has been nibbled at. This distinction highlights that surface-
talk depends entirely on how the object is pre-defined: whether as a unit concept or 
divided in two or more segments.387 Thus, “seeing functions analogously to nibbling 
at” which means that “when one sees a whole tomato, one is not seeing any 
subparts of it, such as a part of its surface.”388 In this way, in ordinary talk, seeing an 
object is defined as seeing all of it because the object has not been subdivided into 
different parts (of which one can mention the surface). 
Relating this logic to architecture can produce significant results. For 
instance, if the architectural envelope is seen as one conceptual unit and not 
subdivided into an ornamental layer and an underlying structure, then seeing 
“ornament” or “cladding” would mean that one is, in fact, seeing architecture and not 
a partial or superficial element of it. If however, the building is categorised into 
conceptually segregated sub-units, then the question arises whether one is only 
seeing a part of architecture (ornament, cladding, skin) that is masking the rest, and 
if so, whether such elements have an appropriate relationship with what lies 
beneath? Thus, it is through conceptual segmentation that surface design becomes 
vulnerable to accusations of superficiality or deceit.   
Clarke’s argument is based on the proposition that in normal talk of 
“seeing,” surfaces are not mentioned at all, because the object in discussion is not 
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pre-divided into exact units. However, the complexity of everyday scenarios 
exceeds this argument. For example from the ordinary person’s point of view, it is 
not always clear where surface ends and the rest of the object begins. Moreover, in 
many scenarios, one talks of mixtures and ambiguous amounts. For instance, when 
a tomato is not divided into two units, it is still possible to say that a bit of tomato 
has been nibbled at, or only some of it or a bit of the top layer. Such statements 
would contradict Clarke’s position, which maintains that if the tomato is not 
subdivided, one would only say “the tomato has been nibbled at.” 
The limitation of Clarke’s theory is especially apparent when we consider 
that the observer is often not in a position to confidently and precisely determine 
the exact subdivision of the object in view. To determine subdivisions would 
require a cross-section view through the object or a prior knowledge of the object’s 
construction. In ordinary scenarios these factors are rare, which is why Clarke’s 
reliance on prior knowledge of exact units of measurements makes his theory at 
odds with everyday scenarios.389 
Seeing architecture as one conceptual unit does not necessitate thick wall 
construction, though it might strongly suggest such an arrangement. Even if the 
architectural envelope is made of distinctly different layers, it is still possible to 
consider these layers as operating within a conceptual mixture, i.e. without precise 
conceptual boundaries. With new technologies and materials of construction, the 
external layers of a building are now capable of performing structural duties, whilst 
structure is increasingly taking on ornamental characteristics. Such advancements in 
design and construction require their own theoretical approaches to facilitate new 
definitions and generate alternative approaches to traditional categories.390  
4.2.3 Theory of Surface Layout 
Before examining Stroll’s conclusion about the epistemological significance of 
surfaces, it is important to mention James Jerome Gibson’s work, which offers an 
alternative approach to traditional theories of visual perception. Questioning the 
established definitions of “seeing” in epistemology, Gibson argues that much like 
experimental psychology, the complexity of seeing is often reduced to “snapshot 
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vision” or “aperture vision” where only a partial element of reality is considered.391  
In such scenarios, the subject is limited to one perspective, given a short period of 
time and fixed in one place when looking at an object. It is for this reason that the 
subject can only see a segment of what would be seen in normal conditions, where 
movement around the object, or in some cases within the object itself, is possible. 
Therefore the observer in such a “test condition” is like the prisoner in the Platonic 
cave who is restricted to one point of view.  
Gibson’s criticism is that natural vision is different to “laboratory cases,” as 
movement and time always play an important factor.392 Thus, Gibson proposes a 
theory of surface derived from “ambient vision” and “ambulatory vision” which he 
argues to be closer to how people see objects in everyday conditions.393 In ambient 
vision, the head is allowed to rotate and scan the environment whilst ambulatory 
vision allows movement through the ecological environment as well as the 
rotational scanning of the head.394 It is argued that in the case of ambulatory vision, 
the observer is not apprehending a flat visual field composed of connected 
snapshots, rather a flowing array of visual cues that determine movement, direction, 
depth and so on.395 In other words, as the observer moves and scans the 
environment, the surfaces of objects emerge and recede, which together with an 
awareness of space and time, allows for a more comprehensive visual perception.  
Gibson’s theory proposes that the perception of depth is not achieved by 
interpreting two-dimensional images formed in the mind (abstract), but rather 
through a direct experience of surfaces in space and time (physical). In this theory, 
objects are set against a surface background, rather than floating in empty space or 
air. Thus, depth, distance, shape and other attributes of objects are determined by 
analyzing surfaces in relationship to other surfaces that make up the visual field. 
The following passage from The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1986), 
explains this concept:  
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I suggested a new theory in a book on what I called the visual world 
[Gibson, The Perception of the Visual World (Boston, 1950)]. I considered “the 
possibility that there is literally no such thing as a perception of space 
without the perception of a continuous background surface” (p.6). I called 
this a ground theory of space perception to distinguish it from the air theory 
that seemed to underlie the old approach. The idea was that the world 
consisted of a basic surface with adjoining surfaces, not of bodies in empty 
air. The character of the visual world was given not by objects but by the 
background of the objects. Even the space of the airplane pilot, I said, was 
determined by the ground and the horizon of the earth, not by the air 
through which he flies. The notion of space of three dimensions with three 
axes for Cartesian coordinates was a great convenience for mathematics, I 
suggested, but an abstraction that had very little to do with actual 
perception.396  
This theory is validated by pointing out that the perception of the size and distance 
of an object on the ground is often more difficult to judge than the size and distance 
of an object in the sky. This is because in the latter case the background surface 
displays more visual clues against which the object can be compared.397 Thus, 
Gibson’s unique theory proposes that depth or height is an effect of surface layout:  
I would now describe the ground theory as a theory of the layout of 
surfaces. By layout, I mean the relations of surfaces to the ground and to 
one another, their arrangement. The layout includes both places and 
objects, together with other features. The theory asserts that the perception 
of surface layout is direct. This means that perception does not begin with 
two-dimensional form perception. Hence, there is no special kind of 
perception called depth perception, and the third dimension is not lost in 
the retinal image since it was never in the environment to begin with. It is a 
loose term. If depth means the dimension of an object that goes with height 
and width, there is nothing special about it. Height becomes depth when 
the object is seen from the top, and width becomes depth when the object is 
seen from the side. If depth means distance from here, then it involves self-
perception and is continually changing as the observer moves about. The 
theory of depth perception is based on confusion and perpetuated by the 
fallacy of the retinal picture.  
I now say that there is information in ambient light of the perception of the 
layout of surface, but not that there are cues or clues for the perception of 
depth. The traditional list of cues is worthless if perception does not begin 
with a flat picture…such is the hypothesis of the direct perception of 
surface layout.398  
The theory of surface layout implies that the context, the background or the 
underlying surface upon which things are distinguished is as important as the 
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surfaces of objects that are in view. One cannot exist without the other. In a natural 
context, the earth, the sky and the horizon help form a complex layout of visual 
surfaces that allows perceptions of depth, movement and objects’ position in 
relationship to each other. In artificial environments other elements can form this 
system of surfaces, from which depth may be distinguished. Thus, depth is in fact a 
surface effect, perceived and experienced through the temporal exploration of surface 
layout. (See figure 4.3) 
According to Gibson, there is a tendency in theories of vision to thin out the 
exterior slice of an object and call it surface. This surface is so thin that one cannot 
directly see the depth or shape of an object.399 In such a definition, surface would not 
show the depth or the roundness of the object. However, in normal conditions, the 
depth and roundness of the object is evident, because one can walk around the 
object and interpret the continuity of its surface as a sign of its roundness 
(ambulatory vision). Even when one stops, scanning the tomato allows for a direct 








Figure 4.3: Surface as the facilitator of vision, based on Gibson’s theory of 
surface layout. See in conjunction with figure 4.2. Source: the author.  
Gibson’s theory of vision attempts to clarify that to see something is to see its 
surfaces in relation to other surfaces, which are all seen directly and without 
intermediaries. Gibson rejects Moore’s idea that we do not directly see a whole 
tomato, for instance, but at most only part of its surface. As a result, to see the surfaces 
of an object is to see the object itself, which in turn implies that to see the object’s 
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Surface makes the object and its context apparent 
Surface reveals shape and depth 
Seeing includes ambulatory and ambient vision  
Seeing the surface of an object is seeing the object  
(Surface-surface relationship) 
 
(Whole-whole relationship)  




surface characteristics (texture, colour, reflection, etc). is to speak of the qualities of 
the object itself. Moreover, not only does Gibson define depth as surface effect, but 
he also emphasises the importance of bodily awareness in space and time. For 
Gibson, “seeing” is a process that is not limited to the eye and the brain, but one that 
involves other organs of the body: neck, shoulders, legs, feet and so on.  
4.3 CONCLUSIONS: SURFACE AS PLACE OF DIFFERENCE 
Like any other theory, Gibson’s “Ecological Approach to Visual Perception,” is 
falsifiable and Stroll elaborates on some of the inconsistencies in his book. Faced 
with the impossibility of formulating an irrefutable theory that encompasses the 
different aspects of surface in visual perception, Stroll promotes “example-oriented 
realism,” in contrast to “holistic theories.” He calls this approach “piecemeal 
realism,” one that “denies that any general account of perception will explain all the 
possible ways that human beings see things, or all the features of the things that are 
there to be seen.”400  
Through careful exposition of numerous examples, Stroll comes to the 
conclusion that the answer to the question “Do we ever see anything indirectly?” is 
“not a firm ‘yes’ or a firm ‘no’, but a firm ‘maybe.’”401 One must be “happy to leave 
it at that.”402 Such a strategy argues that neither “direct realism” or “representative 
realism” provide comprehensive theories of perception as they are both 
“philosophical interpretations of what is essentially a neutral set of facts.”403 
Piecemeal realism, therefore, claims that the world “contains an indefinitely large 
number of irreducibly different kinds of things”404 which makes the declaration of 
one definition or theory an uncomfortably complex operation that, in fact, 
undermines the usefulness of such an attempt. Thus, if one were to anticipate the 
different conceptions of surface in visual perception, one would have to be content 
with a “piecemeal” theory similar to the following: 
It holds that depending on the contextual situation, it will be sensible (and 
sometimes true, sometimes not) to say that one who looks at, gazes at, 
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stares at, etc., an object may be said to be seeing the object, to be seeing the 
whole object, to be seeing all of the object, to be seeing each and every part 
of the object, to be seeing the object itself; and (taking a breath) to object, all 
of the surface of the object, only the surface of the object, and part of the 
surface of the object; and (taking another breath) sometimes to be seeing 
the surface, all of the surface, the whole surface, etc., of the object, and at the 
same time, to be seeing the object, all of the object, the whole object, and so 
on; and (taking another) sometimes to be seeing each of these items directly 
and sometimes not. Each of these characterizations fits some situation in 
which human percipients find themselves and does not fit others. What 
piecemeal realism then adds is the assertion that none of them fits every 
situation in which human percipients find themselves.405  
Stroll argues that there cannot be one answer to the question “What is surface?” as 
this definition would not be able to accommodate the different alternatives that 
have been delineated. This is because even though surface is a boundary term,  
the conception of being a boundary is ambiguous in exactly the way that 
the conception of being surface is. So “boundary” cannot be used to 
explicate “surface” since “boundary” suffers from the same ambiguity as 
“surface” does.406  
Stroll inevitably concludes that: “We shall have to live with this result.”407 Yet, if an 
inquiry into the nature of surface leads to a realisation that the term cannot be 
reduced to one theory or conception, it also means that surface can be thought of in 
different ways, each with its own unique ramifications. This is not to say that the 
term is so malleable that it is meaningless, rather that surface is a potentially 
generative concept with important implications for epistemology, scientific inquiry 
and the way we deal with the world on an everyday basis.  
In the absence of one irrefutable conception of surface, or a complete theory 
of visual perception, an alternative approach towards theory becomes possible. 
Rather than expecting theories to define reality in perfect clarity, it is possible to 
view theories as (creative) constructs that catalyze further thought, exploration and 
analysis. From this point of view, falsifiability or refutability of theories is not an 
indication of their originary falsehood, but rather an indication of their finite 
temporal zone of operation within the evolution of thought, pushed forward by 
continuous testing and experimentation. Perhaps, the complexity of reality cannot 
be contained within any one theory, but theorisation is nevertheless a necessary 
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element of an active interaction with complex reality. Thus, in the case of surface, it 
is possible to shift the emphasis from definition to proposition, in order to arrive at 
alternative philosophical approaches towards seeing, perception and creative 
production. 
Stroll’s “analytic phenomenological deconstruction”408 of ordinary English 
language led to four different conceptions of surface, each with its own unique 
potential. The LS conception for example, defines surfaces as interfaces: an abstract 
boundary at which both separation and connection occur simultaneously. In 
contrast to the other conceptions, surface as an interface encourages notions of 
interaction and exchange. The DS conception of surface is also abstract, yet it 
assigns physical attributes to surfaces. This conception is dependent on the shape 
and the discernable compactness of an object. The DS model is closer to the 
common-sense view, even though surface is still a two-dimensional entity without 
thickness. As an abstract model, the DS conception of surface is the “logical limit or 
conceptual limit”409 of an object, and perhaps the likeliest reason for the 
“shallowness” and “insubstantiality” of the word “superficial.”  
The ordinary person’s conception of surface (OS view) proposes a more 
substantial definition of surface as the outer layer that can be heterogeneous to the 
rest of the object, but an extension of the object and not a foreign layer. In this 
conception, surface does not oppose depth since it possesses a thickness that 
facilitates physical operations to be performed on it. The fact that the OS conception 
includes paints and patina as parts of the object means that from this point of view, 
surface appearances can be considered as part of the object’s reality and not an 
artificial construct that masks or denatures the real object.  
Finally, the scientific conception of surface (the SS view) suggests a surficial 
understanding of the term, where surfaces are viewed as complex topographical 
systems. In this conception every physical entity has a surface that can be analyzed 
and studied (even gases, and animate objects like humans), but more importantly, 
surface is treated as an expansive landscape, which can be explored through 
contemporary technologies. The scientific conception allows movement in scale, 
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which offers explorations beyond what meets the naked eye. Although in this 
conception surface has minimal thickness, it is nonetheless a three dimensional entity 
and a substantial layer with physical properties upon which physical operations can 
be performed.  
Thinking of surface in physical terms shifts the emphasis from the thinness 
of surface to its thickness, which accommodates visual and physical interaction with 
the object. Moreover, such conceptions, allow heterogeneous layers to be considered 
as the surfaces of the object. In fact for most viewers what architects refer to as 
“cladding” or “skin” can easily be the surfaces of architecture. This usage of the term 
suggests a much more continuous relationship between surface effects and the rest 
of the architectural object.  
The modernists utilised metaphors of clothing to detach ornament from the 
materiality of construction. In such conceptions, ornament became associated with 
the thinness of surface, but more importantly, the ornamental layer became 
secondary to the object of architecture. Inevitably, the ornamental surface was 
considered a superficial mask that obscured the material reality of architectural 
construction. However, it has been demonstrated that surface can be defined as a 
thick and complex heterogeneous system that does not mask the object, but rather 
facilitate its appearance. Combining this conception with Gibson’s theory of surface 
layout suggests an alternative understanding of surface in visual perception in 
which, the traditional strategy of penetrating surfaces to uncover a deep and hidden 
reality transforms to a desire for surface exploration, where depth, meaning or 
reality become effects of surface layout. In this model of thought, emphasis shifts from 
surface/depth opposition to surface/surface relationships.  
It is therefore possible to think of surfaces not as masking barriers (as 
depicted in the Platonic cave) but as the facilitators of seeing, that are not depthless 
superficialities (as in Baudrillard’s Hyperreality), rather thick surficial systems 
within which, diversity and difference proliferate. There are many conceptions of 
surface, but all define it as a boundary condition where difference becomes apparent. 
Moreover, if shadows and images are surface-less phenomena, they are nonetheless, 
surface phenomena in that they require surfaces for their existence. Therefore surfaces 
mark the thick boundary condition, the milieu in which “image” and “reality” 
intermix and become experientially apparent. It is for this very reason that surface is 
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“Projective thinking, in any kind of future project, takes a different talent than the analytical 
and critical, engages a different part of the personality and the brain. It takes different skills, 
those which are customarily called romantic, imaginative, chaotic, challenging, overcoming, 
progressive – in an old word, ‘modernist’.” 410 
Charles Jencks 
“Nothing is more distressing than a thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off, that 
disappear hardly formed, already eroded by forgetfulness or precipitated into others that we 
no longer master…We constantly lose our ideas. That is why we want to hang on to fixed 
opinions so much. We ask only that our ideas are linked together according to a minimum of 
constant rules. All that the association of ideas has ever meant is providing us with these 
protective rules – resemblance, contiguity, causality – which enable us to put some order 
into ideas, preventing our “fantasy” (delirium, madness) …”411 
Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari 
“It is by following the border, by skirting the surface, that one passes from bodies to the 
incorporeal. Paul Valéry had a profound idea: what is most deep is the skin. This is a Stoic 
discovery, which presupposes a great deal of wisdom and entails an entire ethic.”412 
Gilles Deleuze 
“There is a curious thickness about architecture’s thinness today. Even as they have grown 
ever thinner, building skins have developed an appetite for more: more performance, more 
sensuousness, more intelligence, more, more.”413 
Ron Witte 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FIVE 
The previous chapter was concerned with the nature of surface in language, 
epistemology and visual perception, constituting the beginnings of a philosophy of 
surface that strived for an accurate definition of the term. However, by shifting the 
emphasis from definition to proposition, the following chapter explores the 
characteristics of surficial philosophy that uses surface to propose an expansive model 
of thought, which escapes the circularity and the transcendental hierarchy of the 
metaphysical tradition. The thesis argues that “surficial” is a more appropriate 
word for such philosophy because it avoids the shallowness and insubstantiality of 
“superficial,” and also because it echoes the geological and topological conceptions 
of surface that inspire this philosophical approach.  
The following chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, Gilles 
Deleuze’s conception of the simulacrum is elaborated, which the thesis appropriates 
to develop a more positive approach towards images. It is argued that Deleuze’s 
strategy is based on univocity of difference, which shifts the emphasis from comparison 
to origin based on a criteria of similitude, to exploration of processes of becoming based on an 
appreciation of originary difference. The second section demonstrates how Deleuze 
uses surface to formulate a surficial philosophy that collapses the Platonic hierarchy 
between “image” and “reality,” “essence” and “effect” or “simulated” and the 
“real.” This collapse is not deconstructive or destructive, but instead creative as it 
considers difference as occurring upon a surficial complexity that demands a 
nomadic movement of thought. The final section of this chapter elaborates the 
characteristics of smooth thought expressed through different concepts that form a 
complex, rhizomatic network of propositions.  
Thus, this chapter pursues a philosophical “line of flight” to develop an 
alternative approach to surface, image and appearance in architecture, with 
particular reference to Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum.  
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5.1 FROM TRANSCENDENTAL HIERARCHY TO UNIVOCITY: 
SURFACE, DIFFERENCE AND THE REALITY OF APPEARANCE 
In chapter three, Plato’s metaphysics was discussed through three analogies from 
The Republic. It was demonstrated how the Platonic model elevated the “intelligible” 
realm over the realm of the “visible,” associating the former with originary Ideas and 
the latter with visible copies. This binary hierarchy was followed by a description of 
the visible world as a dark prison in which surfaces mask the light of goodness and 
shadows (surface phenomena) deceive humanity by creating false appearances. 
Throughout his dialogues, Plato develops a strong hierarchy and desire for 
transcendence, which determine the relationship between the model (Idea, reality, 
essence) and its copies (shadows, images, appearances). 
In the Sophist, Plato continues his method by differentiating between two 
forms of image making: “the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of 
making appearances.”414 Plato defines “likenesses” as faithful copies of the original, 
while “appearances” are defined as intentional distortion of reality, either to 
beautify or gain power through manipulation of the spectator.415 Thus, appearances 
are images as phantasms or deceitful constructs that deviate from reality, while 
likenesses on the other hand, are images that attempt to represent reality, but are 
often deficient in their representation.  
Plato constructs these two conceptions of image in an attempt to “hunt” 
down the sophist, to define him accurately. He describes sophistry as the art of 
appearance making, which he associates with conjecture. Thus, the sophist is 
someone who only appears to be a wise man, having only a “conjectural or apparent 
knowledge ... which is not the truth.”416 
                                                      
414 See Plato, Sophist, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Kissinger Publishing, Montana, 2006, p. 82 
415 For Plato an image is a good copy while appearance is malicious phantasm: “STRANGER 
And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the 
unfavourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a 
correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which 
they profess to be like? May we not call these "appearances," since they appear only and are 
not really like? THEAETETUS Certainly. STR. There is a great deal of this kind of thing in 
painting, and in all imitation. THEAET. Of course. STR. And may we not fairly call the sort 
of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art? THEAET. Most 
fairly.” Plato, Sophist, p. 81 
416 “STR. Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent 
knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth? THEAET. Exactly; no better description 
of him could be given.” Plato, Sophist, p. 77.   
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Plato’s methodology is an attempt to create an ordered structure of reason that 
prevents the sophist or “any other creature” from escaping its logic.417 By 
“capturing” the sophist in the system, Plato concludes that sophistry418 is inferior to 
philosophy419 because it is an art of imitation: an act of image making, of the appearance 
making kind, which is ultimately uninformed and insincere. 
In Plato’s metaphysics images are imitations and they are judged according 
to degrees of faithfulness to original models. While Plato saw two categories of 
image (faithful copies and distorted constructs) Baudrillard develops four: (1) image 
as a reflection of reality, (2) image as a perversion of reality; (3) image masking the 
absence of profound reality (4) image as simulacrum, which “has no relation to any 
reality whatsoever.”420 According to Baudrillard, it is the mass dissemination of the 
fourth category of image that is responsible for “hyperreality”: a condition in which 
depth and meaning is lost to superficiality.   
However, despite having four conceptions of image, Baudrillard’s 
categorisation follows the Platonic system of thought. This is because Baudrillard 
sees images as copies of reality and therefore in an inferior relationship to an 
originary concept that is reflected, denatured, masked or ultimately destroyed.  
Thus, this thesis argues that the cynicism towards surfaces, images and appearances 
evident in Baudrillard’s theories is a legacy of a familiar transcendental hierarchy421 
inherited from the Platonic approach, which in the case of the third and fourth 
phases of the image evokes “melancholia” and “nostalgia” for a reality that is no 
longer in the image.  
                                                      
417 The theme of bondage evident in the metaphor of the cave continues in the hunting and 
capturing of the sophist: “STR. Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the 
image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, 
to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, 
and proclaim the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and 
secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section 
of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor 
any other creature will ever escape in triumph.” Plato, Sophist, p. 80 
418 Sophistry comes from the Greek word sophos meaning “wise man, clever.” 
(http://www.etymonline.com) Sophists were therefore “wise men” who gradually became 
renowned and distrusted for their clever rhetoric. 
419 Philosophy has a similar definition to sophistry, but it implies a more modest attitude. 
While the sophist is the “wise man” the philosopher is the “lover of wisdom” coming from 
the Greek word philosophos: philos "loving" + sophos "wise, a sage." 
(http://www.etymonline.com, accessed April 2009) 
420 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6 
421 Transcendental hierarchy is used to describe a hierarchical system that inspires 
transcendence, i.e. going above or beyond appearance. It also refers to a hierarchical system 
based on transcendence, i.e. the philosophical belief that essence lies beyond appearances.  
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In the previous chapter it was explained how Jacques Derrida destabilises 
the Platonic system of thought using deconstruction.  But deconstruction maintains 
the trace of transcendence, which is transcendence manifested in a different way. 
Derrida’s deconstruction suggests that signifier (image) and signified (reality) are in 
fact both signifiers (images) that assume the position of the absolute signified or the 
originary model (reality). But if reality is an artificial effect of signifiers operating 
through the deferral of meaning, then the very notion of signification collapses. 
Moreover, there must have been an originary “signifier” that instigated this 
interconnected web of signifiers in the first place. Derrida’s solution to this 
“chicken-egg conundrum” is the trace, a paradoxical and spectral concept, which 
theorises how an impossible non-origin that is absent can nevertheless generate the 
system of signifiers. The trace (like “arch-writing”) is therefore a “quasi-
transcendental concept”422 that is defined through the negative, i.e. what it is not. 
Derrida’s philosophical approach promotes the “closure” of Platonism, through 
“substitution” and “erasure,” but his strategy is always in danger of “falling back 
within what is being deconstructed.”423 This is because substitution is limited to 
predefined constructs, whilst erasure contains the trace, which continues the 
presence of the erased.  
Derrida’s theory gives significance to the play of images since each image 
(signifier) can become a model (signified) to other images that make up reality. 
However, since Derrida “maintains Plato’s definition of the simulacrum (or writing, 
the pharmakon) as a copy of a copy,”424 images remain to be artificial reproductions of a 
quasi-origin that is not only absent but also impossible to fathom. Thus, the 
Derridean approach theorises a world of “myths and counter-myths”425 in which 
image and reality are both polluted (by the medicine-poison), which is why both 
(image and reality) must constantly be put under erasure. In this philosophical 
approach, negation and denial becomes a perpetual process.   
                                                      
422 For discussion of this, see Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of The Mirror: Derrida and the 
Philosophy of Reflection, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 317 and Geoffrey 
Bennington, Jacques Derrida, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 267-283. 
423 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 14 
424 Leonard Lawlore, “The Beginnings of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida 
and Deleuze” in Between Deleuze and Derrida, ed. Paul Patton & John Protevi, Continuum, 
London, pp. 67-83, p. 69 
425 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 285 
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However, by utilising Gilles Deleuze’s conception of the simulacrum, this 
thesis argues that an alternative approach is possible, one that does not define 
images as artificialities, but rather as different realities. In this approach images are 
not copies of a reality that is distorted, masked, erased or absent. Instead, they are 
recognised as different regions of reality, where difference because an immanent, 
not a transcendent concept. The elaboration of this idea necessitates an exposition of 
Deleuze’s conception of the simulacrum and other concepts that express this 
particular philosophical approach.  
In an essay entitled “Plato and the Simulacrum” (included in the Appendix 
of The Logic of Sense) Deleuze sets out to go beyond the transcendental hierarchy of 
the Platonic model of thought, which he describes as the following:  
Platonism is the philosophical Odyssey and the Platonic dialectic is neither a 
dialectic of contradiction or of contrariety, but a dialectic of rivalry 
(amphisbetesis), a dialectic of rivals and suitors. The essence of division does 
not appear in its breadth, in the determination of the species of a genus, but 
in its depth, in the selection of the lineage. It is to screen the claims 
(pretensions) and to distinguish the true pretender from the false one.426  
The Platonic division follows a hierarchical logic based on degrees of similarity, which 
pollutes every judgement and fuels the determination to distinguish essence from 
appearance, reality from image, original from copy, and model from simulacrum. In 
these binary hierarchical divisions, the secondary elements are not only judged by 
their similarity to original models, but they are also subordinated to the primary 
elements that are often beyond visual perception. This is the familiar logic that 
elevates the original category, accepts the copy (likenesses) as a true pretender and 
dismisses the simulacrum (appearances) as phantasm: 
The distinction wavers between two sorts of images. Copies are secondary 
possessors. They are well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance; 
simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an 
essential perversion or a deviation. It is in this sense that Plato divides in 
two the domain of images-idols: on one hand there are copies-icons, on the 
other there are simulacra-phantasms. [Sophist, 236b, 264c]427  
This transcendental hierarchy that causes the devaluation of image, surface and 
appearances in much theoretical discourse, inspires a perpendicular movement of 
thought: either one of uncovering essence by penetrating surfaces, images and 
                                                      
426 Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum” in The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with 
Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, Athlone Press, London, 1990, pp. 253-266, p. 254 
427 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, p. 256 
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appearances, or one of discovering the originary Idea through ascent, distancing 
and distillation. This is because images are considered as imitations of reality, and 
as such they are distinct from it, already separated at inception. This understanding 
of images, combined with a definition of surface based on thinness (not thickness) 
determines the traditional epistemological position that considers surface and its 
effects (images and appearances) as masking or denaturing the reality of things. Thus, 
whether intentional or accidental, surfaces, images and appearances, deceive the 
observer, which is precisely why they must be transcended or surpassed.  
In contrast to this familiar conception, Deleuze and Guattari propose 
another strategy, which maintains the distinction between image and reality, but 
abolishes their hierarchy by placing them side-by-side. Thus, the simulacrum "does 
not replace reality . . . but rather it appropriates reality in the operation of despotic 
overcoding."428 This is because simulation “carries the real beyond its principle to 
the point where it is effectively produced."429 In this conception, reality is not 
detached from the image or the simulacrum, but instead it is utilized for the creation 
of more reality - an alternative reality. In other words, both image and the model that 
it resembles are considered as part of an extended reality. 
Deleuze’s conception of the simulacrum is based on a non-hierarchical 
philosophy of immanence, which appreciates originary difference: “The simulacrum 
is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity.”430 This 
conception of the simulacrum offers a different understanding of image. The 
traditional conception of image defines it as a reproduction.431 It is a conception that 
is based on the resemblance of the image to an originary model. Image as a 
simulacrum however, bears only a deceptive resemblance to a supposed model, 
implicating a different mode of operation and a different process of production.432 In 
this alternative conception, image becomes re-production433 since it is defined 
according to its inherent difference from its supposed model. 
                                                      
428 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Mark 
Seem, Robert Hurley, Helen R. Lane, Athlone Press, London, 1984, p. 210 
429 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 87 
430 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, p. 257-8 
431 Here, “reproduction” implies copy, duplication and imitation.  
432 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, pp. 48-49 
433 The word “re-production” is used to suggest creativity, further production and a 
productive process.  
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In other words, the difference between a copy and a simulacrum is that the 
former is made in order to stand in for its model, but the latter uses resemblance to 
take a life of its own.434 The aim of the simulacrum is not to become the model, but 
rather to use its appearance to create a new reality, a new space of operation. For 
this very reason, the simulacrum should be judged according to its unique mode of 
operation and its immanent dissimilarity. Because of this difference, the simulacrum 
does not fit the Platonic binary hierarchy of model over copy and therefore exists as 
an other condition. From this point of view image (as simulacrum) does not indicate 
the copying of reality, but instead the production of further reality:   
The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours a positive power, 
which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. At least 
two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum – neither can be 
assigned as the original, neither as the copy.435  
Thus, the resemblance of the simulacrum is “a means, not an end.”436 When an 
insect mimics a leaf, it does not reproduce the leaf and one cannot say that the insect 
is a bad copy of the leaf. This is because the insect’s visual mimicry is an active 
participation in a different reality: that of predation and camouflage. The same can 
be said of the images of architecture printed in magazines. In many instances, the 
intention is not to accurately reproduce the physical building on paper – i.e. to fool 
the spectator into thinking that he is looking at the real architectural object. Instead, 
such photographic re-productions represent an active participation in a different 
reality: that of global communication though mass media.  
Deleuze’s theory of the simulacrum formulates a philosophical approach 
that gives significance to appearance making and the dissemination of images 
through contemporary technologies. Unlike Baudrillard’s nihilistic conception of 
hyperreality, (which is characterized by the “implosion” of meaning), Deleuze’s 
theory of simulacrum indicates hypercreativity as an “explosion” of new games, new 
rules and new realities that are very much real:  
By rising to the surface, the simulacrum makes the Same and the Similar, 
the model and the copy, ... [and] the determination of their hierarchy 
impossible. It establishes the world of nomadic distributions and crowned 
anarchies. Far from being a new foundation, it engulfs all foundation, it 
                                                      
434 Pop Art is a good example of this. 
435 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, p. 262 
436 Brian Massumi, “Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari,” 
Copyright, no. 1, 1987, pp. 90-97, p. 91 
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assures a universal breakdown (effondrement), but as a joyful and positive 
event, as an unf-founding (effondement): ‘behind each cave another that 
opens still more deeply, and beyond each surface a subterranean world yet 
more vast, more strange. Richer still … and under all foundations, under 
every ground, a subsoil still more profound.’ [Beyond Good and Evil, section 
289. English translation by R. J. Hollingdale.]437  
Deleuze’s theory is based on immanent difference not transcendental difference. In the 
former, image is man-made reality, while in the latter image is a man-made 
imitation of reality, i.e. an instance of artificiality. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, artificiality must be pushed to its limit in order to transform reproduction 
to what can be called creative re-production. They write: 
The artificial and the simulacrum are not the same thing. They are even 
opposed to each other. The artificial is always a copy of a copy, which 
should be pushed to the point where it changes its nature and is reversed into the 
simulacrum (the moment of Pop Art).438  
Deleuze subverts the dominant hierarchies of the Platonic tradition. However his 
strategy is different from Derrida’s “sure play,” which maintains a trace of 
transcendence. If Derrida’s “closure” of Platonism is accompanied by “mourning” 
and the necessity of “trace” as a quasi-transcendental concept, Deleuze’s approach 
celebrates the transformation of Platonism by unfolding the difference that is 
immanent within its origins.  
Derrida’s sure play that presents itself in deconstruction, was a result of an 
anxiety about the destruction of metaphysics, and simultaneously a preventive 
measure against falling back into metaphysics.439 Deleuze on the other hand, does 
not set out to overcome metaphysics in general, but instead Plato’s metaphysics in 
particular. Thus, he can push “closure” to its limit by calling for a momentary 
destruction, which is different from a Heideggerean destruktion, or the Nietzschean 
one for that matter. The Deleuzean destruction of Platonism is creative in that it 
destroys only to reassemble:  
                                                      
437 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, p. 263 
438 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, p. 265 
439 “…all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. 
…There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake 
metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this 
history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest.” Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing 
and Difference, pp. 280-281 
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… there is a vast difference between destroying in order to conserve and 
perpetuate the established order of representations, models, and copies, 
and destroying the models and copies in order to institute the chaos which 
creates, making the simulacra function and raising a phantasm – the most 
innocent of all destructions, the destruction of Platonism.440   
Thus, in Daniel W. Smith’s words: “if Derrida sets out to undo metaphysics, 
Deleuze sets out simply to do metaphysics”441 because there are virtualities in 
metaphysics that have not yet been actualised. For Deleuze, metaphysics is in a 
process of transformation. It is not a unitary (homogenous) body that is dying, but 
instead a heterogeneous body that is in continuous transmutation.  
Deleuze’s ontology is one of univocity, which echoes Baruch Spinoza’s 
theories.442 However unlike Spinoza for whom univocity is a measure of similarity, 
for Deleuze univocity highlights the significance of ontological difference: 
With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it 
is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. 
Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we 
and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal 
Being.443  
This ontology of diversity within unity is summarised in the formula “PLURALISM 
= MONISM.”444 Deleuze’s ontology requires that “Difference ... be thought 
alongside unity, or not at all.”445 Such univocity has a different agenda to that of 
John Duns Scotus446 or Spinoza’s, since it highlights difference of Being, the 
                                                      
440 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” The Logic of Sense, pp. 265-6  
441 Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence” in Between Deleuze and 
Derrida, p. 50 
442 Baruch Spinoza suggested that everything is a modification of one substance, “God or 
Nature” [Latin: Deus sive Natura]: “That eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature, 
acts from the same necessity from which he exists.” See Baruch Spinoza, “Ethics,” in The 
Collected Writings of Spinoza, trans. Edwin Curley, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1985, propositions 1-15 
443 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, Continuum, New York, 2004, 
p. 48 
444 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 20 
445 Tod May, “Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze” in Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of 
Philosophy, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, Dorothea Olkowski, Routledge, London, New York, 
1994,  pp. 33-50, p. 47 
446 John Duns Scotus’ “Univocity of Being” argues that “[t]he difference between God and 
creatures, at least with regard to God's possession of the pure perfections, is ultimately one 
of degree.” In other words, what we ascribe to God is the same as what we ascribe to 
creatures and human beings. The only difference is that God possesses these attributes 
infinitely, but humans and other creatures possess them in a limited way. See Richard Cross, 
Duns Scotus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 39 
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equivocal difference that remains within the univocity of Being. In Tod May’s 
words:   
What univocity implies is not that everything is the same or that there is a 
principle of the same underlying everything, but instead, precisely the 
opposite. With univocity comes difference, difference for the first time 
taken seriously in itself.447 
For Deleuze, origin, metaphysics, reality or any other concept possesses an 
immanent difference (or an embedded potential for diversity) that unfolds to create 
a multiplicity of expressions. This unfolding is often achieved through binary 
constructs, which is not to be considered as sign of separation, transcendence or 
hierarchy. Instead, binary pairs are considered as philosophical tools, or “abstract 
machines”448 that aid thinking: 
We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that 
challenges all models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo 
the dualism we had no wish to construct but through which we pass. 
Arrive at the magic formula we all seek – PLURALISM = MONISM – via all 
the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture 
we are forever rearranging.449 
Deleuze’s differentiation between the “virtual” and “actual” as different elements of 
reality, is an illustration of a philosophical technique that attempts to illustrate the 
difference within the “plane of immanence.”450 For Deleuze, the “virtual” is “not 
opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself.”451 Thus, the virtual 
“designates a pure multiplicity in the Idea,”452 which once actualised creates a 
diversity of phenomena that sometimes seem similar, but are in fact always 
immanently different. In other words, the virtual is not a product of transcendental 
difference and therefore must not be confused with the “possible” as that which is 
“opposed to the real.”453 The virtual “undergoes a process of actualisation” and 
must be contrasted to the “actual” as that part of reality that has become apparent. 
                                                      
447 Tod May, “Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze” in Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of 
Philosophy, p. 43 
448 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi, Athlone Press, London, 1988, pp. 50 -75  
449 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 20 
450 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Graham 
Birchill, Verso, London, 1994, p. 41 
451 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263 
452 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 264 
453 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263 
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The possible, on the other hand, “undergoes a process of realisation” and should 
therefore be contrasted to the real.  
The subtle difference between the virtual and the possible is not a “verbal 
dispute” but a “question of existence”454 which highlights the significant difference 
between transcendence and immanence. For Deleuze, the realisation of possibility 
evokes a transcendental system of thought in which the creation of origin occurs as 
“a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs and is subject to a law of 
all or nothing.”455 “Realisation,” therefore, is a process that renders the “possible” as 
a copy of the real, and forces the real to the resemblance of the possible.456 Not only is 
the possible separated from reality, but it also changes our conception of reality. 
This according to Deleuze is the “defect” of the possible: “a defect which serves to 
condemn it as produced after the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image of 
what resembles it.”457 
Actualisation of virtuality on the other hand is “always a genuine creation”458 
because the virtual is reality that is not yet actualised. In other words, if the 
“possible” (like the Platonic image) is a transcendental concept, a segregated entity 
that is detached from reality, the “virtual” is an immanent concept, inherent within 
reality. For this reason, the virtual and the actual refer to an altogether different 
understanding of reality, which evokes an altogether different approach towards 
the Platonic categorisation of image.  
 Appropriating Deleuze’s theories, it is possible to define image making as 
“genuine creativity” or the further production of reality, not imitation or copying 
(as in the relationship between the possible and the real). This would mean that in 
fact the images of a building reproduced through the mass media create a different 
reality, which parallels the physical and contextual reality of the architectural object. 
When the motives of such imagery is recognized as more than mere representation 
of physical objects, then they become extensions of (architectural) creativity as they 
allow the designer to participate in the global economy of image that is as real as 
                                                      
454 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263 
455 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263 
456 “[T]o the extent that the possible is open to “realisation”, it is understood as an image of 
the real, while the real is suppose to resemble the possible. That is why it is difficult to 
understand what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like.” 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 263 
457 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 263-4 
458 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 264 
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any physical object. Conceiving images in this way necessitates a shift from the 
familiar logic of transcendence based on similitude, to immanence based on 
difference:   
The actualisation of the virtual, on the contrary, always takes place by 
difference, divergence or differentiation. Actual terms never resemble the 
singularities they incarnate. In this sense, actualisation or differentiation is 
always a genuine creation. It does not result from any limitation of a pre-
existing possibilities.459 
The virtual as reality evokes “virtual reality”460 which is a term commonly used for 
the computer simulation of reality, whether for gaming or for other purposes. In its 
common usage, virtual reality implies imitation and the copying of originary reality 
that is always more authentic. Deleuze’s conceptions of virtual and simulation 
however, implies a different interpretation of virtual reality. While the virtual is 
considered to have a reality of its own, simulation, is for Deleuze a process that is 
inherently different from reproduction or realisation. This is because the goal of 
simulation is not resemblance (realisation of the possible) but creation of a new 
reality (actualisation of the virtual/virtual reality), in short, re-production.   
5.2 FROM THE SUPERFICIAL TO THE SURFICIAL: COMPLEXITY AND 
CREATIVITY 
Deleuze’s univocity evokes a different model of thinking and a different movement 
of thought. By rejecting transcendence and highlighting immanent difference, 
Deleuze rejects the familiar Platonic verticality of thought and the ideal purity of its 
origins. This creates an interest in the “minoritarian” and horizontal (non-
hierarchical) processes of “becoming” that take inspiration from unexpected 
sources. For example, Deleuze utilizes Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artuad’s writings 
for his own philosophical work, arguing that in the “madness” of their ideas there 
lays a profound logic of looking at things, which is not given a proper place within 
the Platonic tradition. This is because Platonism focuses on origins and the depths  
                                                      
459 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 264 
460 “Second Life” is an example of an Internet based virtual world, which enables users to 
interact with each other through avatars and create objects in the virtual environment.  The 
word virtual has wider uses, in computing and information technology. For example, 
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of things, by sacrificing surface and surface effects. With this in mind and taking 
inspiration from Stoic philosophy,461 Deleuze proposes a model of thought based on 
the exteriority of surface: 
Everything now returns to the surface… The most concealed becomes the 
most manifest. All the old paradoxes of becoming must again take shape in 
a new youthfulness – transmutation.462 
It is by following the border, by skirting the surface, that one passes from bodies to 
the incorporeal...what is most deep is the skin. This is a Stoic discovery, 
which presupposes a great deal of wisdom and entails an entire ethic.463 
The Deleuzean surface represents the non-hierarchical plane of immanence that 
battles against the transcendence of Platonic height or Nietzschean depth. In this 
model of thought surface includes the height (of Ideas) or the depth (of meaning). 
When the incorporeal is included in the corporeal surface, the superficial assumes a 
thicker dimension and a greater significance. No longer defined as a two-dimensional 
abstraction associated with shallowness or insubstantiality, superficial becomes 
surficial464 evoking the geographical milieu associated with the complexity of 
terrestrial life: 
It is no longer a question of Dionysus down below, or of Apollo up above, 
but of Hercules of the surface, in his dual battle against both depth and 
height: reorientation of the entire thought and a new geography.465  
Thus, Deleuze’s univocity creates a surficial philosophy in which surface possesses an 
essential thickness, while height or depth become surface effects, just as the terrestrial 
surface produces the height of the mountains and the depth of the seas: 
There is no longer depth or height. … It is always a matter of unseating the 
ideas, of showing that the incorporeal is no high above (en hauteur), but is 
rather at the surface, that it is not the highest cause but the superficial effect 
par excellence, and that it is not Essence but event.466  
                                                      
461 Stoic philosophy was a Hellenistic philosophy founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium. The 
Stoics provided a unified account of the world, consisting of formal logic, non-dualistic 
physics and naturalistic ethics. See Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, Routledge, 
London, New York, 2004, pp. 241-257  
462 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 7-8 
463 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 10 
464 Surficial is a geological term defined as “of or relating to the Earth’s surface.” See Oxford 
English Dictionary, www.oed.com 
465 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 132 
466 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 130 
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In contrast to the Platonic philosopher of heights and the Nietzschean philosopher 
of depths, Deleuze proposes a third image of the philosopher, one that takes 
inspiration from the expanse of surface. Such a philosopher expects things laterally, 
from an immanent event not a transcendent ideal - in other words, from the dawn of 
the day, not from the Platonic Sun. 
Nietzsche was able to rediscover depth only after conquering the surfaces. 
But he did not remain at the surface, for the surface struck him as that 
which had to be assessed from the renewed perspective of an eye peering 
out from the depths. Nietzsche takes little interest in what happened after 
Plato, maintaining that it was necessarily the continuation of a long 
decadence. We have the impression, however, that there arises, in 
conformity to this method, a third image of philosophers. In relation to 
them, Nietzsche’s pronouncement is particularly apt: how profound these 
Greeks were as a consequence of their being superficial! These third Greeks 
are no longer entirely Greek. They no longer expect salvation from the 
depths of the earth or from autochthony, any more than they expect it from 
heavens or from the Idea. Rather, they expect it laterally, from the event, 
from the East – where, as Carroll says, “all that is good…, ris(es) with the 
dawn of the Day!”467     
The practitioner of surficial philosophy escapes the popular image of the 
philosopher as a “being of ascents… with his head in the clouds…”468 He does not 
think vertically, distancing himself in order to gain ideal height, nor does he think 
perpendicularly to penetrate appearances and discover hidden reality.  Instead, the 
surficial philosopher floats across the surface, engaging with events and expressions 
and processes of transformation. Moreover, such a philosopher does not leave the 
Platonic cave; “on the contrary, he thinks that we are not involved enough or 
sufficiently engulfed therein.”469  
Surficial philosophy is based on an alternative thought process. For 
Deleuze, reason is always “traversed” by the chaotic and irrational complexity of 
reality.470 Since “underneath all reason lies delirium” leaving the safety of tradition 
for the chaos of irrationality can in fact be beneficial, because madness “need not be 
                                                      
467 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 129 
468 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 127 
469 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 128 
470 "All this, however, presupposes codes or axioms which do not result by chance, but which 
do not have an intrinsic rationality either. … Reason is always a region carved out of the 
irrational -- not sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a 
particular kind of relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium, 
and drift." Deleuze, Gilles and David Lapoujade, Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974), 
trans. Mike Taormina, Semiotext(e), New York, 2003, p. 262 
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all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough.”471 Thus, the goal of the philosopher is 
not to calibrate reality472 nor is it to discover truth, as in the case of traditional 
epistemology. Instead he attempts to achieve consistency within the chaos of reality, 
which is defined... 
… not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every 
form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a 
virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, 
which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or 
reference, without consequence.473 
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Figure 5.1: The Middle-out Nature of Deleuzean Thought. Source: the author.  
Using D.H. Lawrence’s metaphor, Deleuze and Guattari describe knowledge as 
putting up an “umbrella” in order to shelter from the “un-decidability” of reality. 
Poets and artists however, battle with such sheltering canvases: they “make a slit in 
                                                      
471 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 131 
472 Deleuze differentiates between philosophy and science, one maintaining the infinite 
complexity of reality through concepts, the other calibrates reality using functions. Deleuze 
writes: “By retaining the infinite, philosophy gives consistency to the virtual through 
concepts; by relinquishing the infinite, science gives a reference to the virtual, which 
actualizes it through functions. Philosophy proceeds with a plane of immanence or 
consistency; science with a plane of reference. ... Science is haunted not by its own unity but 
by the plane of reference constituted by all the limits or borders through which it confronts 
chaos.” Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? Pp. 118-9 
between science and philosophy: philosophy creates concepts on a plane of immanence 
while science creates functions on a plane of reference. Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy? p. 41  
473 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 118 
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the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy 
chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through….”474 However, 
poets and artists must also battle against established clichés and categories that clog 
both their minds and their canvases: 
The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer 
write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with 
pre-existing, pre-established clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to 
clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos 
that brings us the vision.475  
This epistemology is different from the classical tradition. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the chaos of reality is the ungraspable infinite that has three daughters: art, science 
and philosophy.476 Creativity is not chaos, but “a chaosmos, a composed chaos – 
neither foreseen nor preconceived.”477 To read a philosopher (an artist, or writer for 
that matter) is no longer to find a single, correct interpretation by penetrating the 
superficies of his thoughts or arguments.  Instead, to read a philosopher or an artist 
is to explore his work by examining the virtuality that lies across it, which is often 
not yet actualized.478 Moreover, from Deleuze’s perspective, concepts are not 
solutions to problems, but constructions that define a range of thinking.479 This is a 
philosophical approach that celebrates chaotic complexity, affirms the rupture of 
pre-established categories and anticipates future theories by encouraging creativity 
liberated from predetermined judgment:  
                                                      
474 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? pp. 203-204 
475 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 204 
476 “Chaos has three daughters, depending on the place that cuts through it: these are the 
Chaoids – art, science, and philosophy – as forms of thought and creation. We call Chaoids the 
realities produced on the plane that cut through the chaos in different ways.” Deleuze and 
Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 208 
477 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 118  
478 “Philosophers introduce new concepts, they explain them, but they don't tell us, not 
completely anyway, the problems to which those concepts are a response. [...] The history of 
philosophy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what he must have 
taken for granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what he did say." Gilles 
Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. by Martin Joughin, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1995, p. 136 
479 In fact, philosophy as the making of concepts can be traced back to Plato, even though 
such a position would contradict the very notion of the Platonic Idea. Charles Griswold 
writes: “The [Platonic] tripartite schema of Idea, artifact, and imitator is as much about 
making as it is about imitation. Making is a continual thread through all three levels of the 
schema. The Ideas too are said to be made, even though that is entirely inconsistent with the 
doctrine of Ideas as eternal expressed earlier in the Republic itself (and in all the other 
Platonic dialogues).” Charles Grisworld, “Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry” in Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22 Dec. 2003, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-
rhetoric/, accessed Jan 2009.  
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Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If it 
is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but 
on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only 
by defying judgment. What expert judgment, in art, could ever bear on the 
work to come?480  
By shifting the emphasis from pre-established (transcendental) values to immanent 
virtuality (embedded potentiality), surficial philosophy gives prominence to further 
production through exploration, rather than subversion (of established hierarchies) 
through substitution. Moreover, unorthodox processes such as dreams and esoteric 
experiences are considered as an important aspect of philosophy, since philosophy 
“cannot be content to be understood only philosophically or conceptually, but is 
addressed essentially to nonphilosphers as well."481 This would be the 
“nonphilosophical” as that which is “closer to the heart of philosophy than 
philosophy itself.” 482 Deleuze and Guattari write:  
Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not 
immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping 
experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very 
respectable, rational, or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of 
dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and 
excess.483 
Thus, by promoting “groping experimentation” and “irrational processes” Deleuze 
and Guattari catalyze the rupturing of established philosophical “umbrellas” that 
protect us from the chaos of reality, which creates, changes and transforms. In this 
approach, philosophy becomes the creation of concepts that are defined as intensive 
multiplicities that are inscribed on a plane of immanence.  
The “plane of immanence,” represents “pure immanence” and is given 
numerous descriptions: “neither surface nor volume, always fractal”;484 “like a 
desert that concept populate but never dividing up”; 485 “like a section of chaos and 
acts like a sieve”;486 with “variable curves that retain the infinite movements that 
turn back on themselves in incessant exchange.”487 Ultimately, for Deleuze and 
                                                      
480 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith, Michael A. Greco, 
Verso, London, 1998, p. 135 
481 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
482 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
483 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
484 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 36 
485 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 36 
486 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 42 
487 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 42 
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Guattari, the plane of immanence is “the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or 
deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts.”488  
Deleuze and Guattari describe an alternative metaphysics inspired by the 
exteriority of the surface. They abolish transcendental hierarchy by flattening 
multiplicities to the same “plane of consistency” which possesses a complex fluidity 
that allows multiplicities to form non-hierarchical interconnections. Even though 
the plane of consistency is flat (i.e. non-hierarchical), it is not two-dimensional, as it 
possesses a fractal thickness that increases with the number of interactions that 
occur upon it:  
We do not have units (unités) of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of 
measurement. …All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or 
occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of 
consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this “plane” 
increase with the number of connections that are made on it. Multiplicities 
are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or 
deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect 
with other multiplicities...The ideal for a book would be to lay everything 
out on a plane of exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same sheet: 
lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social 
formations. …are opposed in every way to the classical or romantic book 
constituted by the interiority of a substance or subject.489  
The plane of immanence may be reminiscent of Edwin A. Abbott’s “Flatland."490 But 
the philosopher of this plane does not dream of visiting the one-dimensional world 
of “Lineland,” nor does he aspire to go to “Spaceland:” the three-dimensional world 
of the powerful (but nameless) sphere. Instead, the philosopher of the plane of 
immanence believes that he is not sufficiently engaged with the complexities of his 
own expansive dimension. In other words, the surficial philosopher does not gaze at 
the infinite volume of the heavens, instead he participates in the dynamic forces of 
the surface of the earth.   
Abbotts’ novella is a tale of hierarchy, both transcendental and immanent. 
The three dimensional Spaceland is unavailable but desirable to the occupants of the 
two dimensional Flatland, who are submitted to strict social rules.491 Deleuze and 
                                                      
488 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
489 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 8-9 
490 See Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 
1987. 
491 In Abbott’s novella, men are portrayed as polygons whose social class is directly 
proportional to the number of sides they have. For example, triangles are at the bottom of 
the social ladder and are considered generally unintelligent, while the Priests as multi-sided 
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Guattari’s plane of consistency however, is non-hierarchical, promoting multiplicity 
and continuous processes of becoming. While in this purest form, immanence is a 
fractal plane that denies transcendence, Deleuze and Guattari develop the plane by 
association with concepts such as surface, the earth, strata, desert or the sea.492 Such 
surficial models are inspired by the adventures of “the Hercules of the surface ...[and 
the] reorientation of the entire thought and a new geography.”493 Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that the abstract purity of the ideal is lost in human philosophy. But, 
this is seen as a positive event that indicates new realities and future possibilities: 
Philosophy and science (like art itself with its third side) include an I do not 
know that has become positive and creative, the condition of creation itself, 
and that consists in determining by what one does not know – as Galois 
said, ‘indicating the course of calculations and anticipating the results 
without ever being able to bring them about.’494  
Thus, surficial philosophy is based on creativity, which extends itself through its 
inevitable end. Since there is no anxiety about the demise of concepts or theories, 
death is not accelerated in anticipation of rebirth (Baudrillardian theoretical 
violence)495 nor is it delayed through theoretical “pharmakons” (Derridean 
deconstruction). Instead it is considered as a necessary element of a continuous 
process of becoming that is already at work in every production. Destruction like 
any other aspect of reality, (like the fold of a Möbius strip) exists within the 
continuum and not at the end of things, because there is no beginning or end, but 
always a progressing middle, which consists of a mixture of “birth[s] and 
disappearance.”496  
By deploying terms such as “surface,” “plane,” “plateau,” “Earth,” 
“desert” and the “sea,” Deleuze and Guattari construct an alternative philosophy  
                                                                                                                                                        
polygons (whose shapes approximate a circle), are considered to be the "perfect" shape. 
Women on the other hand are lines, which when viewed from the side appear as points. 
They are required by law to sway back and forth and announce their arrival, because 
numerous men have been stabbed by oncoming women! 
492 Deleuze and Guattari refer to such concepts in most of their writings. But notions of 
Earth, strata, layers and belts are elaborated in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, while in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the notion of the earth as a 
Body without Organs is expanded. The earth continues to remain a strong conceptual force 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.  
493 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 132 
494 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 128 
495 “Theoretical violence, not truth, is the only resource left to us.” Baudrillard, Simulacra and 
Simulation, p. 163 
496 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 118 
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Figure 5.2: The flow of the surficial plane of immanence. Source: the author 
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that does not judge essence according to preconceived transcendental categories, but 
instead values events according to their immanent potential.497 This is because 
judgement is “the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be 
renewed.”498 The result is a univocal philosophical approach in which surface is the 
thick border between traditional binary oppositions and the middle which is “by no 
means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed.”499  
5.3 THE “SMOOTH” SPACE OF SURFICIAL THOUGHT 
Surface as the expansive space of the middle (between high and deep) represents 
immanence, the place of difference, and an alternative mode of thought. Deleuze 
and Guattari construct a complex and interconnected “rhizome” of concepts that 
express this non-hierarchical philosophical approach. In contrast to the traditional 
Platonic logic which is “arborescent,” rising above the surface of the ground with 
each branch fathering small branches, Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic method 
grows within the thickness of the terrestrial surface in a complex interconnected 
system of concepts that spans out in every direction. This alternative system of 
thought forms horizontal and trans-species connections, while the arborescent 
model works with vertical and linear connections.  
As a philosophical concept, the “rhizome” is not just a complex system of 
subterranean roots, but also a metaphor for a non-hierarchical interconnection of 
concepts.500 Thus, “There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those 
found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines.”501 The rhizome represents a 
number of principles: “connections,” “heterogeneity,” “multiplicity,” the “principle 
of asignifying rupture”, and the “principle of cartography and decalcomania.” The 
“principle of asignifying rupture” for example, indicates that the rhizomatic system 
“may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old 
lines, or on new lines.”502 This suggests that a rhizomatic system of concepts is less 
vulnerable to deconstruction (much like the world wide web) because it is not 
                                                      
497 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 22 
498 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 10 
499 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 25 
500 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 7-25 
501 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 8 
502 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 9 




dependent on one source, root or origin. Instead, its growth is genetic and emergent 
since the generative code is immanent to the entirety of the network.  
If terms such as “surface,” “Earth,” “plateau” and “ground” invoke a 
surficial understanding of immanence as the basis of an alternative philosophical 
approach, concepts such as “Body without Organs”503 and “Smooth Space” evoke 
the fluidity and pliability of a thought process in which concepts are never hammered 
down into a final form, but rather always becoming different. Thus, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, “The Body without Organs,” introduces a new strategy that 
has an “extraordinary fluidity” characterized by shifting “from one code to the 
other.”504 Moreover, "The Earth, is a body without organs...permeated by unformed, 
unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic 
singularities, by mad or transitory particles."505  
Deleuze and Guattari go against the common perception of the earth as a 
solid and stable body by associating it with flows that move at various speeds. In 
fact, one can argue that rocks and mountains are very slow-moving flows; living 
things are flows of genetic material; and language can be considered as the flow of 
information, words, and so on. Therefore the earth as a BwO is “fluid and slippery” 
and refuses to be striated by the rigidity of traditional philosophical categories.506  
The concept of “Smooth space” continues the fluidity expressed in the 
BwO, evoking a liquid conception of the terrestrial surface that is in constant 
movement and transformation. Notions of complexity and mixture are also 
introduced in “smooth space” as a space of becoming where forces and vectors 
transverse categories, definitions and units of measurement. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, thought is voyage (across seas, deserts, steppes) that can be smooth or 
                                                      
503 Deleuze and Guattari borrow the term from Antonin Artuad’s radio play (1947): “When 
you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all 
his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.” Antonin Artaud. "To Have 
Done with the Judgment of God, a radio play (1974)" in Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, ed. 
Susan Sontag, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1976, pp. 555-574, p. 571 
504 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 15  
505 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 40 
506 “Although the organ-machines attach themselves to the body without organs, the latter 
continues nonetheless to be without organs and does not become an organism in the 
ordinary sense of the word. It remains fluid and slippery.” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 15 




striated.507 Smooth thought resists striated lines in favour of exploring a more 
primitive, nomadic voyage that is more in tune with the flows of the Earth. In other 
words, smooth thought encourages following lines of flight not to arrive at points 
(of origin) but to “distribute” oneself across the surface of immanence: 
The smooth and the striated are distinguished first of all by an inverse 
relation between the point and the line (in the case of the striated, the line is 
between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines); 
and second, by the nature of the line (smooth-directional, open intervals; 
dimensional-striated, closed intervals). Finally, there is a third difference, 
concerning the surface or space. In striated space, one closes off a surface 
and “allocates” it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in 
the smooth, one “distributes” oneself in an opens space, according to 
frequencies and in the course of one’s crossings (logos and nomos).508  
In a surficial model of thought, emphasis shifts from gravitational points of origin 
that pull everything inwards to vectors and lines of flight that shoot out in different 
directions. In this approach, the question of origin is not solved by making origin 
abstract, or absent, or making the absence of origin the origin. Instead, the solution 
lies in thinking laterally, horizontally and expansively by embracing becoming as 
the continual process that transforms any originary concept.509 Thus, Deleuze and 
Guattari offer an alternative system that explores the potential of creative thought:  
The line-system (or block-system) of becoming is opposed to the point-
system of memory. Becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself 
from the point, and renders points indiscernible: the rhizome, the opposite 
of arborescence; break away from arborescence. Becoming is antimemory.510 
This philosophy of the surface encourages short-term memory as that which 
includes “forgetting as a process” in order to escape a paralyzing state of stasis 
brought about from centuries of meditation upon the origin: 
                                                      
507 “To think is to voyage…Voyage smoothly or in striation, and think the same way” 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 482 
508 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 480-1 
509 “A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose 
it… A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor 
end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination; to speak of the absence of an origin, to 
make the absence of an origin the origin, is a bad play on words. A line of becoming has only 
a middle. The middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it is the absolute speed of 
movement. A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. A 
becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border 
or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both.” Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 293 
510 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 294 




…short-term memory is of the rhizome or diagram type, and long-term 
memory is arborescent and centralized (imprint, engram, tracing, or 
photograph). …Short-term memory includes forgetting as a process; it 
merges not with the instant but instead with the nervous, temporal, and 
collective rhizome. Long-term memory (family, race, society, or 
civilization) traces and translates, but what it translates continues to act in 












      Lines of Flight          Points of Origin 
Figure 5.3: From a philosophy based on gravitational points of origin to a 
philosophy based on exploratory lines of flight.  
Surficial thought is also characterized by an interest in the minor, the secondary and 
the absurd, that offer a variety of unfamiliar conditions that do not fit into the 
majoritarian category. This interest in the minoritarian is a desire for discovery, 
which instigates a forward-looking process that requires a momentary forgetting of 
tradition in preparation for future actualisation of potential:  
Where psychoanalysis says, ‘Stop, find your self again,’ we should say 
instead, ‘Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our BwO yet, we haven’t 
sufficiently dismantled our self.’ Substitute forgetting for anamnesis, 
experimentation for interpretation.512 
The interest in the “minoritarian” is also indicative of a pliable mode of thought that 
is receptive to other cultures, thoughts and processes of production. The 
minoritarian is different from minority because the latter is an aggregate 
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determined by quantity. Thus, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it does not matter 
that there are more insects than men on the planet, because the term “man” 
“constituted a standard in the universe in relation to which men necessarily 
(analytically) form a majority… In this sense women, children, but also animals, 
plants, and molecules, are minoritarian.”513 Surficial thought encourages the 
becoming-other of the white-man (adult male) that constitutes the majoritarian in 
Western culture. But this becoming is not limited to becoming-woman, since it also 
includes becoming-African, becoming-Asian, becoming-animal, becoming-plant, 
becoming-molecular and so on. For Deleuze and Guattari “becomings are 
minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian.”514 
Juxtaposing these different concepts together, it is possible to argue that 
smooth thought encourages flexibility, fluidity and processes of transformation. 
Moreover, the space of smooth thought is not homogenous, but amorphous.515 
Deleuze and Guattari offer the sea as a good example of such amorphous space.516 
Before longitude lines, the sea represented smooth space, experienced through “a 
complex and empirical nomadic system of navigation based on the wind and noise, 
the colours and sounds of the seas.”517 However, the striation of the seas (through 
lines of longitude and latitude), substituted the complex and empirical nomadic 
system of navigation with a more rigid system that divides the sea into different 
territories. The consequences of this striation are the subordination of directionality 
to dimensionality, and the substitution of vectors (lines of flight) with points and 
coordinates. However, even though striation is now everywhere, smooth space does 
not disappear and is in fact used to control striation, because smooth space has a 
“greater power of deterritorialization than the striated.”518  
5.3.1 From Surface to Surfacing: Events, Propositions and the Expression of 
Sense 
For Deleuze “The surface and that which takes place at the surface is what ‘renders 
possible’.”519 Surface is therefore a verb, not just a noun. Thus, in surficial 
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515 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 477 
516 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 479 
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519 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 186 




philosophy essence is found in events and emphasis shifts from truth to 
proposition, which is complemented by “sense” as “both the expressible or the 
expressed of the proposition.”520 The concept of “sense” encourages an understanding 
of words beyond their denotation and promotes the activation of words as 
expressive verbs.521 The term “surface” for example, is no longer treated as a name 
or a term of stasis, but rather a powerful intensity with expressive potential. In this 
philosophical approach, surface is not only surficial (i.e. more than superficial) but it 
is also surfacing: expressing the actualization of the virtual, the liquid flows of 
“smooth space,” and the complexities of the terrestrial plane.  
Perhaps a brief explanation of the concept of “sense” would clarify the shift 
of emphasis that occurs in surficial thinking. According to Deleuze, the traditional 
conception of proposition involves three distinct relations: denotation, manifestation 
and signification. The first “functions through the association of the words 
themselves with particular images which ought to ‘represent’ the state of affairs.”522 
The second relation concerns the person who speaks and expresses himself and is 
“presented as a statement of desires and beliefs which correspond to the 
proposition.”523 Finally, the third relation (signification) is concerned with the 
“relation of the word to universal or general concepts, and of syntactic connections to 
the implications of the concept.”524 
According to Deleuze, the logical value of signification is not truth, but “the 
condition of truth, the aggregate of conditions under which the proposition ‘would 
be’ true.”525 Consequently, “signification does not establish the truth without also 
establishing the possibility of error” and it is precisely for this reason that “the 
condition of truth is not opposed to the false, but to the absurd: that which is 
without signification or that which may be neither true nor false.”526 Sense, on the 
other hand, is “the expressed of the proposition, [it] is an incorporeal, complex, and 
irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in 
                                                      
520 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 22 
521 Deleuze write: “The duality in the proposition is not between two sorts of names, names 
of stasis and names of becoming; rather, it is between two dimensions of the proposition, 
that is, between denotation and expression, or between the denotation of things and the 
expression of sense.” Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 25 
522 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 12 
523 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 13 
524 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 14 
525 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 14 
526 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 14-15 




the proposition.”527 Deleuze describes sense as the fourth dimension that 
complements the circularity of denotation, implication and signification, by 
unfolding the traditional model of proposition into a complex topological surface:  
It is only be breaking open the circle, as in the case of the Möbius strip, by 
unfolding and untwisting it, that the dimension of sense appears for itself, 
in its irreducibility, and also in its genetic power as it animates an a priori 
internal model of the proposition.528  
If the traditional model of proposition is based on the Platonic circle (that creates the 
interiority of essence and obeys the centrality of the origin), the Deleuzean model 
unfolds essence unto the surface that has no interiority (or exteriority in the traditional 
definition of the word, which places it in opposition to interiority).529 As a 
topological geometry, the Möbius strip is a surface with only one side that creates 
many sides. It is also a folding geometry that actualizes the univocal formula 
“Pluralism = Monism.”530 Deleuze uses the Möbius strip to explain the effect of 
“sense” on proposition. But this non-orientable model also demonstrates that in 
surficial thought there is no surface that masks the essence of the proposition, only 







Figure 5.4: Breaking the circularity of proposition: the significance of sense. 
Source: the author 
In this alternative model of thought, the generating principle is not a transcendent 
point of origin, but rather an immanent surface phenomenon (much like the fold or 
the gentle curvature of the Möbius strip) that generates the effect of inside, outside, 
                                                      
527 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 19 
528 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 20 
529 In Andrew Ballantyne’s words “Deleuze and Guattari draw attention to a spatial contrast 
– a move from confinement to expansiveness....” Andrew Ballantyne, Deleuze and Guattari for 
Architects, ed. Adam Sharr, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 62 
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top, bottom and so on. The Möbius strip is a complex geometry, but it is not abstract 
or imaginary.531 Such a topological model offers an alternative to familiar Euclidean 
geometries that have inspired traditional models of thought for centuries. The circle 
(or the sphere) for example, forms an impassable boundary (a double sided surface) 
that masks and separates the inside from the outside. The Möbius strip on the other 
hand, is the boundary condition that facilitates a smooth transition from one 
category to the other. In this model of thought, surface is not a barrier or a limit, 
rather a single-sided topology that generates human categories.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: The Fold that makes the Möbius Strip as an example of topological 
space and a surface model of thought that creates difference within continuity 
and replaces absolute separation with smooth transition. 
Aware of the play of the signifier and the circularity of traditional models of 
thought, Deleuze proposes a game. But, this game is unlike Derrida’s “sure play” 
which is “limited to the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces.”532 Instead, 
he promotes creative re-production that takes inspiration from unexpected and 
unfamiliar sources. This is because madness, “dreams,” “pathological processes,” 
“esoteric experiences,”533 “need not be all breakdown ... [they] may also be 
breakthrough.”534  Deleuze’s game is not what Derrida calls “the affirmation of a 
                                                      
531 The Möbius strip can be constructed using a piece of paper or its instances can be found in 
nature. The Cyclotide (cyclic protein) Kalata B1, active substance of the plant Oldenlandia 
affinis, contains Möbius topology for its peptide backbone. Möbius strips are also common 
in the manufacture of fabric computer printer and typewriter ribbons, as they allow the 
ribbon to be twice as wide as the print head whilst using both half-edges evenly.  
532 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 292 
533 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
534 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 131 




world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin”535 because it 
considers signs as possessing a reality of their own. Such a game calls for an active 
and creative participation in univocity and necessitates an appreciation of the 
difference immanent to origin, an affirmation of chance, creativity and simulation:  
This game is reserved then for thought and art. In it there is nothing but 
victories for those who know how to play, that is, how to affirm and ramify 
chance, instead of dividing it in order to dominate it, in order to wager, in 
order to win. This game, which can only exist in thought and which has no 
other result than the work of art, is also that by which thought and art are 
real and disturbing reality, morality, and the economy of the world.536 
Deleuze’s game is one which promotes a “great deal of movement,” 537 “invents its 
own rules; it bears upon its own rule,”538 but remains comprehensible through the 
expression of sense. It is a game that affirms chance and endlessly ramifies it.539 
What does this aesthetic game have to offer that the Derridaean “sure play” 
doesn’t? It renders thought free from pre-existing categories, which as Derrida 
concedes, limit his game to “substitution.”540 The Deleuzean game encourages new 
rules just as promotes the undoing of existing ones. Such a game does not represent 
the end of metaphysics, rather the end of Plato’s metaphysics, which is replaced 
with other models of thought (metaphysical or otherwise). In this philosophical 
approach, creative production becomes an essential element of a (machinic) process, 
which is particularly useful for “thought and art.” Thus, the overcoming of 
Platonism does not signal the implosion of meaning, but the explosion of sense 
across the surfaces of immanence: 
It is thus pleasing that there resounds today the news that sense is never a 
principle or an origin, but that it is produced. It is not something to 
discover, to restore, and to re-employ; it is something to produce by a new 
machinery. It belongs to no height or depth, but rather to a surface effect, 
being inseparable from the surface which is its proper dimension. It is not 
that sense lacks depth or height, but rather that height and depth lack 
                                                      
535 See Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing 
and Difference, p. 292 
536 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 60 
537 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 59 
538 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 59 
539 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 59  
540 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 289 




surface, that they lack sense, or have it only by virtue of an “effect” which 
presupposes sense.541   
5.3.2 From Lack to Act: “Desiring Machines” and Smooth Processes of 
Production 
As mentioned previously, Deleuze and Guattari deploy a rhizomatic network of 
concepts to develop a philosophy that pursues univocity based on difference as an 
alternative to transcendental hierarchy based on the logic of similitude. In this 
philosophy surface represents the exteriority of expression, the space in-between 
(the height of heaven and the depth of essence), and the fractal dimension that 
resists stasis through flows, trajectories and processes of becoming. A philosophy 
inspired by this surficial plane of immanence promotes active participation and 
affirms the uniqueness of human creativity, shifting the emphasis from eternal truth 
to momentary creativity:  
God and actor are opposed in their readings of time. What men grasp as 
past and future, God lives it in its eternal present. The God is Chronos: the 
divine present is the circle in its entirety, whereas past and future are 
dimensions relative to a particular segment of the circle which leaves the 
rest outside. The actor’s present, on the contrary, is the most narrow, the 
most contracted, the most instantaneous, and the most punctual. It is the 
point on a straight line which divides the line endlessly, and is itself 
divided into past-future. The actor belongs to the present….The actor 
actualizes the event, but in a way which is entirely different from the 
actualization of the event in the depth of things. Or rather, the actor 
redoubles this cosmic, or physical actualization, in his own way, which is 
singularly superficial – but because of it more distinct, trenchant and 
pure.542   
The proposed surficial philosophy is characterized by a desire to surface. But desire 
is not defined as a lack, nor is it governed by acquisition. It is instead defined as a 
process of production:  
…when the theoretician reduces desiring-production to a production of 
fantasy, he is content to exploit to the fullest the idealist principle that 
defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production, of ‘industrial’ 
production... If desire produces, its product is real. …Desire does not lack 
anything; it does not lack its object.543 
                                                      
541 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 72 
542 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 150 
543 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 26 




In surficial thought the desire to surface is desire to produce. Thus, processes of 
production are “desiring machines” that continuously produce the real. Such 
machines are theatrical but are not machines of fantasy, and must not be defined 
that way. Thus, the traditional model of origin is redefined comprehensively. Lack 
does not instigate desire, action or production; it is rather the machinic production 
that produces lack as a counter-product within the real that desire produces.544 If 
one accepts that desiring machines continuously produce the real across the plane 
of immanence, then reality is no longer uncovered by penetrating surfaces, images 
and appearances, but rather it is extended, amended and re-produced.545 Since desiring 
machines are not based on lack, their operation is not predetermined by a search for 
an originary entity that is hidden or absent. Thus, it is no longer the question: 
“’What does it mean?’ but rather ‘How does it work?’ How do these machines, these 
desiring-machines, work – yours and mine?”546  
This philosophical approach is radically different from traditional models 
of thought that judge surface, image and appearances according to a transcendental 
reality that is either masked or absent. Baudrillard follows such a model of thought 
when he defines the seduction of images as the allure of absence or death, where a 
fascination with the “void that haunts us”547 permits the proliferation of artificial 
and superficial images that have no relationship with reality. The result becomes a 
despondent conclusion that depicts humanity as imprisoned in a flattened 
hyperreality where the  “implosion of meaning”548 has effected the degradation of 
lived life into a “speculative universe.” 549 
Deleuze and Guattari however, formulate a different approach to surfaces, 
images and appearances. For them it is not seduction as the fascination with lack, 
absence or death that catalyzes the proliferation of images, but instead the desire for 
the production of a different reality that determines the significance of image making. 
Thus, images are not the “concrete inversion of life”550 but instead the flow of life: its 
                                                      
544 “Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: 
they are counter-products within the real that desire produces.” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 27 
545 “Re-produced” is used here to imply further production in contrast to “reproduced” 
which evokes copying or imitation.  
546 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 109 
547 Baudrillard, Seduction, p. 83 
548 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 31 
549 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 19 
550 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 2  




transformation, and re-production in different mediums. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
desire, (seduction) and simulation do not represent lack or absence of reality, but 
instead the production of more real.  
For Deleuze and Guattari “everything is production, even consumption.”551 
Everything affects and exists upon the same immanent plane where “production as 
process overtakes all idealistic categories.”552 This immanent condition is 
characterized by liquidity and flow where “Desire causes the current to flow, itself 
flows in turn, and breaks the flows.”553 This model of fluidity inspires trans-
disciplinary operations and the liquefaction of rigid boundaries in a smooth state of 
being that can be called a “body without organs.”554  
The smooth space of immanence necessitates smooth processes of 
production. Deleuze and Guattari offer the “felt” and “patchwork” as 
“technological models” of such smooth production, which are contrasted to the 
making of fabrics. The fabric represents striated space because: 
First, it is constituted by two kinds of parallel elements; in the simplest 
case, there are vertical and horizontal elements, and the two intertwine, 
intersect perpendicularly. Second, the two kinds of elements have different 
functions; one is fixed, the other mobile, passing above and beneath the 
fixed. …Third, a striated space of this kind is necessarily delimited, closed 
on at least one side: the fabric can be infinite in length but not in width, 
which is determined by the frame of the warp; the necessity of a aback and 
forth motion implies a closed space (circular or cylindrical figures are 
themselves closed). Finally, a space of this kind seems necessarily to have 
atop and a bottom; even when the warp yarn and woof yarn are exactly the 
same in nature, number, and density, weaving reconstitutes a bottom by 
placing the knots on one side.555 
Felt is introduced as an “anti-fabric,” a nomadic material that is “in principle 
infinite, open, and unlimited in every direction; it has neither top nor bottom nor 
                                                      
551 Deleuze and Guattari write: “everything is production, even consumption, production of 
productions, of actions and of passions; productions of recording processes, of distributions and 
of coordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, of sensual 
pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain.” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, p. 4 
552 “Man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other….rather, they are 
one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. Production as process overtakes all 
idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an 
immanent principle.” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 4-
5 
553 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 5 
554 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 15 
555 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 475 




centre; it does not assign fixed and mobile elements but rather distributes a 
continuous variation.”556 Felt is produced by “fulling,” which is in fact a process of 
folding by rolling the block of fibres back and forth. The intricate entanglement of 
fibres in felt parallel the complex interconnectivity of the rhizome. Moreover, felt is 
produced using processes of production that can extend in any direction, the micro-
fibres being “abstract lines”557 that hold the “chaosmos” together. Deleuze and 
Guattari associate felt with the earth, with nomadic movement and the exteriority of 
the terrestrial surface. For them, the production of felt represents the unfolding of 
monadic life 558 onto a nomadic life: 
For among sedentaries, clothes-fabric and tapestry-fabric tend to annex the 
body and exterior space, respectively, to the immobile house: fabric 
integrates the body and the outside into a closed space. On the other hand, 
the weaving of the nomad indexes clothing and the house itself to the space 
of the outside, to the open smooth space in which the body moves.559 
If felt describes a nomadic chaosmos, patchwork demonstrates that the smoothening 
of striated space does not necessitate homogeneity, rather “an amorphous, nonformal 
space prefiguring op art.”560 In other words, if, the weaving of fabric is contained by 
the vertical and horizontal elements, patchwork creates a smooth space 
characterized by heterogeneous elements that can extend in different directions:  
Patchwork, in conformity with migration, whose degree of affinity with 
nomadism it shares, is not only named after trajectories, but ‘represents’ 
                                                      
556 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 475-6 
557 “A line that delimits nothing, that describes no contour, that no longer goes from one point to 
another but instead passes between points, that is always declining from the horizontal and 
the vertical and deviating from the diagonal, that is constantly changing direction, a mutant 
line of this kind that is without outside or inside, form or background, beginning or end and 
that is as alive as a continuous variation – such a line is truly an abstract line, and describes a 
smooth space.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 
498 
558 In his book The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze reconstructs Gottfried W. Leibniz’s 
Monadology. For Leibniz monads are “the real atoms of nature” and “the elements of things.” 
However, Deleuze argues that Monads “resembles a sacristy more than an atom: a room 
with neither doors nor windows, where all activity takes place on the inside.” Thus for 
Deleuze a monadic life is one of pure interiority while a nomadic life is one of pure 
exteriority. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Monadology, trans. Robert Latta, Forgotten 
Books, 1968. See also Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Athlone Press, London, 
1993. Leibniz’s Monads and Deleuze interpretation of them are discussed in the following 
pages of this thesis as part of an exposition of the concept of the fold.  
559 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 476 
560 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 477 




trajectories, becomes inseparable from speed or movement in an open 
space.561   
Felt and patchwork as “technological models,” suggest a more fluid, complex and 
interdisciplinary approach towards architectural production. In recent years, the 
advancement of contemporary digital tools has allowed a smoothening of 
traditional (architectural) categories a heightened sense of collaboration between 
different disciplines. The increasing sophistication of new technologies and their 
widespread availability has provided a fertile ground for interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary mutation, where designers borrow ideas from unexpected sources 
in an effort to explore the “becoming-other” of architecture.562 
  
  
Figure 5.6: Different approaches to the design process: the smooth, space of felt 
and patchwork compared to the striated space of fabric. Felt and patchwork 
suggest complexity and an explorative and interdisciplinary approach to the 
design process which can extend in all possible directions. Fabric on the other 
hand is more restricted in its expansion. Source: the author. 
However, it must be noted that the concepts discussed above are not to be 
considered as liberatory solutions that must be adopted at the expense of other 
modes of operation. Instead, they are conceptual approaches that confront 
established modes of thought with “new obstacles” in anticipation of new “passages 
or combinations” and other “forces” that might develop from such interaction.563 
                                                      
561 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 477  
562 Many contemporary architects are engaged in amorphous design processes in which the 
digital animator, software engineers or other experts contribute to the design of a building. 
Aegis Hyposurface, Greg Lynn’s Embryological House, or the recent work of Frank Gehry, 
Zaha Hadid or NOX are early prototypes of such transmutational architecture. 
563 Thus Deleuze and Guattari warn: “Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save 
us.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 500 












Figure 5.7: Aegis Hyposurface (1999) dECOi Architects. According to Mark 
Goulthorpe, Aegis is an activated surface that responds to stimuli captured 
from the environment. This is effected by arrays of pneumatic pistons operating 
in real time, which are controlled by a computer system that processes 
information from various sensors. The surface is therefore not designed in the 
traditional sense of the word, it is rather continuously designed, generated from 
an endless sampling of electronic sensory-input.  







Figure 5.8: The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum (1997) Frank Gehry. In order to 
construct the complex forms, Gehry had to collaborate with experts from the 
aerospace industry who were familiar with CATIA, a computer modelling 
software that was particular useful for mapping out the folded surfaces of the 
design. Source: Coosje Van Bruggen, Frank O. Gehry Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 
Guggenheim Museum Publications, New York, 1997. 
  




5.3.3 From Representation to Expression: “Haptic Space” and “Close-range 
Vision” 
In a philosophical approach where everything is production, thought assumes a 
different movement. Instead of cutting through rigid layers, surficial thought floats 
within the smooth space of becoming. In this movement of thought, the eye assumes 
a “non-optical function,” since smooth space is in fact “haptic space” as 
distinguished from the optical space of the tradition.564 Deleuze and Guattari prefer 
the term “haptic” to tactile because they argue the former “does not establish an 
opposition between two sense organs but rather invites the assumption that the eye 
itself may fulfil this nonoptical function.”565 
The concept of “close-range vision” suggests a more sympathetic 
engagement with art, one that limits (pre-) judgement from distance. Such 
proximity of vision and thought implies the viewer-artist as one who not only 
occupies the same dimension as the work of art, but also helps produce it from the 
same thickness.566 In other words, the close-range interaction facilitates by this 
“groping” vision, creates a non-hierarchical mixture from which the work of art, the 
artist and the observers emerge as altered entities. 
In this “the haptic, smooth space of close vision...orientations are not 
constant but change according to temporary vegetation, occupations, and 
precipitation.”567 This implies a nomadic approach to art, in which, lines of flight 
move in different trajectories, exploring new territories beyond points of reference. 
This is because “there is no visual model for points of reference” which would 
define stylistic rules. If there are points of reference, they are “tied to any number of 
observers, who may be qualified as ‘monads’ but are instead nomads entertaining 
tactile relations among themselves.”568 It is through such an “aesthetic model” that 
Deleuze and Guattari transform Leibniz’s Monads into expressive nomads that 
explore the surficial plane of immanence.  
                                                      
564 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 492 
565 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 494  
566 “The law of the painting is that it be done at close range, even if it is viewed from 
relatively far away…Similarly, it is said that composers do not hear: they have close-range 
hearing, whereas listeners hear from a distance. Even writers write with short-term memory, 
whereas readers are assumed to be endowed with long-term memory.” Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 493 
567 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 494 
568 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 494 




Deleuze and Guattari define nomad art as one in which the eye senses the 
surface of immanence which it belongs to. In other words, the viewer does not stand 
back (or above) a work of art, since “there is no intermediary distance, or all 
distance is intermediary.”569 From this point of view, seeing a work of art 
necessitates a mixing with its texture, a process of dissolution within its thickness. 
Thus, the eye assumes: 
a haptic, non-optical function: no line separates earth from sky, which are 
of the same substance; there is neither horizon nor background nor 
perspective nor limit nor outline or form nor centre.570 
“Close-range” and “haptic vision,” offer a different approach to art, one in which 
judgement based on pre-established points of origin gives way to valuation inspired by 
potential lines of flight. This approach encourages a shift of emphasis from disciplined 







Figure 5.9: Two different approaches to seeing (in architecture): detachment 
and perpendicularity of seeing in traditional models of thought compared to 
the haptic voyage of the eye in surficial thought.  Source: the author.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetic model follows other “models” that rely on the 
introduction of new concepts, which are fed into abstract machines of comparison 
that once animated in time, push thought forwards into unknown territories: 
Indeed, it is through symmetry that rectilinear systems limit repetition, 
preventing infinite progression and maintaining the organic domination of 
a central point with radiating lines, as in reflected or star-shaped figures. It 
is free action, however, which by its essence unleashes the power of 
                                                      
569 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 494 











repetition as a machinic force that multiplies its effect and pursues an 






Figure 5.10: Abstract thought and abstract machine of thought: circularity of 
transcendental hierarchy compared to dynamics of surficial approach based on 
difference, repetition and transformation. For architectural design, the latter 
strategy suggests a continuous redefinition of established categories and the 
relationship between them. Source: the author.  
If the first two machinic constructs were activated by haptic vision and close-range 
vision, (operating in conjunction with optical vision and distant vision), the third 
machinic concept is the nomadic “abstract line” which is compared to the “concrete 
line” of representational art. The “abstract line” is a nomadic line that has not yet 
been “downgraded” to a concrete or a figurative line.572 What marks the downfall of 
nomadic abstract lines is the development of text, which “takes charge of 
abstraction” and communication leaving the artistic line to representation or 
figuration:  
In effect, the line is all the more abstract when writing is absent, either 
because it has yet to develop or only exists outside or alongside. When 
writing takes charge of abstraction, as it does in empires, the line, already 
downgraded, necessarily tends to become concrete, even figurative. 
Children forget how to draw.573 
Deleuze and Guattari’s abstract line cannot be reduced to any “organic line” which 
depicts humans or animals. The nomadic line is more enigmatic, belonging to the 
liquid flows of haptic vision and smooth space. Such a line follows momentary 
                                                      
571 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 498 
572 The nomadic line “is no less at the ‘beginning,’ inasmuch as it is a pole always 
presupposed by any line capable of constituting another pole.” Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 497 
573 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 497 
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desires and avoids any pre-established rules of symmetry or striation. A nomadic 
line is primitive, seductive and creative and it demands haptic vision. In other 
words, the nomadic line is not one of representation or reproduction but of 
expression and re-production.   
 
             
Figure 5.11: From expression to representation: nomadic abstract line, Egyptian 
geometric line, Greek organic line. In nomadic abstract line emphasis is on 
expression and a haptic relationship with the medium. In Egyptian and Greek 
art, the line becomes increasingly figurative, representing the subject through 
laws of proportion and perspective. Both the Greek line and the Egyptian line 
belong to striated space, even though the Greek organic line “subordinates 
volume and spatiality” whilst the Egyptian geometrical line “reduced them 




For Deleuze and Guattari the depiction of the organic body in Greek art marks the 
transformation of smooth space into striated space as “The organic body is 
prolonged by straight lines that attach it to what lies in the distance. Hence the 
primacy of human beings, or of the face.”575 What distinguishes the smooth space of 
abstract lines is the flow of expression and the tactility of vision unrestricted by 
“rectilinear coordinates of striated space.” This suggests that if in striated space the 
eye looks for depth of meaning past surfaces of representation, in smooth space, the 
eye feels immanent sense across surfaces of expression. (See figure 5.9) 
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575 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 498  




5.3.4 From “Monads” to Nomads: Fold, Architecture and Surfaces of 
Expression  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetic model, Monads become nomadic entities in 
continuous movement and transformation. Such nomadic Monads offer a model for 
individual creativity without losing ties with a greater holistic continuity. This 
model of thought also offers an alternative approach to art and creativity. Deleuze 
and Guattari write:  
These questions of orientation, location, and linkage enter into play in the 
most famous works of nomad art: the twisted animals have no land 
beneath them; the ground constantly changes direction, as in aerial 
acrobatics; the paws point in the opposite direction from the head, the hind 
part of the body is turned upside down; the “monadological” points of 
view can be interlinked only on a nomad space, the whole and the parts 
give the eye that beholds them a function that is haptic rather than optical. 
This is an animality that can be seen only by touching it with one’s mind, 
but without the mind becoming a finger, not even by way of the eye.576 
Leibniz’s Monadology is based on an account of a Monad as “the real atoms of 
nature” and “the elements of things,”577 which have perception.578 Monads that 
possess feeling are defined as souls, where perception “is more distinct, and is 
accompanied by memory.”579 A mind is defined as a soul with the “knowledge of 
necessary and eternal truths”. This is the key to reason and the sciences “raising us 
to the knowledge of ourselves and of God.” 580 
The body of a Monad however, is something quite different. It belongs to 
matter and operates according to a different set of rules. The body exists in a 
plenum where all matter is connected together so “every motion has an effect upon 
distant bodies in proportion to their distance”. All bodies are in a perpetual flux 
                                                      
576 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 494 
577 Leibniz, The Monadology, 3   
578 Leibniz makes a clear distinction between perception and consciousness as he dismisses 
the Cartesian argument that “minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls 
of animals nor other Entelechies.” Leibniz, The Monadology, 14. Thus, Leibniz disagrees with 
souls being entirely separate from bodies, yet also dismisses that souls are mortals.  
Therefore, the essence of a Monad is perception and this can only be found in the simplest of 
things, the atoms of the universe, which are indivisible 
579 Leibniz, The Monadology, 19. For Leibniz, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. 
So animals can have souls because animals have perception and memory. In these cases 
memory resembles reason, but the actions are only a result of comparison to past experience 
which is very different to intelligence or rationality. An example is a dog that runs away 
from a stick when it was been beaten by it before. The dog merely remembers the pain from 
the past and deduces that it will cause him pain again. 
580 Leibniz, The Monadology, 29 




“like rivers” where parts enter and pass through each other continuously. Thus, the 
space of matter is thick and full and there is no void within it.581 
Leibniz defines the body of the Monad as a “divine machine” which is 
fundamentally different to any man-made creation, because it is not made of simple 
parts, but of machines ad infinitum.582 Defined this way, the relationship between 
the body and the soul becomes complex: “bodies act as if (to suppose the 
impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both 
act as if each influenced the other.”583 Thus, while distinguishing the soul from the 
body, Leibniz theorises them as existing in a complex harmony and continuity with each 
other “since they are all representations of one and the same universe.”584 It is for 
this “impossible” relationhsip that Deleuze proposes the fold, as a concept that 
explains the connected difference that characterizes Leibniz’s metaphysical distinction 
between the monadic soul and body.   
After reconstructing Leibniz’s conception of “soul” and “perception,”585 
Deleuze transforms the monadic “body” into an architectural façade, which he 
defines as “an outside without an inside.”586  Deleuze argues that this façade 
belongs to the material world and it deals with matter, the flowing plenum outside 
of the Monad.  This façade “can have doors and windows – it is riddled with holes – 
although there may be no void, a hole being only the site of a more rarefied 
                                                      
581 “Though the earth and the air which are between the plants of the garden, or the water 
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582 “The machines of nature, namely living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts 
ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, 
between the divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403).”582“God alone is completely 
without body. (Theod. 90, 124).”Leibniz, The Monadology, 74 
583 Leibniz, The Monadology, 81 
584 Leibniz, The Monadology, 78 
585 Deleuze reconstructs Leibniz’s theories of perception in the Monad. While arguing that 
the Monad resembles a cell, Deleuze explains that the Monad possesses conscious and 
unconscious perceptions. Unconscious perceptions are inconspicuous or minute, while 
conscious perceptions are deductions from such minute unconscious perceptions within the 
monad. Deleuze argues that there are two different kinds of conscious perception: universal 
and individual. The universal perception is common to all Monads since the same world is 
included in all existing Monads. Thus, all Monads perceive the same colour of green, the 
same musical note and the same object is actualised in them. Individual perception on the 
other hand, favours certain differential relations that result in exclusive perceptions, 
therefore, two monads would never perceive the same green in the same degree of 
chiaroscuro. See Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, Athlone 
Press, London, 1993, p. 90 
586 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 28 




matter.”587 In this conception, openings are not a disruption of the façade (a rupture) 
but rather a different manifestation of the same surface. Thus, the monadic facade 
operates much like a Möbius strip: opening “from the outside and onto the 
outside.”588 Deleuze’s radical transformation of Leibniz’s metaphysical theory is 
complete when he describes the monadic “sacristy” as having two floors.589 The 
lower level is assigned to the facade, which belongs to the exteriority of matter. It 
has four windows and a door, which represent the five senses, making the room “an 
infinite room for reception or receptivity.”590 The upper level is assigned to the the 
soul or the mind. It is pure inside without an outside. The upper floor is “blind and 
closed but on the other hand resonating as if it were a musical salon translating the 
visible movements below into sounds up above.”591  
Thus, Deleuze takes Leibniz’s ideas and applies them to a Baroque house. 
By doing this, he uses architecture to explore philosophy and simultaneously offers 
a way of exploring architecture through philosophy. In the Baroque sacristy that 
represents the Monad, the fold facilitates the connection between the two floors: the 
physical world as the bright lower floor and the metaphysical world represented by 
the dark upper floor. Leibniz’s impossible connection between these two worlds is 
made possible by the fold, not just as an architectural feature of the Baroque, but also 
as a philosophical concept and process. The fold not only connects binary oppositional 
categories but it also explains their originary connectedness. A fold of paper for 
example, separates one side from the other, but the two sides are not two different 
pieces of paper, but in fact, one continuous piece that is polarized by the operation 
of the fold. The fold is therefore a surface phenomenon that creates difference 
within the continuity of the same paper. The fold simultaneously separates and 
connects the high and the low, the interior and the exterior. Although these worlds 
seem separate and opposed, they endlessly relate to each other through the fold: 
“that echoes itself from the two sides according to a different order.”592  
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Figure 5.12: Deleuze’s sketch of the baroque house depicting the folds that 
connect the high with the low. The upper chamber is closed in on itself, without 
window or opening. It contains the Leibnizian screen/curtain/membrane that 
reverberate according to the senses, expressing a haptic connection between the 
incorporeal and the physical. These curtains are folded, yet tense and elastic.  
There is another fold between the two floors, symbolized by an abstract 
baroque motif at the joint between the upper and the lower floors. This latter 
fold is dependent on the mannerist style of a work of art, which simultaneously 
connects and separates the high with the low. Source: Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz 
and the Baroque, 1993. 
The fold is “an infinite work or process,” that describes the smooth harmony 
between “essence” and “appearance.” It is a creative process comparable to 
chiaroscuro.593 Much like the terrestrial surface that describes the middle condition 
between the height of Ideas and the depth of essence, the fold describes an in-
between space, where the two worlds of soul and body merge. Folds are not 
abstract entities, rather manners of matter.594 Thus, if the Platonic tradition 
introduced the stairway, and the Neo-Platonic tradition suggested the stairwell to 
                                                      
593 Inspired by Leibniz’s Monadology, Deleuze likens the fold to chiaroscuro: the style of 
pictorial art in which only light and shade are represented. The image is the product of light, 
emanating from the Monad who receives it from God. The light cannot come from outside 
because the Monad is a pure interior and therefore is a metaphysical entity. The exterior 
world of matter is an  infinitely dark or holey façade, where the holes are not voids in the 
sense of absence, but more rarefied matter. As light approaches this dark surface of matter, 
the infinitely holey façade, “the white is progressively shade, giving way to obscurity, to a 
thicker and thicker shadow.” (Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 32) This is 
the basis of how Leibniz’s Monads express themselves and as the very essence of the fold. 
From this perspective, language, art, architecture, poetry and philosophy all become 
chiaroscuros through the fold: the smooth fusion of the light of the soul with the dark façade 
of matter.  
594 “We go from matter to manner; from earth and ground to habitats and salons, from the 
Texturologie to the Logologie.” Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 35 




connect the physical and the metaphysical realms, then the fold, as an allegorical 
connection, is the contribution of the Baroque. 
However, if the fold is the Baroque expression of a smooth connection, the 
“unfold” is the expression of the same paradigm in other styles and cultures.  In 
other words, unfold is not contrary to the fold, but a different manifestation of the 
same principle. For Deleuze, the emphasis must be placed in the translation of the 
paradigm into a physical expression, which will change according to the choice of 
materials and methodologies used. Thus, different cultures have developed 
different manifestations of the paradigm of the fold, releasing the forces of the soul 
from the prison of the infinite.  
However, Deleuze criticises the Greek Platonic tradition, not on their ideas 
or forces, but on what he calls the failure of these forces to be in harmony with the 
physical world. For Deleuze, Baroque architecture is triumphant because “The 
paradigm becomes ‘mannerist,’ and proceeds to a formal deduction of the fold.”595 
Therefore, the power of the fold and the unfold, lies in the mannerist expression that 
releases the soul from the immateriality of the infinite and surfaces it in the material 
world of façades. This mannerism is not copying or representing the metaphysical 
realm, but rather expressing or re-producing it in the physical forms.596 However, if 
for Leibniz and the Baroque it is the fold that surfaces the virtuality of the soul upon 
the exteriority of matter, in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, it is the surficial (not 
superficial) surface that actualizes the virtualities of the plane of immanence.   
Leibniz’s philosophy is based on a certain optimism that emerges in his 
conception of Monads and their relationship to God.597 Deleuze’s theories borrow 
some of this optimism, which becomes evident in his affirmation of creativity, 
exploratory experimentation and processes of becoming. For some critics such 
optimism threatens moral or critical judgment or promotes uninhibited mannerism 
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597 Leibniz writes: “Since all possible things have a claim to existence in God’s understanding 
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actual world which is possible.” G. W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and of Grace, 
based on Reason 1714,” in Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd Edition, ed. and trans. L. E. 
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what must the others be like?” Voltaire, Candide and Other Stories, trans. Roger Pearson, 
Edition 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 15. 




or expression. In the context of architectural design, such affirmative theories can 
also be accused of reducing architecture to a superficial play of forms and surfaces 
that do not contribute much to the social and political needs of the society. Deleuze 
and Guattari however, would argue that for progress to occur the umbrella of 
established rules and categories must be ruptured and its risks accepted, only to 
allow a little bit of windy chaos to transform outdated concepts and practices.  
Inspired by such theories, many contemporary architects have 
appropriated some of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, which have led to 
significant changes in how buildings are designed in relation to the environment. 
Alicia Imperiale writes:  
Deleuzean thought has promoted smoother transitions and interactive 
exchanges across surfaces of buildings and sites. The fold is ambiguous, 
being figure and non-figure, organization and non-organization. As a 
formal metaphor, the fold has appealed to architects who seek to move past 
highly figured and readily identified form to an architecture that is rather 
formless.598 
Contemporary architecture is increasingly reliant on computer technology to aid 
processes of design and construction. Most of such technologies rely on activated 
surfaces that interact with “users” through images and other visual effects. The 
presence of activated surfaces and digital images in the different stages of design 
and construction has led to new architectural projects that explore the ability of the 
computer to model and construct complex surfaces that are not just ornamental and 
expressive, but they also perform structural roles as well.   
During the past few decades, new technologies have allowed surfaces to be 
flatter and thinner, performing simultaneous operations with less materials and 
effort. The “cladding” of buildings are no longer inert, protective shells that only 
keep out wind and rain. They have become sensitised surfaces that perform 
structural duties, monitor the building immediate environment (both inside and 
outside), regulate the passage of vital resources and energies to and from the 
building, and finally express an architectural style through form, colour and texture. 
All these capabilities have become compacted into the architectural surface which 
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fluctuates from thick to thin, twists and turns from concave to convex and folds and 
unfolds to create new spaces.    
Considering the recent technological advancements, it is possible to argue 
that surface in the contemporary condition is increasingly expressive of the principle 
of unfold as it marks the space of transition between virtual and physical realities. 
With the aid of new technologies, architectural surfaces form the smooth space of 
transformation between imagination and its many different manifestations in the 
world of “facades.” It therefore important that architectural theory attempts to go 
beyond traditional conceptions of surface as a shallow and masking layer that hides 
reality, towards alternative conceptions that consider surfaces as the monadic body 
of cultural (and architectural) production. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS: SURFICIAL PHILOSOPHY: IMMANENCE, 
CREATIVITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF MORE REAL 
Throughout this chapter, the thesis has elaborated the proposition that Deleuze (and 
Guattari) develop different concepts in order to formulate a surficial philosophy that 
collapses the Platonic transcendental hierarchy between image and reality, without 
abolishing their difference. By examining these philosophical concepts, the thesis 
has demonstrated the complexity of such non-hierarchical philosophy, which shifts 
the emphasis from comparison to origin based on the criteria of similitude to explorations 
of processes of becoming based on an appreciation of originary difference. It has been 
argued that if traditional thought assumes a perpendicular movement against 
surfaces, images and appearances (either gaining distance to reach lofty Ideas or 
penetrating appearances to uncover hidden reality), surficial philosophy encourages 
a non-perpendicular, nomadic movement of thought that explores virtual 
multiplicities across the expanse of the plane of immanence. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest a flattening of familiar hierarchies 
established by Plato, which have continued to govern theories of ornament and 
image. However, this flattening is not considered a destructive act (i.e. making 
things superficial as Baudrillard would have us believe) but rather a creative 
surfacing that produces a different philosophical model. Surficial philosophy may be 
unfamiliar, requiring new concepts, images of thought and continuous elaboration. 
Yet, it constructs a complex model that generates a more pliable approach towards a 
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rapidly transforming era. Perhaps the following aeronautical metaphor can describe 
the advantages of this alternative approach. If traditional models of thought are 
aerodynamically stable (having become familiar to the philosophical tradition), a 
non-hierarchical philosophy based on immanence can be compared to certain 
contemporary jets that are aerodynamically unstable. However, this seemingly 
irrational design is in fact highly deliberate as it is aimed at exploiting new 
possibilities (“fly-by-wire” technologies) that allow it to perform manoeuvres that 
are impossible by traditional, (aerodynamically) stable models of thought. By 
shifting the emphasis from the determination of points of origin to the activation of 
lines of flight, surficial philosophy includes chaos, dreams, imagination and 
illusions as a necessary element of creative production, whether in art, science or 
philosophy. This alternative approach includes unfamiliar processes and affirms 
experimentation and transformations in order to arrive at unforeseen territories.   
Surficial philosophy is based on immanent difference, which is radically 
different to transcendental difference (Plato) or (quasi)transcendental différance 
(Derrida). The shift from transcendence to immanence is evident in a new approach 
to the simulacrum, which does not define it as a copy of a copy of reality, but 
instead as image that produces further reality, i.e. a different kind of reality. In this 
conception image is appreciated in a different way as it is recognised for having a 
different purpose than merely representing its supposed model.  
Such a conception of image is made possible by refusing to define reality as 
a homogenous concept, but rather a smooth, heterogeneous mixture in which 
different elements exist in a fluid complexity. This model shifts the emphasis from 
clear boundaries and rigid hierarchies to continuous processes of transformation 
that highlight the middle: the fold between the soul and the body, the terrestrial 
surface between ideal height and profound depth, or other unfolds. From this point 
of view, surface is no longer an outer layer, but instead the progressing middle and 
the smooth space of becoming that facilitates the actualisation of virtualities. This 
conception of surface necessitates close-range vision and a haptic eye that explores 
the topography of immanence.   
In this alternative philosophical approach, the criterion is more creative 
and less juridical, being more concerned with pushing forces to the limits of their 
potential, rather than capturing them within a pre-established logical system. 
Moreover, images and appearances are re-production, not reproductions of 
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different reality, which does not indicate the implosion of meaning caused by 
superficial effects, but rather the explosion of sense across the surfaces of 
expression. From this surficial point of view, it is surface that generates “image” and 
“reality”; “virtuality” and “actuality.” Thus, reality is not to be found beyond 
opaque visual barriers, by thinning out the outer layer or making it literally 
transparent. Instead, one senses reality by studying surface layout, surface effects 
and the rich ambiguities of phenomenal transparency. In this process, the seduction 
of false appearances is replaced by the desire to produce, the desire to surface.  
Relating the principles of surficial philosophy to architectural theory has 
significant consequences. Firstly, the notion of becoming minoritarian inspires a 
renewed interest in ornament and the ornamental, surface and the superficial, and 
other concepts that have been subordinated to “primary” architectural categories. 
This becoming process inspires inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary interaction 
as architecture attempts to mutate beyond its familiar definitions. This can include 
architecture becoming-skin, becoming-surface, becoming-smooth and so on. Aided 
by new technological possibilities, a surficial approach to architecture is affirmative 
of unfamiliar desiring machines of production that operate along new lines of flight. 
The points of memory, tradition and the established architectural canon are 
encountered and surpassed as the process cannot be limited to the stasis of the 
“punctual system.” This is because  
creations are like mutant abstract lines that have detached themselves from 
the task of representing a world, precisely because they assemble a new 
type of reality that history can only recontain or relocate in punctual 
systems.”599 
Moreover, a non-hierarchical philosophy changes the process through which things 
are judged. Rather than comparing creative production against values set within 
long-term memory, judgement is carried out according to values acquired from 
short-term memory. This means that art is valued according to its own micro-
histories and lines of development, not against a transcendent time-line that resides 
in the distant past or in the distant future. If everything is a production of a desiring 
machine, then valuation occurs according to immanent timelines. This way, the 
value of an object is determined through a sensitised process that is more in tune 
with the entity’s immanent potential.  
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Finally, a philosophy of surfacing flattens hierarchy in favour of a more 
pliable approach that exploits unexpected opportunities. This means that concepts 
are not contrasted in order to determine an order of superiority based on pre-
established notions of orginality. Instead, all concepts are compared in order to 
expand horizons and to offer alternatives. In other words, oppositional relationships 
are set up momentarily with the knowledge that there are many other such set-ups 
that can be proposed at any one time. Oppositional pairs rise and fall as abstract 
machines break free from the circularity of traditional thought. The consequences 
for architectural theory are a liberation of creativity from established hierarchies and 
a more positive attitude towards experimental endeavours, whilst simultaneously 
remaining open towards criticism, negation and death as an important element of 
development.  
Perhaps, such an approach to thought is particularly useful for 
architectural education where students are burdened with fewer responsibilities. 
Whether the university environment should be one of learning established 
techniques in preparation for work in the industry, or one of experimentation and 
conceptual creativity in order to inspire positive change in the industry is a 
discussion that is best left to other research opportunities. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight that surficial philosophy encourages creativity and 
experimentation as an expansive process that does not find equilibrium, rather 
consistency. To put this in another way would be to say that surficial philosophy 
does not become static, poised in the absolute middle. Instead, it flows from the 
middle-out, continuously moving in-between things, whilst simultaneously creating 
new entities and categories.  
Throughout this chapter, it has been argued that rather than erasing the 
origin and placing it in the past as an impossible quasi-concept, it is possible to 
place the essential origin within and among the thickness of reality as a complex but 
immanent concept.600 This suggests a surficial approach based on a philosophical 
conception of surface as the smooth space of immanence. The thesis arrived at this 
theory with the aid of Stroll’s exhaustive analysis of the term “surface” from the 
“common-sense” point of view, and Gibson’s theory of surface layout, which 
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demonstrated that it is possible and in fact popular to define surface by its 
thickness, i.e. as a concept that includes dept. Moreover, in normal conditions of 
seeing depth perception is in fact an interpretation of surface layout. These two 
theoretical positions, combined with an understanding of images as surface 
phenomena offer an alternative understanding of surfaces as the facilitators of seeing, 
not barriers opposed to seeing, where essence is not separated from appearance, but 
rather created by it.  
Following these concepts, it was argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophical approach allows for a more positive and affirmative attitude towards 
images as expressive actualities that are as real any supposed origin or model. From 
this point of view, image making is not “imitation art” belonging to an act of 
copying (reproduction of an originary reality) but instead, production or re-
production that creates more reality. Thus, it is possible to argue that the images of 
architecture re-produced in magazines and mass media are not merely spectacular 
manipulation, but also participation in an alternative reality produced by images 
and the technologies that disseminate them. This in turn suggests that the 
production of the architectural image (whether through ornament, skin, or surface 
design) is not a secondary task in comparison to the primary task of designing the 
structure (function or materiality) of architecture, but rather as Semper implied, an 
immanent element of architectural design.  
An architecture that is sensitive to such intricacies would be one that does 
not refrain from the important task of participation within production of images (of 
thought, of architecture, of future possibilities) but rather one that positively 
engages with it. Such architecture might imply a primitive approach, as it will be 
accessible to the everyday person, but primitivity need not be interpreted as naivety 
or backwardness. Instead, such primitivity is not only highly postmodern (and 
therefore relevant to the agenda of opening up architecture to the public and 
removing it from its pedestal as high art) but it is also sympathetic and affirmative 
of the rapidly transforming socio-technological condition with all the possibilities 
that it offers. Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum displays such nomadic 
primitivity, a surface art of the yurt in which surfaces are not barriers to seeing and 
skin is not secondary to structure. Instead, seeing is haptic, skin is architecture and it 





SURFICIAL ARCHITECTURE: THE CASE OF THE 




“Creativity entails the momentary relaxation of the critical in order to go beyond the present 




“A fall into the surface is a leap of potentiality ... [it] is not exclusively a falling down, it is 
an opening out into the readiness of change, into a sensitivity to potentiality. This is ... 




“I think that what makes it look good contributes to its unpopularity...I see Gehry’s work as 
caught inevitably but unfortunately in arguments to which it has a more subtle relationship 
than is perhaps normally described, but that are in any case not resolvable.”603 
  Jeremy Gilbert-Rolf 
“To advertise perfection is beneath Gehry’s love of imperfect humanity.”604 
Peter Schjeldahl 
 
“Great architecture is not just a question of pure genius per se; it’s a function of 
opportunity.”605  
Thomas Krens 
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER SIX 
The following chapter returns to architecture, specifically Frank Gehry’s Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum, from which many of the themes of this research began. The 
museum is not treated as a traditional case study, which would involve a “detailed 
and intensive analysis”606 of the building itself. Instead, Gehry’s seminal work is 
used to bring into discussion his particular design approach, which by following the 
specificities of a particular zoomorphic sign, manages to challenge traditional 
models of thought by resisting easy classification. In this sense, the BGM acts as an 
architectural exemplar that binds together the different concepts that have been 
developed in previous chapters.  
In this chapter, the thesis attempts to relate Gehry’s design approach to 
surficial philosophy, arguing that it is the folded surfaces of the Bilbao Guggenheim 
Museum that constitute the very site of Gehry’s architecture - not hidden structure, 
or even the relationship between external skin and internal skeleton. Moreover, as 
Gehry’s most successful building, the BGM represents a pliable “nomad art” 
characterized by “lines of flight,” “haptic vision” and a primitive expression that 
manages to achieve a complexity that is in tune with the current postmodern 
condition.  
This chapter questions whether the formal logic of Gehry’s architecture lies 
in the tectonic relationship between “skin” and “armature,” or whether it arises 
from a definition of architecture as continuous skin, or folded surface. Gehry’s design 
process and his particular approach towards media images, zoomorphic symbolism 
and architectural theory are explored in order to investigate this proposition.  This 
thesis argues that the pliability of paper (that Gehry uses to model his initial ideas 
for a project), is indicative of a smooth architectural approach that is also evident in 
the adoption of the fish as a personal totem, or Gehry’s preoccupation with the 
becoming-other of architecture, which in the case of the Bilbao Guggenheim 
Museum, results in the construction of what Charles Jencks calls an “enigmatic 
signifier.”607 
                                                      
606 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 48.  
607 See Charles Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? John Wiley and 
Sons, London, 2007, p. 62 
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The thesis proposes that Gehry’s BGM resists easy classification, not only 
because it generates an ambiguous image, but also because it expresses a surficial 
approach to architecture, which challenges established hierarchies and traditional 
categories. Such an approach is argued to indicate the evolution of postmodern 
“double-coding,” into smooth multiplicity. This implies that rather than reversing 
modernist hierarchies or merely exaggerating the difference between established 
categories, the BGM achieves a complex, pliable hybridity in which difference is 
utilised for the production of new and unfamiliar categories.  
This thesis argues that the BGM necessitates surficial thinking in which 
boundary is no longer a line of separation, but rather an expansive surface of exploration 
and a non-hierarchical space of transformation. To engage with this new space is to 
explore difference without hierarchy and to exploit media that transverse 
disciplines, countries, cultures, and politics. 
Gehry’s BGM deploys new technologies to achieve a becoming-other of 
architecture: becoming-sculpture, becoming-image, becoming-fish, becoming-
virtual and so on. The resultant architecture requires a shift of emphasis and an 
alternative movement of thought that does not define surfaces as thin visual 
barriers, but rather expansive topologies that act as rich mediums. In this alternative 
approach, questions of style, ornament, image and appearance gain a new 
significance, where surface becomes the very site of architectural production.  
6.1 THE POSTMODERN CONTEXT: NEW TECHNOLOGY AND HYPER-
COMMUNICATION 
According to Charles Jencks, the current postmodern condition is characterised by 
advanced technology, increasing speeds of communication, “hybridisation of 
national cultures”, the “blurring of social classes,” the rise of “transnational 
institutions” and other “fundamental transformations.”608 For Jencks, such changes 
are underway towards a “more hybrid, integrated world ... in constant and 
instantaneous communication across its boundaries.”609  
Much of these transformations are facilitated and accelerated by new 
technologies that make knowledge more readily accessible. The Internet for  
                                                      
608 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? pp. 7-8 
609 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 8 
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example, has become a powerful network through which users produce and share 
information, while TV, radio, newspapers, magazines and other broadcasting 
technologies have helped distribute such information across traditional boundaries. 
Aided by the mass production (of hardware and software), images, sounds and 
texts can now be transmitted across the globe. This unprecedented capacity to share 
information has accelerated cross-boundary transaction and interdisciplinary 
interaction, which is evident in sciences, economics, politics and cultural and 
national identity.  
In this context of media networks and intensified visual production, 
virtualities have a powerful impact on every aspect of human culture. Time 
magazines selection of YouTube.com as the best invention of 2006 clearly 
demonstrates the shift from the values of the “Industrial Age” to those of the new 
“Information Age.” The success of Google610 or Facebook611 have demonstrated the 
economic potential of virtual “sites,” the power of new media and the significance 
of the various activated surfaces that display them. Moreover, virtual reality 
environments (like Second Life) or online multiplayer games have demonstrated the 
popularity of such alternative realities and their significance for the production of 
new economies.  
The so-called “information age” would not have been possible without 
advancements in screen technologies and techniques of image reproduction. From 
the earliest stages of lithography to the invention of photography, film, television 
and now the computer, the development of culture and civilisation has been linked 
to the ability to transfer knowledge using printed or activated surfaces. In recent 
times however, developments of technologies has been much more rapid: if 
progress from the earliest woodblock printing612 to photography613 took over sixteen 
                                                      
610 Google.com is an online search engine that generates almost all of its revenue through 
advertising related to Internet search, e-mail, online mapping, social networking, and video 
sharing services.  
611 Facebook.com is a free-access social networking website that currently has more than 175 
million active users worldwide. Like Google, Facebook generates revenue from advertising. 
See Facebook statistics http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics accessed 
January 17th 2009.  
612 Woodblock printing is a technique for printing text, images or patterns. It originated in 
China in antiquity as a method of printing on textiles and paper. As a method of printing on 
cloth, the earliest surviving examples from China date back to Han dynasty (before AD 220). 
See Wikipedia Encyclopaedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodblock_printing 
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centuries, the emergence of new media has been condensed to a few decades. This 
has not only encouraged greater visual production and re-production, but it has 
also led to increased interaction with images and the surfaces that produce them.614  
The speed and breadth of communication has had numerous consequences, 
which we continue to grapple with. Some of the more positive effects have been the 
promotion of exploration, tolerance and inclusion. The accessibility of information 
has led to a better understanding of distant cultures and other modes of thought, 
which in turn has encouraged nomadic movements across national, cultural and 
ideological borders. According to Charles Jencks, the postmodern condition has 
encouraged a taste for heterogeneity and promoted a new understanding of 
minority rights, leading to “’otherness’ as a desirable category.”615 The recent 
nomination of a black man as the president of the United States is a clear example of 
this development.  
Jencks argues that if the postmodern world is shifting towards “pluralism 
and cultural eclecticism” this shift is “mostly the by-product of communication and 
global capitalism.”616 This is because the world has been united by current 
technologies into “an instantaneous, twenty four hour information world, the post-
industrial successor to the modern world of industrialisation.”617 These 
developments do not indicate the absence of mass production, but rather its 
transformation into a more advanced stage of mass customization.618 In other words, 
if the pre-industrial era was characterized by the production of small volumes with 
high costs, and the industrial age afforded high volumes with low unit costs, the 
post-industrial age can be recognized by the production of diverse products in high 
volumes and low costs.619 Thus, the new capabilities offered by the computer and 
                                                                                                                                                        
613 In 1826, Nicéphore Niépce takes the first permanent photograph, a landscape that 
required an eight hour exposure. See Wikipedia Encyclopaedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_photography  
614 Touch-phones or interactive screens such as “Microsoft Surface” are indicative of the 
importance of virtual images for contemporary culture and the significance of surfaces in 
providing access to and interaction with such alternative realities.     
615 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going?  p. 117 
616 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going?  p. 96 
617 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going?  p. 96 
618 The concept was first conceived by Stand Davis and later developed by Joseph Pine. See 
Stan Davis, Future Perfect, 10th anniversary edition, Addison-Wesley Pub Co, Harlow, 
England, 1996 and Joseph Pine, Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition, 
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass., 1993. 
619 An example of this is Levi’s “Personal Pair” program for women’s jeans (1995). Personal 
pair customers participated in a fitting session at any of 56 Levi stores across North America. 
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other digital technologies facilitate mass customization, which achieves the benefits 
of mass production without falling victim to its standardization. Such processes are 
only befitting an interconnected world in which new technologies have not only 
allowed new forms of creativity, but they have also allowed individuals to 
communicate their individuality over (virtual and actual) boundaries.  
The combined effect of the aforementioned developments has been a 
blurring of traditional boundaries, not only between different professional 
disciplines, but also societal classes, ethnic groups, ideologies and so on. However, 
in this context of dissolution, fuzziness and blurring,620 architecture is still expected 
to create boundaries, since by definition it implies the demarcation of space. It is for 
this very paradoxical situation that theorists have attempted to offer alternative 
approaches to architecture’s boundaries, which could be institutional, theoretical 
and programmatic boundaries or physical boundaries (like the surface, façade, skin, 
shell, envelope and so on).  
Thus, whether programmatically or visually, contemporary architecture 
continues to respond to recent cultural and technological transformations by 
exploring boundary conditions, hyper-communication and new technologies in 
order to develop an architecture that is more sensitive and responsive to the 
increasing complexity of postmodern living.  
6.1.1 Thee Different Postmodern Approaches in Architecture  
Arguably, in much of the developed world, contemporary architecture is in its 
“postmodern” phase.  As elaborated in chapter three, the postmodern movement in 
architecture can be traced back to the early 1960s, where Venturi and others 
promoted a more holistic approach to architecture to combat the purist idealism of 
Modernism.621 Inspired by new technologies, and frustrated by the elitist doctrines 
of modernist manifestos, the postmodernists called for an architecture of 
communication, that promoted the “popular” and the “ordinary.”622  
                                                                                                                                                        
The results were transmitted electronically to the company factory where they were matched 
against more than 10,000 stored designs to select the best fit; the jeans then were produced 
individually from the selected pattern.  
620 See Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going?  p. 100 
621 See Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction, 1966 
622 See Venturi, and Scott Brown, and Izenour, Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten 
Symbolism of Architectural Form, 1977 
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Moreover, as a reaction to the modernists manifesto of “form follows 
function” and the depreciatory associations of ornament with crime, Venturi et al, 
(1977) proposed the “decorated shed” concept which was an attempt to liberate 
architectural expression from functional restrictions and simultaneously free 
structure from the burden of communication. This, they argued, would be a better 
alternative to “duck” architecture in which form follows, and often represents 
function.  
The decorated shed metaphor signalled a move from modernists’ 
conceptions of “cladding” and “style” to postmodernist notions of “screen” and 
“communication” in an attempt to allow architecture to participate freely in the 
visual flux of signs, billboards and screens that were quickly replacing the machinic 
structures of the industrial revolution. It was hoped that by returning to complex 
visual communication, and by acknowledging the importance of popular culture, 
the modernist desire for visual and conceptual clarity would transform into a desire 
for “complexity and contradiction.”623  
The postmodern manifesto allowed architects to engage popular culture 
whilst maintaining a relationship with their professional ethos. This was the effect 
of “double coding”624 facilitated partly by the decorated shed metaphor and partly 
by notions of irony as a complex form of communication. Consequently, much of 
postmodern architecture maintains a certain schizophrenic quality: at once 
acknowledging the intricacies of architectural theory and simultaneously trying to 
appeal to the demands of popular culture as presented through mass media.  
Over the years, architects have developed different interpretations of the 
postmodern agenda in architecture. However, Jencks identifies three general 
approaches that seem to encompass much of the architectural projects of recent 
decades.625 The first approach is characterized by architects who turned to stylistic 
historicism, which was applied to structures that rarely ventured beyond the shed 
                                                      
623 See Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction, 1966 
624 Charles Jencks writes: “Today I would still partly define Post-Modernism as I did in 1978 
as double coding: the combination of Modern techniques with something else (usually 
traditional building) in order for architecture to communicate with the public and a 
concerned minority, usually other architects.” Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-
modernism Going? p. 51 
625 For the three approaches to postmodernism, see Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-
modernism Going? pp. 57-60  
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concept.626 The second approach is based on theoretical criticality, expressed 
through double-coding and irony, where architectural communication attempts to 
acknowledge two opposing points of view. In many cases this second approach 
results in the construction of monuments to a critical commentary on architecture’s 
established ways, which is often only understood by a few architects, theoreticians 
or historicists who are familiar with the (double) coded language.627 The third 
approach is exemplified by architects who responded to Venturi’s embracing of 
popular culture, by designing “iconic” or “imagistic” buildings that communicated 
to a larger audience. Frank Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum (1997), Rem 
Koolhaas’s CCTV building in Beijing (2008) or Arata Isozaki’s Disney Headquarters 
in Florida (1991) are different examples of this third approach.  
Much of the projects that fall into this third approach to postmodern 
architecture are made possible by giant corporations hiring global architects to 
construct iconic buildings, both to represent their cause, but also to draw attention 
to it. Consequently, the criticism of such architecture picks up on the inflated 
monumentality and accuses the resultant building of approaching the condition of 
an “icon”: a visual one-liner that reduces architecture to a mere “image,” i.e. a 
superficial representation of something else.  
It is at this very juncture that this thesis attempts to open an unfashionably 
positive and polemical discussion relating to image and the architecture that 
exploits it. With reference to the current age of electronic reproduction, the thesis 
argues that the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum offers an alternative approach to the 
postmodern agenda, one that is closer to complexity than contradiction. In other words, 
Gehry’s building represents a supple and smooth architectural strategy that is 
thicker than the superficiality of pastiche, richer than the (cynical) irony of double-
coded semiotics, and phenomenally transparent in comparison to the literal 
transparency of other iconic buildings. It is argued that Gehry’s BGM manages to 
                                                      
626 Such reference to past styles is often referred to as “pastiche” and superficial, 
demonstrating a reductive simplicity of communication or a regurgitation of old motifs. 
Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia (1978) and Michael Graves’ Portland Public Service Building 
(1982) are examples of this. 
627 This approach threatens a return to the elitism of modernism and/or a reduction of 
architectural experience in favour of intellectual or textual delight. James Stirling’s addition 
to the Neue Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart, (1983) or Peter Eisenman’s “House VI”, (1975) are 
examples of this approach.  
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include multiple concepts without being irreducible to any, hinting towards a 
complex ambiguity that is more evocative than obscure.  
The BGM is not only successful in exploiting the potential of mass media to 
create the “Bilbao Effect,” but it also raises important questions about established 
attitudes towards appearance in architectural theory. This thesis argues that in 
many ways, Gehry’s museum demands a rethinking of the binary hierarchical 
relationship between ornament and structure – arguably the most influential 
oppositional pair for both modernist and postmodernist manifestos. Such 
architecture not only demands an alternative mode of thought, but it also 
anticipates future explorations in architectural design and construction.  
6.1.2 Frank Gehry: The Evolution of Projects 
The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum marks an important moment in Gehry’s long 
architectural career. Although the museum is the most popular of Gehry’s 
endeavours, it nonetheless follows a persistent design ethos that can be seen in his 
earlier buildings. This is not to say that this continuous design approach produces 
similar buildings, but rather that Gehry’s design strategy achieves consistency in 
maintaining flexibility, seeking diversity and exploring new techniques. This has 
not only allowed greater adaptability to a rapidly changing techno-cultural context, 
but more importantly, it has allowed Gehry to be able to reflect such developments 
in his architectural projects.  
Although Gehry often adopts a self-effacing style when asked about his 
own work, he is in fact one of the most prolific architects to date. Jencks calls him 
the “number two architect in the world (the first place being permanently 
unoccupied).”628 With over 250 projects to his name, Gehry has had the opportunity 
to develop his ideas in practice.629 The Studio-Residence for Lou Danziger, 
(Hollywood, California, 1964) for example, represents Gehry’s modernist phase, 
where he practiced restraint in geometry, materials and colour. His own house in 
Santa Monica (Gehry House, Santa Monica, California, 1978), anticipates the 
criticality of Deconstructivist architecture, while bordering on a literal destruction of 
                                                      
628 Charles Jencks “Frank O. Gehry: Creating Another Way” in Frank O. Gehry: Individual 
Imagination and Cultural Conservatism, Academy Editions, London, 1995, p. 6 
629 In his book entitled Frank O. Gehry: The Complete Works published in 1998, 255 projects 
were mentioned in the bibliography. See Francesco Dal Co, Frank O. Gehry, Kurt Walter 
Forster, Hadley Soutter Arnold, Frank O. Gehry: The Complete Works, Monacelli Press, New 
York, 1998 
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the original bungalow. In “trying to build a lot of ideas,”630 Gehry pierces the 
surfaces of the original house, constructs rotating glass covers and windows, and 
employs “gritty” materials like chain link fencing, unfinished plywood, corrugated 
metal and wire-mesh glass. Hal Foster celebrates “the unfinished look”631 which he 
considers appropriate to LA and its “restless transformations”632 arguing that it 
almost achieves what Kenneth Frampton calls “critical regionalism.”633 
If Gehry’s earlier work was inspired by the LA vernacular, the “urban 
junkyard”634 of disparate styles, his fame during the 1980s and 1990s allowed him to 
engage with the “myth and mystery of Hollywood.”635 Thus, as Gehry’s horizons 
expanded, he not only became aware of references outside of LA, but he also went 
“upscale in materials, techniques, clients and projects.”636 The Vitra museum (Weil 
am Rhein, Germany, 1989) is Gehry’s first white building,637 which clearly 
demonstrates his transformation from grunge architect to a more mature, 
formalistic phase. The building seems to take inspiration from Le Corbusier and his 
Chapel of Notre-Dame du Haut (Ronchamp, France, 1951-55) and perhaps even 
Frank Lloyd Wright and his Guggenheim Museum (New York, USA, 1959). 
Nevertheless, Gehry maintains an uneasy relationship with canonical architects, 
being simultaneously inspired and intimated by their work.638  
Following the successes of his first museum, there came a new phase and a 
new decade (1990s) characterized by more lavish projects such as Frederick 
Weisman Museum of Art (Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, 1993) and the Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum. Thus, Gehry’s stylistic transformations can be summarised  
                                                      
630 Frank Gehry, quoted in Peter Arnell and Ted Bickford, Frank Gehry: Buildings and Projects, 
Rizzoli International Publications, New York, 1985, p. 134 
631 Hal Foster, Design and Crime: and other Diatribes, Verso, 2003, p. 29 
632 Foster, Design and Crime: and other Diatribes, p. 29 
633 See Foster Design and Crime: and other Diatribes, p. 30 and Kenneth Frampton, “Towards a 
Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance” in Postmodern Culture, ed. 
Hal Foster, Pluto Press, London, 1983, pp. 16-30. 
634 Mildred S. Friedman, “The Reluctant Master” Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, Thames 
and Hudson, London, 2003, pp. 11-26, p. 12 
635 Friedman, “The Reluctant Master” in Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 13 
636 Foster, Design and Crime: and other Diatribes, p. 30 
637 Martin Filler “Veni, Vidi, Vitra: The International Architecture of Frank Gehry” in Vitra 
Design Museum, Thames and Hudson, London, 1990, pp. 10-23, p. 19 
638 In numerous conversations Gehry discusses how he used to be anti-Le Corbusier, or that 
Frank Lloyd Wright would not approve his own work. Not only do these statements 
highlight the influence of such architects on Gehry’s work, but they also illuminate Gehry’s 
attempt to grapple with the comparisons of his own work with his predecessors. See Gehry 
Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 41 and p. 140  
Chapter Six: Surficial Architecture: The Case of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum – The Postmodern 











Figure 6.1: Phase one: deconstructive juxtaposition. Gehry House, 









Figure 6.2: Phase two: formalistic composition. The Vitra Museum,  
Weil am Rhein, Germany, 1989.  












Figure 6.3: Phase three: surface exploration. The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum,  
Bilbao, Spain, 1997. Source: the author.  
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into three different phases: the early experimentation with LA vernacular, the 
imagistic phase inspired by Pop Art and early Postmodernism639 and finally 
the “gestural aesthetic” of his more recent projects.  
Hal Foster celebrates Gehry’s earlier work, condemns his Pop work and 
problematizes his later work. For Foster the difference lies between the renewal of 
exhausted architectural habits and imagistic ingratiation: 
What is at stake here is the difference between a vernacular use of chain 
link in a house, or of cardboard in a chair, and a Pop use of giant binoculars 
as an entrance, or of a fighter jet attached to a façade (as in his Aerospace 
Hall, 1982-84, in LA). Equally at stake is the difference between a material 
rethinking of form and space, which may or may not be sculptural (here 
Gehry is influenced by Richard Serra), and a symbolic use of readymade 
image or commodity object (here gain he is influenced by Oldenburg). The 
first option can bring elite design in touch with common culture, and 
renew stale architectural forms with fresh social expressions. The second 
tends to ingratiate architecture, on the model of the advertisement, to a 
public project as a mass consumer.640 
While Foster’s argument is persuasive, this thesis offers an alternative evaluation 
based on a proposition that Gehry’s seemingly unashamed appeal to the popular 
has in fact been beneficial for a rethinking of architecture’s “stale” traditions, 
whether in theory or in practice. The Pop symbolism of the giant binoculars of the 
Chiat/Day Building for example, is not only a more committed collaboration 
between architecture and art, but it is also a more rigorous questioning of 
architecture’s classical forms. According to Martin Filler “the acknowledgement of 
architecture as an art form” has been “one of the major preoccupations” of eighties’ 
postmodernism.641 But unlike his contemporaries who reduce artistic collaboration 
to superficial decoration, Gehry achieves a more non-hierarchical relationship in 
which both architecture and art undergo rigorous testing.  
The binoculars are one example within a long evolutionary process in 
which Gehry experiments with the becoming-other of architecture (becoming-image, 
becoming-art, becoming-sculpture, becoming-shell) while simultaneously refining 
his postmodernist agenda of redefining architecture’s relationship to popular media 
                                                      
639 Of which one can mention his Chiat/Day Building in LA, California, 1985-1991. The 
building has three different styles used in the main facade, particularly the giant sculpture of 
binoculars that function as both a car and pedestrian entrance. The conception of the 
binoculars was a collaboration between Gehry, Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen. 
640 Foster, Design and Crime: and other Diatribes, p. 32 
641 Filler “Veni, Vidi, Vitra: The International Architecture of Frank Gehry” in Vitra Design 
Museum, p. 10 
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and technologies of mass communication. Whether these architectural 
investigations qualify as what Foster calls “elite design” seems less important in 
relation to Gehry’s strategy, which through numerous explorations (whether 
successful or not) attempts to question the “function” of architecture. In many ways, 
Gehry’s different architectural follies (e.g. jet, binoculars, fish, horse’s head)642 
problematize the canonical primacy of spatial or structural concerns in architecture, 
which also dominate conceptions of image, appearance, visual communication, 
engagement with mass media and so on. As was discussed earlier, this hierarchical 
relationship that inspires the definition of architecture as “clothed structure” or 
“decorated shed,” continues to relegate matters of image and appearance to 
superficial subservience, even if in the current postmodern condition, such concepts 
are being rigorously promoted and therefore becoming an important feature of 
societal operation.  
The jet, binoculars, fish, or horse’s head represent a rebellious imagistic 
tendency that never disappears from Gehry’s work. But such experiments with the 
limits of architecture are what Deleuze calls “slits” in the umbrella of establishment 
that “let in a bit of free and windy chaos”643 to combat “the pre-existing, pre-
established clichés” and bring us the “vision.”644 Thus, despite differing styles, 
Gehry’s agenda in challenging architecture’s established ways remains the same.  
Gehry is like a chameleon, simulating different styles in order to create or 
engage with different realities. It can therefore be argued that his architecture is less 
imagistic and more simulative, in the Deleuzean definition,645 since it produces new 
(architectural) realities and spaces of peration. Much like a camouflaging animal, 
Gehry’s architecture requires “ambient” and “ambulatory vision,”646 not only to 
grasp the immanent difference that characterizes the simulacrum before the eyes,  
                                                      
642 Gehry’s imagistic, or perhaps imaginistic investigation of the becoming-other of 
architecture begins with the fighter jet of the Aerospace Hall (early 1980s) and undergoes 
different transformations through different projects: the binoculars of the Chiat/Day 
Building in LA, California, the Fish Dance restaurant in Kobe, Japan (late 1980s) the 
Barcelona Fish of the Olympic Village (early 1990s) or the “horses head” of the DZ Bank, 
Berlin, Germany in 2001. 
643 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 203 
644 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 204 
645 See section “5.1 From Transcendental Hierarchy to Univocity: Surface, Difference and the 
Reality of Appearance” in chapter five of this thesis. Also see Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the 
Simulacrum” in The Logic of Sense, pp. 253-266 
646 See section “4.2.3 Theory of Surface Layout” in chapter four of this thesis. See also Gibson, 
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, pp. 222-3  
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Figure 6.4: Binoculars: Chiat/Day Building, Venice, California, USA (1985-1991) 











Figure 6.5: The Fish: Sculpture for Olympic Village, Barcelona, 1992.  












Figure 6.6: The Horse’s Head: DZ Bank, Berlin, Germany, 2000.  
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/roryrory/2442892558  
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but also less metaphorically, to observe the complex, non-symmetrical arrangement 
of his buildings. Peter Arnell compares Gehry’s work with Cubism, which:  
...in questioning the presumption of fixed position from which one sees, it 
brought into question the very nature of perception, proposing the 
indisputable fact that the eye moves constantly, that perception is based on 
a composite of “takes” on an object garnered as one moves around it.”647 
Arguably, what Arnell and Bickford recognised in 1985 applies to the much of 
Gehry’s later work, including the BGM, which involves “an ongoing collaboration 
in which each viewer brings their own sensibilities and experiences,” into an 
unusual communication that is never “straight forward.”648 
6.2 THE BILBAO GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM 
The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum marks an important turning point in Gehry’s 
career, representing a refinement of his personal style to a distinct architectural 
“brand,” which has subsequently allowed him to achieve celebrity status, becoming 
a “starchitect.”649 Many have celebrated the building and its subsequent 
reformulations (the Experience Music Project in Seattle, 2000, or the Disney Concert 
Hall in Los Angeles, 2003) as sculptural works of a genius symbolizing freedom and 
democracy. 
The BGM is a modern and contemporary art museum situated alongside 
the Nervión River in Bilbao, Spain. Since its opening to the public in 1997 the 
museum has attracted much international attention, evidenced by the publication of 
books, newspaper and magazine articles, the creation of online websites and also in 
terms of tourist visitors to the city of Bilbao. By 2007, the museum attracted over 9 
million visitors, with an average of 800,000 non-Basque visitors a year, compared to 
                                                      
647 Arnell and Bickford, Frank Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XIII 
648 Arnell and Bickford, Frank Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XIII 
649 Since the Bilbao Gehry has appeared in Apple's black and white "Think Different" 
pictorial advertising campaign that associates offbeat but revered figures with Apple's 
design philosophy. He even once appeared as himself in the animated series The Simpsons 
where he parodies himself by suggesting that his ideas are derived by looking at a crumpled 
paper. He also voiced himself on the TV show Arthur, where he helped Arthur and his 
friends design a new treehouse. Gehry has also starred in a documentary film about himself 
in collaboration with film director Sydney Pollack (a friend of Gehry’s) entitled Sketches of 
Frank Gehry. In this documentary some of Gehry’s more prominent work is discussed with 
input from his friends, architectural theoreticians and critics, of which Hal Foster remains 
the more consistent skeptic about Gehry’s work. See Sydney Pollack’s film entitled The 
Sketches of Frank Gehry, Sony Pictures Classics, 2005.  
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less than 100,000 before the opening of the museum.650 It is therefore not surprising 
that the public authorities that invested in the Guggenheim recovered their 
investment “within the first six years of the museum’s operation!”651 According to 
Beatriz Plaza (Economic Professor at the University of Basque Country, Bilbao) “the 
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao was a very risky project, but it is on the right track to 
being worth the huge risk and investment.”652  
The museum has been accredited to “putting Bilbao on the map” and 
despite its formal complexity, it was built on time and on budget.653 Moreover, the 
building has catalysed further development for the city, attracting architectural 
projects by some of the most renowned architects in the world: Norman Foster, 
Arata Isozaki, Zaha Hadid, and Santiago Calatrava. 654 Thus, the BGM has become a 
cultural and socio-political icon generating much needed publicity for Bilbao and 
the Basque region, and bringing unprecedented success and fame for the architect 
too.655  
The BGM can be summarised as a series of folded surfaces based around 
the broken ship concept inspired by Bilbao’s former ship-building industry. The 
building’s flowing form offer a welcome relief from the rectilinear forms of the post-
industrial city, generating a shimmering visual expression of fluidity and movement  
                                                      
650 Despite attempts to emulate such success elsewhere, very few museums or galleries 
outside capital cities have managed to achieve BGM’s popularity. For example, the National 
Centre for Popular Music in Sheffield, England, opened in 1999, predicted 400,000 visitors a 
year. However, only seven months after its opening, just over 100,000 people visited. The 
museum was doomed to bankruptcy in the same year it opened. See Beatriz Plaza, “The 
Bilbao Effect (Guggenheim Museum Bilbao) in Museum News, vol. 86, No. 5, Sep. 2007, p. 13. 
Also available at http://www.scholars-on-
bilbao.info/fichas/MUSEUM_NEWS_The_Bilbao_Effect.pdf 
651 Plaza, “The Bilbao Effect (Guggenheim Museum Bilbao)” in Museum News, vol. 86, No. 5, 
Sep. 2007, p. 13 
652 Plaza, “The Bilbao Effect (Guggenheim Museum Bilbao)” in Museum News, p. 13 
653 In an interview with Harvard Magazine, Gehry explains how he did this. First he made 
sure that “the organization of the artist” was maintained during construction to prevent 
business or political agendas from interfering from the original vision. Second, he made sure 
that careful and detailed cost projections were carried out before construction. Finally, he 
used the computer software CATIA in close collaboration with individual building trades to 
control costs during construction. See Bent Flyvbjerg “Design by Deception: The Politics of 
Megaproject Approval,” Harvard Design Magazine, no. 22, Spring/Summer 2005, pp. 50-59. 
654 See Bilbao Metro by Norman Foster, 1990-1995, Isozaki Atea, or Isozaki Towers, 1999, 
Zaha Hadid’s Zorrozaurre master plan for a 60-hectare peninsula in the Nervión river in the 
former port area of Bilbao, Spain, 2004,and Santiago Calatrava’s Zubizuri (White Bridge) 
which is a foot-bridge across the Nervión river in Bilbao. 
655 The building can be seen in the opening sequence of the 1999 James Bond film The World 
is Not Enough, directed by Michael Apted (distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer), 1999.  




































Figure 6.7: The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. Source: the author. 



























Figure 6.8: Elevation drawings of the BGM. Source: Yukio Futagawa, 
Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa, Frank O. Gehry, GA Document, vol. 54, ADA Edita, 
Tokyo, 1998, p. 17 
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which can also be associated with the waves of the river or the Atlantic coast 
beyond. Like “an object from outer space” that landed a century ago, the museum is 
an alluring alien object that has become an inseparable part of its context.656 
At the time of its conception, the museum represented a successful 
hybridisation of traditional and modern technologies and processes of design and 
construction. In order to transfer the complex curves from architectural models to 
architectural reality, Gehry and his team had to learn from the aerospace industry. 
Since in the early 1990s most architectural modelling software were purely for 
visualisation purposes, CATIA657 was utilised in order to precisely map out and 
formulate the museum’s complex forms. The surface-driven modelling software, 
together with new construction technologies allowed Gehry and his team to 
construct the complex non-Euclidean geometries of the building on time and on 
budget. 
Although the sculptural forms of the exterior are its most well known 
features, the BGM is also notable for its unusual interior. The main entrance to the 
museum involves a large central atrium where a series of bridges, elevators and 
stair towers connects the exhibition galleries on three different levels. The gallery 
spaces are adaptable to a wide range of art and are a response to the Guggenheim 
Foundation’s requirement for spaces to exhibit a permanent collection, a temporary 
collection, and a collection of selected living artists.658 The galleries for the exhibition 
of the permanent collection are rectilinear spaces and relatively familiar in design.659 
The temporary collection is housed in the largest space of the museum, which 
                                                      
656 This image of thought is taken from Juan Ignacio Vidarte (director of the BGM) who in the 
documentary Sketches of Frank Gehry, quotes a British journalist: “I think it was a British 
Journalist... he said that this [the BGM] looks like as it was an object from outer space which 
had landed here a century ago, so it is foreign in the sense that it has nothing to do with any 
of the buildings which are around,  but at the same time there is a certain; there is a quality 
of it which makes it belong to its place, ...I mean you take this out from here and no one 
would understand the city now.” See Sketches of Frank Gehry, directed by Sydney Pollack, 
Sony Pictures Classics, 2005.  
657 Computer Aided Three Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) is a modelling 
software developed by the French company Dassault Systemes that was used for the 
modelling and construction of Mirage Fighters. It is particularly good for modelling complex 
surface structures. 
658 According to Thomas Krens himself: “The idea was that the museum had to be able to 
accommodate the biggest and the heaviest of any existing contemporary sculpture on the 
one hand, and a Picasso drawing on the other hand.” See Coosje Van Bruggen, “Towards a 
Unity of Opposites: A Mere Building Versus Sculptural Architecture” in Frank O. Gehry, 
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, New York, 1997, pp. 95-134, P. 115 
659 There are a total of six galleries devoted to the permanent collection, which are stacked in 
two sets of three square galleries on the second and third levels of the museum.  
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extends to the east. This space passes under the Puente de la Salve Bridge, 
terminating in the tower on its far side.660 Since the interior of this space is column-
free, it allows for large-scale art installations to be exhibited comfortably. The 
exhibition of the work of selected living artists is housed in a series of eleven 
distinct galleries, each with its own unique spatial qualities.  
The dramatic central atrium is the space from which the circulation to the 
galleries originates and to which it returns. Though Gehry had intended to adopt a 
more conservative approach towards the interior, Thomas Krens and others 
persuaded him to make a more expressive contribution. Coosje van Bruggen writes: 
 In a discussion with the conceptual artist Daniel Buren Gehry stated: “My 
typical stance has been that the museum should be laid-back and a simple 
box, in which the artist can come and do anything,” expecting that, because 
he was deferential to the arts, he would be approved of as  “a nice, polite 
architect.” To Gehry’s surprise, Buren reacted differently. “In case you 
involve yourself in such a thing one day...make the best building you can 
do. I think to try to make simple, neutral space would be the worst way. 
For what?”661 
According to van Bruggen Gehry had suggested that the atrium space should allow 
the visitors to experience “the informality of a crowded, rough-textured sculptor’s 
studio” which Gehry perceived as a prototype for urbanistic design:  
[Gehry] perceives such an organically evolved environment of ideal forms 
in chance relationships as a prototype for urbanistic design: “[Brancusi’s 
studio] looked like a whole city...the idealistic city, though I don’t think he 
intended that.”662 
Whilst it can be argued that the BGM provided Gehry with a stylistic “formula” that 
he has been mostly unable to escape from, the design, construction and “effects” of 
BGM continue to have important implications for our conception of superficiality, 
authenticity and architectural creativity in late-capitalistic societies. Gehry’s  
                                                      
660 Gehry had contemplated designing the tower as an open mesh form like the Barcelona 
fish; a glass tower; a combination of a limestone-and-metal with a restaurant and terrace at 
the top, but Thomas Krens rejected these ideas. Gehry offered to put a gallery space in it, but 
that was also turned down. Finally, a breakthrough came in fall 1994, when the tower 
became an autonomic sculptural element. See Van Bruggen, “Towards a Unity of Opposites: 
A Mere Building Versus Sculptural Architecture,” p. 121.  
 
661 Van Bruggen, “Towards a Unity of Opposites: A Mere Building Versus Sculptural 
Architecture” in Frank O. Gehry, Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, pp. 95-134, P. 115 
662 See Van Bruggen, “Towards a Unity of Opposites: A Mere Building Versus Sculptural 
Architecture,” p. 121 





















Figure 6.9: The central atrium, Constantin Brancusi’s Paris Studio, and interior 
views of BGM’s galleries. For the design of interior spaces, Gehry seemed to 
have been inspired by a sculptor’s studio where one can come across a variety 
of unexpected forms, materials and spatial relationships.  Sources (clockwise): 
Joshua White, Frank O. Gehry, Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, New York, 1997, 120-
1, and Yukio Futagawa, Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa, Frank O. Gehry, GA 
Document 54, p. 78 & 73. 























Figure 6.10: First and second level plans of Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. 
Source: Yukio Futagawa, Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa, Frank O. Gehry, GA 
Document, vol. 54, ADA Edita, Tokyo, 1998, p. 40 






















Figure 6.11: Third and fourth level plans of Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. 
Source: Yukio Futagawa, Guggenheim Bilbao Museoa, Frank O. Gehry, GA 
Document, vol. 54, ADA Edita, Tokyo, 1998, p. 41 
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building is a smooth mixture of different ideas accumulated over a long period of 
architectural experimentation. Its ambiguous complexity opens up questions about 
transdisciplinary collaboration, the notion of surface and its effects in architectural 
production and the importance of architectural imagery in an age of technological 
re-production and communication. This thesis argues that it is precisely this 
conceptual smoothness, simulative complexity and non-hierarchical (surficial) 
enfolding of architectural categories that makes the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum so 
popular and simultaneously so problematic for critics and commentators.   
6.2.1 Phenomenal Exteriority: an Architecture of Surface and Skin 
For some theorists like Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe, what makes the building “look good 
contributes to its unpopularity” and the “controversy that surrounds his work.”663 
The building’s preoccupation with flowing curves, shimmering surfaces and 
spectacular imagery is more modernist than postmodern since it is concerned with 
the ornamental and the visually beautiful, rather than the postmodern 
preoccupation with ironic, double-coded subversion.664 At the same time, the 
museum expresses a self-assertive liveliness that can be attributed to the modernist 
ambitions of a radical break from the visual traditions of architecture.  
In fact, Gehry admits of being “a strict modernist in the sense of believing 
in purity, that you shouldn’t decorate.”665 However, this statement is complicated by 
being supplemented it with another: “And yet buildings need decoration, ...they 
need human scale, ... they can’t just be faceless things. That’s how some modernism 
failed.”666 The BGM demonstrates an inclusive approach to concepts (modernist or 
postmodernist), that are dissolved together in a smooth mixture. In his early 
projects, (like the Gehry House) the different ideas are clearly demarcated, because 
they have not undergone a process of dissolution. The boundaries of difference are 
                                                      
663 See Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe “Frank Gehry is not Andy Warhol: A Choice between Life and 
Death” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, ed. Ana María Guasch, Joseba Zulaika, 
University of Nevada Press, 2005, p. 223 
664 Gilbert-Rolfe writes: “Not only is it pretty, but it’s modernist, rather than postmodern, in 
the sense in which those terms are used in the discourses surrounding the visual arts, while 
at the same time it is of course quite unmodnerist in every crucial respect except for its 
preoccupation with visual effect self-assertive liveliness – which incidentally illustrates the 
bankruptcy of the way those terms are used. I see Gehry’s work as caught inevitably but 
unfortunately in arguments to which it has a more subtle relationship than is perhaps 
normally described, but that are in any case not resolvable.”  See  “Frank Gehry is not Andy 
Warhol: A Choice between Life and Death” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 223 
665 Frank Gehry, “Commentaries” in Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 47 
666 Frank Gehry, “Commentaries” in Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, pp. 47-8 
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clear: one knows where and how Gehry has intervened with the “old dumb house.” 
In his later work however, difference begins to dissolve into a smooth liquidity, 
which brings both success and controversy. Therefore, the Bilbao Guggenheim 
Museum displays a more “subtle relationship” to a wider range of concepts that it 
absorbs within itself.  
The titanium skin of the BGM is comparable to the white walls of the 
International Style, in that it generates an image of a modern, contemporary style. 
Just as the colour white evoked images of purity, clarity and transparency, titanium 
conjures associations with the aerospace industry, with lightness and endurance of 
new technology. However, Gehry’s use of titanium in the Bilbao Guggenheim 
Museum cannot be reduced to modernism. In the BGM the modernist sensibility 
evolves. If the white of the International Style was representative of ornamental 
purity, it was also an exposure of architecture’s primary elements: the wall, the 
structure, “the machine for living in.”667 Put in another way, the white paint was a 
tight swimsuit, exposing the contours of the architectural body. The titanium skin of 
the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum however, is not a tight suit. It is positively 
different.  
Hal Foster compares the museum with the Statue of Liberty arguing that 
“for all the apparent futurism of CATIA designs” the BGM is a comprised of a 
“separate skin hung over a hidden armature.”668 This is seen as a “regressive” 
arrangement since “Gehry allows his skin to dominate his structure.“669 At first, 
Foster’s evaluation is convincing, remaining faithful to architecture’s established 
categories and the hierarchies that govern them. In other words, following the 
modernists’ conception of architecture as clothed structure, or the postmodernists’ 
decorated structure, Foster’s argument implies that the BGM is skinned structure. 
This model suggests a seemingly instinctive hierarchical order based on 
constructional sequence: since structure and structural concepts come first, they 
cannot be dominated by skin, surface or other superficial categories. This is the 
traditional hierarchical logic that persists in much of architectural theory, relegating 
surface, image and appearance to a subservient secondariness. It is also the very 
                                                      
667 Le Corbusier, Vers une architecture, translated as Towards a New Architecture, trans. 
Frederick Etchells, The Architectural Press, London, 1987, p. 100 
668 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 37 
669 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 37 
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reason why later in his essay, Foster has to defend his argument: “Mine is not a plea 
for a modernist transparency of structure.”670  
However, this thesis argues that the formal logic of Gehry’s architecture is 
not in the tectonic relationship between “skin” and “armature,” but instead in the 
surficial relationship between skins and folded surfaces that generate a variety of 
internal, external and virtual spaces of operation. It is therefore significant that after 
sketching some preliminary thoughts on paper, Gehry continued to model the 
building with paper, a thin and pliable material that inspires the surfaces of the 
finished museum. Computer technology also had an important part to play, as it 
facilitated the accurate modelling and construction of the complex surfaces of the 
design.  
 
       
Figure 6.12: Left: unfolding the skins of an onion. Right: an image of Gehry’s 
model parts. Just like the onion, the BGM is an architecture of skin. Source: the 
author + Joshua White, Frank O. Gehry, Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 
Guggenheim Publications, NY, 1997, p. 94. 
If Jørn Utzon’s Sydney Opera House was inspired by the peeling of an orange, it is 
possible to say that Gehry’s Bilbao Guggenheim Museum implies the unfolding of 
an onion. In the first analogy, skin covers body as something radically different. In 
the second analogy however, body is composed of layer upon layer of skin. 
Therefore, rather than hiding a primary body or structure, the titanium skin is in 
fact another manifestation of the same generative surface that creates the internal 
facades. In Gehry’s design process, it is the skin or the thick surface that evolves, from 
its beginnings as paper to its virtualisation in the computer and finally to its 
                                                      
670 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 38 
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construction in different materials. Here is a process that appreciates the logic of 
surfaces and their effects. By trusting paper and its transformation through different 
media (including the computer), Gehry creates a consistent architectural process 
that includes new digital technologies. It is therefore not surprising that Thomas 
Krens declares that Gehry has “a greater faith in process than any other architect,”671 
a design process which Antonino Saggio calls “Skin in.”672  
If the BGM’s design logic problematizes the relationship between skin and 
structure, it is because it doesn’t define skin according to the order of construction, 
i.e. the logic of structure. In this sense, Gehry’s work invokes Gottfried Semper’s 
theories, which defined the pliable surface as the site of architectural creativity, 
incorporating a “festive spirit” which was expressive of individual creativity, 
cultural identity or religious ideology.  
In Gehry’s BGM, the skin actualises architecture. It is not an inert layer 
whose function is simply the shielding of the interior from the exterior, but a 
complex architectural element with latent forces that create significant effects. This 
would be a conception of skin that is not in opposition to flesh and bones, nor is it a 
detachable layer secondary to the architectural body. After all, what is a body 
without a skin? Can a skin-less body still be defined as one? What is architecture 
without surfaces or their effects? Can it still be defined as architecture? 
This thesis argues that the BGM is constituted by one generative element: 
the folding skin that simulates a diversity of experiences. In such architecture 
everything follows the logic of surface where exteriority folds and unfolds to simulate 
interiority. Thus, the building operates like a Möbius strip, in which “exterior” or 
“interior,” “skin” and “structure” are continuations of the same generative surface. 
This is not say that the titanium skin continues on the inside or that one does not 
know when one enters the building. That would be a literal translation of the 
Möbius strip concept. Instead, the BGM offers phenomenal exteriority by continuing 
the logic of the generative surface to the interior facades of the building. Thus, in 
                                                      
671 Quoted in Bruce Lindsey, Digital Gehry: Material Resistance/Digital Construction, 
Birkhäuser, Basel, Boston, 2001, p. 42 
672 Antonino Saggio “Flying Carpets” preface to Digital Gehry: Material Resistance/Digital 
Construction, pp. 5-9, p.8 
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Jeremy Gilbert-Rolf’s words, Gehry’s architecture offers “the outside of the inside 
and the final outside provided by the skin.”673 
Gehry’s museum demands surficial thought since it is not based on a 
relationship between skin that covers the structure. The titanium layer cannot be 
reduced to a detachable skin-suit draped over the structure, because it forms the 
building’s plane of immanence. Without it, the building becomes a skinned body that is 
“less a body even than a skeleton, which we find it easier to re-clothe in flesh (there 
are plenty of dancing skeletons in story and ritual, but very few skinned bodies).”674  
Thus, the titanium skin is not “hung over” the body of architecture (as 
Foster describes it), rather it is the body of architecture. Without it, the Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum would cease to be. This is not a verbal dispute but a 
significant difference between two models of thought and two different approaches 
to architecture. Foster’s argument relies on traditional transcendental hierarchy, 
determined to go beyond surfaces and appearances. The alternative approach 
proposed here is based on a non-hierarchical model of immanence that explores 
surfaces and appearances. From this alternative theoretical point of view, removing 
the titanium skin would be removing the building’s architectural body, “the face of 
its bodiliness.”675  
Gehry draws surfaces, models surfaces, and constructs surfaces. In such 
architecture, surface is the Deleuzean fold that describes the prior connectedness of 
form and function. There is no hierarchy, only difference within continuous exteriority. 
In such architecture, the folding surface creates “inside” and “outside”676 since it 
operates like the Deleuzean façade (or the monadic body) opening “from the 
                                                      
673 Gilbert-Rolfe, Jeremy, “Frank Gehry is Not Andy Warhol: A Choice between Life and 
Death” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, University of Nevada Press, 2005, p. 228 
674 Steven Connor, The Book of Skin, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003, p. 29 
675 Connor, The Book of Skin, p. 29 
676 Skin gives the body surface; it surfaces the body. As the surfacer of the body, it lacks 
definitive boundaries, flowing continuously from the exposed areas of the body to its 
internal cavities. In other words, skin is not a bag with holes, but a continuous topology, 
much like a Klein Bottle.  In Ellen Lupton’s words “Where does the lip end and the mouth 
begin? Is a navel an “outie” or an “innie”? The ambiguous transition between inside and out 
is as plain as the nose on your face: skin is continuous over and into the nose, differentiating 
into nose-specific cells at some dark inner point (a transition almost more anatomical than 
biological).” Ellen Lupton, Skin: Surface, Substance + Design, Princeton Architectural Press, 
New York, 2002, p. 45 
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outside ... onto the outside.”677 In this sense, familiar categories occur upon the same 
surficial plane of immanence.  
Foster’s criticism however, maintains a traditional transcendental 
approach, arguing that structure is “hidden” and that exterior surfaces “rarely 
match up with interior spaces.”678 This thesis argues that in the BGM there is no 
interiority in the traditional sense of the word, i.e. a hidden space in contrasts to 
apparent exteriority. The exterior and the interior need not match each other, since 
each is a plane of exteriority operating according to its own immanent rules.  
Moreover, external appearance is not made secondary in relation to interior 
space or structure. This theory can be supported by the fact that Richard Serra, 
whose monumental works of sheet metal are usually set within the landscape, 
brings his sculpture “inside” the museum. This is not just a consequence of large 
“internal” spaces, but also the effect of the building’s implied continuity from 
“outside” to “inside.” The BGM’s surfaces do not hide, nor are they concerned with 
privacy. The spaces they create are those of performance and expression, creating an 
architecture of “an outside without an inside.”679 This architecture of facades, 
appearances and imagistic expressions is perhaps appropriate for public buildings 
of this kind that are often required to promote not just visual art but also the 
aspiration of a particular society.680 This equivocal exteriority without interiority is 
also the very reason why Foster complains of disorientation.681 
Yet, it must be clarified that the proposed argument here is not that the 
BGM is literally made of one continuous surface. If this were the case, the titanium 
exterior would seamlessly continue inside and the visitors would be able to enter 
the building without noticing a threshold or a boundary. Instead, the thesis argues 
                                                      
677 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 28 
678 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 37 
679 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 28 
680 A precedent for such architecture is Jørn Utzon’s Sydney Opera House, in Sydney, 
Australia, 1973. In 2003 Utzon received the Pritzker Prize, architecture's highest honour, 
with this citation: “There is no doubt that the Sydney Opera House is ... one of the great 
iconic buildings of the 20th century, an image of great beauty that has become known 
throughout the world – a symbol for not only a city, but a whole country and continent.” See 
Sydney Opera House 2008 Corporate Media Release 
http://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/08CorporateMediaRelease_JornUtzon.aspx accessed 
on 20 Feb. 2009.  
681 “The disconnection between skin and structure ... can lead to spaces that are not 
surprising (as in the early houses) so much as mystifying (as in Bilbao or Seattle) – a strained 
disorientation that is frequently mistaken for Architectural Sublime.” Foster, Design and 
Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 38 
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that the BGM represents a particular architectural approach based on surface-surface 
relationships rather than surface/depth opposition. This suggests a different model of 
thought in which exaggerating difference based on transcendental hierarchy is 









Figure 6.13: The role of surface in different architectural models of thought.  
Source: the author.  
The BGM expresses a surficial movement of thought in a phenomenally transparent 
manner, the final construction being a mixture of different ideas with different 
degrees of resolution. For example, the main entrance to the galleries is through a 
set of familiar doors that clearly defines the separation of inside from outside. Yet, 
the entrance is lowered down and the door frames blend in with the structural grid, 
thus giving minimal expression to penetration of surfaces. Inside, the white surfaces 
of the galleries contrast with the reflective surfaces of the exterior, but the flowing 
forms and the monumental scale continue to express the ambitions of the exterior, 
which culminate in the gallery devoted to Richard Serra’s sculptures. (See figure 
6.15) Thus, if white walls are an attempt to provide a neutral space for artwork, the 
flying buttresses and the smooth surfaces of the largest gallery positively compete 
with Serra’s sculptures. 
The BGM evokes different images of thought, from the scales of the fish to the 
waves of the sea, or the fuselages of the aerospace industry. The building display a 
surficial logic in which architectural expression is found upon the surface as it flows 
from one material to the next, from one virtual image to another. In this architecture 
of surface, structure is neither hidden nor exposed. It is rather a case of 
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Figure 6.14: The BGM’s glazed surfaces are not holes in the wall in that they are 
not there to reveal the interior. Instead, they represent a different material 
expression of the same architectural surface. Following the same logic, the 
entrance receives minimal expression disguising the inevitable penetration of 










Figure 6.15: Views of the largest gallery space. Gehry’s interior facades 
complement and compete with the artwork. They are a continuation of the 
same performative logic that governs exterior facades. This is why Richard 
Serra’s sculptures (that are often displayed outside) do not seem out of place. 
Source: the author.  
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phenomenal becoming where surface becomes “structure.” The glazed facade of the 
entrance lobby is a clear example, where structural elements and sheets of glass 
follow a folded contour similar to that of the titanium skin. The resultant mesh-like 
structure is reminiscent of CATIA wireframe models of the building’s surfaces prior 
to their actualisation in different materials. Thus, the glazed entrance lobby is not an 
exposure of structure or internal space. It is rather another expression of the same 
generative surface. 
In the BGM surface is not treated as a visual barrier that separates, but 
rather a topological space of operation. Such a conception demands a surficial 
movement of thought that does not penetrate surfaces and appearances in order to 
uncover the original or the originary, but instead, explores surface effects in search 
of immanent difference. The titanium surfaces of the BGM assume a significant 
thickness that distinguishes them from the white coat of paint proposed by the 
International Style. They suggest an architecture in which the visual layer that is not 
applied to a pre-existing structure and therefore it is not considered secondary to a 
primary category. Instead, the BGM suggests a fundamentally different approach 
where minoritarian categories such as “skin,” “surface,” “image” and “appearance” 
constitute an architecture of exteriority, which is not literal exteriority (like Serra’s 
sculptures), but rather phenomenal exteriority. In this way, the BGM fully exploits the 
concept of pli (fold), which according to Andrew Ballantyne “is in action in such 
words as imply, implicit, multiply, duplicate, replicate ... [as] they are all ‘folding’ 
words.”682 
6.2.2 Smooth Surfaces and Slippery Images  
Being an “enigmatic signifier,” the BGM is difficult to pin down; it has a fluid 
expression that is inclusive of many implicit metaphors. Imagistically, the museum 
has been compared to a fish, a mermaid, a boat, a bouquet of flowers, a duck (a 
swan with its head in its wings),683 or even Marilyn Monroe.684 The building’s 
shimmering surfaces imply an amorphous movement like the waves of the sea. The 
                                                      
682 Andrew Ballantyne, Deleuze and Guattari for Architects, Thinkers for Architects, ed. Adam 
Sharr, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 92 
683 See Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where Post-modernism Going? p. 67 
684 In an article in The New York Sunday Times Magazine, critic Herbert Muschamp 
compared the Bilbao Guggenheim to Marilyn Monroe. See The New York Times Magazine, 
September 7, 1997, pp. 54-59, 72, 82, or The New York Times, September 7, New York 
Edition, section 6, p. 54 



























Figure 6.16: The BGM as “enigmatic signifier.” Source: Charles Jencks, Critical 
Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 67  
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metallic shape echoes Bilbao’s former ship-building industry and the shells of the 
boats in the harbour, while the careful arrangement of titanium panels evokes the 
scales of the fish, or the glimmering surface of the sea under the sun. The question 
whether all these connotations are intentional, intuitional or accidental, is in many 
ways part of the BGM’s popular appeal. 
Gehry has had a fascination with water and the fish, so much so that the 
latter has become his personal totem.685 When asked about the significance of the 
fish, his response is multi-faceted making the slippery emblem even more difficult 
to grasp.686 Sometimes the fish is described as a sign of frustration with postmodern 
pastiche,687 while in other cases Gehry describes it as a consequence of subversive 
participation in the postmodern game:  
Why did I draw the fish in the first place? I did it because of the 
postmodern game. I said, “Okay, if you’re going to go back, fish are three 
hundred thousand years before man, so why don’t you go back to fish? ... I 
looked at fish in ponds – the sense of movement fascinated me. The Greeks 
did it, and Rodin did it.688  
However, “The fish is more complicated than that”689 and “there are other 
factors.”690 The first incarnations of the fish can be traced back to sketches submitted 
to the “Chicago Tribune Competition Revisited,”691 the project for the Smith House 
(1981)692 and later to “Connections,” a collaborative project with Richard Serra.693 In 
                                                      
685 Gehry has constructed lamps, jewellery, sculptures, and even buildings based on the fish 
motif. See Gehry’s “Fish Lamps” (1984), “Standing Glass Fish” (1986), the Kobe “Fishdance” 
Restaurant (1987) and “Frank Gehry Jewellery Collection” in collaboration with Tiffany & 
Co. (2006). 
686 In an interview with Peter Arnell, dated 24th February 1984, Gehry explains: “I can tell you 
how the fish came about, I can trace the steps, and you can read into it whatever you want.” 
Frank Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in 
Frank Gehry: Buildings and Projects, ed. Peter Arnell and Ted Bickford, Rizzoli, New York, 
1985, p. XVI 
687 “I was so furious that people were drawing Greek temples, regurgitating the past, 
abandoning the present...” Frank Gehry, as quoted in “Call That a Fish Frank?’ by Janet 
Abrams, Blueprint, September 1988, p.54 
688 Gehry, “Commentaries” in Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 47 
689 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVI 
690 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVII 
691 The 1980 Chicago Tribune Competition Revisited, was a re-run of a 1922 competition for 
the design of the company’s headquarters. Gehry’s design was a solid concrete 
metamorphosing into an eagle at the top.  
692 For this proposal, Gehry designed an entrance colonnade made of sculptures of animal 
forms. In the colonnade, the eagle reappeared adjacent to an upright fish.  
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the first project, Gehry explains, he wanted to sketch an eagle to represent the 
“power of the press in America”694 but he “began thinking about the fish” and 
“realized how beautiful it was.”695 As power was replaced with beauty, the fish for 





Figure 6.17: Between Frank Gehry (left) and Richard Serra (right). Sketch for a 
bridge design for “Connections” at the Architectural League of New York, 1981. 
Source: Frank O. Gehry Associates, printed in Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 
Guggenheim Museum Publications, New York, 1997, p. 43 
Gehry links the fish to his childhood memories, playing with the carp that his 
grandmother bought from the market. In many ways, the fish represents Gehry’s 
own slippery persona that takes inspiration from the amorphous fluidity of its 
aquatic world. Gehry explains: 
If you believe in astrology, since I was born February 28th that makes me a 
Pisces. If there’s anything in that then that’s – the fish is – I don’t really 
believe in that, but ... I’m a good swimmer too. My favourite sport is 
swimming. I’m a sailor, I’m a water person.”697  
Pisces in astrology is associated with pliability of character, intuition, sensitivity, 
illusion and dreams.698 Whether influenced by such descriptions or not, Gehry 
                                                                                                                                                        
693 In this 1981 competition, Gehry’s giant fish together with Serra’s steel pylon held up the 
Manhattan suspension bridge. See figure 6.11 
694 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVI 
695 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVII 
696 Gehry writes: “The fish evolved further: I kept drawing it and sketching it and it started 
to become for me like a symbol for a certain kind of perfection that I couldn’t achieve with 
my buildings. Eventually whenever I’d draw something and I couldn’t finish the design, I’d 
draw the fish as a notation.... For me it’s a symbol of perfection.”” Gehry, “No, I’m an 
Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank Gehry: Buildings and 
Projects, p. XVII 
697 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVII 
698 “Pisces: February 19 - March 20. Pisces is the twelfth Sign of the Zodiac, and it is also the 
final Sign in the Zodiacal cycle ... Many people associate Pisceans with dreams and secrets... 
Pisceans are fluid and easy-going, in keeping with the Mutable Quality assigned to this Sign 
... Pisceans alternate between reality and non-reality in keeping with their introspective 
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nonetheless characterizes himself as a “fish person” or “water person,” and 
expresses an enigmatic malleability that is not only evident in his architecture, but 
also affects his design process.699 According to Olivier Boissière, “The fish is used for 
what it is: a reservoir of extended and compact forms, of texture and iridescent 
colours.”700 However, it is safe to say that the fish is also part of an intuitive 
expression, a Deleuzean “desiring machine”701 that relies on primitive “zoomorphic 
yearnings.”702 As such, the fish expresses movement and flow, but it also evokes an 
evasive slipperiness that wriggles out of any predetermined definition. In many 
ways, the fish is Gehry’s “Body without Organs,” a virtual body characterized by an 
“extraordinary fluidity” that introduces a strategy of shifting “from one code to the 
other.”703 Although interpretative categories attach themselves to the body without 
organs, “the latter continues nonetheless to be without organs and does not become 
an organism in the ordinary sense of the word. It remains fluid and slippery.”704  
The evasiveness of Gehry’s architecture evokes the “trickster” in 
mythology.705 According to Lewis Hyde, tricksters are “the lords of in-between,” the 
“boundary-crosser” who also “creates a boundary, or brings to the surface a 
distinction previously hidden from sight.”706 For Hyde “the best way to describe 
trickster is to say simply that the boundary is where he will be found – sometimes 
drawing the line, sometimes crossing it, sometimes erasing or moving it, but always 
there, the god of the threshold in all its forms.”707In mythology, the trickster is a 
                                                                                                                                                        
natures; their voyage between consciousness and an unconscious dream state says much 
about their intuitive, almost psychic natures. ... The Fish are happy to be considered hazy, 
since there's a certain sense of safety in that self-proclaimed netherworld.” See 
http://www.astrology.com/allaboutyou/sunsigns/pisces.html accessed 20 Jan. 2009. 
699 Gehry attributes many of his architectural ideas to his clients. For example for the BGM, 
he argues that the decision to have two gallery types, (one for living artists and the other for 
dead artists) was Thomas Kren’s idea. See Frank Gehry, Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 
143 
700 Olivier Boissière, “Manufacturing the Sublime” in Frank Gehry Vitra Design Museum, ed. 
Martin Filler, Olivier Boissière, Thames and Hudson, London, 1990, pp. 24-34, p. 31 
701 See section “5.3.2 From Lack to Act: “Desiring Machines” and Smooth Processes of 
Production” in chapter five of this thesis.  
702 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVII 
703 See section “5.3 The “Smooth” Space of Surficial thought” in chapter five of this thesis. See 
also Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 15  
704 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 15 
705 Different trickster characters are found in old stories: Hermes in Greece, the Raven or 
Coyote in North America, Eshu in West Africa, Krishna in India and many others.  
706 Lewis Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, North Point Press, New 
York, 1998, p. 7 
707 Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, pp. 7-8 
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playful, deceitful character motivated by hunger, ego or desire, whose actions are 
characterized by ambivalence, lack of respect, cunning and amorality.708 His method 
is one of conscious subterfuge.  
In many instances, Gehry’s architecture possesses characteristics that 
define it as the work of a trickster. However, the slipperiness of the fish is indicative 
of a different side, a more unconscious but complex ambiguity that operates in a 
different way in comparison to the duplicitous techniques of the trickster. 
According to Hyde the trickster is a “predator” who “is the mythic embodiment of 
... doubleness and duplicity, contradiction and paradox.”709 The fish on the other 
hand is the prey that “is tricky, if it has the wit to slip the trap, it will do so by 
finding a breach in the wickerwork, a rip in the net, an escape hatch its enemy has 
not noticed.”710 Gehry’s fish therefore is a character whose natural instinct is to 
escape entrapment, even those set up by the trickster.711  
The fish “solidified” Gehry’s “understanding of how to make architecture 
move”712 allowing him to express some of the qualities that he appreciates in 
architecture. However, the evolution of the fish (from sketch to sculpture, then to 
architecture) is not merely the refining of an architectural image or brand, but also 
the emergence of an architect: the surfacing of the virtual self through a zoomorphic sign. 
It is for this reason that Gehry’s architecture has been accused of “self-
indulgence,”713 since the many incarnations of the fish (of which one can perhaps 
include the BGM), seem to represent the inflation of an ego to such a degree, that it 
becomes (monumental) architecture. 
Arguably, however, the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum is a “full Body 
without Organs,” healthy and productive, while Gehry’s replications of the “Bilbao 
Effect” in later projects (the Experience Music Project, Seattle, 2000, or Walt Disney 
Concert Hall, LA, 2003) are “cancerous BwOs,” caught in a pattern of self-same
                                                      
708 See Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, p. 10 
709 Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, p. 7 
710 Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, p. 46 
711 “The fish swims through its expansive, watery world and suddenly trickster blocks its 
passage, makes its world less expansive, less fluid.” Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: 
Mischief, Myth and Art, p. 46 
712 Gehry, “Commentaries” in Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 42 
713 See Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 40 


























Figure 6.18: Eagle, snake and fish: Gehry’s experimentation with different 
zoomorphic signs to develop an architectural language. Clockwise: proposal for 
Charles Jencks’ porch, fish lamps (source: Francesco Dal Co. and Kurt W. Forster, 
Frank O. Gehry, The Complete Works, The Monacelli Press, New York, 1998) Kobe 
Fishdance restaurant (source: Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 1997), the (fish) tower 
of the BGM (source: the author). 
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reproduction.714 This is because the BGM, represents genuine creativity, i.e. a re-
production, or an evolution of the (Barcelona) fish as a BwO, while later replications 
of the Bilbao formula lose their immanent character, becoming reproductions, or 
mere copies of an original model. Deleuze and Guattari would parallel Gehry’s later 
projects with addiction (drug usage as a habit), which they define as a cancerous 
BwO and an act that is no longer motivated by actual desire.715 
There is no doubt that Gehry is familiar with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work.716 Much like their “lobster”717 Gehry’s “fish” is a marine creature that can be 
traced back to ancient seas: smooth spaces that resist striation.718 The sea and the fish 
within it form a non-hierarchical plenum characterized by directionality rather than 
dimensionality, lines of flight rather than points or coordinates, fluidity and 
processes of transformation, rather than rigid boundaries and categories. These are 
concepts that are both pre-historic and contemporary.719  
If the Santa Monica house was emblematic of Gehry’s earlier phase 
(perhaps more aligned with the trickster concept) the Barcelona Fish (1992)720 
inspires Gehry’s later work and the very first use of computer technologies in his 
design process.  The project combines formal duck and decorated shed “almost 
literally” being a “combination of Serra and Oldenberg, ...both all structure and all 
surface, with no functional interior.”721 However, being a hybrid of sculpture and 
                                                      
714 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 162-163 
715 See Deleuze and Guattari, “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body 
without Organs?” A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 149-166 
716 Jencks writes “I once came upon him surreptitiously reading Deleuze’s book.” Jencks, 
Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 63 
717 See Deleuze and Guattari, “10,000 BC: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think 
it is?) in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 39-40 
718 See section “5.3 The “Smooth” Space of Surficial Thought” of chapter five.  
719 In fact many advanced automobiles, aircrafts, trains, submarines and even buildings are 
now inspired by the streamline fish, whose shape and surface texture allows it to flow 
through water with least resistance. Moreover, the scales of the fish evoke the metals with 
which many of these advanced machines are constructed.  
720 From 1989-1992 Frank Gehry undertook a project for the Olympic Village in Barcelona as 
part of a residential and commercial masterplan designed by Bruce Graham of Skidmore 
Owings and Merrill (SOM). The most striking element of Gehry’s design was a 54m long 
and 35m high fish-shaped canopy that drew attention to the rest of the commercial 
development. 
721 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 34 




























Figure 6.19: The slippery fish and the smooth sea (Gehry’s BGM and the 
Nervión River). Source: the author. 
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architecture, structure and surface, the Barcelona fish clearly demonstrates Gehry’s 
desire to transform architecture through a slow evolutionary process.722 
Foster applauds Serra for exposing the construction of his sculpture for all 
to see and accuses Gehry of tectonic obscurity. This is not surprising, because Serra 
explores the becoming-architecture of sculpture by transforming the structural wall 
(the most recognisable architectural element) into spatial “snakes.” Thus, Serra’s 
work is more compatible with architecture’s established hierarchies, the primacy of 
the structural wall being clearly recognisable in the final object. Gehry on the other 
hand explores the becoming-sculpture of architecture by inhabiting sculptural emblems 
like the fish. Both approaches share a common dedication to transformation. 
However, in Gehry’s architecture becoming produces more unsettling results since 
the final architectural object is a difficult mixture of different ideas (some half 




Figure 6.20: From the apparent ambiguity of the fish to the conceptual clarity of 
the decorated shed. The BGM attempts to include a multitude of architectural 
strategies. Source: the author. 
Much like his serpentine emblem, Serra’s sculptures achieve “intensity” and 
“directness”723 which effect visual and conceptual clarity. However, Gehry’s 
                                                      
722 In Gehry’s own words: “My working process is an evolution, like watching paint dry. 
This is where I get in trouble with misconceptions about how I work.” Frank Gehry, Gehry 
Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 195 
723 Gehry writes: “I am excited by the intensity and the directness and the economy of moves 
in someone like Richard Serra; the intensity is very inspiring to me.” The forms of the Vitra 
Museum can be compared to a coiled snake inspired by Serra’s work. Frank Gehry, “No, I’m 
an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank Gehry: Buildings and 
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architecture follows the fish, creating slippery signifiers whose complexity is hidden 
in full sight. One can argue that Serra is literally transparent in his conceptual 
operation, but Gehry is phenomenally transparent. If Serra’s sculptures seem timeless 
(or frozen in time) Gehry’s architecture are momentary steps in an evolutionary 
process that is latent with virtual lines of flight and further processes of becoming.  
Gehry repeatedly challenges his boundaries in search of his personal 
approach to architectural design. He achieves this by selecting a design process, 
keeping faith with its mode of operation and by letting it lead the way. According to 
Thomas Krens, Gehry has “a greater faith in process than any other architect.”724 
This exploratory attitude allows Gehry to come to terms with the computer, even 
though he doesn’t quite know how to use it:  
The process has led me to the craziest thing I have ever been involved with, 
and that is the computer...I am computer-illiterate: I do not know how to 
turn it on, I am scared of the thing.725 
The BGM (like the Barcelona Fish) was designed with the aid of CATIA (computer-
aided-three-dimensional interactive application) and Gehry benefited greatly from 
collaboration with French aerospace engineers. The theme of collaboration (with the 
client and with experts of other disciplines), which continues to reoccur in Gehry’s 
long career, is an indication of his smooth, malleable approach to architectural 
production.   
Collaboration brings complexity, diversity and hybridity to the design 
process. While Gehry’s numerous collaborations with artists are well known, in 
many of his projects the client is a powerful force in the design process.726 Gehry 
offers the client a significant role727 and in many instances he even goes as far as 
admitting that some of the important ideas were the client’s.728 Although there is 
some truth in such statements, Gehry’s self-effacing style often backfires, 
                                                      
724 Thomas Krens quoted in Bruce Lindsey Digital Gehry: Material Resistance/Digital 
Construction, p. 42 
725 Gehry makes this remark in 1995, during the design of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. 
See Frank O. Gehry: Individual Imagination and Cultural Conservatism, p. 41  
726 When asked where he gets his ideas from, Gehry admits: “we talk to the client, a lot.” 
Gehry quoted in Digital Gehry: Material Resistance/Digital Construction, p. 21 
727 “I show them all the models from the last project. I say, ‘You look at it, you do it, you 
listen.’” Gehry, Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 195 
728 In reference to the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, Gehry writes: “It was Tom Krens’s idea 
to have galleries for living artists different from galleries for dead artists. In the end it was a 
pretty good strategy.” Gehry, Gehry Talks: Architecture + Process, p. 143 
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undermining the significance of his pliable strategy in determining the design 
outcome.729 
Collaboration with the aerospace industry provides Gehry with the 
titanium skin, which provides an image of modernity and high technology, as well 
CATIA that allows him to manipulate complex surface geometries. Gehry’s 
receptivity to collaboration is indicative of his liberal, non-hierarchical thought, but 
also a shrewd evasiveness that lessens the burdens of the architect:  
The work that interests me now is to do with collaboration, about 
developing relationships with other talents and surviving with one’s ego 
intact; with speaking one’s own language and having one’s own firm 
beliefs and ideas within the context of a collaboration. ... If I were to push 
anything that is what I would work towards. I have tried to do it with other 
architects, sometimes successfully, and sometimes not, but in the years I 
have left, that is what I want to do. I want to work with groups of people 
developing building complexes, developing not a unilateral decision about 
what they city should be – I do not trust my own judgement in such a 
context – but how to survive and how to make identifiable pieces of the 
buildings which are coherent with others, creating a democratic (whatever 
that is) model for our world. I do not like the responsibility of having the 
world put upon my shoulders – to solve everything in one building. I 
cannot accept that position, I am not capable of doing it.730   
Gehry speaks of being democratic,731 but his democracy is driven by opportunism 
and a strong desire to transform: “I have an intense need somehow to change things 
and to transform them.”732 A good example of this can be found in an episode of 
“The Simpsons” cartoon series, “The Seven-Beer Snitch” aired in 2005, in which, 
Gehry is depicted as crumpling a letter and throwing it, only to discover that it is 
the perfect building design. The joke implies that his architecture is arbitrary, 
something that Foster also proposes in his essay. However, rather than taking the 
joke as a threat, Gehry uses it as an opportunity to participate within the medium, 
within the operation of the simulacrum, which is the cartoon caricature. Thus, not 
only does he become the first architect to appear in a popular television series, but 
also through an affirmation of the joke, he transforms its criticality into an 
                                                      
729 Beatriz Colomina implies that Gehry’s involvement with the Bilbao Effect can be reduced 
to “just” designing the building: “Krens is understood as a designer, the architect of the 
“Bilbao Effect.” Frank Gehry is just the architect of the building.” Beatriz Colomina, “Media 
Architect” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, pp. 259-272, p. 259 
730 Gehry, Frank O. Gehry: Individual Imagination and Cultural Conservatism, pp. 33-36 
731 “Since I’m so Democratic I accept Conformists.” Gehry, Frank O. Gehry: Individual 
Imagination and Cultural Conservatism, p. 39 
732 Gehry, “No, I’m an Architect - Frank Gehry and Peter Arnell: A Conversation,” in Frank 
Gehry: Buildings and Projects, p. XVII 
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expression of self-assurance and a tool of self-promotion. In other words, by 
participating in the joke Gehry manages to transform it for his own ends. 
Undoubtedly this strategy is not always successful. However, what is significant 
about Gehry’s approach is the opportunistic pliability effected by an appreciation of 
immanent difference that allows him to participate and exploit alternative realities. 
This is precisely the reason why Gehry is a good “media architect.”733  
Gehry’s strategy allows him to adapt to the different scenarios. His 
exploration of computer technologies have allowed him to design, model and 
manipulate complex surfaces that can be constructed within time and budget. This 
is of particular importance in an age of rapid technological transformations, which 
have offered alternative avenues for architectural production. The computer and 
other digital technologies are now capable of performing highly sophisticated 
operations that are impossible for humans. But more importantly, such technologies 
(mediated by activated surfaces) have created alternative realities that transgress 
established boundaries. The success of the BGM clearly demonstrates the 
significance of this reality and the urgent necessity of theorising an alternative 
approach towards surfaces, images and appearances that are fundamental 
components of such alternative reality.  
 The BGM exploits media re-production, which is not copying of reality or 
masking it through deceptive spectacles. In other words, the project uses different 
media to simulate: i.e. produce and engage with different realities. According to 
Beatriz Colomina, Gehry is a “media artist ... expert in the construction of his own 
aura.”734 Evidently, media re-production need not signal the withering of aura in 
architecture, but instead its evolution to a phenomenon that extends across the 
surface-scape of mass media. As a media artist, Gehry has many faces, slipping from 
one to the other in order to create a smooth mixture of virtual implications that 
make him enigmatic. Thus, even Jencks who is the “master of categorisations in 
architecture”735 is unable to pin him down: 
Just call me Daniel Boone, Frank Gehry said to me after I had called him 
that and everything else I thought appropriate: the Industrial Adhocist, the 
father of the Botched Joint, the son of Bruce Goff, the Noble Savage of Santa 
Monica, the Leonardo of Galvanised Sheet-metal, the Malevich of Lighting 
                                                      
733 Colomina “Media Architect,” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 259 
734 Colomina “Media Architect,” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 259 
735 Colomina “Media Architect,” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 260 
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and Rodchenko of the Non-Sequitur...the Charlie Chaplin of Chain Link, 
the Over-Psychoanalysed Jewish Master Builder, the Zen Priest of the 
Unfinished Finish, the Martin Escher of Reverse Perspective and 
Impossible Space, the first Deconstructionist Architect, and so on. The 
problem with Frank ... is that many labels work. He is almost 
unclassifiable.736 
There is no doubt that Gehry wants us to see many things, in a deliberately 
ambiguous expression that relies on “an attractive range of precooked readings that 
target every possible respondent, providing many enticing narratives, one 
appropriate for every occasion.”737 He is therefore the architect of the multiple 
responses that he gets from critics, both positive and negative. However, Gehry’s 
narratives are appealing because they are not presented as theories based on the 
established hierarchies of the architectural canon. Instead, they are a hybrid of 
intellectual savvy and performative “folksy stories” folded into a conceptual felt 
through which his architecture is “seen and not seen at the same time.”738 Arguably, 
such smooth narratives are part of a surficial architectural strategy that is “so far out 
of normal expectations that it defies traditional criticism.”739  
6.3 CONCLUSION: SURFICIAL PHILOSPHY AND THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF SURFACE 
The Bilbao Guggenheim Museum has achieved popular success, not only with the 
general public, but also amongst fellow architects.740 Moreover, much ink has been 
spilt in describing the role of tourism, brand culture, corporate investment and local 
and global politics that made the “Bilbao Effect” possible. While, there has been 
much hype and adoration for the project, there are also those who have taken a 
more critical approach towards Gehry’s exploitation of monumentality, spectacle
                                                      
736 Charles Jencks, “Frank Gehry – The Deconstructionist,” Art and Design, vol. 4, no. 4, May 
1985, p. 14 
737 Colomina “Media Architect,” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 261 
738 Colomina “Media Architect,” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 261 
739 Philip Johnson, interview by Stanley Tigerman in “Building of the Quarter: The Gehry 
House, Per Voco,” Archtype, vol. 2, Spring 1979, p. 23, quoted in Colomina, “Media 
Architect” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, p. 260 
740 Philip Johnson declared it as “the greatest building of our time.” Sverre Fehn, winner of 
the 1997 Pritzker Architecture Prize, called the building "fantastic." See Lee, Denny, “Bilbao, 
Ten Years Later” The New York Times, published on 23 Sept. 2007 at 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/ accessed on October 2008. Also See Guasch, Anna 
Maria, “Global Museums versus Local Artists: Paradoxes of Identity between Local and 
Global Understanding” in Learning from the Bilbao Guggenheim, pp. 185-202, p. 195 
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effects and the mass media. Amongst the critics, Foster remains the most consistent 
whose discontent with Gehry’s museum covers a wide range of issues. 
In comparing the BGM with Frank Lloyd Wrights Guggenheim Museum (a 
whitish building that can be called modernist) Foster argues that Gehry’s design 
lacks “formal logic” or the “programmatic conceit” of Wright’s creation. Moreover, 
the BGM collapses the dichotomy between the “duck” and “decorated shed”741 and 
remains “tectonically obscure.”742 It is neither structure that follows the program nor 
one that symbolises the program, thus becoming a “decorated duck” which 
embodies the “most problematic aspects of both modern and postmodern 
architectures: the wilful monumentality of the first and the faux populism of the 
second.”743 Foster associates Gehry’s success and popularity with “spectacle-effects” 
and the seduction of an imagistic architecture that is “self-indulgent” and 
“arbitrary.” He argues that Gehry’s architecture “evokes an individuality that seems 
more exclusive than democratic”744 and rather than instigating civic engagement, 
the BGM and Gehry’s other cultural centres “appear as sites of spectacular 
spectatorship, of touristic awe.”745 Thus, Gehry’s projects represent an elitist, self-
indulgent and individualist artist who designs “out of the ‘cultural logic’ of 
advanced capitalism, in terms of its language of risk-taking and spectacle-effects.”746 
According to Foster the BGM not only represents an image, a seductive one-liner 
that symbolises the accumulation of capital, but it also represents “’an image 
accumulated to the point where it becomes a capital.’”747  
That the BGM is successful at generating capital for the city is 
unquestionable and it is fair to assume that the building’s spectacular 
monumentality is an important factor. The argument that Gehry’s work after Bilbao 
represents a “detached,” or “arbitrary” approach to “artistic expression” is also 
convincing. It seems after the success of BGM, Gehry has been unable to resist the 
                                                      
741 Hal Foster writes: “As Gehry has privileged neither structure nor ornament, he seemed to 
transcend this opposition, but it is more accurate to say that he collapsed it, and often 
combined the formal duck with the decorated shed.” Foster, Design and Crime: and Other 
Diatribes, p. 33 
742 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, pp. 37 
743 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, pp. 33-4 
744 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 41 
745 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 41  
746 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 41  
747 Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 41  
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pressures of clients and the industry, resulting in an indifferent replication of the 
Bilbao formula in other projects that have not been as successful.748  
Furthermore, the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum seems to possess 
characteristics that are at odds with each other. For example, some of the gallery 
spaces inside are rectilinear rooms that have none of the smooth qualities of the 
exterior. This is also evident outside in the disparity between the boxy forms of the 
southern elevation facing the city and the flowing titanium forms that face the river. 
These contrasting elements seem to suggest that the BGM is a cautious and a self-
conscious attempt at breaking new ground that continuously refers back to the 
familiar.749 In this sense, the building is not perfectly smooth. (See figure 6.21)  
Yet, smoothness does not necessitate homogeneity. As Deleuze and 
Guattari suggested, smooth space can be found in both felt and patchwork, the 
latter expressing the heterogeneous manifestation of the concept.750 Though the 
titanium surfaces of the BGM operate like felt (being an intricate entanglement of 
abstract lines of thought into a smooth and pliable surface), the project in its entirety 
operates like patchwork by stitching together heterogeneous concepts that extend in 
different trajectories. The BGM represents a design ethos that resists entrapment by 
established frameworks such as “duck” or “decorated shed.” It therefore follows a 
strategy that goes beyond familiar processes of production (the making of fabric) 
that are characterized by well-defined, oppositional lines of thought (vertical vs. 
horizontal) and the constraint of extending in only one direction.  
Critics of the museum often highlight the disparity between the exterior 
and the interior, or in other words, the spectacular appearance of the building from 
the outside and its internal function as a museum of art. Foster defined this as a lack 
of programmatic conceit, which is echoed by Lee H. Skolnick who argues that the 
                                                      
748 In fact much of Gehry’s recent work has caused protests by local residents or legal 
retaliation by clients. See the Atlantic Yards project in New York City, which is currently in 
progress, in which there is much oppostion to Gehry’s contributions. Also, The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has recently filed a negligence suit against Gehry, for 
design flaws in Stata Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which have resulted in leaks, 
masonry cracks, mould, and drainage overflow, soon after the building’s unveiling. See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7082678.stm accessed on 21 Feb. 2009.  
749 Gehry recollected in a November 1996 interview: “I always go back to a base of rectangles 
and boxes and the simplest idea, look at it, and then distort again from it.” Coosje Van 
Bruggen, “Towards a Unity of Opposites: A Mere Building Versus Sculptural Architecture” 
in Frank O. Gehry, Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, pp. 95-134, P. 115 
750 See chapter five of the thesis, especially “5.3.2 From Lack to Act: “Desiring Machines” and 
Smooth Processes of Production” and figure 5.6.  
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expressive power of the exterior forms does not qualify them, or the interior spaces 
they enclose as “the most beneficial spaces to display art.” 751 To illustrate this point, 
Skolnick presents Utzon’s Sydney Opera House as an example of an iconic building 
whose forms “manage to refer to both the sails of the harbour and to the theme of 
music, while having the added advantages of clearly delineating the concert halls 
and offering them notably euphonic acoustics.”752 Skolnick goes on to present 
Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin (2001) as an example of an iconic 
museum whose conceptual exploration affects both exterior forms and interior 
spaces.753 
Wright’s Guggenheim, Utzon’s Opera House and Liebeskind’s Jewish 
Museum follow unique concepts (architectural promenade, acoustic shell, traumatic 
void) that affect every aspect of the building, thus achieving a conceptual directness 
that is evident in their iconic exteriors and their distinctive interior spaces.754 
Gehry’s BGM on the other hand seems to include three different ideas in a building 
whose conceptual genesis seems slippery. The diversity of architectural approaches 
is not only evident in the external forms (box, wave, fish) but also in the different 
surface materials (render, titanium, sandstone) and even the gallery spaces 
(permanent, temporary, resident). It is at the central atrium that these different 
ideas, surfaces and spaces come together in a dynamic juxtaposition (reminiscent of 
a sculptor’s studio), which indicates that the process of design has not reached a 
comforting equilibrium.  
                                                      
751 Lee H. Skolnick writes: “In Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, the light, 
curvilinear forms of walls and roofs have been said to evoke sailing ships on the water, and 
are themselves sculpturally expressive. Further, they refer to Bilbao’s geographical position 
and historical role as a port city. This does not necessarily qualify them, or the interior 
spaces they enclose, as the most beneficial places to display art.” Lee H. Skolnick, “Towards 
a New Museum Architecture: Narrative and Representation” in Reshaping Museum Space: 
Architecture, Design, Exhibition, edited by Suzanne McLeod, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 
118-133, p. 121 
752 Skolnick, “Towards a New Museum Architecture: Narrative and Representation,” p. 121 
753 Skolnick writes: “Although not universally revered, its jagged, slashing design is 
unquestionably successful at evoking the wrenching, irrational and disorienting chaos of the 
Holocaust on the most visceral and experiential level. Though it has gained the perhaps 
ignominious distinction of either obviating the need for actual exhibitions, or at least making 
them notoriously difficult to mount in its highly architecturally specific spaces, at least these 
spaces are interpretive of the subject hand rather than something completely unrelated.” 
Skolnick, “Towards a New Museum Architecture: Narrative and Representation,” p. 124 
754 In the first project, it is a spiral atrium that offers a theatrical architectural promenade 
through which the artwork is experienced. In the second project, the concrete shells manage 
the internal acoustics of the concert hall, while in the final project (Libeskind’s museum) 
disorienting spaces and lonely voids offer an experience of the horrors of the museum 
subject: the Holocaust. 
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Figure 6.21: The three different architectural strategies juxtaposed together in 
the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. Sources: the author.  
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 Critics associate this with a lack of formal logic, programmatic conceit or 
tectonic clarity. However, this thesis argues that the uneasy juxtaposition of ideas in 
the BGM is indicative of a smooth approach to architectural design and 
collaboration, which allows for a multitude of different interpretations. The flowing 
forms of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum have been described as an expression of 
movement in architecture. Just like the fish that needs to be in constant movement 
to pass water over its gills and to survive (or even the aircrafts that need movement 
to stay airborne) Gehry’s architecture necessitates movement. But this movement is 
not limited to formal expression since Gehry’s design approach is one of movement 
between concepts and ideas, in a restless, slippery manner that never settles in one 
place.  
Gehry’s strategy requires a different movement of thought, one that does 
not look for clarity of expression, but rather the potential for different 
interpretations. It is true that not all of the museum’s interior spaces offer a new 
way of experiencing art. But perhaps the BGM may outlast its current function and 
become a place of architectural pilgrimage, part of the great series of art works we 
preserve in our histories of architecture. Therefore, one can argue that the building 
is less about the relationship between form and function and more about the 
expression, communication and projection of (architectural) ideas, concepts and 
images of thought. It is the ambiguity of Gehry’s architecture of surface exteriority 
that has caused the BGM to be a popular medium for image-ination and 
simultaneously a problematic project for critics who define it as tectonically and 
conceptually obscure.   
The purpose of this study is neither to celebrate Gehry as the greatest living 
architect nor is it to prove that the BGM is one smooth architectural strategy. 
Instead, the thesis uses Gehry’s building and various elements of his design strategy 
to problematize the established hierarchies that have dominated architectural 
thought.755 For example, in an effort to show that Gehry is not the “Greatest Living 
Artist”756 Foster punctures the surfaces and ruptures the skin, suggesting that the 
BGM has somehow managed to deceive us. Such evaluations indicate a familiar 
model of thought based on Platonic transcendence, in which image is an imitation, 
                                                      
755 Here, architectural thought also refers to architectural theory, praxis and criticism. 
756 This statement marks the very point from which Foster begins his analysis or critic of 
Gehry’s work.  
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spectacle is a mere effect and skin hides structure. In these models of thought the 
pronounced bifurcation between categories is followed by a rigid hierarchy that 
determines the value of things.  
Throughout the preceding chapters, this thesis has attempted to offer a 
more affirmative criticality based on a non-perpendicular movement of thought that 
is argued to be more in tune with creative exploration. This alternative approach 
was given the name of surficial thought and was theorised by deploying alternative 
conceptions of surface, image and appearance as philosophical (and conceptual) 
tools, which in the case of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, become the primary 
elements of Gehry’s architecture.  
In the BGM, Gehry manages to collapse the dichotomy between “duck” 
and “decorated shed” and in so doing problematizes the very foundations of 
architectural theory. As was discussed earlier, even though the modernists were 
evidently preoccupied with style, they nonetheless reinforced the canonical 
hierarchical order that privileges natural materials, structure and space to ornament, 
surface and appearance. Frustrated by modernism’s dogmas, the postmodernists 
followed the logic of “substitution,”757 expressed through the “decorated shed” 
concept that demanded more emphasis on visual communication. This was a 
Derridean “sure-play,”758 within the boundaries of tradition, which was “limited to 
the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces”759 and which refrained from 
unsettling architecture’s established categories. Thus, many postmodernists 
(including Gehry) resorted to a reactionary approach, an edgy strategy that 
highlighted boundaries in order to exaggerate oppositional categories.760  In the case 
of the “decorated shed” concept, this dramatised difference is best exemplified by 
Herzog & de Meuron’s Eberswalde Technical School Library (Germany, 1999) in 
which the “shed” is the simplest architectural box, while the “decoration” is the 
most superficial image repeated endlessly, neither having any effect on each other.  
                                                      
757 See Derrida’s game: “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” 
Writing and Difference, p. 292 
758 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 292 
759 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” 
Writing and Difference, p. 292 
760 Foster argues that in comparison to his earlier “LA vernacular” style (exemplified by The 
Gehry House), Gehry’s later work like the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, “began to lose its 
edge.” See Foster, Design and Crime: and Other Diatribes, p. 30.  
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Figure 6.22: Eberswalde Technical School Library, Germany by Herzog & de 
Meuron (above) and Bilbao Guggenheim Museum by Frank Gehry. The former 
is the decorated shed par excellence, while the latter evolves the concept. In the 
Eberswalde library, image is superficial and it does not affect structure. In the 
BGM however, image is surficial since it becomes architecture affecting 
“structure” and the spaces inside.  
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/21158327@N05/2162926386  
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In certain aspects of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum however, difference 
exists within a smooth mixture, which evokes Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to 
the unsettling of established traditions. There are no longer clear boundaries 
between categories, only expansive spaces of becoming. If in the Eberswalde Library 
image does not affect structure, and structure is unhampered by image, in the BGM 
image becomes architecture affecting and deforming structure and the spaces inside. 
While the Eberswalde Library, expresses difference between two autonomous 
categories (ornament vs structure) the BGM expresses difference in hybridity, where 
the observer is faced with a multiplicity of images and categories that are latent 
within the surfaces of the building. This thesis argues that Gehry’s museum evokes 
and includes the modernist metaphors of design (clothing, cladding, clarity), the 
postmodernist equivalents (duck, decorated shed, complexity) and more general 
notions of aura, image, spectacle and simulation in a pliable whole that creates an 
auratic complexity and a seductive expressivity. It is the phenomenal transparency 
of this supple approach to architecture that causes unease amongst critics who 
equate it with obscurity. 
Gehry’s museum communicates through a primitive, yet simultaneously 
alien mode of expression, which includes intuition, illusion and simulation in the 
construction of what Jencks calls an “enigmatic signifier.”761 In such communication 
clarity is not the central goal, because the origin and the original do not form the 
focal point. Instead the emphasis lies on the process, those of expression, 
interpretation and simulation. In this form of communication, one enjoys the 
journey through the thickness of metaphorical and implicit propositions that create 
a more phenomenal expression of sense, rather than literal (or ironic) 
communication of meaning or fact.762 This expression is primitive, alien and in many 
ways at odds with the culture of critical commentary. However, it is also highly 
relevant and in tune with postmodern aspirations of plurality, as it manages to 
incorporate complexity and diversity within a series of seemingly simple gestures. 
What is proposed here is that the BGM’s success is not so much the 
consequence of “spectacle effects,” but rather the rich interpretative potential 
                                                      
761 Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 62 
762 See Deleuze’s definition of sense and its association with the Möbius Strip, elaborated in 
section “5.3.1 From Surface to Surfacing: Events, Propositions and the Expression of Sense” 
in chapter five of this thesis. 
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offered by simulative virtuality.763 Foster borrows Debord’s formulation of the 
spectacle as “autonomous image,” “a moment of the false”764 which hides lived 
reality and develops an attitude of “passive acceptance” in the spectator.765 This is 
also the Platonic definition of the image as a copy of reality, an inferior imitation that 
hides, denatures or masks the absence of reality, or as Baudrillard argues eventually 
severs its relationship with reality altogether. Such conceptions of image results in 
nihilism and nostalgia since “The spectator’s consciousness,” is argued to be 
“imprisoned in a flattened universe, bound by the screen of the spectacle behind 
which his life has been deported.”766  
There is no doubt that in the contemporary condition capital has turned 
into image and image has turned into capital. However, to reduce the spectator to a 
deceived prisoner of the image would be to underestimate humanity and to neglect 
the potential of images, not only as powerful modes of visual communication 
central to the progress of civilisations, but also as mediums that create a new reality, 
a new space of operation. Thus, it is not so much that image masks reality (Plato, 
Debord, Baudrillard) or that reality is the play of image-signifiers with the true 
original reality being an impossible quasi-transcendental concept (Derrida). Instead, 
all such categories (image, reality, signifier, signified) are already connected by 
what is common to them all: the fact that they are all different aspects of reality. 
This thesis therefore argues that the success of Gehry’s architecture is tied 
to an instinctive appreciation of the simulative image, which is not separate from 
reality, rather it is a different aspect of reality, accessed via imag[e]ination. Such a 
definition of image echoes Deleuze’s conception which it them “a positive power,” 
in order to collapse the traditional Platonic hierarchies between “the original and the 
copy, the model and the reproduction”767 and catalyse new modes of production and re-
production.  
                                                      
763 Where simulation and virtuality follow the Deleuzean definition.  
764 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 9 
765 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 12 
766 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 218 
767 Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum” in The Logic of Sense, p. 262 
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Figure 6.23: In the exteriority of surficial architecture there is nothing to hide, 
which is why both “skin” and “structure” are on theatrical display, whether 
“inside” or “outside.” Bilbao Guggenheim Museum. Source: the author.  
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768 Manuel Gausa, The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture, 2003, p. 577 
769 Excerpt from an interview of Susan Sontag in February 1977 published in PAJ – A Journal 
of Performance and Art 27, 2, (2005) p.3 
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7.1 PREAMBLE TO A HYPOTHESIS 
The evolution of postmodernist theory in conjunction with the rapid development 
of new technologies has had an important role in the transformation of physical and 
theoretical boundaries. In early twentieth century, modernist theory was inspired 
by industrial technologies of the time. In their quest for a new style, Le Corbusier 
and other pioneers of modernism drew inspiration from industrial silos, ships, 
aeroplanes, automobiles and other machinic assemblages that represented new 
technology and progress. The reduction of ornament and a conceptual emphasis on 
function and efficiency were legacies of the machine metaphor, which followed an 
ordered logic and strict rules of operation to guarantee maximum efficiency and 
economy.770  
The development of postmodern theories in the second half of twentieth 
century was simultaneous to the rapid advancement of communication technology, 
where the increasing production and reproduction of visual phenomena inspired 
new metaphors. If early twentieth century was the “Industrial Age,” the advent of 
new technologies of mass communication and electronic computation led many to 
consider late twentieth century as the “Information Age,” in which capitalism 
transforms to “late-capitalism” through the transfer of information. 
In recent decades, computers have provided a platform upon which 
different disciplines mix. In most societies the “machine for living in”771 is 
challenged by digital networks and virtual reality environments in which images, 
sounds and texts flow. No longer bound to their physical locations, “users” are able 
to access information and experience distant events through the Internet - the global 
phenomenon that has spawned multi-million dollar companies by defying 
traditional cultural and national boundaries. Time magazines selection of
                                                      
770 Much of these concepts could be found in the theoretical discourse promoting the 
International Style of early twentieth century which promised a modern future inspired by 
new industrial technologies. 
771 "The house is a machine for living in." Le Corbusier, Vers une architecture, translated as 
Towards a New Architecture, trans. Frederick Etchells, The Architectural Press, London, 1987, 
p. 100 
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YouTube.com, as the best invention of 2006 clearly demonstrates the shift from the 
old values of the Industrial Age to those of the new Information Age.772 
The success of Google,773 Facebook,774 Second Life775 or online multiplayer 
gaming networks has demonstrated the popularity of such virtual sites and 
alternative realities, the power of new media and digital technologies, and their 
significance for the generation of new economies. Thus, in this context of rhizomatic 
networks776 and information flow, notions of machinic order are increasingly 
challenged, while traditional concepts of boundary, site, context, place and home 
have become subject to further questioning.   
For many such new technological developments are based on phenomena 
that are intangible or virtual as opposed to real. The withering of aura, the 
accumulation of the spectacle, the precession of simulacra are all concepts that warn 
against false appearances and a hallucinatory hyperreality that destroys lived 
reality. Throughout the preceding chapters, this thesis has argued that such 
theoretical reflections on the contemporary media saturated condition share a 
common theme: the binary hierarchical separation of image from reality. It has been 
demonstrated how such theories follow a traditional metaphysical model 
categorising images as artificial copies of a natural reality that is primary and 
original.777 Thus, in these theories, images and the new technologies that facilitate 
their (re)productions, operate much like the walls of Plato’s cave, imprisoning 
humanity in a shadowy world of disillusionment.  
                                                      
772 See “Time Best Inventions 2006” available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/2006/techguide/bestinventions/inventions/youtube.html 
accessed 20th March 2009.  
773 Google.com is an online search engine that generates almost all of its revenue through 
advertising related to Internet search, e-mail, online mapping, social networking, and video 
sharing services.  
774 Facebook.com is a free-access social networking website that currently has more than 175 
million active users worldwide. Like Google, Facebook generates revenue from advertising. 
See Facebook statistics http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics accessed 
January 17th 2009.  
775 Second Life is a virtual world that allows its users to explore and interact with each other 
through avatars. Residents are also allowed to create and trade virtual property with each 
other. See http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Main_Page accessed 20th March 2009.  
776 These digital networks form a rhizomatic system that is difficult to control. It is not so 
much a tree structure with clear lines of lineage, but what Deleuze and Guattari call a 
rhizome as a complex network that represents a chaotic complexity that abolishes hierarchy. 
See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 7-25 
777 See Plato’s elaboration on the difference between image and appearance in, Sophist, pp. 
82-3 
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This familiar model of thought is recognisable by the clear demarcation of 
inside from outside by the opaque boundary that not only acts as a barrier, but also 
facilitates false appearances. The resultant philosophical approach is therefore 
characterized by a distinct hierarchical order and a perpendicular movement of 
thought that desires to penetrate or surpass marginal categories in order to arrive at 
the essence of things.   
In a similar tone, much criticism of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum 
revolves around the argument that the building is designed for the spectacular 
image, which is destined for media reproduction. The spectacle is defined as an 
image that masks and hides reality, while image is defined as an inauthentic copy of 
reality. Consequently, the BGM is accused of benefiting from illusory fascination 
since its form does not follow function, context, structure or any structural logic. In 
other words, the BGM is superficial architecture, which is at best detached from 
originary reality, or in worst-case scenario, a hallucinatory image that has no 
relationship with reality whatsoever.  
The deconstruction of such theories would not only challenge the 
definitions of terms, but it would also attempt to question what we mean by the 
“function” of architecture. In this way, this thesis has been deconstructive to some 
extent, arguing that image-making is in fact, an important function of architectural 
design, especially in the current context of intensive visual production.  In a 
different approach however, this thesis has explored Deleuze’s strategy for the 
overcoming of traditional models of thought. Inspired by an alternative conception 
of the simulacrum, this thesis has proposed that image production is not as Plato 
would define “imitation art,” belonging to an act of copying (or reproduction) of an 
originary reality, but instead, further production or re-production that creates a 
different reality of its own.  
From this point of view, image-making is not a secondary task in 
comparison to structural design, but rather as Semper implied, an essential and 
originary element of architectural design. It follows then that designing for re-
production in magazines and mass media is not superficial manipulation, but a 
positive participation in a different reality that is produced by images and new 
media technologies. An architecture that is sensitive to such intricacies would not 
refrain from participation within production of the images (of thought, of 
architecture, of future actualities). Such architecture might adopt a primitive 
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approach to appeal to a wider audience, but this primitivity is not to be confused 
with naivety or backwardness. Instead, this primitivity is in tune with the 
postmodern agenda of opening up architecture to the public and removing it from 
its pedestal as high art. Such architecture would also be more sympathetic and 
affirmative of the rapidly transforming socio-technological condition with all the 
possibilities that it has to offer. This thesis proposes that Gehry’s Bilbao 
Guggenheim Museum displays such nomadic primitivity, which challenges Platonic 
models of thought by questioning their perpendicular movement against surfaces. 
In other words, the BGM demands a surficial approach to architecture in which 
surfaces are not barriers to seeing and the skin is not secondary to structure. Instead, 
seeing is haptic and surface becomes architecture. 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
In the preceding chapters the thesis has deployed theories about ornament and 
image in order to trace the effects of the familiar, Platonic model of thought on the 
treatment of surfaces and their effects in architectural theory. It has been argued that 
this traditional model of thought is based on the opposition between inside and 
outside and the boundary that acts as a visual barrier and facilitates false 
appearances. Thus, “the analogy of the cave” continues to influence attitudes 
towards surfaces, images and appearances in architecture.  
In Part One, the thesis demonstrated that the early modernist theory 
transformed Semper’s “textile wall” into a clothed wall or a tattooed wall, covered by 
an excessive layer that masked the body of architecture. Semper associated the 
ornate textile with weaving, the primitive demarcation of space and the expression 
of art and culture, while ornament was a representation of the textile wall as the 
originary architectural element. However, by associating the textile with clothing or 
the tattoo, Loos theorised the ornamental layer as a superfluous mask that had a 
secondary function in architecture. Thus, in Loos’s model ornament represented a 
superficial layer associated with fleeting fashions or “degenerate” primitivism.778  
                                                      
778 See section 2.1 of the thesis entitled “Masking Surfaces: “Clothed” Structures and the 
“Decorated Shed” 
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The discussion of ornament was also influential for the generation of 
postmodern theory in architecture. As a reaction to “form follows function”779 and 
the deprecatory associations of ornament with crime,780 Venturi et al, (1977) 
proposed “decorated shed”781 concept that signalled a shift from the modernists’ 
notions of cladding and style to the postmodernist notions of screen and 
communication. This was an attempt to allow architecture to participate freely in 
the visual economy of signs, billboards and screens of mass media that were 
becoming symbols of capitalism.  
 Though the “decorated shed” concept allowed greater freedom of surface 
expression, it nevertheless maintained, if not exaggerated the separation between 
“ornament” and “structure” as instigated by the modernist metaphors of clothing 
and cladding. Since the postmodernists promoted the decoration of construction but 
not the construction of decoration,782 in many postmodern projects ornamentation 
was merely applied to structures that rarely ventured beyond the shed concept. 
Consequently, visual expression became susceptible to accusations of superficiality 
and excess, and for many, such postmodern projects were in fact modernist 
buildings in “pastiche” disguise, demonstrating a reductive simplicity of 
communication, or regurgitation of old motifs.783  
In the discourse of “image” similar issues of masking, covering and hiding 
was traced. For example, it was demonstrated how Benjamin celebrated the 
technological penetration of the false auratic shell of a work of art. Benjamin 
attributed this breakthrough to the mass reproduction of the image, captured and 
broadcast via photography and film. However, as technologies of mass imagery 
advanced, theorists such as Debord and Baudrillard began to theorise images as 
inauthentic reproductions, i.e. false appearances that mask reality and imprison 
humanity in a “speculative universe” or a “hyperreality.” For these theorists, 
                                                      
779 The origins of this phrase can be traced to Louis Sullivan who wrote, “form ever follows 
function.” See Louis Sullivan, “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered” published 
Lippincott's Magazine, vol. 57, March 1896, pp. 403-9. The electronic version can be accessed 
at http://academics.triton.edu/faculty/fheitzman/tallofficebuilding.html accessed 20th 
March 2009.  
780 See Loos, “Ornament and Crime (1908)” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular 
Culture in the Shadow of Adolf Loos, pp. 29-36. 
781 See Venturi et al., Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, p. 
87 
782 Venturi et al., Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, p. 163 
783 Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia (1978) and Michael Graves’ Portland Public Service 
Building (1982) are examples of this. 
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separation became a key concept: separation of image from the real, or the 
separation of individual from society. The consequences of this separation were the 
denaturing or the destruction of reality.  
This thesis has argued that in both discourses of ornament and image, 
surfaces are central to the deceptive act: they either mask aspects of reality, or they 
facilitate illusionary appearances that deviate from reality. Thus, ornament is 
considered superfluous, image is regarded as inauthentic, and both these concepts 
are associated with surfaces that deny access to reality. It has been argued that 
surfaces and their effects suffer from a traditional transcendental hierarchy that 
considers reality as existing behind or beyond images and appearances. This 
transcendental hierarchy was traced back to Plato’s dialogues, particularly the 
“allegory of the cave”784 which theorised the familiar attitudes towards surfaces as 
barriers to visual perception, and surface effects as shadowy representations of an 
inaccessible reality. An analysis of  Plato’s allegory also revealed the common belief 
that man-made effects are not to be trusted as they deviate from their natural 
origins. Yet, the proliferation of man-made phenomena continues with greater 
speeds, where in the current technological world, more time is devoted to 
interaction with (and through) “artificialities” and “virtualities” that constitute 
much of the contemporary world.  
In order to find an alternative approach to surface, image and appearance, 
a reconsideration of traditional models of thought became inevitable. This led to the 
“closure” of Platonic thought through the writings of Jacques Derrida whose work 
follows a series of contributions by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger.785 
Derrida’s “deconstruction” destabilises the traditional hierarchies of Platonic 
thought by demonstrating that what is called “origin,” “centre,” or “structure,” is in 
fact another signifier in a chain of signifiers that continuously defer meaning. This 
deferral in language necessitates that origin is “put under erasure,” since its 
originality has become questionable. Thus, every discourse is subject to slippage 
and must be deconstructed to expose its “aporias.”  
                                                      
784 Plato, Republic, (514a-520a) 
785 Derrida’s work is of particular importance to contemporary architecture, not only because 
of the popularity of his writings amongst architects and designers, but also because since the 
1980s, deconstruction has developed into a popular architectural style, often referred to as 
“Deconstructivist Architecture.” See Phillip Johnson & Mark Wigley, Deconstructivist 
Architecture: The Museum of Modern Art, New York, Little Brown and Company, 1988 
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Such an overcoming of metaphysics through language relies on the absence 
of an absolute signified. This absence produces differing consequences. On the one 
hand, deconstruction allows further interpretations within traditional metaphysics, 
not by producing more metaphysics, but by unravelling the intricacies of what has 
been written before. This was argued to be context-breaking and an anticipation of 
emergence through a re-reading of existing works.786 On the other hand, 
deconstruction can lead to negative perfectionism: “deconstructing everything in 
the name of the undeconstructable,” waiting for a true signified that will never 
come.787 In the absence of “non-origin,”788 the erasure of the signified leads to the 
uninhibited play of the signifier, in which the “death of the author”789 and the 
deferral of meaning gives license to superficiality. For Baudrillard’s this is precisely 
what occurs in “hyperreality” where the dissemination of autonomous images 
(simulacra) destroys both meaning and reality. If Derrida’s placing of the origin 
under erasure (sous rature) “demands the surface of the text,”790 Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality flattens reality onto the superficial image in “an implosion of 
meaning.”791 In this theory, the transcendental hierarchy between image and reality 
collapses onto the surface, but this flattening is considered an undesirable event in 
which reality is destroyed in the process. Thus, hyperreality becomes a highly 
nostalgic and pessimistic theorisation of the contemporary condition, which longs 
for Platonic Ideas.792  
This thesis has argued that the themes of superficiality and inauthenticity 
in the discourses of ornament and image are the effects of a traditional model of 
thought in which essence exists beyond surface appearances. The “closure” of this 
metaphysics through deconstruction, exploits “sure play”793 and “substitution”794 
which occurs within the frameworks set up by the tradition. However, sure play 
cannot escape the necessity of (a transcendent) origin imposed by traditional 
                                                      
786 As Derrida suggests  “Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to 
another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual 
order with which the conceptual order is articulated.“ Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of 
Philosophy, p. 329 
787 See Caputo, “Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)”, p. 8 
788 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 61 
789 See Barthes, Image, Music, Text, pp. 142-148 
790 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 18 
791 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 31 
792 See section 2.2.3 of the thesis: “The Autonomy of the Image: Simulation and 
“Hyperreality””  
793 See section “3.2.1 Play, Différance and Writing” 
794 See section “3.2.1 Play, Différance and Writing”  
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frameworks, leading to the conceptions of an impossible “non-origin” which acts as 
a quasi-transcendental concept. The impossibility of this quasi-transcendental non-
origin in a metaphysical framework that requires its presence catalyses nihilistic 
theories (like Baudrillard’s), which declare the destruction of reality and the 
“artificial perfection of the sign.”795 This in turn leads to a pessimistic theorisation of 
the contemporary condition as a superficial and hallucinatory world facilitated by 
modern media technologies in which artificial signs and images have become 
“murderers of the real.”796 
This thesis proposes that another approach is possible, which rather than 
limiting play to the deconstruction of traditional models, (i.e. “limited to the 
substitution of given and existing, present, pieces,”797) begins to create new models of 
thought, which could simply be a transformation of previous ones, or a 
reconstruction of present pieces. This new approach follows the view that 
metaphysics is not a homogenous corpus that is dying (or coming to a closure) but 
instead a heterogeneous “Body without Organs”798 that is in continuous 
transmutation. Consequently, the “overcoming” of Platonism does not necessitate the 
end of metaphysics, rather the end of Plato’s metaphysics, which must be replaced 
with other models of thought.799 In this philosophical approach, creative 
productivity becomes an essential element of a process, which is particularly useful 
for “thought and art.”800 Thus, the overcoming of Platonism does not signal the 
implosion of meaning onto the superficial surface, but rather the explosion of sense 
across the surficial surface. 
Following this trajectory in relation to traditional metaphysics, Part Two of 
this thesis has proposed that surface can be used to create an alternative model of 
thought that yields a different philosophical approach to images and appearances. 
                                                      
795 Baudrillard, Seduction, p. 94 
796 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 5 
797 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and 
Difference, p. 292 
798 Deleuze and Guattari borrow the term from Antonin Artuad’s radio play (1947): “When 
you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all 
his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.” Artaud, "To Have Done with 
the Judgment of God" in Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings, p. 571 
799 In Smith’s words, “if Derrida sets out to undo metaphysics, Deleuze sets out simply to do 
metaphysics” because there are latent potentials in metaphysics that have not yet been 
actualised. Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence” in Between Deleuze 
and Derrida, p. 50 
800 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 60 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Exploring Surface as Medium – Summary of the Thesis 
 279 
This necessitated further inquiry into the very definition of surface, which was 
pursued using Stroll’s exhaustive analysis of the term in the English language. 
Stroll’s work demonstrated that there is not one answer to the question “What is 
surface?” as this definition would not be able to accommodate the various usages of 
the term in everyday language. This is because even though surface is a boundary 
term, “the conception of being a boundary is ambiguous in exactly the way that the 
conception of being surface is” and therefore, “We shall have to live with this 
result.”801 
However, it has been argued that the ambiguity of boundary and surface 
can be explored and exploited. In other words, if an inquiry into the nature of 
surface leads to a realisation that the term cannot be reduced to one theory or 
conception, it also means that surface can be thought of in different ways, each with 
its own latent potential. This is not to say that the term is so malleable that it 
becomes meaningless, rather that surface is a generative concept with important 
implications for epistemology and everyday interaction with the world.  
In the absence of a comprehensive conception of surface, or a complete 
theory of visual perception, an alternative approach towards theory becomes 
necessary. The thesis assumes one such approach that does not expect theories to 
define reality in an impossible clarity, but instead, by accepting them as conceptual 
constructs, anticipates further thought, exploration and analysis. From this point of 
view, falsifiability of theories does not indicate their superfluity, but rather their 
temporal zone of operation within the evolutionary continuum of thought pushed 
forward by complimentary processes of testing and experimentation. Perhaps 
reality cannot be contained within any one theory, however, theories remain 
necessary for interaction with the complexity of reality. Consequently, this thesis 
has attempted to shift the emphasis from definition to proposition, in order to arrive at 
a new interpretation of surface that would help with the development of traditional 
models of thought. 
Although Stroll concludes that there is no single definition of surface, he 
nonetheless suggests four different conceptions of surface. This thesis highlights the 
“ordinary person’s view” (OS)802 and the “scientific” conception (SS)803 in order to 
                                                      
801 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 64  
802 The ordinary person’s conception of surface (“OS view”) proposes a more substantial 
definition of surface as the outer layer that can be heterogeneous to the rest of the object, but 
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argue that some “common-sense” conceptions allow surface to be defined by its 
thickness (not thinness) and as a spatial topography of exploration rather than a 
rigid line of separation. Moreover, such conceptions allow heterogeneous layers  
(like paint or patina) to be considered as the conceptual continuation of the object, 
rather than a foreign layer. Thus, “ornament,” “cladding” or “skin” as concepts that 
suffer from a tacit detachability from the primary elements of architecture, can in 
fact be theorised as the surfaces of architecture. This conception would allow such 
terms to possess a more continuous conceptual relationship (i.e. an originary 
connectedness) with the architectural object.  
It is by appropriating these conceptions that the thesis proposes surface as 
a model of thought that generates a non-hierarchical approach towards ornament, 
image and appearance. By combining Stroll’s “physical” conceptions with Gibson’s 
“theory of surface layout,”804 this thesis proposes an understanding of surface that 
does not define it as a masking barrier (as depicted in the Platonic cave) but as the 
facilitator of seeing, that is not depthless superficiality (as depicted in Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality), rather a thick surficial system, within which diversity and difference 
proliferate. If traditional metaphysical models define surface as a line of separation 
and its effects as marginal categories, the proposed conception of surface considers 
it as medium: a means to an end and an in-between milieu that is more than a 
“logical limit or conceptual limit”805 of a category, entity or object. In this conception, 
surface is less superficial (thin, shallow, insubstantial and outer), and more surficial, 
belonging to the Earth as the “plane of immanence” that lies in-between the height 
of ideals and the depths of essence. In the resultant epistemological position, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
which conceptually, is a continuation of the object. In such a conception, surface possesses 
depth: an essential thickness for physical operations and transformations to occur upon and 
within it. Since the OS conception includes paints and patina as parts of the object, the 
definition of surface acknowledges the appearance of the object as part of its reality and not 
as a covering layer that is foreign or secondary to the object. See section “4.1.2“ of the thesis 
entitled "Minimal or Arbitrary Thicknesses of Physical Conceptions.” 
803 The scientific conception of surface (the SS view) suggests a surficial understanding of the 
term, where surfaces are viewed as complex topographical systems. In this conception every 
physical entity has a surface that can be analyzed and studied (even gases, and animate 
objects like humans), but more importantly, surface is treated as an expansive landscape, 
which can be explored through contemporary technologies. The scientific conception allows 
movement in scale, which offers explorations beyond what meets the naked eye. Although 
in this conception surface has minimal thickness, it is nonetheless a three dimensional entity 
and a substantial layer, with physical properties, upon which physical operations can be 
performed. See section “4.1.2“ of the thesis entitled "Minimal or Arbitrary Thicknesses of 
Physical Conceptions.” 
804 See section 4.2.3 of the thesis.  
805 Stroll, Surfaces, p. 46 
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traditional penetration of surface (to uncover a deep and hidden reality) transforms 
to surface exploration since depth is either thickness or an effect of surface layout. In 
this model of thought, emphasis shifts from surface/depth opposition to an 
exploration of surface/surface relationships.  
There are many conceptions of surface, but all define it as a boundary 
condition where difference becomes apparent. If shadows and images are surface-
less phenomena, they are nonetheless, surface phenomena: dependent on surfaces for 
their existence. It is therefore argued that surfaces are borderline mediums in which 
both “images” and “reality” become experientially apparent. This smooth process of 
becoming that occurs at the surface level is precisely why surface is both a noun and 
a verb.  
Traditionally surface has been thinned-out in favour of depth that opposes 
it, while surface phenomena (shadows, images, and ornament) have been 
considered misleading copies of reality. An investigation of surface in everyday 
language revealed that it is possible to theorise surface by its thickness, i.e. 
possessing an originary depth. With this in mind, the thesis has utilised Deleuze’s 
philosophy to argue that it is also possible to consider surface effects as posessing a 
different reality that necessitates valuation according to its own immanent rules. In 
other words, by appropriating concepts such as the “fold,” “smooth space,” 
“plateau,” or “the sea” this thesis proposes a different strategy that maintains the 
distinction between image and reality, but abolishes their hierarchy by placing them 
side-by-side within a smooth space of becoming. It is argued that this alternative 
approach is based on the exteriority of the topological surface that abolishes 
transcendental hierarchy by flattening difference to the same plane of immanence. 
This “plane of consistency”806 possesses a complex fluidity in which multiplicities 
form non-hierarchical interconnections.807 
                                                      
806 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 8-9 
807 See section 5.2 of the thesis entitled: “From the Superficial to the Surficial: Complexity and 
Creativity”  










Figure 7.1: Two different movements of thought in relation to surface.  Sources 
(of images):       
http://www.elcamino.edu/academics/naturalsciences/earth/images  
http://www.doobybrain.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02 
Combining surface with the concept of the fold creates a topological model that 
replaces the circularity of the Platonic model with the complexity of the Möbius 
Strip.808 If the former is characterized by the separation of the inside from the 
outside, the latter is defined by the continuous transformation of the one side that 
becomes many sides. In the familiar Platonic model, boundary is a barrier that 
facilitates false appearances, which in turn necessitates a perpendicular movement of 
thought that penetrates or surpasses “marginal” categories in order to arrive the 
“primary” essence of things.  In the proposed model however, boundary is a spatial 
topography that promotes “nomadic” movements of thought that explore surficial 
conditions. This is an immanent approach to surfaces and their effects; a surficial 
philosophy inspired by Deleuzean univocity, which resists the ascent of Platonism to 
the height of Ideas or the descent of Nietzschean Philosophy to the depth of 
experience. 
What does this surficial philosophical approach offer art and architecture? 
Firstly, by exploring the surface as the middle condition, surficial philosophy gives 
significance to marginal categories, inspiring a renewed interest in surface, 
ornament image, appearance, and any other concept that is subordinated to 
“primary” categories in architecture.809 Secondly, surficial philosophy changes 
                                                      
808 See sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.4 of the thesis.  
809 This is closely related to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming minoritarian.”  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Exploring Surface as Medium – Summary of the Thesis 
 283 
processes of judgement. By comparing events to their own micro-histories, surficial 
philosophy avoids comparison to a transcendent model that resides in the distant 
past or in the distant future. This indicates a shift of emphasis from comparison to 
the origin (or the original) based on criteria of similitude, to an appreciation of 
originary difference, immanent potential and exploratory processes of becoming.  
Moreover, surficial philosophy replaces rigid hierarchy with a more pliable 
approach that anticipates unexpected opportunities. This means that concepts are 
not contrasted in order to determine the fixed order of dominance or superiority 
based on notions of truth or originality. Instead, oppositional pairs continuously rise 
and fall as abstract machines break free from the circularity of traditional thought. 
The consequences for architectural theory are a liberation of creativity from 
established architectural hierarchies and a more positive attitude towards 
experimental endeavours, whilst simultaneously remaining open towards criticism, 
negation and death as important elements of progressive development.  
7.3 RE-SURFACING THE PROPOSITION 
In investigating the notion of surface in architecture, this thesis has in many ways, 
concerned itself with the problematization of boundary in contemporary culture. 
Boundary is often defined as a dividing line that marks the limits of categories. The 
etymology of the word can be traced back to Medieval Latin,1 to words associated 
with limits of land and territory. A boundary line can be abstract or physical. A wall 
for example is a physical boundary that separates inside from outside. A surface on 
the other hand, can be physical or abstract, separating an object from another. In 
much the same way, a border can be a physical or abstract boundary separating 
nations, counties, and cities. There are also temporal boundaries that polarise life. 
Births, deaths and marriages, are classic examples of such temporal boundaries. 810 
Sometimes the exact position of a boundary is unknown, contested or 
difficult to determine, leading to speculation, debate, or even war. The 
Isreali/Palestine conflict clearly demonstrates the problematic nature of boundary. 
In other scenarios, boundaries are difficult to determine in a different way. For 
                                                      
810 See Online Oxford English Dictionary www.oed.com 
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example, where is the exact limit of the colour blue before it transforms into green? 
Where is the boundary between the upper and lower half of a homogenous sphere? 
Where does Mount Everest end? 
Whether sharp or blurry, abstract or physical, boundaries are central to our 
common-sense approach to the world. Boundaries create order by stabilising 
difference, helping humanity deal with the complexity of reality. They also create 
frameworks within which institutions and disciplines operate, and they offer a zone 
of safety or clarity, a place of belonging and a sense of order that is both useful and 
comforting. In most cases, boundaries are solidified in order to determine roles and 
clarify rules of interaction.  
Yet, boundaries are deeply problematic. Not only are they often difficult to 
determine or enforce, but also they are also capable of becoming rigid limits that 
hinder freedom, exploration and progress. Moreover, as regulators of interaction, 
they sometimes hinder interaction, the flow of ideas and disciplinary progress by 
remaining inflexible to evolutionary transformations. There is also the “border-line” 
syndrome with its negative connotations. Being associated with the boundary, with 
the margins of categories is not a desirable trait. In most nations, the majoritarian 
group holds “the centre of power” while the minoritarian categories occupy border-
line conditions. To be near the boundary is often to be away from the hearth; the 
pivotal centre; the essence of things. It is also associated with a willingness to 
transgress, to go beyond limits in an act of rebellion, treachery or betrayal, since to 
cross borders is often to enter enemy territories. It is therefore not surprising that 
traditionally boundary conditions are defined as places of instability (war, chaos, 
contact with the unknown) and of illegal activity (drug-trafficking, human 
trafficking, smuggling). It is for these reasons that boundaries are fortified to 
prevent cross-contamination and to maintain the hierarchy of power and the order 
of things. In fact, throughout history, architecture has developed different solutions 
to the fortification of boundaries, being by its very definition concerned with the 
demarcation of space. 
Throughout history, architecture has developed sophisticated styles for the 
design of boundary in its different manifestations: the architectural wall, surface, 
cladding, ornament and so on. The visual composition of such boundary lines is a 
significant aspect of architectural design, not only because it affects the quality of 
space, both inside and outside, but also because it relates architecture to its 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Exploring Surface as Medium – Resurfacing the Proposition 
 285 
contextual milieu. In classical times, architectural styles were often linked to a 
particular religion, culture or nation, and regulated by strict rules that were passed 
down from generations. Such conditions supplemented by the difficulty of free 
communication, necessitated faithfulness towards established traditions where the 
boundaries between different categories could be compared to a wall, a solidified 
limit that separated things (public/private, native/foreign, visible/intelligible and 
so on).811 
This regard for traditional boundaries has always been in tension with 
another force, one that continues to question their legitimacy.812 Thus, if traditional 
thought respected boundaries, the modernists attempted to create new ones based 
on new ideologies. Though modernism is often associated with 20th Century, its 
principles are in fact centuries old.813 All modernist movements propound a clean 
break from past traditions, but ironically remain tied to them in their opposition. In 
early twentieth century, modernists theorised a stripping of architecture’s excessive 
ornamentation, only for it to be replaced by an ornamental “white walls” or the 
glittering glazed walls of the International Style. 
The modernists advocated the penetration of traditional boundaries, only 
to form new ones, which were more in tune with contemporary times. While they 
succeeded in problematising established architectural theory and praxis, their 
manifestos did not eliminate rules and limits. Instead, they merely pushed them 
further into new territories. Thus, in modernist manifestos, old barriers transformed 
to new frontiers that were to be advanced beyond traditional lines. While the 
modernists were concerned with “pushing boundaries,” the postmodernists 
problematized boundaries further by including both sides of it. Concerned with the 
disappearance of old boundaries, and the dominance of new ones, the 
postmodernists suggested “complexity” through irony and “double-coding.” The 
postmodern manifesto allowed architects to engage popular culture whilst 
maintaining a relationship with their professional ethos. This was the effect of 
                                                      
811 See also metaphors and analogies in Plato’s dialogues: for example, “metaphor of the 
sun,” “analogy of the divided line” and “the allegory of the cave” In Plato’s Republic, 
Translated by Robin Waterfield, (507b-509c), (509d-513e) and (514a-520a).  
812 The authority of the wall has always been subverted by the opening: windows, doors, 
fissures, cracks etc. 
813 According to Charles Jencks, the first use of the term can be traced back to Modernus, used 
by 5th Century Christians who “claimed to be agents of progress fighting to overcome their 
corrupt predecessors.” Jencks, Critical Modernism: Where is Post-modernism Going? p. 8 
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double coding facilitated partly by the decorated shed metaphor and partly by 
notions of irony as a “complex” form of communication.  
This double-coded strategy signified a third approach to boundaries. If the 
traditional and the modernist conceptions defined boundaries as limits (barriers or 
frontiers) the postmodernist conception defined boundaries as interfaces. In the 
former transgression was forbidden, while in the latter it became an important 
aspect of the boundary condition. Thus, by redefining boundaries as interfaces, the 
postmodernists advocated complexity and inclusion rather than purity and 
exclusion.      
Yet, throughout the preceding chapters, this thesis has argued that there is 
another approach possible, one that defines the boundary condition as a spatial 
topography that must be explored. This surficial approach relates to the Earth, to 
topology814 and geology,815 conjuring up a diversity of concepts, from the thickness 
of the crust to the “smooth” fluidity of the seas.816 This approach is based on 
surficial philosophy, which takes inspiration from univocity,817 and topology 
exploring the non-hierarchical difference across the “plane of immanence.”818 This 
would be an alternative metaphysical model and an unfamiliar mode of thought, 
which not only offers greater flexibility towards new possibilities, but also offers 
more sympathy towards creativity.  
In surficial thought, boundary is no longer an abstract line that is made 
sharper (thinner) and more rigid in order to stabilise categories. Instead, boundary 
is expanded to a continuous surface and an extensive topography that is explored in 
search of new hybrid categories. Difference is no longer in the opposition between 
the two sides of the boundary line, rather it occurs upon and within the surficial 
landscape of infinite transformations. This alternative model of thought necessitates 
                                                      
814 Topology (from Greek Τοπολογία, from τόπος, “place”, and λόγος, “study”) is a major area 
of mathematics that has emerged through the development of concepts from geometry and 
set theory. Topology investigates geometries such as the Möbius strip, which has one surface 
and one edge! See Oxford English Dictionary.  
815 Geology (from Greek: γη, gê, "earth"; and λόγος, logos, "speech") is the science and study of 
the solid and liquid matter that constitutes the Earth. Oxford English Dictionary. 
816 See Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of “smooth space” and “nomadic voyage” of 
thought in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 480-3 
817 Deleuze adapts the doctrine of univocity to claim that being is, univocally, difference. He 
modifies John Duns Scotus and Baruch Spinoza’s conceptions to highlight an alternative 
univocity, one that is not based on similarity, but on difference. See section 5.1 of the thesis. 
818 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? p. 41 
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a different movement of thought that is unlike the Platonic ascent to the height of 
“Ideas” (ideals) or the Nietzschean descent to the depths of experience (essence). 
Instead, surficial thought demands “lines of flight” inspired by a Deleuzean voyage 
across the smooth space of becoming (potential).819  
If the traditional boundary is concerned with exclusion, the modernists’ 
with expansion and the postmodernists’ with double-coded inclusion, a fourth 
conception of boundary is possible that explores hybridity and evolution. In this 
alternative approach, interdisciplinary interaction evolves into transdisciplinary 
transmutation since the boundary condition is no longer a line of separation, but an 
expansive surface of exploration, a non-hierarchical space of transformation. This is 
where boundary becomes medium: the middle condition that is a means to an end. The 
in-between gains a new significance not as marginal space of indifference, but as an 
active space of unexpected becoming. To engage with this new space is to explore 
difference without hierarchy “so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that 
brings us the vision.”820 One way of exploring boundary as a medium is to exploit 
the image-scape of (new) media that traverse disciplines, countries, cultures, politics 
and so on. If the traditional definition of boundary evokes exclusion and 
inaccessibility where interaction does not threaten established categories, this 
alternative definition of boundary is based on inclusion and hybridity, where 
smooth processes of becoming develop new hybrid categories. In this context, 
disciplinarity dissolves into a liquid mixture, which catalyses unexpected 
discoveries.  
In recent decades, new technologies have facilitated the becoming-other of 
architecture: becoming-virtual, becoming-sculpture, becoming-image, becoming-
digital and so on. These developments require a shift of emphasis and an alternative 
movement of thought. No longer limited to the thinness of boundaries (the cross-
sectional approach) architecture is gradually exploring the surface-scape of 
“borderline phenomena” and the forces of “new media.” It is therefore not 
surprising that in the current context of rapid visual production, questions of style, 
ornament, image and appearance have gained new significance. 
                                                      
819 This nomadic voyage encourages becoming other: becoming minoritarian, becoming-
molecular, becoming-animal, etc. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, p. 291 





In many cultures and civilisations, the most significant architectural monuments are 
often distinguishable by their labour-intensive design necessitated by a greater 
attention to detail and a desire for beautification. In such architecture, surface 
ornamentation is responsible for conveying the building’s significance, but more 
importantly, it often communicates a profound message, becoming both a reflection 
of the society’s belief system and also a reinforcement of it through architectural 
surfaces.  In the case of Iranian architecture, sacred buildings are particularly 
noticeable, not just because of their monumental scale, but also because of the 
exhaustive ornamentation that embellishes every surface of the building.  
Such intricate ornamentation is often constructed using individual glazed 
tiles that are carefully arranged to create a highly symbolic representation of the 
divine garden. These ornate surfaces are comparable to those of digital screens, 
where small picture elements (pixels) create a virtual image, which signifies 
something beyond the limitations and specificities of materials and context. What 
the master builders strove to achieve using tiny mud tiles on the surfaces of 
architecture, modern technologies facilitate through digital screens. Nevertheless, 
the desire to communicate through architecture persists and it is only the tools that 
actualise such desires that have undergone major transformations.    
The preference for geometric depiction instead of figurative representation 
in the traditional architecture of Iran was an indication of submission to God821 and 
acceptance of divine superiority. Because the makers of such architecture 
considered their art as inherently different from what it alluded to, art was not 
judged according to how closely it resembled what it represented, but rather 
according to its own immanent rules. This indicates a different model of thought in 
which art becomes re-production (simulation, creative production) rather than 
reproduction (copy, imitation). This approach allows for the same generative 
principle to surface in a multitude of different manifestations.  
                                                      
821 The Arabic term “islam” means "submission" and itself comes from the term “aslama,” 
which means "to surrender, resign oneself." A person who follows Islam is called a Muslim, 
and this means "one who surrenders to God." See Online Etymology Dictionary 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=Islam accessed January 2009.  
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Thus, the abstract motifs of such traditional art are not an indication of 
primitivity, or an inability to imitate reality. Instead, they point towards an 
alternative approach to surface, image and appearance in architecture. Caught 
between the ideal purity of religious belief and the earthly intentions of their royal 
patrons, Safavid artists resorted to a surficial strategy that connected the two worlds 
by the way of the pixelated surface. Consequently, the ornamental surfaces of their 
architecture operated in the same manner as the folds of the Baroque since they 
connected the monadic interiority of the soul with the nomadic exteriority of 
facades. In other words, the symbolic surface in Safavid architecture is the 
Deleuzean unfold, which is in fact a different manifestation of the same paradigm.  
Such ornamental surfaces were, to use Stephen Perrella’s terminology, 
“hyper-surfaces”822 that simulated the nomadic carpet, which was in itself a re-
production of the lush ground plane upon which people lived and worshipped. 
Thus, walls were not only made from the ground (mud) but they also simulated an 
ideal version of it (the beautiful carpet). In this approach, the architectural wall 
became an extension of the ground: not a perpendicular barrier that opposes it, but 
a folded surface that is already connected to the surficial plane. This was a different 
architecture based on “constructing surfaces under the sky rather than building 
volumes under the Sun.”823  
Today, many of the technologies that allow for the production and 
reproduction of art are dependent on surfaces: they either generate virtual surfaces 
(computer modelling, virtual reality environments), or they dis-colour surfaces 
(photography, printed magazines, advertising), or they project information through 
activated surfaces (TVs, digital screens). If traditionally, surface was a thin inert 
layer that approached two-dimensionality, contemporary surfaces are thick, 
activated milieus that are multi-dimensional. Electronic Paper for example is a new 
hybrid technology that exploits the thickness of the surface to create a digital screen 
that is pliable like paper but maintains the ability to be updated digitally.824 E-paper 
                                                      
822 See Stephen Perrella, "Hypersurface Theory: Architecture >< Culture," Architectural 
Design, vol. 68, no. 5/6, May/June 1998, pp. 6-16. 
823 Manuel Gausa, The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture, 2003, p. 577 
824 Electronic paper (also called e-paper or electronic ink display) mimics the effect of ink on 
paper and is able to hold digital information indefinitely without the need for electricity. E-
paper is easier to read than conventional screens because the image does not need to be 




allows building surfaces to be like chameleon skin whose changing patterns can be 
visible in daylight. Whilst materials like Polyurethanes, Aerogel,825 or 
Electroluminescent Film,826 have allowed architectural surfaces to resemble alien 
skins, the development of new technologies such as E-paper or Touch Screens827 
offer the possibility of constructing architectural surfaces that operate as complex 
surficial systems. These new surface technologies not only offer alternative 
approaches to architectural design, but they also bring radical change to our 
experience of buildings and the urban environment they help create.   
 
Figure III: Surface as medium. The simplest form of e-paper works by mixing 
black and white pigment particles in hydrocarbon oil. The resultant mixture is 
then placed between two parallel, conductive plates separated by a gap of 10 to 
100 micrometers. When a voltage is applied across the two plates, the particles 
migrate to the plate bearing the opposite charge, thus creating the desired 
image. Source: www.e-ink.com 
                                                      
825 Aerogel is a silicon based solid with a porous, sponge-like structure invented in 1930s. 
Because 99 percent of its volume is empty space, it is one thousand times less dense than 
glass (another silicon-based solid). With a weight only three times that of air, Aerogel is 
extraordinarily light as well as strong and transparent. Airglass, in Sweden, is currently 
producing windows using Aerogel, which could significantly increase energy efficiency. 
One pane has the equivalent thermal insulating quality of ten to twenty glass panes, and a 1-
inch thickness can protect a human hand from a blow torch. In the future, Aerogel could 
reduce the size of the computer chip by providing a smaller, more compact substitute for 
traditional silicon. 
826 EL films consist of three thin layers of plastic: a middle layer with a phosphorous powder 
coating, and two outer conductive layers, one of which is transparent. As an electric current 
passes from one conductive layer to another, the phosphorous powder glows and emits 
light. 
827 “Touch Screens” are overlays that have the ability to display and receive information on 
the same screen. Touchscreens have become commonplace since the invention of the 
electronic touch interface in 1971 by Dr. Samuel C. Hurst. There are a number of types of 
touch screen technologies available: Resisitve, Capacitive, Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW), 




Increasingly in contemporary architecture, digital technologies are not just 
employed for visualization purposes, but they are also utilised as generative tools of 
design. Today, the computer is utilised to generate randomness within the design 
process. This has allowed a shift from industrial-age paradigms of mass production 
to the emergence of non-standardized building design processes based on digitally 
controlled variation and serial differentiation, which have had a liberating effect on 
architectural design. Surficial philosophy lends itself well to such unfamiliar 
processes in which architectural design shifts towards an intuitive process of 
exploration.  
Most contemporary digital modelling software is based on the production 
of virtual surfaces to which materiality, texture, colour and pattern is added. Such 
software have allowed architects to model complex surface geometries with 
precision, making their construction more economically viable. Without the ability 
to actualize virtual surfaces, digital design would be confined to the digital screens. 
Although advanced manufacturing techniques are becoming more readily available, 
in most scenarios, the complexity of the surfaces produced in the computer requires 
some degree of simplification for the final construction sequence. Consequently 
processes such as faceting, pixilation and polygonization are utilised which often 
add an ornamental effect to the resultant surfaces.   
Once the design is finalized in the computer, it can be relayed to Computer 
Numerically Controlled machines (CNC) that allow exact replication of digital 
surfaces in physical materials.828 These new manufacturing techniques liberate 
design from the uniformity of mass production and towards the flexibility of mass 
                                                      
828 CNC Processses of shaping and re-shaping include “2D Sheet Cutting” which is either 
carried out by Laser cutters, waterjets, Plasma-Arc, or Mechanical tools, or “3D Formation” 
which is categorized into two separate categories: “3D Subtractive Formation” (carried out 
by Multi-axis Milling machines) and “3D Additive Formation” which can be “Layered 
Fabrication”, “Solid Freeform Manufacturing”, “Incremental Forming”, “Rapid 
Prototyping” or “Stereolithography.”A stereolithography system passes computer-
controlled lasers through a tank of polymer solution so that laser-induced polymerization 
occurs at specified locations. A similar technique called Contour Crafting is being developed 
by Behrokh Khoshnevis of the University of Southern California that uses a computer-
controlled crane to build edifices rapidly and efficiently without manual labour. Using a 
quick-setting, concrete-like material, Contour Crafting forms the house's walls layer by layer 
until topped off by floors and ceilings set in place by the crane. The system can even 
accommodate the insertion of structural components, like plumbing, wiring, utilities, as the 
layers are built. Khoshnevis claims that his system could build a complete home in a single 
day, and its electrically powered crane would produce very little construction material 
waste. See http://www.isi.edu/CRAFT/CC/modem.html and 
http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/stories/10009.html accessed Jan. 2008.  
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customization. If the pre-industrial era was characterized by the production of small 
volumes with high costs, and the industrial age by high volumes and low unit costs, 
the post-industrial age can be recognized by the production of diverse products in 
high volumes and with low costs.  
Such new technologies require alternative models of thought that can offer 
greater flexibility towards a rapidly transforming technological condition. This 
thesis has attempted to formulate one such model of thought based on a conception 
of surface as the surficial plane of immanence in which different categories exist in 
smooth mixture and undergo continuous processes of transformation. This 
philosophical approach suggests that surfaces need not remain superficial visual 
barriers as defined by the epistemological tradition. Instead, they can transform into 
facilitators of visual interaction and the very place upon which human activity 
occurs. Inspired by new digital screens and the virtual images they carry, a more 
contemporary approach to surfaces would not limit them to the shadows of 
Platonism, since light need not emanate from a distant source or from within, it can 
also emanate from the surface in-between. 
Surficial thought encourages an alternative approach to architecture in 
which surface is liberated from its opposition to depth. Such an approach suggests a 
return to a nomadic architecture that possesses an intimate connection with the 
surficial plane as it folds and unfolds to become the ornate carpet, hearth, floor, 
wall, roof and screen. In this model of thought, categories become pliable and seeing 
requires close-range vision and a haptic eye, since architecture occurs at the surface, 
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